Offentlig upphandling är ett område som varje år omsätter stora belopp i Sveriges ekonomi. När en upphandlande enhet skall göra inköp av varor eller tjänster som inte är av obetydligt belopp skall enheten tillämpa reglerna om offentlig upphandling. I lagen om offentlig upphandling (LOU) finns det en lagstadgad möjlighet för anbudsgivare att komplettera sitt anbud, 1 kap. 21 §. Rättsregeln att komplettera sitt anbud skulle kunna tolkas som ett avsteg från den för offentlig upphandling gällande likabehandlingsprincipen. Vidare uppkommer frågan om möjligheten att komplettera anbud ger en förhandlingsfördel i upphandlingsförfarandet? Syftet med uppsatsen är att undersöka om rätten att förtydliga och komplettera ett anbud enligt 1 kap. 21 § LOU kan innebära att upphandlingsförfarandet till viss del frångår likabehandlingsprincipen som är fastställd i 1 kap. 4 § LOU och om tillämpningen av 1 kap. 21 § LOU skulle kunna utnyttjas av anbudsgivare för att erhålla fördel i upphandlingsförfarandet. Likabehandlingsprincipen gäller alltid och kommer till uttryck i svensk lag genom begreppet affärsmässighet som återfinns i 1 kap. 4 § LOU. Tillämpningen av 1 kap. 21 § LOU utgör ett verktyg för att göra anbud jämförbara med varandra. Jämförbarheten mellan olika anbud är viktig för att likabehandlingsprincipen ska upprätthållas och komplettering av anbud får bara begäras av den upphandlande enheten. 1 kap. 21 § LOU syftar till att upprätthålla konceptet affärsmässighet och ett brott mot paragrafen innebär därför i sig ett brott mot likabehandlingsprincipen. Härav kan tillämpningen av 1 kap. 21 § LOU inte anses innebära att likabehandlingsprincipen frångås. Vidare kan denna paragraf ge en fördel vid utformandet av anbud under tidsbegränsning då lagrummet ger utrymme för tidsbesparing vid utformande av anbud. Om detta är en fördel vid anbudsgivningen är beroende på om företaget väljer att utnyttja möjligheten eller inte. Exempelvis kan ju detta uppfattas som en fördel och utnyttjas när en anbudsgivare har tidsbrist vid utformandet av sitt anbud. Om denna möjlighet används utgör användandet av möjligheten i sig inte att likabehandlingsprincipen frångås då möjligheten kan användas utan att det ursprungliga kontraktsförhållandet frångås.

Offentlig upphandling är allt växande betydelse. Från och med 1 Januari 2008 har en ny lag om offentlig upphandling trätt ikraft. Denna har en syster lag som reglerar upphandling inom försörjningssektorn. Den klassiska sektorn omfattar offentliga upphandlingar som upphandlande myndigheter gör gällande varor, tjänster och byggnadsentreprenader. Efter att en upphandlande myndighet har prövat anbuden ska de upplysa alla anbudssökande och anbudsgivare om utgången. Detta sker genom ett tilldelningsbeslut, i vilket skälen för tilldelning står att finna. Ett tilldelningsbeslut är en accept av ett anbud, vilket genom de allmänna reglerna i avtalsrätten leder till ett civilrättsligt bindande avtal. Detta kan innebära ett problem då denna avtalsbundenhet uppkommer innan en upphandling är avslutad enligt LOU. I den händelse att en domstol vid en överprövning skulle finna att upphandling måste göras om eller rättas blir detta ett problem då den upphandlande enheten har ett avtal som de inte längre får bibehålla. Denna problematik kan undvikas genom att den upphandlande myndigheten redan i förfrågningsunderlaget anger att avtal sluts genom ett upphandlingskontrakt. På det viset uppkommer även det civilrättsliga avtalsslutet vid samma tidpunkt som den offentligrättsliga. Kvarstår finns dock en viss problematik kring att upphandlande myndighet ändock ingår ett avtal med en leverantör när det fortfarande finns överprövningsmöjligheter kvar, dvs. innan upphandlingen är avslutad. Efter Alcatel-målet har Sverige ändrat LOU och det går nu att överpröva ett tilldelningsbeslut även efter det att ett upphandlingskontrakt är ingåtts. Det har inför lagändringen förs en diskussion om huruvida skall vara uttryckligen förbjudet att ingå avtal innan överprövningstiden har löpt ut, och att avtal som då är i strid med LOU skall vara ogiltiga. Lagstiftaren valde dock att enbart ändra lagen genom att låta överprövningsrätten kvarstå en period även efter tilldelningsbeslutet och eventuellt avtalsslutande. Denna ordning har föranlett vissa problem då en civilrättslig bundenhet kan uppkomma även om upphandlingen inte är avslutad enligt LOU. Två mål som har avgjorts i kammarrätten har fastslagits att tilldelningsbeslutet är en accept som ger ett giltigt avtal. Det ena av dessa domar gick upp till regeringsrätten där de inte gick emot kammarrätten. Svea hovrätt har även de i ett skadeståndsmål funnit att tilldelningsbeslutet skapade ett bindande avtal. Författaren anser att det vore önskvärt att lagstiftaren i lag fastslog en upphandling avslutas med ett upphandlingskontrakt som får ingås först efter att minst 10 dagar förlöpt sedan tilldelningsbeslut delgavs anbudsgivarna. Vid en eventuell prövning i högsta instans vore det eftersträvansvärt att tilldelningsbeslutet, och andra fall av eventuellt för tidiga avtalsslut att det fastslogs under vilka omständigheter en civilrättslig bundenhet kan eller inte kan uppstå.

The purpose of the study was to examine the effects of three Indiana public laws upon the role of the public school superintendent with various publics.Population was defined as practicing Indiana public school superintendents having a minimum of ten years experience as superintendent in Indiana prior to 1978. Five superintendents were selected for personal interviews and the sixth member of the population was the writer.Literature related to the role of the school superintendent was reviewed.Three Indiana laws were selected which were passed by the Indiana General Assembly during the last ten years. Laws selected were: (1) Indiana Public Law 162, the Student Due Process Statute, (2) Indiana Public Law 217, the Collective Bargaining Statute, and (3) Indiana Public Law 57, the Open Door Statute.Analysis of the data obtained in the interview was based upon the formula: R = A + T + C, where R = Role A = Autocratic Behavior exercised by the superintendentT = Time expended by the superintendentC = Control the superintendent has over outcomes, results or goalsSpecifically each superintendent was asked if the degree of autocracy, the time involved and the control of outcomes in working with six publics had increased, decreased or remained the same. The publics selected were school boards, administrators, faculty, parents, students and school attorneys.Findings: Public Law 162 did affect: the degree of autocratic behavior exercised by the superintendent in working with boards, administrators, faculty, parents and students; the time spent by the superintendent when working with boards, administrators, faculty, parents, students and attorneys; the control of outcomes by the superintendents when working with boards, administrators, faculty, parents, students and attorneys.Public Law 217 did affect: the degree of autocratic behavior exercised by the superintendent in working with boards, administrators, faculty and attorneys; the time spent by the superintendent when working with boards, administrators, faculty and attorneys; the control of outcomes by the superintendent when working with boards, administrators, faculty and attorneys.Public Law 57 did affect: the degree of autocratic behavior exercised by the superintendent when working with boards and parents; the time spent by the superintendent when working with boards, administrators and parents; the control of outcomes by the superintendent when working with boards.Conclusions: (1) Public Law 162 had the greatest effect and Public Law 57 had the least effect upon the role of the superintendent. (2) No superintendent spent less time with any publics as a result of Public Law 162 and 217. (3) No superintendent spent less time working with administrators, parents, students, faculty and attorneys as a result of Public Law 57. (4) Public Law 217 had no effect upon the role of the superintendent in working with parents and students. (5) Public Law 57 had no effect upon the role of the superintendent in working with faculty and students. (6) The three laws had the greatest effect on the role of superintendents when working with boards and administrators and the least effect when working with students and parents. (7) The three laws required increased time expended by the superintendent. (8) The relationship most affected by Public Laws 162 and 217 was with administrators and the relationship most affected by Public Law 57 was with boards.3

The study was designed to ascertain the tax supported cost of implementing collective bargaining in Indiana School Corporations in 1975. Two research questions were developed: (1) What was the statistically estimated direct cost to taxpayers attributable to implementation of Indiana Public Law 217 in 1975, and (2) what was the relationship between school corporation size and costs factors pertaining to implementation of Indiana Public Law 217.A questionnaire was designed, to obtain actual and/or estimated costs of administrative and clerical man-hours utilized to implement collective bargaining, costs of consultants and/or legal services, training workshops and materials, equipment and expendable materials. The questionnaire was sent to approximately one-half of the school superintendents in randomly selected Indiana School Corporations with large, medium and small size pupil enrollments.Useable responses were obtained from 93 out of 153 potential participants (60.7 percent), which included 13 reports that no bargaining occurred in 1975. Information from each questionnaire received was sorted and tabulated by means of a computer program especially designed for the purposes of the study. The total cost of implementing bargaining within each school corporation, the total and average cost of implementing bargaining within the groups of large, medium and small size school corporations, and within the entire set of respondents were found and analyzed.Findings derived from the present study indicate that the average cost of implementing bargaining in large size Indiana school corporations, as reported by 28 superintendents, was $10,839. The average cost of implementing bargaining in medium size school corporations, as reporter: by 32 superintendents, was $6,128 and the average cost of implementing bargaining in small school corporations, as reported by 20 superintendents, was $3,761 per school corporation. The average cost of implementing collective bargaining within the set of respondents, as reported by 80 superintendents, was $7,185 per school corporation. The total direct cost of implementing collective bargaining, determined by extending the average cost to all school corporations believed to have engaged in collective bargaining, was $2,047,725.The major conclusions were that: If all 305 Indiana school corporations had bargained and experienced expenses comparable to the reported expenses, implementation of collective bargaining would have cost taxpayers $2,191,425 and would have consumed 158,905 man-hours by administrators, clerical personnel and members of boards of trustees.

In articulating the juridical relationship between the individual and the state, a theory of public law must confront a fundamental problem. The practice of public law involves appeals to ideas of both authority and justice, but these ideas appear to be antagonistic rather than complementary. On the one hand, persons must act in conformity with legal obligations enacted through the contingent exercise of public authority. On the other, persons must act in conformity with timeless ideals of public justice. The theoretical puzzle at the core of public law stems from the incompatibility of these convictions. Because enacted laws are often unjust and just laws are rarely enacted, persons often find themselves simultaneously pulled in one direction by the demands of public authority and pulled in another by the demands of public justice. To escape this tension, the leading theories invariably fragment their subject matter by reducing the whole of public law to one of its aspects, authority in abstraction from justice or justice in abstraction from authority. The purpose of this project is to articulate a unified theory of public law that integrates the distinctive claims of authority and justice into a common framework. My central claim is that once authority and justice are appropriately conceived and justified, they are neither antithetical virtues of opposing theoretical frameworks nor isolated notions. Instead, authority and justice are the mutually implicating principles of a legal system: the right of rulers to exercise public authority is always accompanied by a duty to govern justly; the right of the ruled to just governance presupposes the presence of publicly authoritative institutions. By setting out the character and interrelation of the fundamental components of a legal system, the unified theory illuminates the general practice of public law from the legal systems of the ancient world to the inner workings of modern constitutional states.

In articulating the juridical relationship between the individual and the state, a theory of public law must confront a fundamental problem. The practice of public law involves appeals to ideas of both authority and justice, but these ideas appear to be antagonistic rather than complementary. On the one hand, persons must act in conformity with legal obligations enacted through the contingent exercise of public authority. On the other, persons must act in conformity with timeless ideals of public justice. The theoretical puzzle at the core of public law stems from the incompatibility of these convictions. Because enacted laws are often unjust and just laws are rarely enacted, persons often find themselves simultaneously pulled in one direction by the demands of public authority and pulled in another by the demands of public justice. To escape this tension, the leading theories invariably fragment their subject matter by reducing the whole of public law to one of its aspects, authority in abstraction from justice or justice in abstraction from authority. The purpose of this project is to articulate a unified theory of public law that integrates the distinctive claims of authority and justice into a common framework. My central claim is that once authority and justice are appropriately conceived and justified, they are neither antithetical virtues of opposing theoretical frameworks nor isolated notions. Instead, authority and justice are the mutually implicating principles of a legal system: the right of rulers to exercise public authority is always accompanied by a duty to govern justly; the right of the ruled to just governance presupposes the presence of publicly authoritative institutions. By setting out the character and interrelation of the fundamental components of a legal system, the unified theory illuminates the general practice of public law from the legal systems of the ancient world to the inner workings of modern constitutional states.

The Possibilities of Using Analogy in Public Law Argument by analogy plays an important role in the law. It enables to complete legal system so that it presents system that is uniform and as to its values internally coherent. One of the basic knowledge of law faculty student is that statutory interpretation and application of law by analogy counts among logical methods of interpretation. However, this finding is being ever more frequently questioned in the recent literature. Rather than logical structure of an argument by analogy it is its logical nature that is being emphasized. The main aim of this thesis is to describe the structure of analogy as a general method of reasoning. So defined, analogy will be subsequently applied to the options of using analogy in public law as it is not possible to use analogy to the same extent in all fields of law. Generally speaking, the use of analogy in public law is more restricted than it is in private law and in particular fields of public law the restriction of the use of analogy are even stricter. Throughout the thesis I also attempt to support my theoretical conclusions with the relevant case law. The text is divided into four main chapters. In the introductory chapter I define analogy as a general method and further address its use in law into three...

Philosophiae Doctor - PhD / Judicial remedies are, amongst others, a vehicle through which respect, protection, promotion and fulfilment of human rights can be delivered to those who need them. A remedy is the perspective from which litigants judge either the success or failure of judicial decisions. Judicial remedies make the rights whole, they complete the justiciability of human rights because without them human rights remain statements of legal rhetoric. The nature of the remedies that the courts grant is not only based on the normative nature of the rights they seek to enforce. They are also influenced by factors such as the goals and objectives of judicial remedies as defined, amongst others, by the ethos of either corrective or distributive forms of justice. This thesis explored these factors and their impact on judicial remedies. Stress is put on the impact of the separation of powers doctrine, institutional competence concerns and on the forms of justice pursued by courts. The study is based on the judicial enforcement of the socio-economic rights protected in the South African 1996 Constitution. The research undertaken here was intended to guide scholars, legal practitioners and judicial officers who confront socio-economic rights issues as part of their daily work. / South Africa

La tutelle administrative sur les universités mérite une attention particulière en raison de son statut et de sa tonalité très particuliers. Elle recèle une part de mystère qu'il faut lever pour bien en comprendre les enjeux. D'un côté, la tutelle sur les universités est, sur bien des points, justifiée et légitimée par des traditions et des pratiques anciennes ; celles-ci souvent contradictoires avec la lettre des textes qui la réglementent, d'un autre côté, la tutelle répond à une finalité classique du droit administratif : assurer un contrôle de la décentralisation. Le pouvoir de tutelle sur les universités est déconcertant car cette notion, imprécise et indéterminée, est au centre d'intérêts, a priori, divergents. Alors que l'autonomie des universités et l'indépendance des universitaires semblent militer contre l'existence et l'exercice d'un pouvoir de tutelle, la préservation des intérêts du service public et de son unité est, au contraire, favorable à l'existence d'une tutelle sur les universités. Ainsi, la tutelle universitaire se dévoile sous un jour inattendu qui manifeste son ambivalence : à la fois protectrice, face aux universités, de certains intérêts généraux, et protectrice, face à l'Etat, de l'autonomie universitaire. / The administrative supervision of universities deserves a particular attention due to its status and its very particular meanings. It reveals a part of uncertainty that should be analysed in order to understand the stakes. On one hand, administrative supervision is on many points justified and legitimated by ancient traditions and practices; these often contradict the letter of the texts that regulate them. On the other hand, the supervision answers a classic purpose of public law: to ensure a control of decentralisation. The supervision power over universities is surprising because this notion, imprecise and undetermined, is at the centre of a priori divergent interests. Whereas the autonomy and independence of universities seems to militate against the existence and exercise of a supervision power, the preservation of public service interests and unity is, on the contrary, in favour of university supervision.Thus, university supervision has a new meaning, which underlines its ambivalence: it protects both general interest against universities and university's autonomy against the state. A double movement is therefore initiated, which sees university law irrigating public law and the latter irrigating the former too.

The apparent normative and implementation gaps within the international refugee protection regime suggest the need to reform its implementation and accountability processes. Increasingly, the focus is being shifted to local or domestic actors to attempt to address the challenges faced in realising refugee rights effectively. Among the key domestic accountability actors for the realisation of rights, are national human rights institutions (NHRIs). NHRIs are considered a bridge between the international and domestic human rights systems. NHRIs act as entities that facilitate the diffusion of international human rights norms and standards, including those with respect to refugee rights, into the national spheres. Notwithstanding this, there is paucity in empirical evidence within the refugee rights discourse on the role that NHRIs can play to promote the effective realisation of refugee rights. This study explores the role that NHRIs in South Africa and Kenya play in promoting and protecting refugee rights. It utilises a non-doctrinal and qualitative research approach, to examine the extent to which the NHRIs engage with refugee rights and to explore their capacity to do so effectively. It situates NHRIs within the nexus between international human rights law and international refugee law to frame the understanding for their role within the refugee protection regime. The findings indicate that the NHRIs in South Africa and Kenya that are compliant with the Paris Principles display significant engagement with refugee rights promotion and protection. As accountability mechanisms, they have contributed to the development and implementation of domestic refugee law and policy in accordance with international norms and standards. This has occurred despite the lack of an explicit refugee rights' promotion and protection mandate, but they face barriers and challenges. Various underlying factors that impede their effectiveness to address refugee rights were identified. These included the sociopolitical contexts within which they operate, capacity constraints and invisibility within the refugee protection regime. The socio-political challenges included xenophobia and the securitisation of the asylum space. These compounded organisational and operational weaknesses such as scarce specialist skills in refugee law, limited financial resources, and the absence of strategic and sustained partnerships for refugee rights protection. The overall absence of norms for NHRI engagement with refugee rights was identified as a contributory factor for the lack of a coherent approach for promoting and protecting these rights. Possible avenues to enhance NHRI engagement with refugee rights were identified. For instance, NHRIs building partnerships for refugee rights promotion and protection with CSOs, the UNHCR and regional institutions based on a clear understanding of an NHRI's role as accountability mechanisms. For NHRIs, the imperative lies in building their capacity to address refugee rights to ensure a clear understanding of what the promotion and protection of these rights entails.