<p>This dissertation examines a continuum of insubordination in the Air Force during the early Cold War. After World War II, a coterie of top generals in the Air Force embraced a view held by a minority in American government and the public, which believed that the United States should conduct a preventive war against the Soviet Union before it could develop its own nuclear arsenal. This strategy contradicted the stated national security policies of President Harry S. Truman and his successor, President Dwight D. Eisenhower. This influential circle of Air Force leaders undermined presidential policy by drafting preventive war plans, pushing preventive war strategies on civilian leaders in the executive branch, and indoctrinating senior field grade officers at the Air War College in preventive war thinking and strategies.</p><p>Previous accounts of preventive war activity in the Air Force centered about the Air War College and its first commandant, General Orvil Anderson. In 1950, General Anderson disparaged President Truman and urged for preventive war against the Soviet Union an interview to a local news reporter. Syndicated newspapers reprinted General Anderson's remarks, and the Air Force Chief of Staff, General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, relieved General Anderson from his command of the Air War College. The traditional interpretation views General Anderson's firing as the culmination of preventive war discourse and activity in the Air Force.</p><p>Examining senior leaders' private and public remarks, declassified transcripts from Air Force commanders' conferences in the early 1950s, and student essays from the Air War College, I show that the preventive war behavior persisted in the Air Force long after General Vandenberg relieved General Anderson in 1950. The culmination of the preventive war movement came in 1954, when a preventive war strategy called Project Control, devised by the Air War College and sponsored by Air Force Headquarters, stalled before the State Department. Following Project Control's failure, Air Force Chief of Staff General Nathan F. Twining finally began to direct the service to develop air power strategies that supported President Eisenhower's nuclear policy of massive retaliation.</p><p>The preventive war episode in the Air Force demonstrates an extreme example of how the military bureaucracy regulates and undermines the Constitutional authority of the president to govern national security policy. That this behavior is normal implies that active steps must be taken to ensure proper civilian control over the military. I argue that three prominent theories of civil-military relations--Samuel Huntington's objective control, Morris Janowitz's constabulary theory, and Peter Feaver's agency theory--are notable contributions to U.S. civil-military relations; however, none of these approaches could have solved the breakdown in civil-military relations that prompted the preventive war activity in the Air Force. My concept for civilian control over the military mirrors modern preventive medicine, and assumes that the military is "at risk" for undermining presidential policy. "Preventive control" empowers civilian authorities to actively monitor the military for evidence of insubordinate behavior, and to establish liberal military education programs in order help all airmen to understand and accept political limits on the use of force.</p> / Dissertation

Orientador: Héctor Luís Saint-Pierre / Banca: Rafael Duarte Villa / Banca: Samuel Alves Soares / O Programa de Pós-Graduação em Relações Internacionais é instituído em parceria com a Unesp/Unicamp/PUC-SP, em projeto subsidiado pela CAPES, intitulado "Programa San Tiago Dantas". / Resumo: A incorporação do conceito da estratégia preemptiva ao documento de Estratégia de Segurança Nacional dos EUA em 2002, e a suposta aplicação dessa estratégia na Guerra do Iraque em 2003, fez com que os debates teóricos sobre guerras preventivas e preemptivas fossem reabertos. Em termos gerais, as guerras preventivas podem ser entendidas como o "início de uma ação militar em antecipação a ações danosas que não ocorrem no presente nem são iminentes". A análise da definição de guerras preventivas mereceu enfoque especial para embasar o estudo das três correntes teóricas principais sobre o tema nas Relações Internacionais, quais sejam: a proibição geral das guerras justas (bellum justum); o status quo legal (direito internacional) e o realismo político. Esta proposta de sistematização do debate nos parece a mais apropriada, por abranger as principais linhas argumentativas teóricas sobre o tema objeto da pesquisa. As abordagens sobre a proibição geral das guerras justas; sobre o status quo legal e realismo político, equivalem às denominadas abordagens moralistas, legalistas e realistas, respectivamente. Cada uma dessas três correntes prioriza uma dimensão de análise dentro da qual se levanta uma problemática sobre as guerras preventivas. De igual forma, constituem foco desta pesquisa as questões levantadas; para os adeptos do bellum justum a questão se coloca nos seguintes termos: as guerras preventivas são justas, isto é, são legítimas? Para os adeptos do status quo legal será: as guerras preventivas podem ser legais? E as levantadas pelos adeptos do realismo: as guerras preventivas são úteis? Com essas questões em mente apresentaremos os argumentos que cada corrente seleciona para respondê-las, esperando que joguem luz sobre as guerras preventivas. / Abstract: This research, on the theme of theories of preventive wars in international relations, focuses on the questions described next. For the followers of bellum justum: are preventive wars just, that is, legitimate? For the followers of the legal status quo: can preventive wars be legal? For the followers of political realism: are preventive wars utile? With these inquiries as its center, it aims to present the arguments that each of these lines of thought select to answer them. The incorporation of the concept of preemptive strategy in the USA's National Security Strategy document, in 2002, and the presumed application of this strategy in the Iraq War in 2003 caused the reopening of the debates about preventive and preemptive wars. In general terms, preventive wars can be understood as "the start of a military action in anticipation to harmful actions that do not occur in the present and are not imminent". Here, the definition's analyses of preventive wars received special attention, in order to create the foundation for the study of the three main lines of thought in the theme of International Relations: the blanket prohibition of just wars (bellum justum), the status quo (international law) and political realism. This debate's systematization proposal seems more appropriate because it embraces the main theoretical argumentative lines regarding the research's subject. The approaches referring to the just wars' general prohibition, the legal status quo and political realism are equivalent to what is called respectively moralist, legalist and realist approaches. Each one of these three lines of thought give priority to a determined analysis' scope, in which a determined problem about preventive wars is raised. The likely outcome of this specific research is to help clarify specific topics regarding preventive wars. / Mestre

Made available in DSpace on 2014-06-11T19:27:59Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 0 Previous issue date: 2009-06-15Bitstream added on 2014-06-13T19:36:25Z : No. of bitstreams: 1 palaciosjunior_amc_me_mar.pdf: 813863 bytes, checksum: d22bc93dce433e95371358f0a482dcf0 (MD5) / A incorporação do conceito da estratégia preemptiva ao documento de Estratégia de Segurança Nacional dos EUA em 2002, e a suposta aplicação dessa estratégia na Guerra do Iraque em 2003, fez com que os debates teóricos sobre guerras preventivas e preemptivas fossem reabertos. Em termos gerais, as guerras preventivas podem ser entendidas como o “início de uma ação militar em antecipação a ações danosas que não ocorrem no presente nem são iminentes”. A análise da definição de guerras preventivas mereceu enfoque especial para embasar o estudo das três correntes teóricas principais sobre o tema nas Relações Internacionais, quais sejam: a proibição geral das guerras justas (bellum justum); o status quo legal (direito internacional) e o realismo político. Esta proposta de sistematização do debate nos parece a mais apropriada, por abranger as principais linhas argumentativas teóricas sobre o tema objeto da pesquisa. As abordagens sobre a proibição geral das guerras justas; sobre o status quo legal e realismo político, equivalem às denominadas abordagens moralistas, legalistas e realistas, respectivamente. Cada uma dessas três correntes prioriza uma dimensão de análise dentro da qual se levanta uma problemática sobre as guerras preventivas. De igual forma, constituem foco desta pesquisa as questões levantadas; para os adeptos do bellum justum a questão se coloca nos seguintes termos: as guerras preventivas são justas, isto é, são legítimas? Para os adeptos do status quo legal será: as guerras preventivas podem ser legais? E as levantadas pelos adeptos do realismo: as guerras preventivas são úteis? Com essas questões em mente apresentaremos os argumentos que cada corrente seleciona para respondê-las, esperando que joguem luz sobre as guerras preventivas. / This research, on the theme of theories of preventive wars in international relations, focuses on the questions described next. For the followers of bellum justum: are preventive wars just, that is, legitimate? For the followers of the legal status quo: can preventive wars be legal? For the followers of political realism: are preventive wars utile? With these inquiries as its center, it aims to present the arguments that each of these lines of thought select to answer them. The incorporation of the concept of preemptive strategy in the USA`s National Security Strategy document, in 2002, and the presumed application of this strategy in the Iraq War in 2003 caused the reopening of the debates about preventive and preemptive wars. In general terms, preventive wars can be understood as “the start of a military action in anticipation to harmful actions that do not occur in the present and are not imminent”. Here, the definition’s analyses of preventive wars received special attention, in order to create the foundation for the study of the three main lines of thought in the theme of International Relations: the blanket prohibition of just wars (bellum justum), the status quo (international law) and political realism. This debate`s systematization proposal seems more appropriate because it embraces the main theoretical argumentative lines regarding the research’s subject. The approaches referring to the just wars` general prohibition, the legal status quo and political realism are equivalent to what is called respectively moralist, legalist and realist approaches. Each one of these three lines of thought give priority to a determined analysis` scope, in which a determined problem about preventive wars is raised. The likely outcome of this specific research is to help clarify specific topics regarding preventive wars.

中共對外使用武力是一個很複雜、龐大的研究議題。自中共建政以來，不僅和意識形態對立的美國發生嚴重的軍事衝突，亦和同屬社會主義陣營的蘇聯、越南爆發軍事衝突；除了涉及統一問題而爆發多次台海危機外，亦與第三世界大國印度爆發大規模邊境衝突。早期的研究通常從冷戰的角度出發，帶有明顯的工具性質，但囿於資料保密，使得研究成果難以突破，臆測性大於實證性，此窘境直至冷戰結束後始有轉變。 有利於學術研究氛圍的主要因素有四點：一是前蘇聯、美國檔案的解密、部分中共檔案的開放、及少數智庫提供部分解密檔案，使得研究者可以取得重要的一手資料；二是關鍵人物之訪談與回憶錄的出版，可以補充檔案文獻的不足；三是中國崛起與中國威脅論成為國際關注焦點後，連帶地使得軍事議題浮上檯面，西方學界主要從權力結構及歷史的角度關注中國權力增長的意義，透過中共使用武力的分析，藉以預測未來是否出現權力轉移與中國在軍事上的應對方式；四是1995-96年台海危機的爆發，以及近期中共與越南、菲律賓及日本，因南海島礁與釣魚臺主權爭議問題而引發的衝突，使得有關中共對外使用武力的研究再度引起學界的關注。 目前有關中共使用武力的研究範疇相當廣泛，少數研究採取多重案例研究，嘗試歸納出中共對外使用武力的模式、步驟、原則或特徵；多數的研究則針對單一案例研究，並聚焦於分析中共發動戰爭的原因。此外，學界開始從歷史文獻分析轉而採取理論分析與建構。凡此種種，皆提供了一個重新詮釋中共對外使用武力的視野。然而，現有的研究成果雖然相當豐碩，卻無法建立一個一般性的分析框架或理論性模式，並且忽略中共對外使用武力的預防性動機與其政策選擇之間的動態關係，因此無法完整地解釋中共對外使用武力行為。 本文的研究目的並不是建立一個宏大的普遍理論，而是在一定的時空範疇內針對某一類現象建立一個合理、具有經驗性與理論性意涵的模式。換言之，即是借鑒相關國際關係、心理學及經濟學等相關理論的核心概念，並透過將中共對外使用武力的原因概念化過程，以預防性動機為主軸，提出一個「中共對外使用武力之動態衝突抉擇模式」，以解釋：中共較容易與何者發生軍事衝突、領導人在戰爭（衝突）前的認知、為何會使用武力、以及使用武力的決策選擇如何確立？並透過六個正例（1950年韓戰、1953-54年第一次台海危機、1962年中印邊境衝突、1969年珍寶島衝突、1979年懲越戰爭、1995-96年第三次台海危機）及一個反例（1999年「特殊國與國關係」）的多重案例檢驗，以回答上述的問題。 本文的研究發現： 一、中共的確比較容易與實力或意圖上具有潛在挑戰其周邊權力地位的國家發生軍事衝突。 二、中共領導人在戰爭（衝突）前，的確有產生錯誤認知。 三、中共是出於防止周邊權力地位衰退的預防性動機而對外使用武力。 四、中共對外使用武力中，領導人對周邊權力地位衰退的程度與衰退的必然性之認知強弱，會影響其決策選擇。