The work of Jean Cocteau reveals connections, similarities and differences between him and the writers of the surrealist movement. In order to appreciate the links it is also necessary to examine the principles of Surrealism to determine the extent to which they have similar origins to some of Cocteau's own ideas. This line of inquiry leads to an examination of the part played by the work of Freud and Jung in inspiring both Surrealism and Cocteau. To a certain degree one is lead to question the association between Freud and Surrealism which has often been taken for granted and to look for the origins of surrealistic thought in more specifically French sources to which Freud also had access. Whilst it is difficult to bring about a rapprochement between Cocteau and Freud, there is a much smaller problem in comparing the work of Jung and that of Cocteau. There are striking similarities which indicate not only a divergence of thought between Cocteau and the surrealists but which also tempt one to extrapolate a direct link between Cocteau and Jung for which there is virtually no direct evidence. What is achieved in comparing the two is a greater understanding of the creative method of Cocteau, of the forces which drove him, and of his basic position as a child of the 20th century, yet as a poet of all ages. One begins also to have a clearer vision of the reasons which underlie his all important interest in mythology as a source of pure emotion and distilled poetic essence. For personal rather than artistic reasons a close rapport between Cocteau and the surrealist group is unthinkable as well as generally known, so that there is an enhanced interest not only in a direct comparison but also in comparing Cocteau with artists and poets who worked close to official movement but were not, at least for very long, part of it. Garcia Lorca is a Spanish writer in this position whose ideas and background so closely, resemble Cocteau's that it is almost surprising to find that he was at least tolerated if not completely accepted by the Surrealists; his friends Dalí and and Bunuel even joined the group formally. On the other hand Cocteau's proclaimed admiration for Garcia Lorca indicated at least some feeling in not being able to participate directly in the Surrealist experience. Comparing Cocteau with Lorca necessitates an examination of the creeds and ideals of them both, highlighting aspects of poetic power and creativity in the process. It is hoped to place in the context of 20th century thought the work of both Cocteau and the Surrealists. A continuity between the second half of the nineteenth century and the twentieth century should also be established and the manner in which the First World War acts as a watershed made clear. From the study Cocteau emerges as a more consistent and deeper thinker than he is often considered. The parallels found in the work which he presented in a variety of different artistic fields coupled with the overpowering sense of mission which begins to appear, dispel for ever the myths of the careless and carefree casual adolescent dilettante and reveal instead a conscious artist, a thinking poet, a careful craftsman and a profoundly proud human figure wrought with deep seated anxieties often masqued with flippancy. Undeniably however, consciously or unconsciously, whether or not the Surrealist liked the idea, there was an affinity between them and Cocteau which was sometimes a very close link and at others flared up into an open hostility which at least indicated that they were working in the same areas. Since it was the fashion at the time to accept the view of Freud as a scientist and a medical practitioner in the field of psychiatry, a view which he himself insisted upon, it has been felt justifiable to accept it, although nowadays he is partially discredited. The concept of the subconscious is also not considered favourably although it seemed real to Freud, Jung, the Surrealists and to Cocteau. Consequently it is desirable to work within the parameters of their imagination rather than to take the stance of modern behaviourist psychiatrists whose ideas are irrelevant to the literary uses made of the work of Freud and Jung.

<p> According to C. G. Jung, the individuation process requires a reflective turn inward toward the voice of psyche, or said differently, the inner voice. The inner voice can only be heard by the individual, but that does not mean the individual must discover it alone. A Quaker practice termed the clearness committee brings a small group of people together to help an individual access her inner voice in order to find clearness regarding a life issue. This phenomenological study explores the experiences of eight people who sought the assistance of clearness committees. The focus of this research is the exploration of these people&rsquo;s essential lived experiences of being the focus person in a clearness committee. Participant narratives reveal themes from their clearness committee experiences, illuminate characteristics helpful for hearing one&rsquo;s inner voice, and uncover insights they received while exploring the nature of their issue. A phenomenological psychological method guided the analysis toward a description of the essential experience of the clearness committee. This research concludes that the interaction of the clearness committee with the individual can lead to a tension of opposites in psyche that stirs movement of the individuation process. When combined with the perspective of transformational alchemy, this study suggests that repetitive stirring of psyche is required for the individuation process.</p>

<p> Cognitive science has been beset for thirty years by foundational disputes about the nature and extension of cognition&mdash;e.g. whether cognition is necessarily representational, whether cognitive processes extend outside the brain or body, and whether plants or microbes have them. Whereas previous philosophical work aimed to settle these disputes, I aim to understand what conception of cognition scientists could share given that they disagree so fundamentally. To this end, I develop a number of variations on traditional conceptual explication, and defend a novel explication of cognition called the sensitive management hypothesis.</p><p> Since expert judgments about the extension of &ldquo;cognition&rdquo; vary so much, I argue that there is value in explication that accurately models the variance in judgments rather than taking sides or treating that variance as noise. I say of explications that accomplish this that they are <i> ecumenically extensionally adequate</i>. Thus, rather than adjudicating whether, say, plants can have cognitive processes like humans, an ecumenically adequate explication should classify these cases differently: human cognitive processes as paradigmatically cognitive, and plant processes as controversially cognitive.</p><p> I achieve ecumenical adequacy by articulating conceptual explications with <i>parameters</i>, or terms that can be assigned a number of distinct interpretations based on the background commitments of participants in a discourse. For example, an explication might require that cognition cause &ldquo;behavior,&rdquo; and imply that plant processes are cognitive or not depending on whether anything plants do can be considered &ldquo;behavior.&rdquo; Parameterization provides a unified treatment of embattled concepts by isolating topics of disagreement in a small number of parameters.</p><p> I incorporate these innovations into an account on which cognition is the &ldquo;sensitive management of organismal behavior.&rdquo; The sensitive management hypothesis is ecumenically extensionally adequate, accurately classifying a broad variety of cases as paradigmatically or controversially cognitive phenomena. I also describe an extremely permissive version of the sensitive management hypothesis, arguing that it has the potential to explain several features of cognitive scientific discourse, including various facts about the way cognitive scientists ascribe representations to cognitive systems. </p>

The purpose of this thesis is to evaluate by critical consideration the suitability of various approaches of inquiry for exploring and enhancing motivation intervention in contemporary organisations; in particular, to spell out the need for a critical systemic approach of inquiry in relation to a social context based on critical systems thinking ideas. The thesis explores the question concerning the inducements associated with motivation (to work) and what this may mean in different organisational contexts, while taking into consideration cultural differences that affect the way that motivation is addressed. Furthermore, it raises questions, about power relations in terms of processes involved in developing motivation. It also poses questions about ideological differences in the way that performance orientations may affect general lifestyles and ways of working. It is suggested in the thesis that it is important to consider motivation by looking at a diversity of motivation approaches and by seeing what can be learnt from each, and how each can be developed. It is shown how critical systemic learning can be advanced as a way of encouraging learning by means of ideology-critique. The need for a critical systemic approach to motivation is also shown by drawing on aspects of critical systems thinking and extending such thinking to cover motivation explicitly.

The philosophy of psychoanalysis is distinguished from psychoanalysis. An account of psychoanalysis is developed in progressively more detail. Recently published material is assessed, e.g., Bion's. Some older literature objects to an inaccurate account of psychoanalysis. This problem is avoided by treating the content and method of psychoanalysis as inseparable. / Psychoanalytic propositions have unequal epistemic warrant. Support and objections are found in psychoanalysis and extra-clinically. / Philosophical assessments are tied to the inherent features of both classical and contemporary psychoanalytic practice. Clinical psychoanalysis has interrelated procedures which continue to evolve. Both older and modern psychoanalysis have extra-clinical features and use concepts which have emerged from the clinical situation. / Modern clinical practice is distinguished. The evolved knowledge of countertransference, transference, projective identification, and interpretation are among its features. The analyst's function in the dyad is stressed and illustrated with recent cases. / The expanded clinical application to patients previously judged unanalyzable has produced modifications in theory. Theory is kept to a minimum and consists of flexibly linked concepts. They are a consistent development of recent practice. Some older concepts are inconsistent.

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This study explores the meaning of work by focusing on the grammar of the term working among Acadian-Americans. The Acadian-Americans offered an exceptional starting point because of their deep pride and commitment to working. While the Acadian-Americans do not represent all cultures, they show how the meaning of working is dependent on the grammar of the term. Grammar refers to Wittgenstein's idea which includes the gestures, emotions, patterns of behavior, and rules that people may use in the way they talk about a concept such as working. This would also embody how the concept is organized (Wittgenstein, 1958). A grammar is learned by acting with others in a way that is coherent and makes sense to the participants. The study shows how the “right way” of working is dependent on critical features within this community. The Coordinated Management of Meaning (CMM) developed by Pearce and Cronen (1980) is used as a theory and methodology to analyze the situated interaction of Acadian-Americans. CMM, which has been largely influenced by the work of the American pragmatists, most notably Dewey, James, and Mead, regards communication as the primary social process. The analysis explored the stories told and lived by the Acadian-Americans about working and identified the logical and moral forces that were critical in enacting episodes of action. This study focused on the aesthetical aspects of experience and how feeling and action organizes and symbolizes experience. The consummatory experience of working, an idea first explored by Dewey (1934), provided a heightened sense of identity and membership in a community of people that act and feel a certain way about working. The study concludes that working is lived action and socially constructed through situated interaction. Thus, working can take on different meanings in different contexts with its own rules and practices that guide peoples' actions. This study reveals that working is not the same in all places for all people. CMM is a practical theory, and this study in the tradition of CMM and American pragmatism, offers directions for managers and leaders outside of the academy.

Propositional attitudes, states like believing, desiring, intending, etc., have played a central role in the articulation of many of our major theories, both in philosophy and the social sciences. Until relatively recently, psychology was a prominent entry on the list of social sciences in which propositional attitudes occupied center stage. In this century, though, behaviorists began to make a self-conscious effort to expunge "mentalistic" notions from their theorizing. Behaviorism has failed. Psychology therefore is again experiencing "formative years," and two themes have caught the interest of philosophers. The first is that psychological theories evidently must exploit a vast array of relations obtaining among internal states. The second is that the use of mentalistic idioms seems to be explicit again in much of current theorizing. These two observations have led philosophers to wonder about the probable as well as the proper role of propositional attitudes in future psychological theories. Some philosophers wonder, in particular, about the role of the contents of propositional attitudes in the forthcoming theories. Their strategy is in part to discern what sorts of theory psychologists now will want to construct, and then discern what role propositional attitude contents might play in theories of those sorts. I consider here two sorts of theory, what I call minimal functional theories and what is known as propositional attitude psychology. I outline these two kinds of theory, and show how each defines a role for contents. Contents are ultimately eliminable in minimal functional theories. Although they play an apparently ineliminable role in propositional attitude psychology, they do so at an apparent cost. Propositional attitude psychology does not seem to accommodate a certain methodological principle, a principle of individualism in psychology, which is endorsed even by some of the philosophers most enamored of the approach. Such philosophers have two options: they can attempt to show that the conflict between the approach and the principle is not genuine, or they can reject the principle. I argue that the conflict is real, and recommend a qualified rejections of the principle.

(Uncorrected OCR) Abstract of thesis entitled 'William James' Psychological Philosophy' submitted by Kwok Hang Wah Yvonne for the degree of Master of Philosophy at the University of Hong Kong in November 2002 The aim of this thesis is to suggest a way to better understand William James' philosophy by recognising its relation with his evolutionary psychology. In order to clarify James' version of 'evolutionary psychology', I will present it in contrast to Herbert Spencer's biological psychology. In Chapter Two, I will discuss how Spencer establishes his development hypothesis and how he understands the mind as a biological product being modified by environmental changes. In Chapter Three, I will interpret James' argument against Spencer's ideas that the mind operates passively, and that Spencer has overlooked the subjective factors in mental development. Through the discussion, we can understand the main difference between James' and Spencer's evolutionary psychologies. The fourth chapter will focus on James' psychology of the active mind. I will offer a more detailed explanatory account of James' views of three important mental functions, namely 'discrimination', 'association' and 'conception', as well as how they operate to construct experiences. In the last chapter, I will interpret one of the topics in James' philosophical discussions, so as to illustrate his psychological view in his philosophy. The discussion will show James' views of the different i roles of perception and conception in life, and his evolutionary concern of the functional use of concepts for experience. I will then explain how these views are related to James' argument against rationalism and his position in his radical empiricism. Through these discussions, I hope to shed light on the connection between James' evolutionary psychology and his philosophical ideas, which ultimately offers a better understanding to James' philosophy. ii / abstract / toc / Philosophy / Master / Master of Philosophy