Doctor of Philosophy(PhD) / Animal welfare legislation does not consistently protect all nonhuman animals against all harms under all circumstances. Through an analysis of current legislative arrangements and the origins of animal protection law, and an examination of popular attitudes towards animal cruelty, this study seeks to comment on the role of visibility in informing the level and type of state-sponsored interest protection an animal receives. It is argued that different types of animals enjoy different levels of visibility and that an animal’s level of visibility influences the extent to which the state is willing to intervene to protect the animal from harm. These findings are significant because the highly politicised nature of the lives of many nonhuman animals raises questions about the appropriateness of an animal welfare legislative regime which is at once biased and which also tends to favour those animals who are most readily visible. It is argued that the practice of regulating animal welfare by use of legislative instruments which are inconsistent is problematic from the perspective of liberal principles because liberalism places a heavy emphasis on the concept of equality. Similarly, the practice of preferential treatment for the most visible is not consistent with democratic values because it removes citizens from the process of establishing agreed-upon standards for animal protection. In conclusion, it is argued that because some animals have been effectively drawn into the liberal democratic political landscape, the principle of equitable treatment should be applied to the manner in which the state regulates animal use. Such an approach would mean that animal use would be regulated according to the same values that are applied to other areas of political society. It would also have the effect of establishing what the community views as the appropriate level of nonhuman animal interest protection, by challenging the existence of a double standard predicated on the principle of low visibility.

Doctor of Philosophy(PhD) / Animal welfare legislation does not consistently protect all nonhuman animals against all harms under all circumstances. Through an analysis of current legislative arrangements and the origins of animal protection law, and an examination of popular attitudes towards animal cruelty, this study seeks to comment on the role of visibility in informing the level and type of state-sponsored interest protection an animal receives. It is argued that different types of animals enjoy different levels of visibility and that an animal’s level of visibility influences the extent to which the state is willing to intervene to protect the animal from harm. These findings are significant because the highly politicised nature of the lives of many nonhuman animals raises questions about the appropriateness of an animal welfare legislative regime which is at once biased and which also tends to favour those animals who are most readily visible. It is argued that the practice of regulating animal welfare by use of legislative instruments which are inconsistent is problematic from the perspective of liberal principles because liberalism places a heavy emphasis on the concept of equality. Similarly, the practice of preferential treatment for the most visible is not consistent with democratic values because it removes citizens from the process of establishing agreed-upon standards for animal protection. In conclusion, it is argued that because some animals have been effectively drawn into the liberal democratic political landscape, the principle of equitable treatment should be applied to the manner in which the state regulates animal use. Such an approach would mean that animal use would be regulated according to the same values that are applied to other areas of political society. It would also have the effect of establishing what the community views as the appropriate level of nonhuman animal interest protection, by challenging the existence of a double standard predicated on the principle of low visibility.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--McMaster University, 2006. / Supervisor: Travis Kroeker ... [et al.]. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 298-304).

Thesis (M.A.)--Carleton University, 1992. / Also available in electronic format on the Internet.

Pour Nietzsche, les Grecs interprètent le monde en fonction d’une représentation enrichissante, qui permet ainsi à la volonté de se déployer sous le prisme du concept de force, comme détermination absolue tant de l’homme que des dieux. Leur vie s’y manifeste dans ce cas à partir du pessimisme de la force. Par contre, l’optimisme rationaliste qui recherche une interprétation intelligible ou idéaliste du monde aboutit à un fondement théorique, logique et moral de la vie, représentation appauvrissante, qui lui donne plutôt une forme décadente, rabougrie. Ainsi, le rationalisme finit par se transformer en nihilisme, configurant alors le « pessimisme du monde vrai ». Nietzsche va donc lui opposer le pessimisme dionysiaque, signifiant la recherche d’une nouvelle forme plus moderne d’enrichissement du monde et de la vie, à travers leur rencontre, leur implication l’un dans l’autre qui est supposée créer la joie, la légèreté. Le but nietzschéen est en fait de définir les conditions de possibilité qui permettront de passer de la maladie à la santé, qui impliquera en même temps l’illusion, l’apparence et les forces de l’inconscient ; et ce à partir de la critique, et surtout de la généalogie, comme méthode authentique de lutte contre les symptômes de rabougrissement / For Nietzsche, the Greeks interpreted the world in terms of meaningful representation, which allows the will to unfold through the prism of the concept of force as an absolute determination of both the man whom the gods. Their life is manifested in this case from the pessimism of strength. For cons, the rationalist optimism seeking an interpretation intelligible or idealistic world leads to a theoretical basis, logic and moral life, impoverishing representation, which gives it a shape rather decadent stunted. Thus, rationalism eventually turns into nihilism, then configuring the “pessimism of real world”. Nietzsche is therefore to oppose the Dionysian pessimism, meaning the search for a new more modern form of enrichment of the world and life, through their meeting, their involvement in one another that is supposed to create joy, lightness. The Nietzschean goal is actually to define the conditions of possibility that will pass the disease to health, which involve the same time the illusion, appearance and the forces of the unconscious, and that from the critical philosophy, and especially the genealogy as a method of authentic fight against the symptoms of stunting

Many causes have been proposed for the transition to agriculture but how can archaeologists debate rival interpretations of the record with a seat-of-your-pants theoretical methodology? Truth is a concept that has been the subject of considerable thought and analysis by philosophers for millennia and is a conceptual resource that archaeologists can draw on. The aim of this thesis is twofold. Firstly, the aim is to study the epistemological criteria used in the formulation and assessment of archaeological knowledge: bringing new understanding of knowledge formation in archaeology and how to deal with competing interpretations of the past (specifically with political and ethical ramifications). The second aim is to assess these epistemological criteria and position them in light of the literature on philosophical theories of truth. The focus of this thesis is on the justification project which attempts to identify a characteristic which is possessed by most true propositions and not possessed by most false propositions. In other words, what it is that makes certain statements about the past 'true' or 'not true'. The aim is to understand how archaeological claims about the past come to be made and against what grounds these claims are justified. Three angles are used to answer the aims of this thesis. Firstly, looking at archaeological interpretation in the field, the case study of Çatalhöyük in Turkey is used to track interpretation from excavation through to publication. Secondly, looking at justification in larger syntheses of the past, different explanations for the emergence of agriculture in Britain are explored to understand how justification works at this level of archaeological interpretation, especially when dealing with multiple explanations. Finally, the ethical and political consequences of archaeological justification are discussed. Given the acceptance that there are different interpretations of the past beyond solely the archaeologists, how does justification work in archaeology when we include other interpretations of the past and when concerns shift away from reaching the most justified account of the past, to the practical ramifications of that knowledge? This thesis original and novel contribution is in answering these aims. In the next chapters it will be argued that archaeological justification works within a specific model of justification based on correspondence and coherence. Justification shifts as interpretation moves away from the archaeological record; there is a heavier reliance on abductive reasoning. Multiple interpretations are a product of abductive reasoning and due to the adoption of different theoretical stances. Archaeology fits within a pragmatist theory of truth showing that ethical and political issues are part of the process of justification.