The question "what does Russia want?" has been asked by politicians, policy analysts, and academics alike. Unfortunately, it has been answered in ways that we in the West have wanted to hear, yet the answers we came up with may not be completely accurate, as reflected by our own academic literature. Analysts like Ivan Krastev have argued that "Russia's foreign-policy goals seem less predictable than ever, designed to provoke the West and control its neighbors ... what does the. Kremlin really want?" He criticized realist and liberal perspectives alike and offered that Russian foreign policy is held hostage by the sense of fragility that niarked the· Russian experience of the 1990s. The position of one senior French diplomat was that the Soviet Union was easier to bargain with than Russia is today. Dealing with the Soviets was difficult, but they had a goal in mind. Putin's Russia is just hostile without a clear objective. My paper challenges such thinking. The purpose behind Russia's belligerence is found in the realist perspective that Krastev so casually dismissed. Much along the lines of Stephen Cohen's work, I use descriptive analysis to look at how the ideologies of the past left Russia and the United States at odds. Now that we essentially agree on market economics (with more or less government control of the markets) we can begin to have a compatible coexistence. I have found that in its search for a return to Great Power status, Russia felt betrayed by the United States and treated like a defeated nation. What some dismiss as "paranoia" in the Kremlin is actually a manifestation of balance of power logic. This is firmly grounded in the concept of Kenneth Waltz's defensive realism.

The modem business economy is characterized by increased collaboration among different organizations across nation al boundaries. Post-Soviet Russia is one of the regions that is witnessing rapid economic growth and development of international business relations. Because of the challenges in intercultural communication the current study focuses on the problem of power distance, specifically in the workplace (in post-Soviet Russia). A phenomenological perspective, based on qualitative methodology, guided this research into the meaning of power experiences for individuals. Symbolic interactionism was used as a research paradigm of the study to view humans as active participants of the workplace, who engage in the power relationships actively-reacting to controversies of interactions and constant change in the everyday situations. The researcher developed and conducted several sets of interviews with employees, with relatives/friends of employees, and with country experts. The data were collected from employees of four companies in one of Central Russian regions (where intercultural connections develop especially rapidly)-with two private, two public, two prereform, and two postreform companies. These four companies were selected to examine influences of two dimensions, public versus private and older traditional versus newer entrepreneurial organizations. Analysis included transcribing of the interviews, identification and categorizations of the statements of meaning, description of participants' experiences, and identification of social processes. The results were grouped into gender, age, and ethical themes depending on three major dimensions (ownership, generation, gender). The major findings included: (a) contrary to previous research older managers appear not to be more aversive to risk-taking behaviors, (b) younger superiors are better accepted in the private postreform companies, but are less often appointed to such positions as compared to the other three settings, (c) public companies hold to the Soviet egalitarian gender ideas, but attitudes and hiring practices remain traditional in preferring male leaders, (d) although recognizing that female superiors can be as good as male superiors, young employees emphasize the "natural calling" of the women (that women's primary focus should be family), (e) emphasis on the importance of ethical leaders was common to all company types.

abstract: This dissertation explores how rank-and-file political prisoners navigated life after release and how they translated their experiences in the Gulag and after into memoirs, letters, and art. I argue that these autobiographical narratives formed the basis of an alternate history of the Soviet Union. This alternate history informed the cultural memory of the Gulag in the Komi Republic, which coalesced over the course of the late 1980s and 1990s into an infrastructure of memory. This alternate history was mobilized by the formation of the Soviet Union’s first civic organizations, such as the Memorial Society, that emerged in the late 1980s. However, Gulag returnees not only joined post-Soviet civil society, they also formed a nascent civil society after their release in the 1950s. The social networks and informal associations that Gulag returnees relied upon to reintegrate back into Soviet society after release, also played an essential role in the memory project of coming to terms with the Stalinist past after the collapse of the Soviet Union. As one of the first and most populous epicenters of the Gulag archipelago located in the Far North, from 1929-1958 Komi saw hundreds of thousands of prisoners, in addition to hundreds of thousands more who were exiled to the region from all over the Soviet Union. While some left the region after they were released, many were not able to leave or chose not to when given the choice. Regardless of where they lived when the Soviet Union collapsed, many former prisoners sent their autobiographies to branches of the Memorial Society and local history museums in Komi. For many, this was the very first time they had shared their stories with anyone. While Komi is unique in many ways, it is emblematic of processes that unfolded throughout the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe at the end of the Twentieth Century. This project expands our understanding of how civil societies form under conditions of authoritarian rule and illuminates the ways in which survivors and societies come to terms with difficult pasts. / Dissertation/Thesis / Doctoral Dissertation History 2019

This thesis examines the historical progression of social and political transitions in late Soviet and post-Soviet Russia, seeking to establish the development of Putinism in an historical context and assert a definition of Putinism as a governing philosophy which exploits the rhetoric of democracy and civil society to conceal authoritarian practices. Analysis begins with Mikhail Gorbachev’s ‘moral position’ as the basis of the Gorbachev reforms and the conceptual introduction of democratic and market mechanics, followed by the rejection of the Soviet system and the mixed legacy of shock therapy under Boris Yeltsin, culminating in the ultimate ascendancy of Vladimir Putin as a response to the perceived loss of national status and social dislocation resulting from the Gorbachev and Yeltsin eras. Ultimately, it is asserted that Putinism is ideologically grounded in Chekism, fundamentally anti-democratic and inherently kleptocratic, seeking to maintain power and perpetuate a sistema centered on the Kremlin. Through vertical centralization of the state, the development of alternative mechanisms of governance, domination of political discourse, development of a personality cult, state sponsored redefinition of Russian identity and the encouragement of exceptionalist and neo-imperialist policies.

This thesis analyzes women&rsquo / s status in the Russian Federation in the period after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Yeltsin&rsquo / s reforms radically changed the quality of political, economical and social aspects of Russian life. Yeltsin&rsquo / s period together with the policies of the subsequent governments proved to be mostly detrimental to women&acute / s status in the country. Women have become the ones who suffered most from the instability and lawlessness of the transition period. This study discusses increasing gender inequality and gender asymmetry in economy, politics and in social realms in post-Soviet Russia and examines the transformation of women&rsquo / s role and status in this period

During August 2012 the issues of women's rights in Russia attracted attention of the U.S. newspapers, which was an unusual occurrence for this unprivileged region in feminist theorizing. In my thesis I explore the rhetoric around the Pussy Riot trial and verdict. I argue that international media rendered the protest metonymically, thereby reducing its political content to human rights and Cold War frames. I explore the usage of historical references in the narratives, based on these paradigms. The oppressiveness of the Russian government is constructed through Cold War rhetoric by references to Stalinism, which masks the neoliberal content of this case. The confrontation is represented as a clash of cultures based on the contrast between democracy and oppressive regimes, with Pussy Riot as martyrs for Western values and Putin as an Oriental dictator. I argue that this rhetoric has troubling implications for social activism, that democracy could be only achieved through non-violent and individualist symbolic activism which relies on the Western standards. The second part of my thesis analyzes how social movements in the U.S. and Russia interact with each other and influence each other's tactics through interaction with media representations of the Pussy Riot trial and dominant narratives regarding activism. My support for this argument comes from an analysis of the U.S. and Russian movements' responses to the Pussy Riot trial. Embracing a complex combination of political meanings, these events were significantly determined by prolific mass media coverage and mediated interaction between activist groups. / text

This thesis examines the applicability of the postmodern theories of consumerism and simulacra to the post-Soviet Russian context by undertaking a case study of Viktor Pelevin's novel Generation "Π". In today's environment of economic globalisation and its accompanying global culture, Western theories concerning the postmodern condition have attempted to explain social dynamics in regions outside of their native context. This thesis seeks to contribute to the debate regarding the global applicability of the postmodem theoretical models by applying the perspectives of Fredric Jameson and Jean Baudrillard to post-Soviet Russian cultural material. Such an analysis will help offer an indication as to whether Russia is merely a regional variant of a larger Western-oriented social paradigm, or a society and culture seeking to follow its own distinctive path of development. Generation "Π" portrays Russia in terms of its post-Soviet experiences of globalisation and media simulation. This novel engages the theories of the postmodern and their application into the post-Soviet Russian context and offers an effective depiction of Russian culture in terms of its similarities and differences to the West. In addition, Pelevin's disenchantment with the cultural dominants within post-Soviet Russia and global culture in general are strongly expressed. This thesis argues that while Pelevin's engagement with, the totality of post-Soviet consumerism and media simulation supports the applicability of many of the discussed theoretical concepts to the post-Soviet context, his work also highlights the distinctiveness of the postmodern cultural condition in Russia. This distinctiveness is not only a result of Russia's transition to the market economy but also stems from Russia's literary quest for an organic culture.

No description available.

Ce travail de thèse questionne la place que les dispositifs numériques d'information et de communication occupent dans la reconfiguration de l'espace public (Habermas, 1991) contemporaine post-soviétique. Il étudie également l'émergence, l'inscription sociale et l'usage politique des espaces participatifs du web - tels que les blogs, les forums ou les réseaux sociaux, au sein de cette société. Aussi, nous explorons le processus de la médiation, tel qu'il s'exerce à l'extérieur de la médiatisation classique dans la sphère publique nationale post-soviétique. Après avoir appliqué les différentes méthodes d'analyse des réseaux (cartographie, entretiens semi-directifs, observation participative), nous pouvons constater qu'actuellement en Russie contemporaine nous observons l'éclatement de l'espace public unique et le retour au modèle de double espace public: officiel « dominant », constitué en grande partie des médias audio-visuels, la presse écrite nationale et des partis politiques institutionnalisés et l'espace « parallèle » constitué des « nouveaux » médias numériques (Kiriya, 2012). Ces tendances nous montrent la persistance des formes et des configurations de l'espace public dans la société malgré les changements économiques et sociaux. Dans le contexte post-soviétique, les « nouveaux » médias numérisés soutiennent à la fracture sociale et politique dans la société et épargnent l'espace public officiel des discours et des débats oppositionnels. En même temps, ces dispositifs contribuent à l'apparition des nouveaux acteurs des débats et de la production de l'information, et au maintien de la diversité des opinions. De ca fait, les dispositifs numériques de communication peuvent être insérés dans les espaces sociaux différents et d'accompagner les pratiques de libération et de domination en même temps. Notre travail montre que le déploiement des réseaux socionumériques et des médias numériques post-soviétiques participe aux évolutions plus générales de la société post-soviétique. Ils stabilisent et rendent visible la configuration des acteurs des espaces sociaux préexistants. L'étude de l'ancrage politique des réseaux socionumériques et des médias dans l'espace public officiel nous conduit à adopter une vision critique de la théorie « positiviste » des réseaux socionumériques en tant qu'outils de délibération et de débats argumentatifs. Ainsi, l'espace numérique post-soviétique est devenu une prolongation de l'espace public officiel de domination tout en assurant l'appropriation des discours étatiques propagandistes et leur pénétration dans l'espace privé. Ce travail montre que l'ancrage social (Miège, 2007) et politique de ces outils dans la société Russe est plutôt conservatif et ne contribue à la libération et démocratisation de la société. Bien au contraire – ces outils sont utilisés pour reproduire l'ordre politique dominant, diviser l'espace public etc. Les débats et les mobilisations sur le net ont faiblement contribué à l'émancipation et aux changements sociaux. Insérés dans les champs sociaux nationaux existants, ces médias numériques ont incité à la délibération et la maîtrise de la violence. En même temps, ils pouvaient être mobilisés par les acteurs dominants afin d'asseoir leur domination et leur violence. Dans le contexte post-soviétique, les technologies numériques ont contribué au déclin de la mobilisation politique d'opposition, renforçant l'isolement des acteurs politiques, exclus de l'espace public, et un contrôle social profitable aux autorités russes actuelles. L'expression « spontanée » de mouvements sociaux s'effectue selon les formes protestataires historiquement préexistantes (Bertrand Cabedoche, 2010) et notre étude du cas post-soviétique le confirme pleinement. / This PhD work questions the place of digital information and communication devices involved in the reconfiguration of the contemporary post-Soviet public sphere (Habermas, 1991). It also examines the emergence, social inclusion and the political use of web participatory spaces - such as blogs, forums and social networks, in this society. Also, we explore the process of mediation, as is carried outside the traditional media in the post-Soviet national public sphere. After applying the different analysis methods of networks (mapping, interviews, participant observation), we can conclude that in contemporary Russia we observe the return to dual model public space: Official "dominant" (consists largely of audio-visual media, papers; magazines, radio stations) and "parallel" (consists of the oppositional political parties, "new" digital media) (Kiriya, 2012). These trends confirm the persistence of forms and configurations of public space in society despite the social and economic changes. In the post-Soviet context, the "new" digital media support the social and political cleavage in. At the same time, these devices contribute to the appearance of new actors of debates and production of information, and the maintenance of the diversity of opinions. Thereby, digital communication devices can be inserted in different social spaces, accompany the liberation and domination practices at the same time. Our work shows that the deployment of digital networks and digital media accompanies the development of the post-Soviet society. They stabilize and make visible the configuration of preexisting actors in different social spaces. This study of political use of digital networks and media in the official public space lead us to adopt a critical view of the "positivist" perception of digital networks as tools of deliberation and argumentative discussions. Thus, the post-Soviet digital space has become a digital extension of the formal domination of public space while ensuring the appropriation of state propaganda speeches and their penetration into the private area. This work shows that the social use (Miège, 2007) and policy of these tools in Russian society is quite conservative and does not contribute to the liberation and democratization of society. Quite the contrary, these devices are used to reproduce the dominant political divide public space and so on. The debates and mobilizations on the Internet have slightly contributed to the emancipation and social change. Inserted into existing national social fields, these digital media has led to the deliberation and control of violence. At the same time, they could be mobilized by the dominant players in order to establish their domination and violence. In the post-Soviet context, digital technologies have contributed to the decline of the political opposition mobilization, reinforcing the isolation of political actors, excluded from the public space, and profitable social control for current Russian authorities. The "spontaneous" social movement is performed according to the historically pre-existing forms protesters (Cabedoche Bertrand, 2010) and our study of post-Soviet case fully confirms it.