In the first essay titled "Shareholder Coordination, Information Diffusion and Stock Returns", we show that the quality of information sharing networks linking firms' institutional investors has stock return predictability implications. First, we demonstrate that firms with high shareholder coordination experience less local comovement and less post earnings announcement drift, consistent with the notion that coordination improves firms' information environment. We then document that the stock return performance of firms with high shareholder coordination leads that of firms with low shareholder coordination, supporting the view that coordination acts as an information diffusion channel. Finally, we provide evidence consistent with the notion that the market does not readily recognize the superior quality of high shareholder coordination firms and prices it gradually through the trading of sophisticated institutional investors, thereby causing future returns to be positively associated with shareholder coordination. In the second essay titled "Shareholder Coordination and Stock Price Informativeness", we find that stock prices of firms with better information sharing networks linking institutional shareholders exhibit higher levels of idiosyncratic volatility. This positive relation between shareholder coordination and stock price informativeness is mainly driven by coordination among dedicated and independent institutions and exists even after accounting for endogeneity. We further show that institutional trading serves as an information diffusion channel that strengthens the relationship of shareholder coordination with price informativeness. Overall, our results indicate that a higher degree of shareholder coordination leads to more informative stock prices by encouraging the collection of and trading on private information.

Dividend policy, its determinants, and its impact on firm value are of significant academic interest, and many theories and explanations have been posited on the subject over the years, but there has not been a universal agreement. This thesis examines the links between dividend policy, various aspects of stock liquidity and price informativeness. We study a sample of UK firms over the period from 1996-2013. We show that, on average, stocks of dividend payers have significantly lower bid–ask spread and a lower illiquidity ratio than their counterparts of non-dividend payers. We also find that stocks of high-dividend payers are more liquid than those of firms that pay low or no dividends. These findings are consistent with the predictions of asymmetric information that posit that paying dividends reveals inside information to the market and hence decreases the level of asymmetric information, leading to higher stock liquidity. In the subsequent analysis, we suggest and examine a new channel through which dividend policy can impact firm value. Specifically, we show that dividend payers are less exposed to shocks in the aggregate market liquidity than non-dividend payers. Similarly, we find that the systematic liquidity risk is negatively associated with amount of dividends. Finally, in the context of signalling and agency costs models, we show that dividends are negatively related to stock price informativeness and that this relationship is stronger for firms with lower stock liquidity. The findings imply that dividend policy can both affect and be affected by stock markets.

Dividend policy, its determinants, and its impact on firm value are of significant academic interest, and many theories and explanations have been posited on the subject over the years, but there has not been a universal agreement. This thesis examines the links between dividend policy, various aspects of stock liquidity and price informativeness. We study a sample of UK firms over the period from 1996-2013. We show that, on average, stocks of dividend payers have significantly lower bid–ask spread and a lower illiquidity ratio than their counterparts of non-dividend payers. We also find that stocks of high-dividend payers are more liquid than those of firms that pay low or no dividends. These findings are consistent with the predictions of asymmetric information that posit that paying dividends reveals inside information to the market and hence decreases the level of asymmetric information, leading to higher stock liquidity. In the subsequent analysis, we suggest and examine a new channel through which dividend policy can impact firm value. Specifically, we show that dividend payers are less exposed to shocks in the aggregate market liquidity than non-dividend payers. Similarly, we find that the systematic liquidity risk is negatively associated with amount of dividends. Finally, in the context of signalling and agency costs models, we show that dividends are negatively related to stock price informativeness and that this relationship is stronger for firms with lower stock liquidity. The findings imply that dividend policy can both affect and be affected by stock markets. / University of Bradford

Dans un contexte où l'importance de la Responsabilité Sociale des Entreprises (RSE) va croissante, cette thèse explore la relation entre la RSE et plusieurs attributs financiers des entreprises comme l'information spécifique incorporée dans le prix des actions, le risque de détresse financière des entreprises et le niveau de crédit commercial. Les chercheurs en finance d'entreprise présentent deux points de vue opposés sur la RSE: "Faire le bien est bon pour les affaires" et "La RSE crée des problèmes d'agence". Le premier chapitre aborde brièvement les théories analysant les répercussions financière de la RSE et met en évidence les avantages financiers concomitants aux pratiques responsables. Les entreprises socialement responsables améliorent l'environnement informationnel ce qui complète l'information financière. Dans le deuxième chapitre, nous montrons que la RSE joue un rôle important dans l'amélioration de l'information incorporée dans les cours boursiers. Une meilleure performance RSE est appréciée par les investisseurs et les gestionnaires d'actifs et améliore la disponibilité des financements. Le troisième chapitre explique que les entreprises peuvent atténuer leur risque de détresse financière (Z-score) en améliorant leur performance en matière de RSE. Des entreprises plus responsables promeuvent de meilleures relations avec les parties prenantes grâce à un objectif de confiance et de maximisation de la valeur. Dans le quatrième chapitre, nous constatons que les entreprises socialement responsables ont un meilleur accès au financement (côté fournisseur du crédit commercial) et font plus confiance à leurs clients (côté acheteur du crédit commercial). Par conséquent, cette dissertation fournit un ensemble de résultats soulignant la pertinence et l'importance de "Faire le bien est bon pour les affaires". / In the context of the rapidly growing importance of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), this dissertation explores the relationship between CSR and firm financial attributes, like stock price informativeness, financial distress risk, and trade credit. First chapter briefly discusses the theories of CSR and highlights the financial advantages of favorable CSR practices. Corporate finance researchers present two opposite views on CSR, “Doing good is good for business” and “CSR creates agency problems”. In the second chapter, we testify this association and find that CSR plays an important role to improve the information impounding in stock prices. Socially responsible firms improve the financial information environment. Third chapter elaborates that firms can mitigate their financial distress risk (Z-score) through improved CSR performance. Firm better CSR performance is appreciated by the investors and asset managers and it improves the availability of finance. In fourth chapter, we find that socially responsible firms have better access to finance (supplier side of trade credit) and have more trust on their stakeholders (buyer side of trade credit). Better CSR firms promote the better relationship with stakeholders through trust and value maximization goal. Therefore, this dissertation provides evidence on the importance of “Doing good is good for business”.

在古典理性預期模型中，理性的投資者會蒐集並利用各種相關訊息來幫助其做最適的投資行為。然而市場價格也是訊息來源之一。在效率市場中，價格完全透露出訊息，則無人會有蒐集訊息的動機；若市場有干擾，價格無法顯露出所有相關訊息，私人訊息便有價值。因此，價格資訊性的高低，會影響到私人訊息對投資的重要性。其次，訊息若要能幫助投資者獲得套利利潤，仍須假設投資者必須能夠持有資產一直至資產價值實現為止。顯然的，短期投資者並不符合此一假設。我們相信在通常情況下，長期投資者會比短期投資者更有動機去成為消息靈通者，而且短期投資者對訊息處理的態度有許多特性迴異於古典模型的投資者，他們的存在對市場價格資訊性也會有相當程度的衝擊。本文基於上述想法，利用干擾不對稱訊息下之多期理性預期模型，假設市場中有長期與短期投資者，來探討影響價格資訊性之各項因素及短期投資者之行為特性。

Ce travail doctoral étudie l’effet « retour » de l’information financière liée aux prix des actions sur les décisions des dirigeants d’entreprise. Plus précisément, j'étudie si et comment les gestionnaires apprennent effectivement les nouvelles informations contenues dans les prix des actions pour guider leurs décisions d'entreprise. Ma thèse de doctorat est composée de trois essais, chacun abordant un aspect différent de ce même sujet. Le premier essai étudie le lien entre l'efficacité informationnelle du marché d'actions et le niveau d’efficacité économique réelle de l'entreprise. Dans le premier essai, je constate que lorsque les prix de l'action agrègent une plus quantité d'informations utile plus grande, les décisions des entreprises prises par les gestionnaires devraient être encore plus optimales efficaces. Le deuxième essai étudie si les gestionnaires cherchent à apprendre les informations utilisées par les vendeurs à découvert. L’étude des prix des actions en présence de vendeurs à découvert est-il utile pour les décisions de l'entreprise ? Dans le deuxième essai, j'ai surmonté les difficultés empiriques en exploitant une caractéristique institutionnelle unique sur le marché des actions de Hong Kong. Je constate que les gestionnaires des entreprises « non-shortable » peuvent tirer profit des informations des vendeurs à découvert sur les conditions économiques sectorielles par l'intermédiaire des prix des actions d'autres entreprises « shortable » dans la même industrie et les utilisent dans leurs décisions d'entreprise. Le troisième essai étudie les effets réels de la négociation d'options à long terme. Dans le troisième essai, je constate que l’introduction d’une catégorie spécifique d'options à long terme stimule la production d'informations privées à long terme et donc entraîne une augmentation de l'informativité des prix sur les fondamentaux à long terme des entreprises. Par conséquent, les dirigeants peuvent extraire davantage d'informations du prix de l’action pour guider leurs décisions d'investissement à long terme. / In my doctoral thesis, I investigate the information feedback from stock prices to managers’ decisions. More specifically, I study whether and how managers learn new information from stock prices to guide their corporate decisions. My doctoral thesis includes three essays focusing on this topic. The first essay studies the relationship between stock market informational efficiency and real economy efficiency at firm-level. In the first essay, I find that when stock prices reflect greater amount of information that managers care about, corporate decisions made by managers become more efficient. The second essay studies whether managers seek to learn short sellers’ information from stock prices and use it in corporate decisions. In the second essay, I overcome the empirical difficulties by exploiting a unique institutional feature in Hong Kong stock market that only stocks included in an official list are allowed for short sales. I find that that non-shortable firms’ managers can learn short sellers’ information on external conditions from shortable peers’ stock prices and use it in their corporate decisions. The third essay studies the real effects of long-term option trading. I find that long-term option trading stimulates the production of long-term information, which managers can use to guide their long-term investment decisions.