Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Canterbury, 2009. / Typescript (photocopy). Includes bibliographical references (leaves 297-329). Also available via the World Wide Web.

Thesis (B.A.)--Haverford College, Dept. of Philosophy, 2005. / Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Nebraska-Lincoln, 2009. / Title from title screen (site viewed July 22, 2010). PDF text: viii, 174 p. : ill. ; 884 K. UMI publication number: AAT 3386839 . Includes bibliographical references. Also available in microfilm and microfiche formats.

No description available.

Thesis (M.A.)--Saint Mary's University, 2008. / Includes abstract. Supervisor: Peter March. Includes bibliographical references (leaf 81).

This thesis is about the relationship between a belief being justified and it being true. It defends a version of the view that the fundamental point of having a justified belief is to have a true one. The particular version of that view it defends is the claim that belief is subject to a truth norm – i.e. a norm or standard that says that one should believe something if and only if it’s true. It claims that belief being subject to such a truth norm can explain which beliefs count as justified and which do not. After introducing the idea of a truth norm (Ch. 1), the argument of my thesis involves two main stages. Part One of the thesis (Chs. 2-3) contains the first stage, in which I argue that my way of arguing for a truth norm, on the basis of its explanatory role in epistemology, is much more likely to be successful than a more popular way of arguing for a truth norm, on the basis of its explanatory role in the philosophy of mind. Part Two (Chs. 4-7) contains the second stage, in which I argue that the truth norm can indeed explain justification in the way I’ve outlined. I do this by answering four criticisms that have been made of the claim that belief is subject to a truth norm. These criticisms claim that a truth norm should be rejected because, in turn, a truth norm cannot guide belief formation (Ch. 4), because a truth norm prescribes believing all the truths (Ch. 5), because a truth norm never prescribes suspending judgement (Ch. 6), and because a truth norm in some cases prescribes making problematic trade-offs of having one false belief for the sake of having many true beliefs (Ch. 7). I argue that all of these criticisms fail. But it is through answering these criticisms that we can see the contours of a defensible explanation of justification in terms of the truth norm.

ALMEIDA JÚNIOR, José Gladstone. Análise da teoria da superveniência da consciência. 2014. 93f. – Dissertação (Mestrado) – Universidade Federal do Ceará, Programa de Pós-Graduação em Filosofia, Fortaleza (CE), 2014. / Submitted by Gustavo Daher (gdaherufc@hotmail.com) on 2017-04-17T13:51:41Z No. of bitstreams: 1 2014_dis_jgalmeidajunior.pdf: 899840 bytes, checksum: f0a8006c5240ce9c03215b521157f24a (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Márcia Araújo (marcia_m_bezerra@yahoo.com.br) on 2017-04-18T11:01:02Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 2014_dis_jgalmeidajunior.pdf: 899840 bytes, checksum: f0a8006c5240ce9c03215b521157f24a (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2017-04-18T11:01:02Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 2014_dis_jgalmeidajunior.pdf: 899840 bytes, checksum: f0a8006c5240ce9c03215b521157f24a (MD5) Previous issue date: 2014 / Certainly consciousness is something extremely familiar and, at the same time, enigmatic for us. Its phenomenal aspect, called phenomenal consciousness, imposes a number of barriers to reductionist approaches proposed by physicist/functionalist framework. Such are the difficulties raised by phenomenal consciousness to that reductionist approaches that the problem concerning that aspect of consciousness is the “hard problem of consciousness”. Considering its apparent irreducibility, it is necessary to analyze a framework which have as core an attempt to conciliate the phenomenal consciousness with a minimum commitment with physicalism, insofar as the necessity of a physical substrate that instantiates our conscious experiences is presupposed. Given that impasse the supervenience of consciousness theory arises with the aim of demonstrating a relation of dependence/determination established between the set of consciousness proprieties and the set of physical proprieties of the brain without, however, necessarily entailing a reduction of the former to the last set. Thus, the aim established in this work consist in analyzing in details the supervenience of consciousness theory and the framework which it inserts and, posteriorly, arguing about the reasons that make that theory unable to provide a substantial relation between consciousness and its physical substrate. / Certamente a consciência é algo extremamente familiar e, ao mesmo tempo, enigmático para nós. Seu aspecto fenomenal, denominado de consciência fenomenal, impõe inúmeras barreiras às abordagens reducionistas propostas pelo quadro teórico fisicista/funcionalista. Tamanhas são as dificuldades suscitadas pela consciência fenomenal a estas abordagens reducionistas que o problema referente a este aspecto da consciência constitui o “problema difícil da consciência”. Considerando sua aparente irredutibilidade, se faz necessário analisar um quadro teórico que tenha como cerne a tentativa de conciliar a consciência fenomenal com um compromisso mínimo com o fisicismo, na medida em que se pressupõe a necessidade de um substrato físico que instancie nossas experiências conscientes. Diante deste impasse a teoria da superveniência da consciência surge com o objetivo de demonstrar uma relação de dependência/determinação estabelecida entre o conjunto de propriedades da consciência e o conjunto de propriedades físicas do cérebro sem, no entanto, implicar necessariamente em uma redução do primeiro ao segundo conjunto. Desta forma, o objetivo estabelecido neste trabalho consiste em analisar pormenorizadamente a teoria da superveniência da consciência e o quadro teórico no qual esta se insere e, posteriormente, argumentar sobre os motivos que fazem desta uma teoria incapaz de fornecer uma relação substancial entre a consciência e seu substrato físico.

While a symbol based system externally, there is evidence that, internally the realization of language is much different. Through revisiting the foundations of our perceptions and assumptions about language and cognition, the presented argument will coalesce into an illustration of the unsuitability of symbolic systems for recreating the functions which we call "mind". Simply stated, computational models of mind are the latest arguments of the Cartesian paradigm. The thesis concludes with an argument for the exploration of a symbol-less architecture of cognition based upon a model found repeatedly throughout nature: swarms. Discussions of some of the impacts are presented.

In the past years, the relevance of Thomas Aquinas's theory of cognition for contemporary debates on epistemology has been widely discussed. That theory claims that mind and world are formally identical and that this relationship overcomes various problems associated with scepticism concerning mental representation. The proposal, however, is grounded on the idea that the world can act on the mind through a relation of formal causation. This thesis attempts to develop a Thomistic theory of formal causation which may be suitable for a realist account of mental representation and which may meet the requirements prompted by current discussions. The suggested view is grounded on Aquinas's metaphysics, according to which the world is constituted of substances. The claim that change is possible since substances are hylomorphically constituted (viz., metaphysically composed of form and matter) is defended. Aquinas's claim that some substances have forms which may act independently of matter is also supported. The paradigmatic examples are human souls, i.e. the forms of human beings, whose higher cognitive capacity, i.e. thinking, can be in principle carried on without the need of any material organ. A Thomistic theory of causation is subsequently proposed. It is argued that hylomorphism explains the distinction among four species of causes (material, formal, final and efficient). Aquinas's attempt to explain causal relations conditionally is developed along the lines suggested by John Mackie's INUS conditional analysis. Jaegwon Kim's implementation of Mackie's proposal through an object-based metaphysics of events is then adapted to the hylomorphical account of substances. On these grounds, a theory of formal causation can be proposed and applied to Aquinas's theory of mental representation. The ensuing proposal is offered not in the spirit of historical exegesis but as a substantive philosophical account and it is Thomistic only in the broad sense that it is built on Aquinas's metaphysics and is consistent with his claims on causation.

La concepción clásica de la empatía sostiene que comprender al otro involucra la habilidad para identificarse con él imaginariamente. Hay varias versiones de esta tesis, pero el elemento común parece ser que, para que la comprensión sea posible, el intérprete debe tener la capacidad de simular los estados mentales del agente o de simular ser él, bajo condiciones contrafácticas. En este artículo, intentaré mostrar, en primer lugar, que esta concepción de la empatía ha estado usualmente comprometida con un modelo intencionalista, transposicional y monádico de lo mental. En segundo lugar, me propongo explorar las posibilidades de reformular el concepto de empatía, eliminando esos elementos que puedan sobrevivir en él. La propuesta de esta contribución es que resulta preferible ver la comprensión como la creación de un espacio compartido, según el cual quien comprende expande creativamente su propia subjetividad, constituida intersubjetivamente, dejando un espacio para albergar al otro, lo cual es también, en un importante sentido, un proceso de transformación. Esta manera de concebir la comprensión pretende explicitar y desarrollar algunas intuiciones que se encuentran implícitas en algunos filósofos contemporáneos, integrándolas con discusiones recientes en filosofía de la mente y psicología experimental.---Understanding, imagination, and transformation”. The classical conception of empathy holds that to understand another person involves the ability to identify with him in imagination. There are different versions of this thesis, but the common element seems to be that for understanding to be possible, the interpreter must have the ability to simulate the mental states of the agent, or to simulate being him under contrafactic conditions. I will try to show, in the first place, that this conception of empathy has been usually committed to an intentional, transpositional and monadic model of the mind. In the second place, I will try to explore a way to reformulate the concept of empathy, eliminating these elements that might survive in it. This contribution holds that it is better to see understanding as the creation of a shared space in which the person who understands expands creatively his or her own subjectivity, making space for the other, which is also in an important way a process of transformation. This way of looking at understanding tries to explicit and develop some intuitions that can be found implicit in some contemporary philosophers, integrating them with recent discussions in the philosophy of mind and in experimental psychology.