Chapter 1: Tradable Permits under Environmental and Cost-reducing R&D: This chapter models simultaneous investments in both environmental and cost-reducing R&D by asymmetric Cournot duopolist. Pollution rights (emission permits) are allocated by the regulator and can be traded between firms. Both R&D competition and cooperation are considered. In a three-stage game, firms first invest in R&D, then trade permits, and then compete in output. The strategic interaction between different types of R&D investments is analyzed. It is found that giving more permits to one firm induces it to conduct more cost-reducing but less environmental R&D. The second-best optimal allocation of pollution rights is also analyzed. This allocation matters for social welfare under R&D competition, but is irrelevant under R&D cooperation. Moreover, the optimal allocation depends on R&D spillovers. This paper also studies the grandfathering of permits based on historical output. Compared with the second-best optimal allocation, the higher the emissions reduction level, the more likely that grandfathering allocates too few permits to the large firm and too many permits to the small firm. Adding an R&D budget constraint leads firms to under-invest in cost-reducing R&D relative to environmental R&D. Chapter 2: Tradable Permits under Environmental R&D between Upstream and Downstream Industries: This chapter models the simultaneous investments in environmental R&D by both downstream and upstream industries, with two symmetric firms within each industry competing à la Cournot. Pollution rights are allocated by the regulator, and firms can trade permits. R&D competition, intra-industry (horizontal), inter-industry (vertical) and both intra- and inter-industry (generalized) R&D cooperations are considered. In a four-stage game, firms first invest in R&D, then trade permits, then upstream firms compete in intermediate good production, and finally downstream firms compete in final food production. The strategic interactions between R&D investments are analyzed. It is found that an increase in either vertical or horizontal R&D spillovers reduce the permit price but increase production, but the spillover effects on R&D investments are ambiguous and they depend on the number of permits that a firm receives from the government. However, firms undertake more R&D under generalized cooperation than vertical cooperation, irrespective of spillovers and the allocation of permits, and this results in higher social welfare under generalized cooperation than vertical cooperation. The optimal allocation of pollution rights by the regulator is also considered. This allocation matters for social welfare under R&D competition and horizontal cooperation, but is irrelevant under vertical and generalized cooperations. Chapter 3: Is There a Principle of Targeting in Environmental Taxation?: This chapter studies whether the "principle of targeting", which is referred to by Dixit (1985) as the tax formulae for dirty goods have "additivity property" (Sandmo 1975) and externality-generating sources should be directly targeted (Bhagwati and Johnson 1960), can be applicable in the presence of a uniform commodity tax with an additional emissions tax. We consider three perfectly competitive markets, one of them produces a non-polluting good and the other two produce polluting goods. The regulator chooses optimal taxes on all three markets to maximize social welfare and finances an exogenous public expenditure. First all, it is found that the additivity property does not hold under differentiated taxes, and is even further weakened with a uniform commodity tax. It is also shown that the Pigouvian tax is unlikely to apply on the top of the uniform commodity tax. Furthermore, if there is only tax instrument available -- i.e. either the uniform commodity tax or the emissions tax -- then the uniform commodity tax (emissions tax) induces higher social welfare when marginal social damage is low (high).

In this paper, my purpose is to test whether the government education policy and R&D expenditure policy can lead to development of patents or not. I use an idea-based growth model as the framework while treating patents as outputs to analyze patent development. I use the data of R&D intensity, patent and human capital of 30 countries in OECD from 1997 to 2006 based on panel data model to analyze their relationships. Research shows that R&D intensity and human capital produce some effects on patent development. Finally, I give some advice for government policy about improving patents.

Abstract People are racing with time in the era of knowledge economics. Those who are faster will be the winners. Those who are with original ideas will catch more chances to meet the customer¡¦s needs. Business speed and originality pop out of the performance of R&D. The performance of R&D depends on its member¡¦s personal knowledge and the knowledge prevailing in the origination. The pile of knowledge quantity and speed bases on how fast knowledge is shared. The factors of knowledge sharing situation are related to the characters of the organization and the sharing culture of its departments. This study will discuss the factors of the knowledge sharing situation. Furthermore, what are the performances of R&D? And what is the relationship between the character of the organization and knowledge sharing situation? And will the character of the organization and the R&D¡¦s knowledge sharing affect the performance of R&D? The conclusions of this study are proposed as followings: 1. Factors of the relationship between the character of the organization and knowledge sharing situation: 2. Factors of the relationship between knowledge sharing situation and the performance of the R&D: 3. The impact of the interaction with the organization character and the knowledge sharing situation on the performance of the R&D. Keywords: knowledge sharing R&D performance

In 2001 the IT industries in the world were in a recession and world top companies were in a deficit storm, but Samsung Electronics(SEC) still could make huge income. The success factors of SEC includes leadership, company culture, recruiting, huge investment, e-business, and sports marketing, etc. This thesis tries to do case study about Samsung Group, one of the representative Jaebol(Korean big companies) of Korea, and the main objects of study are SEC and electronic-related subsidiary companies like SDI, SEM etc., to study Samsung Group¡¦s innovation strategy and R&D management. Firstly, this thesis divided the contents of SEC¡¦s Digital Convergence goal and strategy into B to B and B to C, and named as up-stream innovation and down-stream innovation respectively. As one of the main success factors of electronic industries is R&D, I empathize SEC¡¦s unusual technology learning or R&D strategy in the first part, that is R&D history of semiconductor, mobile phone, and TFT-LCD, and its R&D organization. Secondly is the so-called innovation strategy, and this thesis define it to be consisted of four main factors, that is domestic up-stream innovation, international down-stream innovation, domestic down-stream innovation, and international up-stream innovation, which is its innovation process. Finally, I analyzed SEC¡¦s financial ratio, to prove the above non-financial factors more specifically. As a result, Samsung invested huge money to R&D, which is needed for Digital Convergence product, like semiconductor, TFT-LCD, mobile phone etc, based on the vertical integration of group organization, growing to multinational company throughout the innovation strategy.

ABSTRACT In terms of theory, the matrix organization is not only beneficial to preserve and develop the core technologies of enterprise, is but also equipped with flexible functions. This is an ideal research and development organization. Though there are many relevant studies in this respect previously with project or balanced matrix organization as research target, yet many companies adopt the functional matrix organization. Besides the research alliance is formed among enterprises in jointly developing new product/new technique which operational model will be the same as management model of functional matrix organization. As a result this initiates the research motive. This research adopts the exploratory research of case analysis including the compilation and study of relevant literatures as well as case interview, analysis and comparison, finally concludes ¡§The Key Successful Factors of Research & Development Management in the Functional Matrix Organization¡¨. The following conclusions are obtained by this research: An enterprise implements the project research and development of functional matrix organization and must be equipped with the following conditions: 1. The high ranking supervisors support and manifest toward project: the supervisor should clearly manifest the project importance, authorize and support the project leader as well as request the coordination of functional departments. 2. Sufficient Resource: It includes the required professional personnel, technology, budget and time to complete the project, meanwhile the flexibility for counteraction has to be prepared. 3. Appropriate Project Leader: The leader has to be equipped with professional capability, trust from supervisor, especially communication ability and leadership to acquire the coordination of functional chief and project members. 4. Attractive and Definite Object: The project object has to satisfy the sense of achievement of project members, inspire their motives, while the definite object can avoid the unnecessary problems in the results valuation. This article also submits the following suggestions on project execution method: 1. To adopt management by object: When the management by object is adopted. the functional chief supervises his subordinates to complete the preset project and project leader is focused on completed quality, schedule and required budget of object in the project execution period. As such the conflict occurrence can be reduced. Besides project leader doesn¡¦t have to spend too much time on internal management; however the leader can generate more close interactivity with customers that is surely beneficial to achieve the object and performance. 2. Effective Project Information System: The effective project information system can provide the written data to realize the project progress, assure project quality, increase the project realization of project members as well as compile and provide the effective historical data. 3. To Build up Project Team: If project members can work together under project object and develop a project team culture with more awareness and less conflict, this surely facilitates the smooth implementation of project. As a result the project leader does not have to be formally authorized his commanding power from organization, still he is able to inspire its members to proactively work hard in attaining the object. 4. The project leader has the rights of evaluation and allocation: The project leader should be more aware of contributions from his members than other chiefs. If project leader has the performance reward allocation that will facilitate the members be fully dedicated to project implementation. In the project management of matrix organization, the functional department is responsible for sub-project work as well as responsibility of project performance. Therefore project leader should have the performance evaluation toward overall functional department.

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This thesis examines firm innovation in China from firm-level human capital per- spective since resource-based theory and upper echelon theory reveal that the reason why firms vary in performance is that they differ in human capital. Two types of human capital are examined: general human capital measured by number of highly educated workers, and managerial human capital measured by characteristics (edu- cation and age) of general manager and management team. Besides human capital indicators, we also take R&D, firm size, market structure, firm age, ownership, city fixed effects, and industry fixed effects into account. Given the fact that innovations are made up of multifarious elements and hard to measure and define, this thesis examines firm innovation from three different aspects, patent applications, product innovation and total factor productivity.

Canada has long been a proponent of free trade while at the same time defending the current supply management system that protects the dairy industry from import competition. In the most recent Doha Development Round of talks amongst nations belonging to the World Trade Organization, the validity of Canada's protectionist position has been questioned and it is conceivable that Canada may have to make significant changes in the dairy industry to allow more liberal trade policies to be enacted. The key purpose of this study is to find out how free trade will affect the research and development (R&D) incentives of Canadian dairy farmers. On one hand they may be induced to perform more R&D due to competition effects in order to lower costs and achieve a competitive advantage over the main competitor, the United States. On the other hand they may be induced to perform less R&D due to the spillover effect, which allows the Canadian R&D efforts to be used by the United States at no additional cost. It is found that the outcome of these two opposing forces depends on the market scale effect. If Canada is a net importer when the border opens the spillover effect may dominate and Canadian dairy producers may invest less into R&D than under the current protectionist policies. These results however will switch if Canada is found to be the net exporters. The results also depend on the level of the quota currently in place. If the current quota is chosen at a quantity relatively close to the amount supplied at the monopolistic level, a free trade regime may promote R&D efforts more so than supply management. On the other hand, if the current quota level in Canada is closer to the quantity that would be supplied in a competitive industry, Canadian dairy producers may invest less heavily in R&D efforts under a free trade regime than a supply management system.

Chapter 1: Tradable Permits under Environmental and Cost-reducing R&D: This chapter models simultaneous investments in both environmental and cost-reducing R&D by asymmetric Cournot duopolist. Pollution rights (emission permits) are allocated by the regulator and can be traded between firms. Both R&D competition and cooperation are considered. In a three-stage game, firms first invest in R&D, then trade permits, and then compete in output. The strategic interaction between different types of R&D investments is analyzed. It is found that giving more permits to one firm induces it to conduct more cost-reducing but less environmental R&D. The second-best optimal allocation of pollution rights is also analyzed. This allocation matters for social welfare under R&D competition, but is irrelevant under R&D cooperation. Moreover, the optimal allocation depends on R&D spillovers. This paper also studies the grandfathering of permits based on historical output. Compared with the second-best optimal allocation, the higher the emissions reduction level, the more likely that grandfathering allocates too few permits to the large firm and too many permits to the small firm. Adding an R&D budget constraint leads firms to under-invest in cost-reducing R&D relative to environmental R&D. Chapter 2: Tradable Permits under Environmental R&D between Upstream and Downstream Industries: This chapter models the simultaneous investments in environmental R&D by both downstream and upstream industries, with two symmetric firms within each industry competing à la Cournot. Pollution rights are allocated by the regulator, and firms can trade permits. R&D competition, intra-industry (horizontal), inter-industry (vertical) and both intra- and inter-industry (generalized) R&D cooperations are considered. In a four-stage game, firms first invest in R&D, then trade permits, then upstream firms compete in intermediate good production, and finally downstream firms compete in final food production. The strategic interactions between R&D investments are analyzed. It is found that an increase in either vertical or horizontal R&D spillovers reduce the permit price but increase production, but the spillover effects on R&D investments are ambiguous and they depend on the number of permits that a firm receives from the government. However, firms undertake more R&D under generalized cooperation than vertical cooperation, irrespective of spillovers and the allocation of permits, and this results in higher social welfare under generalized cooperation than vertical cooperation. The optimal allocation of pollution rights by the regulator is also considered. This allocation matters for social welfare under R&D competition and horizontal cooperation, but is irrelevant under vertical and generalized cooperations. Chapter 3: Is There a Principle of Targeting in Environmental Taxation?: This chapter studies whether the "principle of targeting", which is referred to by Dixit (1985) as the tax formulae for dirty goods have "additivity property" (Sandmo 1975) and externality-generating sources should be directly targeted (Bhagwati and Johnson 1960), can be applicable in the presence of a uniform commodity tax with an additional emissions tax. We consider three perfectly competitive markets, one of them produces a non-polluting good and the other two produce polluting goods. The regulator chooses optimal taxes on all three markets to maximize social welfare and finances an exogenous public expenditure. First all, it is found that the additivity property does not hold under differentiated taxes, and is even further weakened with a uniform commodity tax. It is also shown that the Pigouvian tax is unlikely to apply on the top of the uniform commodity tax. Furthermore, if there is only tax instrument available -- i.e. either the uniform commodity tax or the emissions tax -- then the uniform commodity tax (emissions tax) induces higher social welfare when marginal social damage is low (high).

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