This is an explorative study into the challenges and ethical dilemmas that practitioners face when assessing the intellectual functioning of black learners. Participants were registered psychologists and intern psychologists involved in assessing black African learners. Data were collected by means of an interview schedule that had been designed for this purpose, based on the literature in the field. All participants were interviewed individually. The psychological practitioners interviewed in this study reported linguistic barriers, limited cultural knowledge, and lack of scientific validation as posing the major challenges for them in assessing black African learners. Among the ethical dilemmas that were reported were confidentiality and informed consent which were sometimes compromised by their dual responsibilities to the client and the schooling system or another third party. Forming discussion forums, development of new and appropriately normed assessment tools and incorporating relevant skills in training programs were recommended as some of the strategies to overcome these challenges and ethical dilemmas. / Thesis (M.Soc.Sci.)-University of KwaZulu-Natal, Pietermaritzburg, 2010.

Punishment is a central component of humans’ psychological repertoire: the desire to punish emerges early in life and persists across cultures and development (e.g., Carlsmith et al., 2002; Hamlin et al., 2011; Henrich et al., 2010; Smith & Warneken, 2016). Although punishment is so central to the human experience, scholars across disciplines have conceptualized punishment in different ways. For instance, some scholars have conceptualized punishment as a type of behavior directed toward those who cause harm or violate social norms (e.g., Clutton-Brock & Parker, 1995; Deutchman et al., 2021) and have worked toward elucidating punishment’s instrumental value (e.g., Alschuler, 2003; Delton & Krasnow, 2017; Nagin, 1998, Zimring & Hawkins, 1995). However, other scholars have conceptualized punishment as more than just a behavior: these scholars have argued that punishment is both a behavior and a mechanism for social communication. These scholars often describe this idea as the “expressive theory of punishment” (Feinberg, 1965; Hampton, 1992; Kahan, 1996). Though past work has argued that punishment is communicative, few programs of research have empirically tested how laypeople interpret punishment’s messages. The paucity of research examining people’s understanding of punishment’s messages is not a miniscule omission. Scholars writing on theories of punishment often postulate, at least implicitly, that laypeople will understand punishment in a way that is consistent with normative theory (e.g., Bregant et al., 2020; Darley & Pittman, 2003). If this postulation is misguided, it could undermine the extent to which people view punishment policy as legitimate (e.g., Nadler, 2004; Tyler, 2006). My dissertation addresses this topic by investigating children’s and adults’ inferences about what punishment signals about punished individuals’ identities. When thinking about identity, people often reason about the current self in tandem with past and future selves (e.g., Peetz & Wilson, 2008). By extension, people may interpret punishment’s messages as communicating distinct information about different selves. I examine this possibility by investigating the inferences laypeople make about people's past, present, and future identities on the basis of punishment. Below, I describe the chapters in my dissertation, each of which consists of one manuscript within my larger program of research. Chapter 1 (Dunlea & Heiphetz, 2021-a), a theory paper, provides a conceptual foundation for the empirical portions of the dissertation. Namely, this chapter introduces the idea that certain forms of legal punishment (incarceration) are especially well-suited to communicate morally relevant information, paying special attention to the idea that such punishment communicates negative moral information about punished individuals. Chapter 2 (Dunlea & Heiphetz, 2020) builds on Chapter 1 by leveraging experimental methods to understand how laypeople understand punishment’s signals. Specifically, Chapter 2 examines children’s and adults’ inferences about what punishment signals about who a punished individual was in the past. Chapter 3 (Dunlea & Heiphetz, in press) extends the results of Chapter 2 by documenting the downstream social consequences of how people understand punishment’s past-oriented messages. Specifically, Chapter 3 examines how different messages about a punished individual’s past shape people’s attitudes toward such individuals in the present. Chapter 4 (Dunlea & Heiphetz, 2021-b) builds on Chapters 2 and 3 by investigating laypeople’s inferences about punishment’s future-oriented messages, specifically probing people’s views about what punishment might signal about who a punished individual might become. Finally, Chapter 5 (Dunlea et al., under revised review) addresses laypeople’s inferences about punishment’s future-oriented messages in a complementary way—by examining the extent to which people understand punishment as communicating messages about intergenerational immorality. That is, Chapter 5 asks whether people understand punishment as conveying morally relevant information about future generations of individuals related to punished individuals (i.e., children of incarcerated parents). Together, these chapters shed light on the origins and development of people’s reasoning about punishment’s messages. In doing so, this dissertation integrates sub-areas of psychology (social cognition, development, moral psychology) and connects psychology with related fields (e.g., philosophy, law) to answer questions central to jurisprudential inquiry.

The purpose of the study was to evaluate the ethical decision making self-efficacy of a sample of state-credentialed psychologists and counselors. A questionnaire was constructed which asked respondents to rate the confidence they possessed in relation to thirty items (reflecting ten a priori ethical decision-making domains). The items described ethical knowledge and ethical decision-making tasks and situations. The questionnaire also included eight questions pertaining to respondents' personal characteristics and professional education, training, and experience. The questionnaire was mailed to 400 Arizona-licensed psychologists and 340 Arizona-certified counselors. Although no formal, a priori hypotheses were established prior to the survey, it was expected that the extent and quality of professional ethics training might be associated with higher scores on factors generated by an exploratory factor analysis performed on survey results. In particular, it was anticipated that a values-clarification component of ethics training would be associated with higher ethical decision-making factor scores. Approximately 50% of the total sample responded to the survey. The factor analysis of scorable questionnaires resulted in a six-factor model of ethical decision-making self-efficacy. The six factors were: (1) Knowledge, (2) Behavior, (3) Thinking, (4) Awareness, (5) Resources, (6) Authorities-Conflict Analysis/Resolution. Having taken an ethics course as a student was associated with higher scores on factors 1, 5, and 6. Having taken an ethics training seminar as a postgraduate was associated with higher scores on factors 1, 2, and 5. Those respondents with a values clarification component to their ethics training scored higher on factors 1, 2, 3, 5, and 6. Study results suggest that further development of an Ethical Decision Making Self-Efficacy Scale and pursuit of a national survey of psychologists and counselors addressing issues raised in this study are warranted.

In this paper, I examine the connection between race and the morality of action. I argue that moral racial identitarianism, where this is the position that in some cases the moral status of a person’s actions depends on their race, is false. / A research report submitted to the Faculty of Humanities, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Art in Applied Ethics for Professionals), 2017 / GR2018

The most ordinary man or woman has means of knowledge concerning his own feelings and circumstances that immeasurably surpass those that anyone else can have.-John Stuart Mill, On Liberty / One feature that varies within competing conceptions of medical shared decision-making is how a patient's values are to be engaged by a physician. One detail that can be overlooked under "shared" decision-making is whether or not a physician ought (or be allowed) to attempt to persuade the patient to adopt particular health-related values. Some argue that it is incumbent on a physician to share her privileged understanding of medicine so as to help her patient embrace "better" values. This thesis argues that it is dangerous to patient autonomy for a physician to exert moral suasion on her patient to attempt to influence or change those values; the danger lies in the power imbalance between patients and physicians that seems inherent in medical encounters, and is exacerbated by the sick role. Thus, while a physician ought to help her patient articulate his health-related values, she ought not try to change them.

No description available.

Thesis (MA (Psychology))--University of Stellenbosch, 2005. / Psychology as a human science is rendered desperate by the human vacuum in its own contents. This paper argues that by adopting the methods and techniques of the natural sciences, psychology and psychotherapy not only transform the patient or client into an a-historical and a-social entity, but also propose an utopian view of reality and lose the inherent moral character of the psychotherapeutic endeavour. It seems as if the Post-Modern theoretical and psychotherapeutic alternatives do not offer a solution that solves the above mentioned problems. This paper aims to introduce the work of the French philosopher Emmanuel Levinas, as a stimulus providing a different starting point in the search for solutions to the mentioned problems. Such an approach seeks to understand the radically ethical character of the therapeutic meeting by recognising the fundamental responsibility of the therapist, not to “totalise” (that is to reduce) otherness (the not me) into sameness (the for me) by assigning differences into pre-established characteristics, properties and categories. Only by recognising the otherness of the client in the “face-to-face meeting” and reacting to the call of the other can psychotherapy be ethical and render justice to historical and social situatedness of the other facing us in therapy. Some of the implications that the ethical challenge of Levinas holds for psychology will be explored. This includes the implications for the therapeutic meeting, psychological ethics, and the possibility of a “Levinasanian psychology”.

Privilege is an evidential principle which, on the grounds of public policy, excludes evidence relevant and otherwise admissible. This thesis aims to discover whether privilege should be applied to the psychotherapeutic profession in South Africa. At present, the only profession in South Africa afforded privilege is the legal profession. There are two main theoretical justifications for privilege: the utilitarian and the individual/human rights approach. This thesis considers whether the psychotherapeutic profession wan-ants privilege under either theory, and recommends that the law of privilege integrate both theories rather than adopt one or the other. The impact of the Constitution and the right to privacy receive particular attention. Very little literature or case law on the question of psychotherapeutic privilege was found in South Africa. Consequently, extensive comparative research into the common-law systems of England, Canada and United States of America was done. This research yielded some interesting findings. The first is that case-by-case development of the law of privilege is uncel1ain and fragmented. The next is that psychotherapeutic privilege exists in almost absolute form in the United States of America, but is littered with lacunae causing as much uncertainty as the case-by-case approach to privilege law. The most helpful method of dealing with the problem was found in Canada, where a two-stage approach to protecting personal information, including psychotherapeutic records, has been developed. In light of this research, this thesis reassesses the original viability of psychotherapeutic privilege in South Africa. Privilege, it was found, is not the best solution to protecting psychotherapeutic communications. This thesis recommends legislative adoption of an amended two-stage approach based on the Canadian model for sexual offence trials as the best method of protecting psychotherapeutic communications in both civil and criminal proceedings. The thesis ends by suggesting draft legislative provisions.

To date, the vast literature on theories of psychology, and psychology as a practice, still remains a reflection of Western experiences and conceptions of reality. This is so despite "psychology" and "psychotherapy" being studied and implemented by Africans, dealing with Africa's existential issues, in Africa. In this context, a distorted impression that positions psychology and psychotherapy as irreplaceable and irrefutable Western discoveries is created. This perception creates a tendency in which psychotherapists adopt and use universalised, foreign and imposed theories to explain and deal with African cultural experiences. In recent years, African scholars' quest to advance "African-brewed" conceptions, definitions and practices of "psychology" and "psychotherapy" is gaining momentum. Psychologists dealing with African clients are increasingly confronted with the difficulty, and in some instances the impossibility, of communicating with, and treating local clients using Western conceptions and theories. Adopting the dominant Western epistemological and scientific paradigms constitutes epistemological oppression and alienation. Instead, African conceptions, definitions and practices of "psychology" and "psychotherapy" based on African cultural experiences, epistemology and ontology are argued for. The thesis defended in this study is that the dominant Western paradigm of scientific knowledge in general and, psychology in particular, is anchored in a defective claim to neutrality, objectivity and universality. To demonstrate this, indigenous ways of knowing and doing in the African experience are counterpoised against the Western understanding and construction of scientific knowledge in the fields of psychology and psychotherapy. The conclusion arising from our demonstration is the imperative to rethink psychology and psychotherapy in order to (i) affirm the validity of indigenous African ways of knowing and doing; (ii) show that the exclusion of the indigenous African ways of knowing and doing from the Western paradigm illustrates the tenuous and questionable character of its epistemological and methodological claims to neutrality, objectivity and universality. Indeed the Western claim to scientific knowledge, as described, speaks to its universality at the expense of the ineradicable as well as irreducible v ontological pluriversality of the human experience. This study's aim is to advance the argument for the sensitivity to pluriversality of be-ing and the imperative for wholistic thinking. / Psychology / D. Phil. (Psychology)

To date, the vast literature on theories of psychology, and psychology as a practice, still remains a reflection of Western experiences and conceptions of reality. This is so despite "psychology" and "psychotherapy" being studied and implemented by Africans, dealing with Africa's existential issues, in Africa. In this context, a distorted impression that positions psychology and psychotherapy as irreplaceable and irrefutable Western discoveries is created. This perception creates a tendency in which psychotherapists adopt and use universalised, foreign and imposed theories to explain and deal with African cultural experiences. In recent years, African scholars' quest to advance "African-brewed" conceptions, definitions and practices of "psychology" and "psychotherapy" is gaining momentum. Psychologists dealing with African clients are increasingly confronted with the difficulty, and in some instances the impossibility, of communicating with, and treating local clients using Western conceptions and theories. Adopting the dominant Western epistemological and scientific paradigms constitutes epistemological oppression and alienation. Instead, African conceptions, definitions and practices of "psychology" and "psychotherapy" based on African cultural experiences, epistemology and ontology are argued for. The thesis defended in this study is that the dominant Western paradigm of scientific knowledge in general and, psychology in particular, is anchored in a defective claim to neutrality, objectivity and universality. To demonstrate this, indigenous ways of knowing and doing in the African experience are counterpoised against the Western understanding and construction of scientific knowledge in the fields of psychology and psychotherapy. The conclusion arising from our demonstration is the imperative to rethink psychology and psychotherapy in order to (i) affirm the validity of indigenous African ways of knowing and doing; (ii) show that the exclusion of the indigenous African ways of knowing and doing from the Western paradigm illustrates the tenuous and questionable character of its epistemological and methodological claims to neutrality, objectivity and universality. Indeed the Western claim to scientific knowledge, as described, speaks to its universality at the expense of the ineradicable as well as irreducible v ontological pluriversality of the human experience. This study's aim is to advance the argument for the sensitivity to pluriversality of be-ing and the imperative for wholistic thinking. / Psychology / D. Phil. (Psychology)