The notion that we are voluntary agents who exercise power to choose and, in doing so, determine some of what happens in the world has been an important notion in certain theological accounts concerning our relationship with God (e.g. 'the freewill defence' for God's goodness and omnipotence in light of moral evil and accounts of human moral responsibility in relation to God). However, it has been claimed that the physicalism supported by contemporary neuroscience research calls into question human voluntary agency and, with it, human power to choose. Emergentist (or non-reductive physicalist) accounts of psychological phenomena have been presented as a way of reconciling the physicalism supported by contemporary neuroscience and the theologically important notion of human power to choose. But there are several issues that remain for the plausibility of the required kind of emergentist account; namely - Does recent neuroscience research show that voluntary agency is an illusion? and Is there evidence for neurophysiological causes which, along with neurophysiological conditions, determine all we do? In this dissertation I set out to address these issues and, in doing so, present an account of voluntary agency as power to choose in the state of being aware of alternatives. I argue that this account allows for the notion that human beings determine some of what happens in a way that is consistent with what contemporary neuroscience shows. Thus, contemporary neuroscience does not undermine this notion of human voluntary agency; or, then, the predominant theological view that we are morally responsible in our relationship with God.

Over the last two decades, research has identified factors that foster versus undermine human motivation and well being with important implications for learning and performance. Much of the research is concerned with intrinsic versus extrinsic motivation and autonomous versus non-autonomous learning environments. The data suggests that learning and performance are often significantly enhanced in autonomy-supportive environments that foster intrinsic motivational perspectives. This study examines the lived experience of Abraham Lincoln in the context of his adult learning motivation, forming a qualitative narrative around his adult educational experiences. It was hypothesized that Abraham Lincoln benefited from learning experiences with high levels of both intrinsic motivation and autonomy-supportive contexts. Results indicate that Abraham Lincoln experienced near total autonomy in his learning activities and that most of his adult learning activities were intrinsically-motivated. A discussion section explores the relevance of the findings to select topics in adult education.

Since the advent of human consciousness all manner of theoreticians from mystics to philosophers, and linguists to scientists have considered why and how it is that an individuated self seems to occupy or indwell a physical body. There is a common experiential sense, in other words, in which personal consciousness and our bodies are felt to be two different things. Two broad areas of opinion attempting to explain this apparent bifurcation are defined for the purpose of addressing this problem: Essentialists who variously maintain that there are non-physical properties inherent to all forms and functions of physicality; and Physicalists who claim that the extant universe as a multiplicity of complex material processes is the only reality. The respective natures of body and mind and the ways in which they relate has yielded an extraordinary variety of hypotheses within and between these two broad categories. In this thesis the dilemma is called the Hard Problem and it focuses particularly on the relationship between consciousness and the brain. Recently, Ken Wilber has constructed an Integral Philosophy which attempts a synergistic gradation of all possible genres of experience and knowledge into one cohesive scheme representing the total Reality. The culminating point of Wilber’s theory claims resolution of the Hard Problem, indeed of all appearances of duality, in the realisation of consummate emptiness in mystical consciousness. Wilber’s proposal therefore tenders a version of Essentialism since it implies that an Absolute principle is inherent to all existence. The problem explored in this study considers whether the epistemological architecture of Wilber’s Philosophy is coherent and consistent. Following a critical appraisal of Wilber’s system it is proposed that epistemological coherence is more likely to be achieved by retaining the ontology of consciousness and matter to only one kind. In this way the scientific protocols which Wilber imports to validate his truth-claims are protected from ontological confusion. Whether this non-dual Physicalism is adequate as a means of explaining consciousness, and particularly mystical consciousness, is moot. Perhaps there remains an inalienable quality in mysticism which will always elude our ability to apprehend it. / Christian Sprituality, Church History and Missiology / D. Th. (Christian Spirituality)

Text in Afrikaans / Die verhaal wat hier vertel word is die van 'n jongeling wat sy ouerhuis verlaat om vir homself te sorg. Dit is die verhaal van die postmodernistiese wetenskaplike wat na 'n tydperk van modernistiese adolessensie moet afstand doen van die geborgenheid van sy kosmiese bestaan om 'n volwasse selfaangewesenheid nate streef. Maar wanneer hy homself (be)vind as die ek wat elke psigo-fisiese en rasioneel-empiriese werklikheid voorafgaan, is dit net om te ontdek dat hierdie ek nog ervaring nog wese is, dat hy hier niks anders (is) nie as 'n verwantskap van hierdie lewe met die dood. Om iets hiervan te begryp moet hy homself as 'n Lacaanse fallus aanskou. Hy is die beeld van die lewensvloed wat sy rol slegs in versluiering kan speel. Sy konstruksie verg altyd alreeds sy destruksie. Al wat (is) is sy masker, 'n persona, 'n vertolkte karakter waaraan die vertolking onttrek en 'n onbeslisbaarheid gepredikeer word · 'n bepaalde/bepalende dekonstruksie. / The story told here is one of a lad who leaves his parental home to take care of himself. It is the story of the postmodern scientist who after a period of modernistic adolescence must give up the safe security of his cosmic existence in the quest for an adult self reliance. But when he finds himself as the I who precedes every psychophysical and rational-empirical reality, it is only to discover that this I is neither experience nor being, that here he (is) nothing but the relationship of this life with death. In order to grasp something of this, he has to see himself as a Lacanian phallus.He is the image of the vital flow that can play its role only when veiled. His construction always already requires his destruction. What (is) is his mask, a persona, an interpreted character from whom the interpretation is being withdrawn and an undecidability predicated- a determinated/determinating deconstruction. / Psychology / D. Phil (Sielkunde)

Orientador: Oswaldo Giacoia Júnior / Tese (doutorado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas / Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-25T10:35:10Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Machado_BrunoMartins_D.pdf: 2434097 bytes, checksum: b96f84372054d404807b2f07636b5d11 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2013 / Resumo: A presente tese de doutoramento tem como propósito analisar e justificar a emergência e a importância da noção de psicologia dentro do projeto filosófico nietzscheano a partir do primeiro aforismo de Humano, Demasiado Humano. Ao observarmos o conjunto do programa, percebe-se que o filosofo anunciou no primeiro aforismo do livro de 1878 tanto um projeto, quanto um plano interpretativo. Portanto, ao analisar MA I 01, tem-se contato (i) com a natureza da empresa crítica nietzscheana, (ii) com os termos de sua proposta metodológica e (iii) com o alcance positivo de sua perspectiva teórica. Esses três fatores apontariam para dois conceitos fundamentais em sua filosofia: história e psicologia. Defendemos que tanto a história quanto a psicologia denotam a influência de Paul Rée como um dos interlocutores mais presentes na obra de Nietzsche desse período. A determinação da psicologia, oriunda das exigências metodológicas trazidas pela filosofia histórica, remete à pergunta pela emergência das significações e das construções provenientes dos chamados sentimentos morais. Nesse curso, Nietzsche produziu sua filosofia sobre um solo psicológico em que as sensações e os sentimentos funcionariam como os elementos empíricos constitutivos das coisas humanas / Abstract: This doctoral thesis aims at analysing and justifying the coming to light and the importance of the notion of psychology within Nietzsche's philosophical project, departing from the first aphorism of Human All Too Human. When one observes this program as a whole, one realizes that Nietzsche has announced in the first aphorism of the 1878 book at the same time a project and a plan of interpretation. Analysing, therefore, MA I 01, one approaches (i) the nature of Nietzsche's critical undertaking, (ii) the terms of his methodological proposition and (iii) the positive scope of his theorietical perspective. All of these three elements would indicate fundamental philosophical concepts: history and psychology. Such determinations denote the especial influence of Paul Rée as one of the most present philosophical interlocutors of Nietzsche's life. The determination of psychology which comes to light in virtue of methodological demandings (historical philosophy) leads back to the question concerning the coming to light of the meanings and productions grounded in moral sentiments. Thus, on this way Nietzsche elaborated his philosophie on the ground of the psychology, where the sensations and the sentiments could be taken as the empirical elements which constitute human things / Doutorado / Filosofia / Doutor em Filosofia

The knowledge base of empirical psychology is more expansive than ever before. So too is the impulse to integrate this factual knowledge into political theory. But how should this psychological turn be undertaken? What would a political psychology for political theorists look like? How could psychology credibly tackle the questions that political theorists characteristically ask, especially regarding the nature and consequences of prescriptive political judgment? In this thesis, I explore this issue through the framework of recent debates between political moralists—specifically, John Rawls, G. A. Cohen, and Peter Singer—and political realists—largely Bernard Williams. Deploying the insights of political realists, I argue that moralists cannot quarantine the relevance of psychological facts through the ideal of a 'pure' normative judgment. To explore what this empirical engagement might look like, I contrast these moralist ideals of judgment with Jonathan Haidt’s social intuitionism, which proposes a more affectively laden and pluralistic model of judgment. I then redeploy the insights of political realism to critique social intuitionism, to uncover its weaknesses from the perspective of existing political theory. Finally, to stabilize this critique, I lay out the framework for a reflexive political psychology, which acknowledges the co-constitutive relationship between the discipline of psychology and its subject matter: human psychology. This reflexive political psychology offers an agenda by which we can investigate the political usefulness of psychological and political theories.

Le thème de l’affectivité parcourt l’œuvre de Sartre de part en part, de son premier essai de psychologie phénoménologique à sa dernière biographie existentielle. Le but de nos recherches est de dévoiler la tension qui se joue, au cœur de cette thématique, entre une liberté revendiquée et une passivité intrusive. Nous avons entrepris cette étude selon une démarche génétique et chronologique circonscrite en trois cadres de travail qui, au sein du projet sartrien global d’investigation de la réalité-humaine, sont à chaque fois axés sur une méthode particulière de compréhension de l’individu. Nous envisageons d’abord sa psychologie phénoménologique, soit les premiers pas de Sartre en philosophie, puis son ontologie phénoménologique, pour terminer par la mise en application de sa psychanalyse existentielle dans ses biographies. D’un cadre à l’autre, Sartre reprend, complète, fonde, abandonne, modifie ou encore infléchit ses conceptions de l’émotion, de la spontanéité, de la captivité, du psychique, de la passivité, des rapports affectifs avec autrui, de l’affectivité originelle, de l’aliénation. Au cours des textes se déploie une philosophie qui pense toujours plus profondément l’affectivité humaine :partant d’une conscience spontanée sans passé, sans histoire, sans contrainte, en commerce usuel avec un monde aux qualités affectives préexistantes, passant par une conscience maîtresse absolue d’elle-même dans les limites que se donne sa liberté, captivée au sein d’un libre projet qui scelle son destin affectif, Sartre aboutit à une émotivité aliénée, intériorisée par un individu enraciné dans un monde où il se fait être ce qu’on a fait de lui. <p> / Doctorat en Philosophie / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished