This thesis seeks to answer the question of what it would be for a person to be persuaded rationally to believe that God exists, and tries to explain in a related way the possibility of rationality in Christian faith. I begin by explicating and defending the "ethics of belief" approach to epistemology. Then two competing ethics of belief are described: "Strong Formalism", which holds, through a voluntaristic decision, a deductivist epistemology; and "Soft Rationalism", which contains an infonnalist epistemology, and rejects voluntarism. Arguments for and against each view are canvassed. But I show that our attempted adjudication is blocked by the "Ultimate Rationality Problem": no ethic of belief seems able rationally to justify its view of rationality. I reduce the Problem to this fact: any view of rationality refutes itself which tries to give a foundational method of epistemic evaluation that both gives a verdict on every proposition and avoids self-justification. I reject several suggested solutions in favour of one which replaces the foundational view of justification by a contextual view. I then generate from the process of justification itself several common epistemic standards, which allow us rationally to favour Soft Rationalism over Strong Formalism. But the former is both foundationalist and needlessly opposed to formalism. I remedy these faults by developing a "Modest Formalist" ethic of belief: a'partly formal set of standards for rational metaphysical argument,"given in. the form of a set of constitutive rules for certain games of interpretive argument. In doing this I defend an improved theory of epistemic probability, and reveal the structure of our substantive views of rationality - as this virtue would be required of believings per se, of actions based on believings, and'of actions (such as living a Christian life) based on what I describe as "experimental faith".

Thesis (B.A.)--Haverford College, Dept. of Sociology, 2007. / Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Tulsa, 1995. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 308-317).

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Michigan State University. Dept. of Philosophy, 2008. / Title from PDF t.p. (viewed on July 20, 2009) Includes bibliographical references (p.171-176). Also issued in print.

Thesis (M.A.)--Montana State University--Bozeman, 2004. / Typescript. Chairperson, Graduate Committee: Melody M. Zajdel. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 94-97).

Inaugural-Dissertation--Jena.

Thesis (doctoral)--Universität, Düsseldorf. / Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references (p. [173]-183) and indexes.

Critical thinking is a widely shared educational goal which has been granted more explicit attention than ever in recent years. Five major approaches to this area of educational concern have been influential to the development of educational practices, research programs, and conceptualization in the field. Three of these approaches (the 'process' or basic skills approach, the problem solving approach, and the logic approach) are found to be based on unfounded assumptions about the nature of reasoning and thinking, and inadequate attention to the purposes which make critical thinking such a widely accepted educational goal. A fourth (the information processing approach) is found to involve instances of reductionism which render incoherent many of the terms with which we understand and assess our own reasoning, and that of others. The fifth approach (the multi-aspect approach associated with Robert Ennis) is not so essentially flawed, but is found to contain some significant problems. Most notably there is a problem with fixing the reference of 'mental abilities' (which is essential for the issue of generalizability of critical thinking abilities) and with understanding the relationship between judgment and the other aspects of critical thinking. It is argued that writers in the field of critical thinking generally have tried to purchase objectivity for their conceptions by connecting them with the ideal of disengaged knowledge, either as exemplified by the study of formal logic or the natural sciences. It is argued that, in contrast with this approach, we ought to recognize that values and value judgments are at the heart of critical thinking. The ideal of disengagement tends to interfere with our understanding of thinking as a normative (rule-governed) activity grounded in our social practices. This thesis argues for the adoption of a realist position with regard to values, an expressivist understanding of language, an interpretive stance toward the study of rationality, and a social constructivist conception of rules. Some consequences of these positions for instruction, teacher preparation, and future research are suggested. / Education, Faculty of / Educational Studies (EDST), Department of / Graduate

Evidence suggests that psychopaths’ notoriously immoral behavior is due to affective rather than rational deficits. This evidence could be taken to show that, contrary to moral rationalism, moral norms are not norms of reason. Rationalists could reply either that psychopaths’ behavior is in fact primarily due to rational deficits or that affects are involved in responding to rational norms. Drawing on the work of Antonio Damasio and colleagues, I argue the latter is the better defense of moral rationalism.

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