Thesis (M.A.)--University of Missouri-Columbia, 2005. / The entire dissertation/thesis text is included in the research.pdf file; the official abstract appears in the short.pdf file (which also appears in the research.pdf); a non-technical general description, or public abstract, appears in the public.pdf file. Title from title screen of research.pdf file viewed on (July 13, 2006) Includes bibliographical references.

M.A. (Philosophy) / Please refer to full text to view abstract

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鄺明偉. / Thesis (M.A.)--香港中文大學, 1990. / Munuscript (computer printout) / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 26-39). / Kuang Mingwei. / Thesis (M.A.)--Xianggang Zhong wen da xue, 1990. / 導言 理性與自由 頁 --- p.1 / Chapter 第一章 --- 對現代性的批判 頁 --- p.7 / Chapter 1.1 --- 韋伯的理性化概念 頁 --- p.8 / Chapter 1.2 --- 馬克思的異化概念 頁 --- p.22 / Chapter 1.3 --- 哈伯瑪斯論現代性 頁 --- p.29 / Chapter 第二章 --- 溝通理性的建構 頁 --- p.36 / Chapter 2.1 --- 溝通行動與溝通能力 頁 --- p.37 / Chapter 2.2 --- 言辭行動的有效聲稱 頁 --- p.40 / Chapter 2.3 --- 論辯進行的形式 頁 --- p.47 / Chapter 2.4 --- 真理共識說與溝通倫理學 頁 --- p.52 / Chapter 2.5 --- 理想的言談情境 頁 --- p.57 / Chapter 2.6 --- 溝通理性的兩個面向 頁 --- p.59 / Chapter 第三章 --- 溝通理性與現代西方社會 頁 --- p.62 / Chapter 3.1 --- 社會的二重分析架構 頁 --- p.63 / Chapter 3.2 --- 糸統與生活世界 頁 --- p.68 / Chapter 3.3 --- 統現代社會的扭曲溝通 頁 --- p.79 / Chapter 3.4 --- 溝通理性與公共領域 頁 --- p.85 / Chapter 第四章 --- 對溝通理性論的評估 頁 --- p.87 / Chapter 4.1 --- 溝通理性的涵義 頁 --- p.87 / Chapter 4.2 --- 市場與論壇 頁 --- p.96 / Chapter 4.3 --- 語言與社會批判 頁 --- p.107 / 註釋 --- p.1 / 參考書目 --- p.26

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Time back to French Revolution (1789), on the other side of the English Channel, a British philosopher Edmund Burke (1729-1797) vigorously appealed French was under a dangerous revolution. As he criticized, the protesters were eradicating the long tradition of France, blindly sublimed the abstract ideas of rights, such as liberty or equal. The dangerous of pursuing abstract ideas, would caused unrecoverable damages in political practices and were also against the human nature. The core and vital of tradition, for Burke, is it brings the intellectual knowledge abreast of modern developments, actively improve and modify those inappropriate contexts. This is why abstract ideas of rights are not persuasive, and tradition is worth been relied. This thesis will focus on Burke¡¦s aesthetic. First, regard the core cause of his social construction is related to his aesthetic. Then, explain how his noble and aesthetic ideas in politics combine with tradition. Last, point out his critics to Rationalism also comes from his ideas of human nature. It is proved that to comprehend his politics through his aesthetic won¡¦t cause conflicts between Ancient Constitutionalism, but can replenish those vogue parts in his political writings.

Only with a comprehensive detailed theory of the practical processes which agents engage in prior to successful action can one get a picture of all those junctures at which the mechanism of rationality may be applied, and at which irrationality may therefore occur. Rationality, I argue, is the exercise of normatives, such as believable and desirable, whose function is to control the formation of the stages in practical processes by determining what content and which functions of practical states are allowed into the process. Believable is a functional concept, and for an agent to wield it requires that he possess beliefs or a theory he can justify about which states are goal-functional. Desirable is likewise a functional concept, and its exercise requires that agents possess justifiable beliefs or a theory about which goals are to be functional. When the desirability belief functions, it does so according to ideals of the theory. For example, it functions saliently where desires become intentions. So long as the normatives function in these ways the agent is rational. To so function is to satisfy the ideal for agency itself. Chapter 2 presents a fine-grained model of the fundamental terms and relations necessary for practical reasoning and agency. In this model, the functions of belief, desire and intention are described in naturalized terms. On the basis of this account of the terms of agency, a taxonomy of the possible failures of rationally controlled practicality is presented in chapter 3. Chapter 4 presents a comprehensive and detailed account of intention formation comprised of the functions of belief, desire and intention. Wherever one of those functions occurs in the process is a juncture at which rationality may be exercised, and therefore a point at which irrationality may occur. In chapter 5 I describe some of the main ways that dysfunctional states may disrupt agency, creating irrationality. The measures agents may take to ameliorate or otherwise control such failures are discussed and distinguished according to the ideal of agency. Finally, and in these terms, I address the problem of akrasia, in particular the views of Davidson and Mele, and show that the room they make for strict akratic action involves a significant compromise of the ideals of agency, and therefore is not as "strict" as they and others have claimed.

This thesis expands upon the discussions of Martha Nussbaum (1991) regarding scientific and Aristotelian conceptions of rationality and how each treats issues of moral reasoning and moral education. It posits that this scientific rationality provides an inherently flawed and limiting conception of the practical reasoner, and that its prevalence within the field of education, as well as in educational research has had damaging effects upon students and educators alike. Thus, it advocates the adoption of an Aristotelian view of reason, one which characterizes the person of practical reason as one who possesses a rich awareness of detail, emotion, context and complexity. Further, it examines the current and potential roles that educational researchers play in either the affirmation or questioning of these conceptions of rationality, and in turn, how these researchers affect change in education, and in society in general.

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Thesis (Ph. D.)--Catholic University of America, 1920. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 168-182).