The submitted publications address aspects of 'The Physicality of the Self from a psychoanalytic perspective and in so doing extend the remit of psychoanalytic thinking. Conscious and unconscious investment of personal meaning in physical exercise, body-oriented behaviour and physical dimensions of experience and communication is explored through presentation and discussion of clinical case examples and infant observation material. The embodied nature of our being is identified as an issue of key significance in psychoanalysis, where unconscious communication, much of which is non-verbal, is a central concern of both theory and practice. Ways of conceptualising psychosomatic disturbance are discussed, whether the disturbance emerges in physical symptoms without apparent organic underlay or in disturbed body-oriented behaviour such as eating disorders and self-injury. With regard to clinical practice, the central significance of receptivity to unconscious communication and capacity for containment (Bion 1962) is reaffirmed. The therapist's 'use of body' as part of the 'use of self Is discussed with particular reference to somatic communication in the transference - countertransference matrix. The primary context for the work is a contemporary object relations framework. The perspective on embodiment or'indwelling' developed by D. W. Winnicott and the post- Kleinian concept of 'psychic skin' are of particular Importance. The disciplines of philosophy, psychology, neuroscience and sociology constitute a secondary, broader, context and inform the discussion of changing perspectives on 'mind', 'body', 'health' and'illness'. A'continuum' model of self-care and self-harm is developed. The acronym 'cashas' is introduced to refer to 'culturally accepted self-harming acts/activities', behaviours which occupy a border area between good enough self-care and clinically relevant self-harm. Drawing on clinical material and research Involving practitioner discussion of clinical vignettes, arguments are advanced for the relevance and clinical usefulness of the 'continuum' model.

Thesis (M.A.)--University of Canterbury, 2008. / Typescript (photocopy). Includes bibliographical references (leaves 86-93). Also available via the World Wide Web.

This dissertation is about moral cognition and the production of spiritual experiences in the Chinese version of the massively multiplayer online game, World of Warcraft (CWoW). Chapter 1 introduces the game, field sites, data collection methods, and the questions and paradigms that structure the dissertation's narrative. This chapter explains that during fieldwork CWoW players frequently described gameplay as yielding positive moral and spiritual experiences. Chapter 2 outlines the cognitive mechanisms – Haidt and Joseph's 'moral foundations' (2004; 2007) – that are hypothesised to inform the in-game experiences to which players attributed moral significance. Chapter 3 argues that some aspects of the WoW gameworld are high in cognitive 'relevance' (following Sperber & Wilson, 1986) for Haidt and Joseph's moral foundations. This relevance yields the game a capacity for cross-cultural appeal. Chapter 4 argues that social agencies operant in the lives of CWoW players motivated players to utilise these morally relevant aspects of gameplay as a 'religion-like tool for group cohesion' (following Sosis & Alcorta, 2008). These extra-game agencies help explain why these aspects of gameplay were cultivated in lieu of, or as superordinate to, aspects that may be 'relevant' to other cognitive mechanisms. Chapter 5 argues that reports of soul merger experiences obtained in CWoW resemble Durkheim’s 'collective effervescence' (Durkheim, 1995 [1912]) and may be understood at the cognitive level as 'flow' (Csikszentmihalyi, 1990) experiences conjoined with affective outputs from Haidt and Joseph's moral foundations. Chapter 6 summarises the key points made in the preceding chapters and concludes that in the contexts sampled here, high-contingency aspects of CWoW gameplay may be viewed as Durkheimian religious rituals.

Submitted by Filipe dos Santos (fsantos@pucsp.br) on 2018-11-12T10:55:13Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Nathália Perin.pdf: 2093092 bytes, checksum: f93448d98462eb30e255b35a016f6649 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2018-11-12T10:55:13Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Nathália Perin.pdf: 2093092 bytes, checksum: f93448d98462eb30e255b35a016f6649 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2018-09-04 / The term "Ontopsychology" emerge for the first time in Maslow's book, "Introduction to the Psychology of Being". From this work and with the influence of philosophy, psychoanalysis, Husserl's phenomenology and the existential-humanist current, Antonio Meneghetti develops Ontopsychology and one of its instruments, ontopsychological psychotherapy. Because this is a recent practice of the contemporary clinic and little diffused, this study aims to present the bibliographic production in Ontopsychology and the proposition of ontopsychological psychotherapy based on the work of Antonio Meneghetti and the other authors. The objective was to clarify not only the Ontopsychology, but more specifically the propositions of ontopsychological psychotherapy. For this, the method used was first a bibliographical review of the work of Antonio Meneghetti and later a bibliographic mapping characterized as state of the art of the other authors. This research aims to contribute to making this knowledge accessible, available even to other practices and lines of psychotherapy, also serving as support for new research and for the scientific community in general. As a quantitative result, in the bibliographic review of Meneghetti's work, in a universe of 92 books, 13 copies were selected, dating from 1989 to 2015. In the survey of the other authors' productions in Ontopsicologia, a total of 498 bibliographies produced between 2007 and 2018, among which Ontopsychology is cited, treated or as a paradigm or object of study. In this universe, 27 were selected on ontopsychological psychotherapy, equivalent to 5.4%. The qualitative results point out that Ontopsychology is an interdisciplinary epistemic science and presents three important findings: semantic field, deflection monitor and ontic Inself (its epistemic criterion). His vision of man conceives him as a unit of historical-spiritual action, which constitutes a terrestrial and also spiritual, ontic event. It has several instruments of intervention, among them the ontopsychological psychotherapy. It was identified by this research that ontopsychological psychotherapy, is characterized by its uniqueness of being an authentication psychotherapy. The term "authentic" is understood according to the capacity to be equal to how the being puts us. It enables man to increase his level of consciousness, to develop the capacity to recognize, among all the possibilities he has in life, those that are in conformity with his own essence. Another important field of research in Ontopsychology is the relationship between energy and image, and one of the premises is that psychic intentionality is formalized through images. The techniques of analysis and intervention are differentiated and allow to know the whole man, verifying if his psychic activity gives the ontological nexus / O termo “Ontopsicologia” surge pela primeira vez no livro de Maslow (1980), “Introdução a psicologia do ser”. A partir dessa obra e com a influência da filosofia, da psicanálise, da fenomenologia de Husserl e da corrente existencial-humanista, Antonio Meneghetti desenvolve a Ontopsicologia e um dos seus instrumentos, a psicoterapia ontopsicológica. Por se tratar de uma prática recente da clínica contemporânea e pouco difundida, este estudo tem como objetivo apresentar a produção bibliográfica em Ontopsicologia e a proposição da psicoterapia ontopsicológica com base na obra de Antonio Meneghetti e dos demais autores. O objetivo visou esclarecer não apenas o pensamento da Ontopsicologia, mas mais especificamente as proposições da psicoterapia ontopsicológica. Para tanto, o método utilizado foi primeiramente uma revisão bibliográfica da obra de Antonio Meneghetti e posteriormente um mapeamento bibliográfico caracterizado como estado da arte dos demais autores. Essa pesquisa pretende contribuir para tornar esse conhecimento acessível, disponível inclusive para outras práticas e linhas de psicoterapia, servindo também de apoio para novas pesquisas e para a comunidade científica em geral. Como resultados quantitativos, na revisão bibliográfica da obra de Meneghetti, em um universo de 92 livros, foram selecionados 13 exemplares, que datam entre os anos de 1989 e de 2015. No levantamento das produções dos demais autores em Ontopsicologia, localizou-se um total de 498 bibliografias produzidas entre os anos de 2007 a 2018, dentre as quais a Ontopsicologia é citada, tratada ou como paradigma ou como objeto de estudo. Nesse universo, foram selecionadas 27 sobre psicoterapia ontopsicológica, equivalente a 5,4%. Os resultados qualitativos apontam que a Ontopsicologia é uma ciência epistêmica interdisciplinar e apresenta três importantes descobertas: campo semântico, monitor de deflexão e Em Si ôntico (seu critério epistêmico). A sua visão de homem o concebe como uma unidade de ação histórico-espiritual, que se constitui em acontecimento terrestre e também espiritual, ôntico. Possui diversos instrumentos de intervenção, dentre eles a psicoterapia ontopsicológica. Identificou-se por essa pesquisa que a psicoterapia ontopsicológica, caracteriza-se pela sua singularidade de ser uma psicoterapia de autenticação. O termo “autêntico” é entendido segundo a capacidade de ser igual a como o ser nos põe. Possibilita então que o homem aumente o seu nível de consciência, que desenvolva a capacidade de reconhecer, dentre todas as possibilidades que tem na vida, aquelas que são em conformidade com a sua própria essência. Outro importante campo de pesquisa na Ontopsicologia é a relação entre energia e imagem, sendo que uma das premissas é que a intencionalidade psíquica se formaliza por meio das imagens. As técnicas de análise e de intervenção são diferenciadas e permitem conhecer o homem por inteiro, verificando se a sua atividade psíquica dá o nexo ontológico

Past research into optimism and pessimism has tended to view these constructs as polar opposites of a fixed personality trait that function in mutually exclusive ways. In the field of child development in particular, this has led to theory-driven work that not only accepts this dichotomy but also uses it to drive and explicate larger issues of resilience and vulnerability. The current thesis challenges the assumptions underpinning this conceptual framework, and, through the use of divergent methodologies, seeks to establish children’s optimism as a dynamic and adaptive process with predictive value during the developmental period. In the first two studies, predictors and correlates of putative dispositional optimism and pessimism in children and adolescents were examined. A significant age-related decline in optimism was found, but importantly a degree of functional independence between optimism and pessimism was also observed. The third study elicited more specific optimistic expectancies using a vignette methodology. This was seen to share some congruence with the earlier measures of dispositional optimism, but the study also elucidated some of the parameters and realism constraining children’s optimism. Again an age-related decline in optimism was demonstrated that was distinct from any associated changes in pessimism. The fourth and final study involved a pilot examination of the dimensionality of the optimism construct, confirming its functional independence from pessimism, and also demonstrating the fluidity and receptivity of children’s optimistic processes from an intervention perspective. From these various studies, it is concluded that optimistic and pessimistic processes in children and adolescents reflect functionally distinct pathways and drive different aspects of vulnerability and well-being. A reconfiguration of the extant theory in this area seems warranted. Based on this conceptual and methodological critique, a preliminary proposal is put forward towards a more substantive approach to the development of optimism and pessimism during childhood and adolescence. / http://proxy.library.adelaide.edu.au/login?url= http://library.adelaide.edu.au/cgi-bin/Pwebrecon.cgi?BBID=1317136 / Thesis (Ph.D.) -- University of Adelaide, School of Psychology, 2008

This thesis concerns two main questions: What is intuition? And can it be a source of knowledge or justification? In addressing these questions, it advances several ongoing philosophical debates, and does so in two main ways: firstly, by formulating a general account of the nature of intuitive judgement that establishes common ground amongst the often disparate views of scholars working on intuition (or intuitions) in psychology, linguistics, philosophy and various other disciplines; and, secondly, by developing a new epistemological position that combines scepticism about the evidential value of intuition with a new account of philosophical skill. The general account of the nature of intuitive judgement mainly consists in drawing a distinction between intuitive judgement and intuitive appearance which is analogous to a distinction that can be drawn between perceptual judgement and perceptual appearance. It is argued that a common type of paradox entails the distinction for the non-perceptual case; it is then demonstrated how various related notions, such as intuitive belief, intuitive thinking and intuition as a cognitive faculty, can be derived from the notion of intuitive judgement. The epistemological account receives additional support from a new theory regarding the objects of intuition, according to which the analogy between intuition and perception holds specifically for what is sometimes called 'aspect perception': it is argued that some intuitive appearances are partially constituted by an appearance of meaning and that, consequently, the analysis of intuitive judgement must distinguish between two types of object, an intentional object (typically, a thought) and a causal one (typically, an expression of thought). It is further argued that the focus on evidential value that has been prevalent in the philosophical literature is too restrictive. By contrast with the prevalent view, it is demonstrated that intuition plays a significant role in human thinking, including in philosophical and scientific enquiry, independently of whether intuition is of great or only of minimal evidential value.

Since the advent of human consciousness all manner of theoreticians from mystics to philosophers, and linguists to scientists have considered why and how it is that an individuated self seems to occupy or indwell a physical body. There is a common experiential sense, in other words, in which personal consciousness and our bodies are felt to be two different things. Two broad areas of opinion attempting to explain this apparent bifurcation are defined for the purpose of addressing this problem: Essentialists who variously maintain that there are non-physical properties inherent to all forms and functions of physicality; and Physicalists who claim that the extant universe as a multiplicity of complex material processes is the only reality. The respective natures of body and mind and the ways in which they relate has yielded an extraordinary variety of hypotheses within and between these two broad categories. In this thesis the dilemma is called the Hard Problem and it focuses particularly on the relationship between consciousness and the brain. Recently, Ken Wilber has constructed an Integral Philosophy which attempts a synergistic gradation of all possible genres of experience and knowledge into one cohesive scheme representing the total Reality. The culminating point of Wilber’s theory claims resolution of the Hard Problem, indeed of all appearances of duality, in the realisation of consummate emptiness in mystical consciousness. Wilber’s proposal therefore tenders a version of Essentialism since it implies that an Absolute principle is inherent to all existence. The problem explored in this study considers whether the epistemological architecture of Wilber’s Philosophy is coherent and consistent. Following a critical appraisal of Wilber’s system it is proposed that epistemological coherence is more likely to be achieved by retaining the ontology of consciousness and matter to only one kind. In this way the scientific protocols which Wilber imports to validate his truth-claims are protected from ontological confusion. Whether this non-dual Physicalism is adequate as a means of explaining consciousness, and particularly mystical consciousness, is moot. Perhaps there remains an inalienable quality in mysticism which will always elude our ability to apprehend it. / Christian Sprituality, Church History & Missiology / D. Th. (Christian Spirituality)

Text in Afrikaans / Die verhaal wat hier vertel word is die van 'n jongeling wat sy ouerhuis verlaat om vir homself te sorg. Dit is die verhaal van die postmodernistiese wetenskaplike wat na 'n tydperk van modernistiese adolessensie moet afstand doen van die geborgenheid van sy kosmiese bestaan om 'n volwasse selfaangewesenheid nate streef. Maar wanneer hy homself (be)vind as die ek wat elke psigo-fisiese en rasioneel-empiriese werklikheid voorafgaan, is dit net om te ontdek dat hierdie ek nog ervaring nog wese is, dat hy hier niks anders (is) nie as 'n verwantskap van hierdie lewe met die dood. Om iets hiervan te begryp moet hy homself as 'n Lacaanse fallus aanskou. Hy is die beeld van die lewensvloed wat sy rol slegs in versluiering kan speel. Sy konstruksie verg altyd alreeds sy destruksie. Al wat (is) is sy masker, 'n persona, 'n vertolkte karakter waaraan die vertolking onttrek en 'n onbeslisbaarheid gepredikeer word · 'n bepaalde/bepalende dekonstruksie. / The story told here is one of a lad who leaves his parental home to take care of himself. It is the story of the postmodern scientist who after a period of modernistic adolescence must give up the safe security of his cosmic existence in the quest for an adult self reliance. But when he finds himself as the I who precedes every psychophysical and rational-empirical reality, it is only to discover that this I is neither experience nor being, that here he (is) nothing but the relationship of this life with death. In order to grasp something of this, he has to see himself as a Lacanian phallus.He is the image of the vital flow that can play its role only when veiled. His construction always already requires his destruction. What (is) is his mask, a persona, an interpreted character from whom the interpretation is being withdrawn and an undecidability predicated- a determinated/determinating deconstruction. / Psychology / D. Phil (Sielkunde)

Thesis (MA (Psychology))--University of Stellenbosch, 2005. / Psychology as a human science is rendered desperate by the human vacuum in its own contents. This paper argues that by adopting the methods and techniques of the natural sciences, psychology and psychotherapy not only transform the patient or client into an a-historical and a-social entity, but also propose an utopian view of reality and lose the inherent moral character of the psychotherapeutic endeavour. It seems as if the Post-Modern theoretical and psychotherapeutic alternatives do not offer a solution that solves the above mentioned problems. This paper aims to introduce the work of the French philosopher Emmanuel Levinas, as a stimulus providing a different starting point in the search for solutions to the mentioned problems. Such an approach seeks to understand the radically ethical character of the therapeutic meeting by recognising the fundamental responsibility of the therapist, not to “totalise” (that is to reduce) otherness (the not me) into sameness (the for me) by assigning differences into pre-established characteristics, properties and categories. Only by recognising the otherness of the client in the “face-to-face meeting” and reacting to the call of the other can psychotherapy be ethical and render justice to historical and social situatedness of the other facing us in therapy. Some of the implications that the ethical challenge of Levinas holds for psychology will be explored. This includes the implications for the therapeutic meeting, psychological ethics, and the possibility of a “Levinasanian psychology”.

This thesis identifies and explores a ‘return to Freud’ in the work of Jacques Derrida. Resemblances between Derrida’s method of deconstruction and the therapeutic procedure of psychoanalysis have long been a source of debate among critics. Is deconstruction little more than a psychoanalytic reading of the history of philosophy, or is Freud a Derridean avant la lettre? Revealing this dilemma to be a false one, this thesis challenges major interpreters of Derrida such as Jonathan Culler and Gayatari Chakravorty Spivak. By developing Derrida’s well-known yet little understood concept of différance, it argues that this dilemma stems from an inadequate understanding of Derrida’s treatment of time. The structure of temporality implied by différance entails that the meaning of the past is continually reconstituted in its relationship to an ever-evolving present. Far from dissolving the importance of Freud’s contribution, this structure allows Derrida to circumvent nebulous notions of ‘influence’ and ‘indebtedness’ while still engaging psychoanalysis as a key theoretical resource in his own project of deconstruction. A productive engagement with psychoanalytic theory is shown to inform every major stage of the philosopher’s career, from his early phenomenological work to his later reflections on the terrorist attacks of 9/11. Derrida repeatedly turns to Freud as a crucial interlocutor in interrogating a number of philosophical problems encountered in his own work. These problems include the nature of time, space, and memory; the role of the fictive in scientific discourse; the question of the archive; the interdependence of the psyche and technology; and the relationship between politics and the unconscious. At a theoretical level, this thesis provides a detailed account of Derrida’s notion of spacing, arguing that the unconditional belatedness entailed by différance calls us to a difficult, dual responsibility: both towards the legator of an inheritance (that is, towards the textual legacy Freud has bequeathed to us) and towards the unforeseeable future contexts in which this inheritance will require transformation. The discourse of deconstruction, it concludes, enacts a careful negotiation of these two demands.