La présente thèse propose une analyse et une systématisation de l’utilisation des réseaux sociaux en période électorale tant au niveau national que local. Ainsi seront étudiées les techniques numériques utilisées, les formes et les méthodes de communication politique « en ligne » au cours des campagnes présidentielles de 2012 en France et en Russie et les campagnes municipales à Bordeaux et à Moscou en 2014 et 2013. Seront donc comparés les ressorts utilisés dans deux pays différents et qui ont permis de transformer les grands réseaux sociaux tels que Facebook, Twitter, Instagram et VKontakte en outils de rassemblement politique attirant de nombreux jeunes à participer activement au processus de campagne.Des entretiens réalisés avec des responsables des mouvements politiques français de Gironde tels ceux des Jeunes socialistes, des Jeunes Populaires et ceux du Front National, il ressort que l’activité numérique en France relève d’un caractère constructif. Ils servent à attirer et mobiliser la jeunesse de moins de 30 ans autours des candidats et de leurs partis grâce à un support en ligne mais s’accompagnent d’un militantisme de terrain, dans la vie réelle.En revanche, il apparaît qu’en Russie, le niveau élevé et l’influence de ces jeunes sur Internet fournit un soutien pour les nouvelles institutions de la société civile. Le succès de la mobilisation des jeunes appartenant à la classe moyenne urbaine relève d’une combinaison de « citoyenneté » et de « massification » de la protestation sur le réseau.En 2013, la volonté et mobilisation active des jeunes dans le projet politique à permis l’émergence de l’opposant Alekseï Navalny, qui a réuni 27% des suffrages et atteint la seconde place aux élections municipales de Moscou. La quasi intégralité de sa campagne a été effectuée sur les réseaux sociaux. Si le fait est courant pour nombre de ses homologues occidentaux, il convient de relever que ce n’est pas habituel pour les politiciens russes. Cette campagne « révolutionnaire » d’A. Navalny a été rendue possible par le fort soutien des jeunes Moscovites qu’il a pu mobiliser sur le plus grand réseau russe : VKontakte. L’organisation de la campagne s’est presque entièrement fondée sur l’utilisation des réseaux sociaux, tant pour la distribution de tracts dans les rues, que la sensibilisation et les collectes de dons. / This thesis will focus on the analysis and systematization of the use of social networks in the presidential campaigns, both in France and in Russia in 2012, as well as in the municipal campaigns in Bordeaux and Moscow, in 2014 and 2013 respectively. The development of this thesis will also include the basic use of technologies, as well as the forms and methods of political online communication at the actual stage of their development.In this thesis, the examination of the political mechanisms used in France and Russia will be carried out in order to assess how social networks such as Facebook, Twitter, Instagram and VKontakte have developed into a powerful tool, with their main aim being to attract more and more young people to actively participate in the election campaigns as well as the voting process in general.Through the conduction of interviews with the chiefs of French Youth Movements, such as the Young Socialists (Gironde), the People’s Young (Gironde), and the Young of National Front (Gironde), we have found that these movements tend to have an overall peaceful nature in France. They aim to attract and mobilize young people (of up to 30 years old) to provide support both online and in the real world, for candidates of the major French political parties, namely the UMP, the Socialist Party and the National Front.In comparison, in Russia, the high level presence and influence of Youth Movements on the Internet provides support for new institutions forming in civil society. The success of the youth mobilization from the urban middle class can be explained by the combination of “civic consciousness” and “massive involvement”.In 2013, young Russians mobilized for active participation in the political life of Alexei Navalny, one of the leaders of the Russian opposition, who managed to obtain 27% of the votes in the municipal elections of Moscow, the equivalent to second place. His «revolutionary” electoral campaign was predominantly transmitted through social networks, notably through the use of VKontakte (the largest social network in Russia), in order to gain a large amount of support from young Moscovites. This action is deemed to be very uncommon among Russian politicians, and is more likely to be seen among Western homologues. Consequently, this led to the distribution of leaflets in the streets, in the subway, going door-to-door, as well as organizing the collection of donations for the campaign across networks.

This article proceeds from the observation that Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin—two politicians frequently correlated and compared since Trump’s bid for the Presidency—have been remarkably successful in mobilizing support for their politics and in seemingly immunizing their rhetorics against vernacular critique. To work toward an understanding of this phenomenon, we propose to look at how political communication by and around the two politicians draws on forms and venues of popular culture. Both contexts, we will argue, have developed new strategies for the instrumentalization of popular culture, strategies that, while actualized differently in the two settings, revolve around an ‘invective turn’ in political communication—a radicalization of the familiar nationalist rhetoric of ‘us versus them’ that seems specifically fueled by pop-cultural forms. To explore this traffic between pop and politics, this article puts into conversation two case studies: On the one hand, of Trump’s campaign speeches which, we contend, symbolically organize around the logic of agôn—of the competitive game—as it has coagulated in the reality-tv genre of the gamedoc. On the other hand, we look at (state-controlled) pop music in the Russian genre of Ėstrada which, thus our argument, advertises a distinct form of patriotism through the principle of ‘glamour.’ Glamour, in Putin’s Russia, operates simultaneously as a style and as an ideology of self-glorification. The article will outline how reality tv’s logic of agôn and patriotic pop music’s aesthetics of glamour each fuel a qualitatively new orientation of political discourse toward the aesthetically charged, affect-saturated denigration of others and valorization of self.

JAPPEL,
Ctibor.
Energy
Security
of
the
United
States
of
America.
Praha,
2012.
74
s.
 Diplomová
práce
(Mgr.),
Univerzita
Karlova,
Fakulta
sociálních
věd,
 Institut
mezinárodních
studií.
Katedra
amerických
studií.
 Vedoucí
diplomové
práce
PhDr.
et
Mgr.
Kryštof
Kozák,
Ph.
D.

 
 
 Abstract
 The
thesis
deals
with
the
energy
security
of
the
United
States
of
America
at
the
 beginning
 of
 the
 21st
 century.
 The
 first
 part
 of
 the
 thesis
 identifies
 energy
 security
as
a
relatively
new
concept
in
political
discourse,
whose
meaning
is
not
 yet
 firmly
 defined.
 The
 goal
 of
 this
 part
 is
 therefore
 to
 refine
 the
 definition
 of
energy
security
using
an
analysis
of
the
content
of
relevant
academic
sources.
 The
 second
 part
 of
 the
 thesis
 focuses
 specifically
 on
 the
 situation
 of
 the
 United
 States
 of
 America.
 It
 identifies
 the
 challenges
 to
 energy
 security
 the
 country
faces,
mainly
the
high
level
of
dependence
on
petroleum
products,
and
 provides
an
overview
of
available
solutions.
 The
 third
 part
 is
 a
 case
 study
 that
 deals
 with
 the
 presidential
 election
 campaign
of
2008.
This
campaign
took
place
during
a
period
of
extremely
high
 energy
prices,
and
the
energy
security
proposals
made
by
the
major
candidates
...

This dissertation examines how the major television networks, in conjunction with the Reagan administration, launched a lingering cloud of nuclear anxiety that helped to revive the Cold War during the 1980s. Placed within a larger political and cultural post-war context, this national preoccupation with a global show-down with the Soviet Union at times both hindered and bolstered Reagan’s image as the archetypal conservative, cowboy President that could free America from its liberal adolescent past now caustically referred to as “the sixties.” This stalwart image of Reagan, created and carefully managed by a number of highly-paid marketing executives, as one of the embodiment of peaceful deterrence, came under attack in the early 1980s when the “liberal” Nuclear Freeze movement showed signs of becoming politically threatening to the staunch conservative pledging to win the Cold War at any cost. And even if the nuclear freeze movement itself was not powerful enough to undergo the Herculean task of removing the President in 1984, the movement was compassionate enough to appeal to a mass audience, especially when framed in narrative form on network television. In the early 1980s, debates over the possibility of nuclear war and other pertinent Cold War related issues became much more democratized in their visibility on the network airwaves. However, the message disseminated from the networks was not placed in an educational framework, nor did these television productions clarify complicated nuclear issues such as nuclear winter theory and proliferation. I argue this renewed network attention on nuclear issues was not placed in an historical framework and likely confused American viewers because it routinely exposed audiences to both fact and fiction, undifferentiated at the level of the mass media.