Thesis (M.M.(Finance & Investment)--University of the Witwatersrand, Faculty of Commerce, Law and Management, Wits Business School, 2016 / Co-location on the JSE took place on the 14th of May 2014. This dissertation looks at the impact this event has had on the market. In order to measure the effects of colocation, market quality factors are examined before and after the event to see whether there were any significant changes. A regression is then undertaken to see the correlation between co-location, liquidity and volatility. Our results suggest that colocation benefits market liquidity but we are unable to assess the relationship with volatility. This means that the growing liquidity in the market can be used to attract more institutions and firms wishing to run trading algorithms and strategies. Trades originally meant for dark pools can be now traded on the JSE co-location servers. By moving trades from dark pools to co-location servers at the JSE and encouraging institutions to use these facilities, transparency can be increased. Exchanges should implement kill switches if it is apparent that they are being impaired or flooded with erroneous orders. The deployment of kill switches, circuit breakers and other system compliance will improve investor confidence and market stability. Subsequent research can lead to better understanding by investigating the correlation between colocation and volatility. / MT 2018

Thesis (M.M. (Finance & Investment))--University of the Witwatersrand, Faculty of Commerce, Law and Management, Graduate School of Business Administration, 2015. / Could not copy abstract

O objetivo deste trabalho é identificar padrões nos desvios da Lei do Preço Único. Utilizando dados desagregados nacionais e internacionais do período 1998-2008, aplicaram-se duas metodologias distintas: i) análise de componentes principais; e ii) estimador group mean Fully Modified OLS para painel proposto por Pedroni (2000). A análise de componentes principais facilita a identificação de padrões na variação de uma quantidade grande de dados e, o estimador group mean FMOLS permite estimar a relação de longo prazo existente entre os preços de um mesmo produto, cotados na mesma moeda, praticados em mercados distintos. Os resultados obtidos indicam que o câmbio é o principal responsável pelos desvios da Lei do Preço Único. Ademais, os resultados sugerem a existência de uma relação fraca entre os preços de um mesmo bem, cotados em Reais, mas comercializados nos mercados brasileiro e americano. / The main goal of this essay is to identify patterns in deviation from the law of one price. Using disaggregated data from Brazil and USA for the period 1998-2008, we applied two different methodologies: i) principal component analysis and ii) panel group mean Fully Modified OLS estimator proposed by Pedroni (2000). The principal component analysis facilitates the identification of patterns in the variation of a large amount of data, while the group mean FMOLS estimates the long run relationship between prices of the same good, quoted in the same currency, charged in separated markets. The results indicate that the exchange rate is the main responsible for deviations from the law of one price. Moreover, the results suggest the existence of a weak relationship between the prices of the same good, quoted in Reais, but sold in the Brazilian and American markets.

In Essay 1, I use cross-country differences in investors’ traits — trust, patience, overconfidence, and risk tolerance — to test the underreaction, overreaction, and uncertain information theories of stock returns. I find that investors’ reactions to large daily stock price shocks vary between lower and higher levels of these traits. Specifically, investors with lower levels of trust and more patience underreact more (or overreact less) to price shocks, which aligns with the predictions of the underreaction hypothesis. Investors with higher levels of overconfidence overreact more to positive price shocks and overreact less to negative price shocks. While this finding does not conform exactly to the predictions of the overreaction hypothesis, it is consistent with more refined theories of how overconfidence affects asset prices. Investors less tolerant of risk overreact less to positive price shocks. I also find that differences in institutional characteristics affect over/underreaction. Specifically, there is less overreaction in countries with stronger investor protections and less insider trading. Additionally, the ability to sell short is associated with more overreaction to negative shocks and less overreaction to positive shocks. In Essay 2, I investigate whether publicly available information (PAI) affects over/underreaction according to predictions of several theoretical models, and then I test if differences in investors’ traits modifies the association between publicly available information and returns. After identifying and correcting for a methodological issue in some prior research, I show that in a pooled international sample of stocks, investors overreact to price shocks not accompanied by information, and also overreact (or react efficiently in some models) to information-based price shocks. I find that the effect of PAI on returns is not the same in each country, which motivates my tests on how this variability relates to differences in investor traits. My results show that investors with higher trust tend to overreact less to shocks accompanied by PAI, while investors less tolerant of risk underreact to positive price shocks. Additionally, investors with higher overconfidence and self-attribution bias overreact more to positive price shocks, but less to negative price shocks, in accordance with behavioral theories. / Includes bibliography. / Dissertation (Ph.D.)--Florida Atlantic University, 2018. / FAU Electronic Theses and Dissertations Collection

by Chan Chi-man, Simon. / Thesis (M.B.A.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1993. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves [5]-[8] (2nd group)). / ACKNOWLEDGMENTS --- p.i / ABSTRACT --- p.ii / TABLE OF CONTENTS --- p.iv / LIST OF FIGURES --- p.vii / LIST OF TABLES --- p.viii / Chapter CHAPTER I. --- INTRODUCTION --- p.1 / Background --- p.1 / Objectives --- p.3 / Scope --- p.5 / Organization of the Paper --- p.6 / Chapter CHAPTER II. --- THE HONG KONG STOCK MARKET - QUANTIFYING ITS CHARACTERISTICS --- p.7 / Introduction --- p.7 / Choice of Proxy for the Market --- p.9 / Hong Kong in the Asian Pacific Region --- p.11 / Choice of Benchmarks for Comparisons --- p.12 / Comparative Returns and Standard Deviations --- p.13 / Correlations Amongst Different Markets --- p.16 / Comparative Price to Earnings (P/E) Ratios --- p.18 / Market Liquidity --- p.19 / Market Concentration --- p.20 / Summary --- p.21 / Chapter CHAPTER III. --- PRICING OF RISKY ASSETS IN HONG KONG --- p.23 / Introduction --- p.23 / Applicability of Pricing Models in the Hong Kong Stock Market --- p.23 / Literature Review --- p.23 / CAPM --- p.28 / The model --- p.28 / Hypotheses to be tested --- p.29 / Data --- p.30 / Methodology --- p.30 / Portfolio construction --- p.30 / Variable estimation --- p.31 / Cross-sectional regressions --- p.31 / Results and discussions --- p.32 / Stability of Beta --- p.34 / APT --- p.37 / Introduction --- p.37 / Analysis --- p.38 / Chapter CHAPTER IV. --- THE EFFICIENCY AND ANOMALIES OF THE HONG KONG STOCK / MARKET --- p.51 / Market Efficiency --- p.51 / Introduction --- p.51 / Informational Efficiency --- p.51 / Forms of market efficiency --- p.52 / Empirical evidence in Hong Kong --- p.53 / Historical prices --- p.53 / Investment advisory --- p.54 / Government budget speeches --- p.55 / Takeover --- p.55 / Conclusions --- p.55 / Anomalies --- p.56 / Introduction --- p.56 / An Exercise on PBV --- p.57 / Summary --- p.58 / Chapter CHAPTER V. --- POLITICAL INFLUENCE AND THE STOCK MARKET --- p.59 / Introduction --- p.59 / Literature Review --- p.60 / Political Risk in Hong Kong --- p.61 / Conclusion --- p.64 / Chapter CHAPTER VI. --- DIVERSIFICATION --- p.65 / Introduction --- p.65 / Literature Review --- p.65 / Does International Diversification Work --- p.67 / Conclusion --- p.72 / Chapter CHAPTER VII. --- CONCLUSIONS --- p.73 / What Moves Stock Prices? --- p.74 / Is the Stock Market Overreacting? --- p.75 / Some Suggestions --- p.76 / APPENDICES / BIBLIOGRAPHY

by Kei Man Keung, Tong Suk Yi. / Thesis (M.B.A.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2000. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 35-39). / ABSTRACT --- p.iii / TABLE OF CONTENTS --- p.iv / LIST OF TABLES --- p.v / Chapter / Chapter I. --- INTRODUCTION --- p.1 / Chapter II. --- THE CHINESE CAPITAL MARKET --- p.6 / Chapter III. --- DATA AND METHODOLOGY --- p.10 / Cases Description --- p.10 / Event 1: Hong Kong Handover (1 July 1997) --- p.11 / Event 2: Zhu Rongji Elected the Prime Minister (March 1998) --- p.11 / Event 3: U.S.- China Summit (25 June 1998) --- p.12 / Event 4: The Chinese Embassy Bombingin Yugoslavia (8 May 1999) --- p.13 / Event 5: China's WTO Entry (15 November 1999) --- p.13 / Event 6: Macau Handover (20 December 1999) --- p.14 / Three Models --- p.15 / Chapter IV. --- EMPIRICAL RESULTS --- p.20 / Chapter V. --- CONCLUSION --- p.26 / APPENDIX --- p.28 / BILIOGRAPHY --- p.35

Tam Chi Sang. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2003. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 73-76). / Abstracts in English and Chinese. / Chapter 1 --- Introduction --- p.p.1 / Chapter 1.1 --- Review of Literature --- p.p.4 / Chapter 1.2 --- Relationships to the existing works --- p.p.11 / Chapter 2 --- Demand Functions --- p.p.20 / Chapter 3 --- Exogenous Timing Duopoly --- p.p.24 / Chapter 3.1 --- Description of the game --- p.p.24 / Chapter 3.2 --- Equilibrium Analysis --- p.p.27 / Chapter 4 --- Endogenous Timing Duopoly --- p.p.38 / Chapter 4.1 --- Description of the game --- p.p.38 / Chapter 4.2 --- Equilibrium Analysis --- p.p.41 / Chapter 5 --- Concluding Remarks --- p.p.52 / Chapter 6 --- Appendix --- p.p.56 / Chapter 6.1 --- Reaction functions in the Exogenous Timing Model --- p.p.56 / Chapter 6.2 --- Reaction functions in the Endogenous Timing Model --- p.p.62 / Chapter 6.3 --- Proofs for Inequalities (10)，(13)，and Proposition 1 --- p.p.66 / Chapter 6.4 --- "Proofs for Inequalities (22), (23), (26), (27), and Proposition 2" --- p.p.67 / Chapter 6.4.1 --- Proofs for Inequalities (22) and (23) with γ >0 --- p.p.67 / Chapter 6.4.2 --- Proofs for Inequalities (26) and (27) with γ <0 --- p.p.70 / Chapter 6.4.3 --- Proof for Proposition 2 --- p.p.72 / References --- p.p.73

Digitized by Kansas Correctional Industries

Thesis. 1978. Ph.D.--Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Alfred P. Sloan School of Management. / MICROFICHE COPY AVAILABLE IN ARCHIVES AND DEWEY. / Bibliography : leaf 226. / Ph.D.

Presale of residential units refers to putting the units on sale before they are completed. The value of presale to the developer comes from the flexibility of timing the presale launch so as to optimize the expected payoff. We model the developer's optimal launch timing as a real option, and the purchaser's series of presale payments with the flexibility to default as compound options. By assuming a stochastic property price process, we derive model frameworks that a risk-averse developer should adopt in launching the presale under single and multiple payment schemes. The frameworks solve the optimal conditions, contract structures, and prices for the launch. We then extend the model to optimize developers' payoffs in monopolistic and imperfect market equilibria. Finally, by assuming a jump-diffusion demand shock process and based on game theoretic approach, we derive sub-game Nash equilibrium optimal strategies that determine when and at what price developers should launch for presale with stochastic or deterministic rare market events. All the models thus derived are subject to probabilities of purchaser defaults, which will happen if the contract prices are too high when compared to market prices. Our model frameworks confirm that the launch option values increase with increases in price growth rates and variances, but decrease in risk-free rates. Furthermore, developers tend to delay the launch when good events are anticipated, while launching presale earlier at lower prices in times of expected bad events. The equilibrium strategies also provide an alternative explanation to oversupply in property markets. We further illustrate effects of rare events on presale launching strategies through government intervention (particularly public housing and housing subsidies) and output flow uncertainty in competitive equilibrium. Our general optimal strategic models are robust in a few aspects. First, we include the time factor that is crucial for some real options. Second, only slight adjustments are required to cope with market changes, or jumps. Finally, the strategies thus derived can be extensively and flexibly applied to other real options which incur multi-stage contingent payoffs, and whose price processes are characterized by stochastic jump-diffusion process. / Lai Neng. / "October 2000." / Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 62-01, Section: A, page: 0270. / Supervisor: Ko Wang. / Thesis (Ph.D.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2000. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 184-192). / Electronic reproduction. Hong Kong : Chinese University of Hong Kong, [2012] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web. / Electronic reproduction. Ann Arbor, MI : ProQuest dissertations and theses, [200-] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web. / School code: 1307.