Graduate School of Business Leadership / MBL

Graduate School of Business Leadership / MBL

This theses examines the process of the order in companies, whose main specialization is the projecting in construction. The study analyses the position of project and architectonical office on the market and process of order based on analysis of related activities. The thesis consists of following parts: theoretical, analytical and practical. Theoretical part describes and clarifies the main concepts and terminology related to the topic. Analytical part analyses current state of the company, i.e. its inner and outer conditions and subsequently, and also the process of concrete contract. The goal of the analysis is to suggest own solutions, which should help to improve the current state of the company. The conditions of the realization and benefits are part of the suggested solution.

En Irak et en Afghanistan, les EEI (engins explosifs improvisés) ont durement atteint les matériels militaires et les soldats occidentaux. Cette confrontation entre haute et faible technicité soulève la question des choix techniques. Les rapports institutionnels et les acteurs mettent habituellement en avant deux raisons pour justifier le choix de la haute technicité : la nécessité de jouir d'une supériorité technique sur l'adversaire pour vaincre, et l'imprévisibilité des futures interventions militaires. L'étude de terrain sur le système de missile antichars Milan et son successeur temporaire, le Javelin, montre que les combattants ne lient pas la polyvalence à la technicité, et que leur travail est en train d'être fonctionnalisé. En effet, les concepteurs (États-majors, DGA, industriels) ont recours à l'approche systémique pour améliorer la cohérence entre matériels et accroître la performance d'ensemble. Cette approche s'inspire de la rationalité managériale, qui pénètre de plus en plus le milieu militaire. Or, les combattants réinventent souvent leurs matériels du fait du caractère imprédictible des conflits, et la puissance née de cette rationalité gestionnaire se révèle sur le terrain en partie fragile et déréalisée. La complexité ressentie par les acteurs à propos des armements contemporains serait alors le révélateur d'une évolution technique hors sol et hors du temps commun, distante des êtres humains concrets. / In Iraq and in Afghanistan, IEDs (improvised explosive devices) severely hit Western military equipment and personnel. This high-tech / low-tech face-off raises questions about technical choices. Institutional reports and actors usually justify the choice of high technicity on two grounds: the need to have technical superiority over rivals to win and the uncertainty surrounding future military interventions. A ground study about the Milan antitank missile system and his temporary successor, the Javelin, revealed versatility is not related to technicity in users' mind, and showed servants are being functionalised. Indeed, designers (military HQs, DGA, private industries) have opted for a systemic approach to increase consistency among equipment and gain in overall performance. Users have got considered as a piece of the system — serving a function. This approach owes much to managerial rationality, which has pervaded the military organisation to a high degree. However, fighters often re-invent their equipment role due to war unpredictability, while power delivered by managerial rationality proves to be partly fragile and derealised. Complexity actors detect about contemporary weapons seems to be a pointer of a technical evolution carried out above ground and beyond time, remote from concrete human beings.