Thesis (D.S.)--University of London, 1915. / Microfilmed for preservation. DNLM Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (D. S.)--University of London, 1915. / Bibliographical foot-notes.

The commonsense practice of explaining and predicting behavior by reference to propositional attitude states such as beliefs and desires has recently come under attack. It is said that such belief/desire psychology is a folk theory, vulnerable to being shown false, and replaceable by a neuroscientific or computational theory. I argue herein that this eliminativist attack on commonsense propositional attitude psychology (CPA psychology) is poorly motivated, and I present positive arguments to the effect that CPA psychology constitutes an independently legitimate descriptive and explanatory practice or theory. I argue that even if CPA psychology and its embedded propositional attitude notions should prove irreducible to anything stateable in the language of physical or computational theory, this is not by itself any reason for thinking that CPA psychology is illegitimate or ought to be eliminated. In addition to arguing against eliminativism, I explicate and evaluate two non-reductionist alternatives to eliminativism: the "intentional stance" theory of Daniel C. Dennett, and the property dualism of Donald Davidson and Stephen Schiffer. I argue that the latter gives a better account than the former of how propositional attitude states can enter into true causal explanations of action. Taking mental properties to supervene upon physically-realized computational properties of organisms, I argue, secures a non-superfluous explanatory role for mental properties. One problem for such a supervenience thesis is the "wide" individuation of propositional content properties. I discuss this problem and conclude that it presents no insurmountable obstacle to taking content to play a role in causal explanation. The upshot of the dissertation is that propositional attitudes as explanatory notions can neither be reduced nor eliminated; we must count propositional attitude states as legitimate explanatory constructs despite the "open texture" of propositional attitude properties. I close the dissertation with a discussion of Hilary Putnam's arguments for conclusions remarkably similar to my own.

This thesis, which is in two parts, attempts to interpret in moral and spiritual terms those responses to bereavement that are often described as psychological. In part one human development is considered comparing religious, philosophical, scientific and psychological theories and a model of the 'core self' is proposed (body, mind and emotions) which responds to social and cultural influences in ways that can be considered moral and spiritual. Theories of duty, consequence and virtue are considered as well as Kohlberg's theory of justice reasoning and Gilligan's views about caring. Within spirituality notions of dualism and continuitydiscontinuity are noted and a tripartite view of spirituality as human, devotional and practical is proposed. The notion of stages in both moral and spiritual development is dismissed in favour of a model of inter-relatedness and interconnectedness, and a bereavement model of adaptation is also suggested to describe the process of grieving which is likened to development. Part two describes the research methods used to obtain data from 169 respondents: 28 children (5-11 years), 99 young people (11-18 years) and 42 adults, including key interviews with four 16/17 year old girls whose parent and/or sibling had died. Respondents discuss traditional religious beliefs and practices; the concept of a loving and/or just God; having a sense of the presence of the deceased; spiritualism and near-death experiences; 'living for the moment'; increased awareness of and empathy with other grieving people; constraints on hurting or harming people; valuing of life itself; funeral attendance, and the response of school staff to bereaved pupils.This study highlights the need for initial teacher training and ongoing INSET on bereavement issues and suggests that research is needed concerning pupil and staff opinions and experiences, and evaluation of school policies. The establishment of an educational centre for resources and information on loss, death and bereavement is also proposed.

The job of the clinical psychologist has been described as that of the 'scientist-practitioner', giving the impression that, in broad terms, it involves the practical application of psychological knowledge in a clinical setting. This study commences by critically examining the values of the 'science' and of the 'practice' involved, and reviewing the available literature on the religious values of clinical psychologists, prior to reporting an empirical investigation of the connections drawn by a group of Christian clinical psychologists working within the UK National Health Service, between their work, their professional values, and their religious commitment.The data on these values connections were gathered in an oblique rather than a direct fashion: the fourteen psychologists who participated, completed a repertory grid which measured their construing of situations at work in which they were highly conscious of their religious commitment. In a semi-stuctured interview, they spoke freely and personally about their understanding of the particular groupings of 'constructs' and 'elements' identified statistically by factoring the grid ratings.Five main themes emerged from a grounded theory qualitative analysis of the interview transcripts. These described workplace issues of enhanced performance and spiritual support; religious disclosure to colleagues, and to clients; value clash; value congruence; and the sense of broader involvement as psychologists who were also members of the Christian community. My overall understanding of what participants said about their grid results, was that these issues might most appropriately be interpreted as dimensions, on which they found themselves occupying variable rather than 'set' positions. Based upon this, I propose a tentative model of the connections between their religious and their work values, as the experience within the workplace, of perpetually shifting positions on the various dimensions identified by the analysis.Consideration is given to the shortcomings and to the implications of the study, and to reflections upon my own involvement as researcher. It is concluded that the status of the results reported, may best be as stimulus for the many lines of further investigation to which they could give rise.

The aim of this essay is to explore the potential for an epistemology consistent with eliminative materialism based on work in connectionist modeling. / I present a review of the connectionist approach to psychological models that contrasts it with the classical symbolic approach, focusing on the nature of their respective representations. While defending the legitimacy of the connectionist approach, I find that its most useful application is as a basis for neuroscientific investigation. / Discussing connectionist psychology, I find it inconsistent with folk psychology and therefore consistent with eliminative materialism. I argue also for the naturalization of epistemology and thus for the relevance of psychology for epistemology. The conclusion of the essay is an outline of connectionist epistemology, which centres around two mathematical analyses of the global activity of connectionist networks; I argue that connectionist psychology leads to a version of epistemic pragmatism.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Wisconsin--Madison, 1968. / Typescript. Vita. eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliography.

D.Phil. (Psychology) / In the first part of the thesis the need for theory development in psychology is sketched by a review of the relevant literature, thus justifying the necessity of theoretical research in psychology. The appropriate method for theory development - comparative metatheoretical analysis - is delineated, and situated against the background of two major approaches to theory development in psychology: the transcendental and the empirical. The key terms that form the basis of most of the analyses are defined, and the aim and scope of the thesis is briefly stated. The second part consists of a review of the competing philosophical views regarding theorizing and scientific inquiry in the social sciences, with the goal of developing an adequate metatheory for psychology. It starts with a historical overview of developments in the philosophy of science, emphasizing issues that are relevant to psychology. The development of scientific realism is reviewed, with a specific focus upon McMullin's empirical argument in favour of realism, and Bhaskar's transcendental justification of realism. It is also shown how realism was adapted by Bhaskar in order to suit the social sciences. Social constructionism the diametric opposite of realism - is then reviewed, as well as the intermediate positions of Manicas and Rosenberg, and Layder. These positions are all critically evaluated, and a choice in favour of a realism as the most appropriate metatheory for social science and psychology is made. In the third part of the thesis the principles of the realist position are developed further and applied to psychology. In this regard, a framework is developed to assess the epistemic status of psychology as a distinctive and legitimate social science, when seen in relation to the other social sciences. The implications of a stratified reality for psychological explanation is examined, and these implications are also linked to psychology' 5 distinctive subject matter and domain of investigation. The epistemic status of psychological explanation in relation to ordinary language accounts is examined, and the influence of stratification in psychological explanation is analyzed. A substantive realist position for psychology is then developed, which starts with a brief review of Manicas and Secord's realist position. The realist position developed has some differences in emphasis when compared to that of Bhaskar, most notably as far as the notion of structural explanation is concerned. Four theoretical case studies the theoretical debate between Guilford and Eysenck, Gustaffson 's structure-of-intellect theory, Campbell and Fiske's validational model,and cross-cultural ability research in Africa - are used to illustrate the thesis that psychological theories are in fact realist explanations aimed at approximating the causes of observed effects. This development of a substantive realist position is followed by a comprehensive analysis of the epistemic power of psychological theories. This analysis is initiated by distinguishing between various levels of causal explanation in psychology, and a framework of levels of causal explanation is developed and linked to the notion of explanatory power. The realist view of psychological theories also entails that psychological theories are seen as having certain epistemic characteristics, and these characteristics can also be seen as evaluative criteria. A model for theory evaluation in psychology is developed in which these criteria are subsumed, whereby theories can be evaluated according to two major axes of evaluation: an axis assessing the epistemic gains effected by any given theory; and an axis which assesses the influence of external factors (or the social domain) upon the epistemic status of a theory. The utility of the model is demonstrated by two applications: a preliminary assessment of Sternberg's theory of human reasoning, and an extended case study which charts the development of Festinger' s theory of cognitive dissonance, and which culminates in the evaluation of the theory. The epistemic gains achieved by the model for theory evaluation are discussed, and the thesis concludes with an afterword where the benefits and limitations of the investigation are discussed.

M.A. (Clinical Psychology) / The point of view followed in this study is that people create, through dialogue, contexts of consensus in terms of their ideas. These cognitive contexts, of which they were co-creators, comprise their realities. Various, divergent theories exist within the field of psychology. In this study an' attempt was made to illustrate how, by means if the recommended point of view, it becomes possible to comprehend the simultaneous existence of different theories. By first dividing theories into two groups, namely linear- and circular epistemology, it was demonstrated that each epistemology has ideas of its own, as well as a language of its own, for conveying these ideas. Thereafter, it was suggested that epistemologists co-create their own contexts of reality with their ideas through the process of languaging about these ideas. In the light of this it was suggested that the idea of any epistemology or theory being regarded as a domain of cognitive consensus, which was co-created by the epistemologist/s, becomes viable.

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