Dentro do tema mais amplo do financiamento político, os objetivos desta tese são explicar o surgimento, a disseminação e os efeitos do financiamento público de partidos e campanhas eleitorais. Um dos principais achados desta tese é a constatação de que o modelo de financiamento político varia em função do sistema eleitoral. Em países com sistemas majoritários há uma tendência à adoção de financiamento exclusivamente privado; por outro lado, é possível dizer que o financiamento público é uma característica dos países com sistemas proporcionais, tamanha a sua predominância nesses países no início do século XXI. Além disso, o tipo de financiamento público também varia de acordo com o sistema eleitoral: em sistemas proporcionais é mais presente um tipo de financiamento público que utiliza critérios alocativos baseados no tempo passado, que tende a propiciar uma perpetuação do status quo ante partidário. Em sistemas majoritários, ao contrário, quando existe financiamento público, geralmente são utilizados critérios alocativos baseados no tempo presente, cujo efeito sobre a competição eleitoral é menos pronunciado. Esses achados sustentam a hipótese de que o financiamento público é adotado em sistemas proporcionais como instrumento de restrição do mercado eleitoral em benefício dos partidos mais estabelecidos. / Within the ample theme of political finance, this dissertation aims to explain the emergence, dissemination and the effects of public or state financing of political parties and campaigns. One of the main findings of this dissertation is that models of political financing vary according to electoral systems. In majoritarian system countries there is a tendency towards the adoption of a purely private model of political financing, whereas it can be said that public financing is a feature of proportional system countries given its prevalence in such countries in early 21st century. Furthermore, types of public financing also vary according to electoral systems: proportional countries tend to utilize allocation criteria on the basis of a previous moment, leading to a perpetuation of the party system status quo ante. When there is public financing in majoritarian countries, the allocation criteria are usually based on present time, which has a less pronounced effect on electoral competition. These findings support the hypothesis that public financing is adopted in proportional countries as an instrument to achieve a restrictive effect on the electoral market, benefiting more established parties.

Dentro do tema mais amplo do financiamento político, os objetivos desta tese são explicar o surgimento, a disseminação e os efeitos do financiamento público de partidos e campanhas eleitorais. Um dos principais achados desta tese é a constatação de que o modelo de financiamento político varia em função do sistema eleitoral. Em países com sistemas majoritários há uma tendência à adoção de financiamento exclusivamente privado; por outro lado, é possível dizer que o financiamento público é uma característica dos países com sistemas proporcionais, tamanha a sua predominância nesses países no início do século XXI. Além disso, o tipo de financiamento público também varia de acordo com o sistema eleitoral: em sistemas proporcionais é mais presente um tipo de financiamento público que utiliza critérios alocativos baseados no tempo passado, que tende a propiciar uma perpetuação do status quo ante partidário. Em sistemas majoritários, ao contrário, quando existe financiamento público, geralmente são utilizados critérios alocativos baseados no tempo presente, cujo efeito sobre a competição eleitoral é menos pronunciado. Esses achados sustentam a hipótese de que o financiamento público é adotado em sistemas proporcionais como instrumento de restrição do mercado eleitoral em benefício dos partidos mais estabelecidos. / Within the ample theme of political finance, this dissertation aims to explain the emergence, dissemination and the effects of public or state financing of political parties and campaigns. One of the main findings of this dissertation is that models of political financing vary according to electoral systems. In majoritarian system countries there is a tendency towards the adoption of a purely private model of political financing, whereas it can be said that public financing is a feature of proportional system countries given its prevalence in such countries in early 21st century. Furthermore, types of public financing also vary according to electoral systems: proportional countries tend to utilize allocation criteria on the basis of a previous moment, leading to a perpetuation of the party system status quo ante. When there is public financing in majoritarian countries, the allocation criteria are usually based on present time, which has a less pronounced effect on electoral competition. These findings support the hypothesis that public financing is adopted in proportional countries as an instrument to achieve a restrictive effect on the electoral market, benefiting more established parties.

O presente trabalho tem por objetivo estudar o financiamento da política no Brasil por pessoas jurídicas, a fim de evocar os riscos que gera para o processo de escolha dos governantes e a fase governamental. A análise dessas questões dá-se por meio de quatro chaves. A primeira trata da capitalização dos partidos políticos e candidatos, a qual demanda fixação de limites por meio de ferramentas de regulação que buscam equilíbrio nas campanhas eleitorais e no financiamento das atividades dos partidos. A segunda versa sobre os dados de eleições nacionais e de pesquisas empíricas sobre o resultado da participação de pessoas jurídicas, correlacionando-o com os efeitos colaterais do financiamento, quais sejam, a corrupção e a influência do poder econômico. O exame de alguns escândalos tem relevância na atualidade, sobretudo diante da possibilidade de subsidiarem reformas que se apresentam necessárias. A terceira aborda soluções encontradas em outros países para equacionar os efeitos da participação das pessoas jurídicas, com destaque para o debate da questão atinente à liberdade de expressão. A pesquisa revela que a Justiça Eleitoral e a jurisdição constitucional brasileira tiveram papel decisivo na conformação do financiamento da política. A quarta consiste na análise crítica das regras do ordenamento brasileiro, inclusive as decorrentes da reforma política, que visam equacionar os problemas diagnosticados no estudo, e das decisões da jurisprudência que lidaram com o princípio da igualdade. Ao final, alinham-se vantagens e desvantagens do financiamento da política por pessoas jurídicas. / The present work aims to analyze the political financing by legal entities in Brazil in order to evoke the risks for the process of choosing the rulers and the period of governorship. The analysis of the issues considers four keys. The first is about the capitalization of the political parties and the candidates, which demands the fixing of limits through regulation tools to seek the balance in the electoral campaigns and in the financing of the parties activities. The second one concerns the data of the national elections and the empirical researches on the result of the participation of legal entities, correlating it with the side effects of financing, in other words corruption and the influence of the economic power. The exam of some scandals is relevant in the present time mainly considering the possibility of subsidizing reforms that are presented as necessary. The third point considers the other countries solutions to balance the effects of the legal entities contributions especially the discussion of the issue pertaining to freedom of expression. The research reveals that the Electoral Courts and the Brazilian constitutional jurisdiction had a decisive role shaping the political financing. The fourth key is the critical analyses of the Brazilian legal system, including the rules resulting from the political reform, which intended to solve the problems identified in the study, and the case law which dealt with principle of equality. In the end, there is an evaluation of the advantages and disadvantages of political financing by legal entities.

O presente trabalho tem por objetivo estudar o financiamento da política no Brasil por pessoas jurídicas, a fim de evocar os riscos que gera para o processo de escolha dos governantes e a fase governamental. A análise dessas questões dá-se por meio de quatro chaves. A primeira trata da capitalização dos partidos políticos e candidatos, a qual demanda fixação de limites por meio de ferramentas de regulação que buscam equilíbrio nas campanhas eleitorais e no financiamento das atividades dos partidos. A segunda versa sobre os dados de eleições nacionais e de pesquisas empíricas sobre o resultado da participação de pessoas jurídicas, correlacionando-o com os efeitos colaterais do financiamento, quais sejam, a corrupção e a influência do poder econômico. O exame de alguns escândalos tem relevância na atualidade, sobretudo diante da possibilidade de subsidiarem reformas que se apresentam necessárias. A terceira aborda soluções encontradas em outros países para equacionar os efeitos da participação das pessoas jurídicas, com destaque para o debate da questão atinente à liberdade de expressão. A pesquisa revela que a Justiça Eleitoral e a jurisdição constitucional brasileira tiveram papel decisivo na conformação do financiamento da política. A quarta consiste na análise crítica das regras do ordenamento brasileiro, inclusive as decorrentes da reforma política, que visam equacionar os problemas diagnosticados no estudo, e das decisões da jurisprudência que lidaram com o princípio da igualdade. Ao final, alinham-se vantagens e desvantagens do financiamento da política por pessoas jurídicas. / The present work aims to analyze the political financing by legal entities in Brazil in order to evoke the risks for the process of choosing the rulers and the period of governorship. The analysis of the issues considers four keys. The first is about the capitalization of the political parties and the candidates, which demands the fixing of limits through regulation tools to seek the balance in the electoral campaigns and in the financing of the parties activities. The second one concerns the data of the national elections and the empirical researches on the result of the participation of legal entities, correlating it with the side effects of financing, in other words corruption and the influence of the economic power. The exam of some scandals is relevant in the present time mainly considering the possibility of subsidizing reforms that are presented as necessary. The third point considers the other countries solutions to balance the effects of the legal entities contributions especially the discussion of the issue pertaining to freedom of expression. The research reveals that the Electoral Courts and the Brazilian constitutional jurisdiction had a decisive role shaping the political financing. The fourth key is the critical analyses of the Brazilian legal system, including the rules resulting from the political reform, which intended to solve the problems identified in the study, and the case law which dealt with principle of equality. In the end, there is an evaluation of the advantages and disadvantages of political financing by legal entities.

La thèse a été évaluée par les personnes suivantes: Carlo Morselli, directeur de recherche et professeur à l'École de criminologie; Anthony Amicelle, président du jury et professeur à l'École de criminologie; Jean Bérard, membre du jury et professeur à l'École de criminologie; Carla Nagels, évaluatrice externe et professeur à l'Université libre de Bruxelles L'auteur aimerait remercier le Fonds de recherche du Québec - Société et culture (FRQSC), le Centre international de criminologie comparée (CICC) et l'École de criminologie pour le support financier octroyé à différentes étapes de la rédaction de la thèse. / La recherche trouve ses origines d’un scandale touchant l’industrie de la construction et les milieux politiques au Québec de la fin des années 2000 (à travers les allégations de corruption et de collusion soulevées par les médias) à la fin novembre 2015 (avec le dépôt du rapport final de la Commission d’enquête sur l’octroi et la gestion des contrats publics dans l’industrie de la construction, ci-après CEIC). L’argument principal est que les années de scandale ont permis au Québec de transiter d’une province considérée comme la terre mythique de la corruption au Canada à une entité développant une des structures anticorruptions les plus novatrices et sophistiquées dans le monde. La thèse est construite comme une étude de cas qui s’intègre aux trois grandes sphères de l’étude du phénomène criminel telles que définies par Sutherland et Cressey, à savoir le passage à l’acte, la réaction sociale et le contrôle social (1947, p.1). Dans l’étude du passage à l’acte, le concept de crime étatico-corporatif est mis à profit afin d’exposer l’aspect symbiotique des systèmes criminels alimentés à travers une interaction fondamentale entre poursuite d’intérêts publics et poursuite d’intérêts privés. De tels systèmes furent en effet identifiés dans plusieurs municipalités du Québec. Pour cette partie de la thèse, les données relatives à l’ensemble des contrats de construction octroyés par appel d’offres public par la ville de Laval dans son histoire (1965-2013) sont analysées à travers diverses mesures de réseaux sociaux. Cette portion de la thèse utilise également les témoignages issus des travaux de la CEIC, et des entretiens semi-directifs réalisés avec des acteurs provenant de diverses autorités de lutte à la collusion (truquage des appels d’offres) et à la corruption au Québec. La combinaison de ces méthodes permet d’évaluer la nature intégrée, historique et spatiale des délinquances recensées au sein de diverses municipalités, avec des indicateurs de collusion qui remontent aussi loin qu’à la création de la municipalité lavalloise dans les années 1960. Dans l’étude de la réaction sociale, un modèle d’analyse intégratif emprunté au domaine de la sociologie de l’action publique (Lascoumes et LeGalès, 2012) est utilisé pour mettre en relief les forces structurelles, organisationnelles et individuelles derrière la constitution du scandale québécois. Cette deuxième grande section de la thèse illustre comment ce scandale s’insère dans des tendances nationales et internationales d’intolérance accrue du public et d’intensification des contrôles à l’égard des actes criminels (corruption, collusion, pots-de-vin, fraude) révélés au coeur du scandale. Enfin, dans l’étude du contrôle social, l’analyse des témoignages issus des audiences de la CEIC est jumelée aux données découlant d’entretiens semi-directifs réalisés avec 22 acteurs provenant d’agences de contrôle créées à la suite du scandale : l’Unité permanente anticorruption (UPAC), le Bureau de l’inspecteur général (BIG) de la ville de Montréal, et le Bureau d’intégrité et d’éthique de Laval (BIEL). Cette dernière section illustre comment la transition d’une scène réglementaire permissive et hautement déficiente à un environnement réglementaire axée sur une mobilisation sans précédent de ressources policières, sur le partage d’information et sur la poursuite des conduites illégales au pénal s’avère très avantageuse, mais s’est accomplie – et s’accomplit toujours – à travers de nombreux défis pour les contrôleurs. / The research originated from a political scandal which spanned several years (2009-2015) in the province of Quebec. The thesis’ main argument is that the scandal years saw Quebec transformed from being considered the “historical golden land” of Canadian corruption into a province which developed one of the country’s most sophisticated systems of corruption and white-collar crime control. The thesis was constructed as a case-study, and addressed the three principal objects of criminological analysis: the breaking of laws, the making of laws, and the reaction to the breaking of laws (Sutherland and Cressey, 1947, p.1). The study applied multiple methods to achieve these goals. In the study of criminal decision-making (breaking of laws), Kramer and Michalowski’s (2006) state-corporate crime concept was applied to demonstrate the presence of multifactorial features of criminal systems fuelled by misbehaving at the intersection of private and public interests. Such conspiracies were found to be generalized across several municipalities throughout the province. For this portion of the thesis, data on all construction contracts awarded through public procurement in the entire history of what appeared to be one of Canada’s most corrupt municipalities, Laval (the 13th largest in the country), was systematically collected from 1965 to 2013. It was then analyzed using various social network measures. Testimonies from Quebec’s Commission of inquiry on the awarding and management of public contracts in the construction industry (hereafter, CEIC) were also coupled with a dozen of interviews conducted with regulators and corruption authorities in Quebec. The combination of methods helped assess the integrated, spatial and historical nature of illicit activities which undergirded many municipalities, Laval being one of the most notorious one. Traces of bid-rigging indicators in public procurement were indeed traced back to as early as the city’s founding in the 1960s. In the study of the making of laws, Lascoumes and Le Galès’ (2002) sociology of public action framework was expanded to investigate the structural, organizational, and individual forces behind the Quebec scandal. This section of the thesis unravels the sudden urge to legislate and investigate schemes that were deeply rooted in the province’s history. By making sense of the Quebec scandal, this sub-section demonstrates how larger structural and contextual factors gradually established increased incentives for elected officials to enhance legal and institutional controls on white-collar and corporate crimes which were found to be systemic across Quebec’s construction and political scenes. Finally, in the study of the reaction to the breaking of laws, testimonies from the CEIC were combined with interviews conducted with 22 actors in control agencies established as a direct result of the scandal: the Permanent Anticorruption Unit (UPAC in French), the Inspector General Bureau (BIG in French) of the city of Montreal, and the Bureau of integrity and ethics of Laval (BIEL in French). This last section shows how transitioning from a state of practical passivity to one of intense controls, monitoring, institutional rearrangements, and legislative efforts was accompanied, for regulatory and police authorities, by several benefits but substantial challenges as well.