Development of the Real Property Law Regulation in Czech Lands in 19th and 20th centuries The purpose of my master degree thesis is to analyse the development of legal regulation in the field of real property law in the Czech lands between years 1800 and 2000. There is several reasons for my research which are specified in the thesis's Preface: the fact I am very interested in everything what is connected with the legal aspects of real property questions, my original profession (having secondary school education in construction domain - and construction is a real property according to the valid Czech legal form) and influence of the denial of certain general principles of property law in the Czechoslovakia in the past to my family. The thesis is composed of ten chapters, each of them describing the legal regulation of the real property law in different historical period of time. Chapter One is introductory and defines basic characteristics of real property law in the past, beginnings of its concept as a fundamental human right and specificities of the soil including mentioning the exclusive Czech legal institute buildings being a real property. Chapter Two shows the essential institutes of legal relations to the real properties from the beginnings of Czech statehood (feudalism and absolutism times)...

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With the advent of the EULIS project, the purpose of which was the unification of national real property registers, it is particularly interesting to study the differences between European legal systems in respect of real property registry law. This thesis compares Sweden and the Civil law system with Ireland and the Common law system. The purpose of this comparison is to illustrate the complications that might arise in transactions between different systems, and it will argue that future cooperation will benefit from being subject to one unified European Real Property Law. Sweden and Ireland differ in their definition of real property and land. Whereas the Swedish legislature defines land as a unit of earth surface that is registered in the Real Property Register, the Irish definition is broader and more abstract. This can cause confusion as to what is really purchased when a buyer from one country wishes to operate within the other. Both systems emphasise the necessity of form, not only in the actual purchase but also when registering the sale. Whereas registering the sale gives right of ownership over previous buyers, it is sufficient to present a contract of sale to establish right of ownership over any third party who might have a claim towards the seller. Registering the property also serves the purpose of having the transaction recognised by the state. The Irish system, however, has two systems of registration, where only one grants the buyer such recognition. This double registration system creates confusion for foreign actors on the Irish property market. EULIS has been developed to provide a single register to facilitate cross-border purchases. As of today it is simply a merged database consisting of information provided by each national real property register. As a consequence, units of property defined according to different legal definitions are presented as if they were similar, which might cause confusion. We propose that EULIS be accompanied by a single code of European real property law to avoid unnecessary bureaucracy and misunderstanding.

Thesis (LLD)--Stellenbosch University, 2015 / ENGLISH ABSTRACT : Section 25 of the South African Constitution authorises and sets the limits for two forms of legitimate regulatory interference with property, namely deprivation and expropriation. The focus of this dissertation is on the requirement in section 25(1) that no law may authorise arbitrary deprivation of property. According to the Constitutional Court, deprivation is arbitrary when there is insufficient reason for it. The Court listed a number of factors to consider in determining whether there is a sufficient relationship between the purpose to be achieved by deprivation and the regulatory method chosen to achieve it. The outcome of the arbitrariness question depends on the level of scrutiny applied in a particular case. The level of scrutiny ranges from rationality review to proportionality review. Deprivation that results in an excessively harsh regulatory burden for one or a small group of property owners will probably be substantively arbitrary and in conflict with section 25(1). Courts generally declare unconstitutional regulatory interferences with property rights invalid. However, invalidating legitimate regulatory measures that are otherwise lawful purely because they impose a harsh and excessive burden on some property owners may not always be justified if the regulatory measure fulfils an important regulatory purpose. Invalidating excessive regulatory measures may in some instances also be meaningless and may not constitute appropriate relief in vindicating the affected rights. The purpose of this dissertation is to investigate the appropriateness of alternative solutions to invalidating otherwise lawful and legitimate but excessive regulatory deprivations of property. The goal is to identify remedies that allow courts to uphold the regulatory measure and simultaneously balance out the excessive regulatory burden it imposes on property owners. One alternative solution is to transform the excessive regulatory measure into expropriation and require the state to pay compensation to the affected owner. This approach is referred to as constructive expropriation. However, in view of the Constitutional Court’s approach to and the wording of section 25 it seems unlikely that it will adopt constructive expropriation as a solution. Another alternative solution is for the legislature to include a statutory provision for compensation in the authorising statute. Examples from German, French, Dutch and Belgian law show that this approach balances out the excessive regulatory burden and allows courts to uphold the otherwise lawful and legitimate but excessive regulatory statute without judicially transforming the deprivation into expropriation. An overview of South African law indicates that there is legislation that includes non-expropriatory compensation provisions. In cases where the regulatory statute does not contain a compensation provision, the courts might consider reading such a duty to pay compensation into the legislation or awarding constitutional damages. In conclusion, it is possible for the state to deprive owners of property in a manner that may result in an excessive regulatory burden being suffered by one or a small group of property owners if the regulatory purpose is necessary in the public interest, provided that the legislature explicitly or implicitly provides for non-expropriatory compensation in the regulatory statute. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING : Artikel 25 van die Suid Afrikaanse Grondwet magtig en stel grense daar vir twee regmatige vorme van regulerende staatsinmenging met eiendom, naamlik ontneming en onteiening. Die fokus van hierdie proefskrif is op die vereiste in artikel 25(1) dat geen wet arbitrêre ontneming van eiendom mag toelaat nie. Volgens die Grondwetlike Hof is ʼn ontneming arbitrêr as daar nie ʼn voldoende rede daarvoor is nie. Die Hof het faktore gelys wat oorweeg moet word om te bepaal of daar ʼn voldoende verhouding bestaan tussen die doel wat die staat met ontneming van eiendom nastreef en die regulerende maatreël wat vir die doel gebruik word. Die uitkoms van die toets vir arbitrêre ontneming hang af van die hersieningsstandaard wat die howe in ʼn spesifieke geval gebruik. Die standaard wissel van ʼn redelikheidstoets tot ʼn proporsionaliteitstoets. ʼn Ontneming wat ʼn oormatige swaar las op een of ʼn beperkte groep eienaars plaas sal waarskynlik arbitrêr en teenstrydig met artikel 25(1) wees. Die howe se benadering is om ongrondwetlike ontnemings van eiendom ongeldig te verklaar, maar dit is nie altyd geregverdig om toelaatbare en andersins regmatige ontnemings wat ʼn oormatige las op sommige eienaars plaas ongeldig te verklaar nie. Die ongeldigverklaring van wetgewing wat ʼn oormatige ontneming magtig mag soms ook nutteloos wees en nie ʼn gepaste remedie wees om die eienaar se regte te herstel nie. Die doel van hierdie proefskrif is om die geskiktheid van alternatiewe oplossings tot die ongeldigverklaring van andersins regmatige maar oormatige ontnemings van eiendom te ondersoek Die doel is om remedies te identifiseer wat die howe toelaat om regulerende ontnemings in stand te hou en terselfdertyd die oormatige las op enkele eienaars uit te balanseer. Een alternatiewe oplossing is om die oormatige ontneming te omskep in onteiening en die staat sodoende te verplig om aan die eienaar vergoeding te betaal. Hierdie benadering staan bekend as konstruktiewe onteiening. Gegewe die Grondwetlike Hof se benadering tot en die bewoording van artikel 25 is dit onwaarskynlik dat die howe konstruktiewe ontneming as ʼn oplossing sal aanvaar. ʼn Ander alternatiewe oplossing is vir die wetgewer om ʼn statutêre bepaling vir vergoeding in die magtigende wetgewing in te voeg. Voorbeelde uit die Duitse, Franse, Nederlandse en Belgiese reg toon aan dat hierdie benadering ʼn oormatige las kan uitbalanseer en die howe toelaat om die andersins geldige en regmatige ontneming in stand te hou sonder om dit in onteiening te omskep. ʼn Oorsig van Suid Afrikaanse reg dui aan dat daar wetgewing bestaan wat wel voorsiening maak vir sodanige vergoeding. In gevalle waar die magtigende wetgewing nie vergoeding voorsien nie kan die howe oorweeg om ʼn vergoedingsplig in die wet in te lees of om grondwetlike vergoeding toe te ken. Hierdie proefskrif kom tot die gevolgtrekking dat dit grondwetlik moontlik is vir die staat om eienaars van eiendom te ontneem op ʼn wyse wat soms daartoe kan lei dat enkele eienaars ʼn oormatige swaar las moet dra, mits die ontneming ʼn belangrike openbare doel dien en die wetgewer uitdruklik of implisiet voorsiening maak vir vergoeding.

Syftet med denna uppsats är att i en jämförande studie utreda skillnaderna beträffande gällande rätt avseende upplysningsskyldigheten för säljaren vid fastighetsköp respektive vid köp av lös egendom. Uppsatsen ska även utreda huruvida skillnaderna är motiverade för säljaren av en vara. Någon bestämmelse som tar sikte på säljarens upplysningsskyldighet finns inte i 4 kap. JB. Av förarbetena framgår det att undersökningsplikten är utgångspunkten för felansvaret och att det inte finns någon generell upplysningsskyldighet för säljaren. I NJA 2007 s. 86 ansågs det motiverat att frångå gängse riskfördelning och ålägga fastighetssäljaren en upplysningsskyldighet, vilken tillsynes verkar ha en generell karaktär. I nämnda rättsfall dras paralleller med avtalsvillkoret i 19 § 1 st. 2 p. KöpL, som ger ett visst mått av upplysningsskyldighet. Inom doktrin är det omdiskuterat om säljaren i vissa situationer ska ha en sådan skyldighet. Efter avgörandet i NJA 2007 s. 86 kan det fastställas att det nu etablerats en upplysningsskyldighet vid sidan av AvtL:s ogiltighetsregler. Mot bakgrund av förarbetena, praxis och doktrin som behandlats gällande 19 § KöpL kan det konstateras att det inte finns ett klart stöd för att säljarens upplysningsskyldighet går vid sidan av AvtL:s ogiltighetsregler. Fastighetssäljaren ansvarar efter NJA 2007 s. 86 redan vid den lägre graden ohederlighet, vilket kan anses ha skapat en slags diskrepans mellan säljaren av lös egendom och fastighetssäljaren. Min sammantagna slutsats blir därmed att de skillnader som nu skapats i gällande rätt beträffande säljarens upplysningsskyldighet vid försäljning av en vara inte är motiverade, med hänsyn till den diskrepans som nu skapats mellan egendomsslagen och som inte kan undgå att betecknas som en generell upplysningsskyldighet för fastighetssäljaren. / The purpose of this thesis is to, in a comparative study, examine differences in the law concerning the obligation for a vendor to inform at real estate purchase and purchase of movable property. The thesis shall also examine whether the differences are justified for the vendor of goods. A provision that refers to the seller's obligation to inform doesn’t exist in ch. 4 JB. The legislative history shows that the buyer’s obligation to inspect is the basis for the allocation of liability and that there isn’t a general obligation for the vendor to inform. In NJA 2007 p. 86, it was considered justifiable to depart from the usual risk allocation and impose a real estate vendor an obligation to inform, which seems to be general. The case mentioned above draws parallels with the contractual term of 19 § 1p. (2) AvtL, which gives a certain degree of obligation to inform. In doctrine, it’s debated whether the vendor in some situations should have such an obligation. After the ruling in NJA 2007 p. 86, an obligation to inform alongside AvtL’s rules on invalidity has now been established. With regard to legislative history, case law and doctrine examined concerning 19 § 1p. (2) AvtL, it can be concluded that there isn’t a clear support that the vendor’s obligation to inform goes alongside the AvtL’s rules on invalidity. The vendor of real estate is liable now by NJA 2007 p. 86 already at the lower degree of dishonesty, which might have created a sort of discrepancy between the vendor of movable property and the vendor of real estate. My overall conclusion is therefore that the current differences created in the law regarding the vendor's obligation to inform when vending goods can’t be justified, having regard to the discrepancy that emerged between asset classes and which can’t avoid to qualify as a general obligation to inform for the vendor of real estate.