In some parts of the African continent, colonialist left a long time ago but the legacy they left exist to this day. In one way or the other they ensured that their legacy lives on even beyond independence of the African people. This is the case also in Southern Africa and particularly in South Africa. The legacy of white settlers who came into the country in the early colonial days is still evident in the characteristics of the contemporary South African society. The racially skewed distribution of land started centuries ago and up until today, such disproportionate in land distribution has not been corrected. At the end of apartheid, the newly elected democratic government placed on top of its agenda the issue of addressing the land question. Land reform programme was drawn and deadlines for achieving certain goals were set. But since then, land reform has been slow and fallen short of its targets. Main contributors to the slow progress of land reform were the policies and mechanism with which the government seeks to implement the programme and achieve its objectives. There has been a plethora of laws enacted with the aim of improving the implementation of the land reform programme in South Africa, but progress has remained slow. Many questions and concerns have been raised as to whether land reform is necessary or not in a democratic South Africa. This thesis argues that land reform is indeed necessary if South Africa is interested in rectifying the injustices and the inequalities of past land distribution. The thesis also argues that a properly implemented land reform would not only bring justice but it will also help in the reduction of poverty which is rife in the South African society and particularly the rural poor. But both the latter and the former will be realizable if the society is aware and have a full understanding of the ever developing laws which guides land reform programme and the acquisition of land in general. / Thesis (M.A.)-University of KwaZulu-Natal, Pietermaritzburg, 2013.

In this paper I try to reconstruct the arguments developed by Fichte in his work Foundations of Natural Right (1796/1797), in order to support the necessity of a recognition of capabilites and rights by the other, so that the I can constitute itself as a self-consciousness. I also take into account the criticisms the Fichtean theory has received by many contemporary interpreters, testing its consistency in the light of these arguments. / En este trabajo intento reconstruir la argumentación desarrollada por Fichte en su obra Fundamento del derecho natural, de 1796/1797, en orden a fundamentar la necesidad de un reconocimiento de capacidades y de derechos por parte del otro, para que el yo pueda constituirse como autoconciencia. También considero las críticas que ha recibido la teoría fichteana por parte de diferentes intérpretes contemporáneos, testeando la consistencia de la misma a la luz de estas argumentaciones.

This paper explores the idea of community through the proposals of some contemporary thinkers who have tried to rethink the concept of being in common assuming some of its paradoxes. For authors like Roberto Esposito, Jean-Luc Nancy and Giorgio Agamben, thinking the community” implies reflecting on it from the paradoxes and contradictions it contains, both conceptually and in terms of everyday reality. The central paradox that sums such contradictions is stating that the community is feasible only to the extent that it is not. Close to Russell’s paradox, such aporia allows us to recognize the difference between the community that takes care of its contradictions and inconsistencies, the community of the crisis, and the one that, conceived in absolute and unequivocal terms, is not responsible for their antinomies and contradictions, and leads to what we call the community crisis. / En el presente artículo se hace un recorrido por la idea de comunidada través de algunos pensadores contemporáneos que han tratado de repensar el estar en común asumiendo algunas de sus paradojas. Para autores como Roberto Esposito, Jean-Luc Nancy y Giorgio Agamben, pensar la comunidad” implica reflexionarla a partir de las paradojas y contrasentidos que contiene, tanto anivel conceptual como a nivel de la realidad cotidiana. La paradoja central que resume tales contrasentidos es la que afirma que la comunidad es realizable solo en la medida en que no lo es. Cercana a la paradoja de Russell, tal aporía nospermite reconocer la diferencia entre una comunidad que se hace cargo de sus contrasentidos e incoherencias, la comunidad de la crisis, y otra que al concebirse en términos unívocos y absolutos, es decir, que no se hace cargo de sus antinomias y contradicciones, nos lleva a lo que hemos llamado crisis de la comunidad.

In this paper I compare and critically evaluate Sreenivasan’s and Pogge’s conceptions of global justice. While Sreenivasan holds that all the currently existing theories of global justice agree that wealthy countries should transfer at least a portion of their wealth to the poor, Pogge claims that all the currently existing theories of global justice agree that wealthy countries should stop harming poor ones in the first place. In this paper I shall try to show (i) that Sreenivasan’s proposal, as presented in his articles, is broad enough to be acceptable by some international distributive justice theories, but not all of them, (ii) that Pogge’s proposal is broader than Sreenivasan, in the sense that it aims to gain support from all the different conceptions of international distributive justice, but it depends on the claim that developed countries are currently harming the global poor—a claim that I will try to defend–, and (iii) that Pogge’s and Sreenivasan’s view are compatible. In fact, if Sreenivasan added Pogge’s central claim of his argument to his own proposal, the scope of theories that he could gain support from would be much broader. / En este artículo comparo y evalúo críticamente las concepciones sobre la justicia global de Sreenivasan y Pogge. Mientras Sreenivasan sostiene que todas las teorías sobre la justicia global actualmente existentes concuerdan en que los países ricos deberían transferir al menos una porción de sus riquezas a los pobres, Pogge reclama que todas las teorías sobre la justicia global concuerdan en que los países ricos deberían dejar de dañar a los pobres en primer lugar. En este artículo, trataré de mostrar (i) que la propuesta de Sreenivasan, como es presentada en sus artículos, es lo suficientemente amplia como para ser aceptable para algunas teorías de justicia internacional distributiva, pero no para todas ellas; (ii) que la propuesta de Pogge es más amplia que la de Sreenivasan, en el sentido de que aspira a obtener sustento en todas las diversas concepciones de justicia internacional distributiva,pero depende de la afirmación de que los países desarrollados dañan actualmentea la pobreza global –una afirmación que intentaré defender–; y (iii) que la visión de Pogge y Sreenivasan son compatibles. De hecho, si Sreenivasan asumiera la afirmación central del argumento de Pogge en su propia propuesta, el alcance delas teorías desde las que él podría ganar sustento sería mucho más amplio.

This is a collection of four papers about the All-Affected Principle (AAP): the view that every person whose morally weighty interests are affected by a democratic decision has the right to participate in that decision. The first paper ('Narrow Possibilism about Democratic Enfranchisement') examines how we should distribute democratic participation rights: a plausible version of AAP must avoid treating unlike cases alike, which would be procedurally unfair. The solution is to distribute participation rights proportionately to the risk that a person's interests will be affected. AAP thus implies an account of political equality that requires adherence to the 'one person-one vote' model only if interests are indeed equally affected. The second paper ('Economic Participation Rights and the AAP') argues that AAP supporters have paid insufficient attention to economic participation rights. The exercise of such rights raises unique worries about democratic accountability, which is why their exercise is constrained by a number of duties. The third paper ('What AAP Is, and How (Not) to Fight It') explores how AAP fares in light of possible objections from desirability and feasibility. Unlike crude versions of AAP, a plausibly restricted version of AAP cannot be dismissed as easily as many AAP sceptics may have thought. My reflections here are useful for AAP supporters and sceptics alike: this paper helps clarify what kind of objection can cast serious doubt on AAP. The fourth paper ('Criminal Disenfranchisement, Political Wrongdoing, and Affected Interests') asks: is AAP compatible with criminal disenfranchisement? AAP, when endorsed in combination with a plausible theory of punishment, is compatible with disenfranchising a narrow set of criminal wrongdoers only: those guilty of 'political wrongdoing', which is wrong primarily because it undermines democratic procedures and institutions for private gain. The upshot is that current blanket policies of criminal disenfranchisement are incompatible with AAP.

It is now taken for granted that the globe is divided into mutually exclusive territories, each of which belong to a particular community. To be a political community, it is thought, means to have sole possession of a piece of the Earth’s surface and to have complete authority over that land. Yet the history of political thought has little to tell us about when and how this conception arose. I argue that the first complete statement of this doctrine of the territorial state emerged with Emer de Vattel’s The Law of Nations in 1758. Vattel’s doctrine synthesized three ideas which had been developing in the genres of natural law and the law of nations since the Peace of Westphalia: the state was supreme over its territory; it possessed independent moral personality; and it was tied to a permanent human community. This dissertation recovers the ideological resources of territorial state formation by tracing the philosophical roots of these ideas in Samuel von Pufendorf, John Locke, and Christian Wolff. I argue that although Vattel’s doctrine would appear as an ideal type, it was in fact provincially rooted in the narrow context of former dynastic fiefdoms in the Holy Roman Empire. I reach this conclusion through a spatial contextualist method of reading canonical texts in the natural law and law of nations traditions. I find that the shared linguistic practices that emerged to conceptualize and defend territorial states often relied upon assuming preexisting communities who laid claim to the land as their ‘native country.’

This study emphasizes the role of soft power in China’s relations with Africa. It attempts to explore and interpret China’s role in Africa from Joseph Nye’s perspective of soft power and Realism in general. China’s foreign policy is ideologically underpinned by nationalism. In the past two decades, it is based on the need to protect its national interest, by expanding trade and diplomatic relations. For this reason, China has expanded economic interest in Africa by means of mutual development and investment, economic cooperation and trade. This has led to the growth of ‘soft’ ties between China and Africa, through the provision of aid and diplomatic cooperation. By using ‘soft power’ as a vehicle to promote the perception of a peaceful rise to power, it also makes a valuable contribution to the Chinese goal of constructing a harmonious world. Based on the research, the conclusion is that China has achieved impressive gains in its overall level of soft power in Africa, especially in economic and political aspects of its relationship with Africa and less in its cultural penetrations. / Political Sciences / D. Litt. et Phil. (International Politics)

This study emphasizes the role of soft power in China’s relations with Africa. It attempts to explore and interpret China’s role in Africa from Joseph Nye’s perspective of soft power and Realism in general. China’s foreign policy is ideologically underpinned by nationalism. In the past two decades, it is based on the need to protect its national interest, by expanding trade and diplomatic relations. For this reason, China has expanded economic interest in Africa by means of mutual development and investment, economic cooperation and trade. This has led to the growth of ‘soft’ ties between China and Africa, through the provision of aid and diplomatic cooperation. By using ‘soft power’ as a vehicle to promote the perception of a peaceful rise to power, it also makes a valuable contribution to the Chinese goal of constructing a harmonious world. Based on the research, the conclusion is that China has achieved impressive gains in its overall level of soft power in Africa, especially in economic and political aspects of its relationship with Africa and less in its cultural penetrations. / Political Sciences / D. Litt. et Phil. (International Politics)

Glossarartikel über die Philosophin und Professorin für politische Theorie Hannah Arendt mit besonderer Berücksichtung ihrer Positionen zur Frauenfrage