This study analyzes the relationship between inter rebel group dynamics and rebel biased third party interventions. Concerning the considerable amount of multiparty civil conflicts and internationalized civil conflicts, prior studies largely overlook the cause and effect of inter rebel dynamics in terms of third party interventions. I delve into two related research questions; How do inter rebel dynamics influence a third party’s decision to intervene in a multiparty civil conflict? What kinds of rebel group interactions are facilitated by such third party interventions? Existing rebel group interaction patterns play a key role in determining conflict process and, influence third party’s decision to intervene. I predict that a cooperative interaction pattern between rebel groups generates an intervention enriched environment for the rebel groups, due to the increased likelihood of successful intervention and the decreased cost of war. The third party’s involvement in ongoing multiple party civil conflict generates a change in bargaining structure between rebels in terms of number of bargainers and distribution of capabilities. I predict a conditional effect of rebel biased interventions on inter rebel dynamics; while forceful intervention boosts cooperation between rebels, weak intervention fuels competition between them. To test my theoretical conjectures, the interlocking relationship between rebels’ interactions and rebel biased interventions has been empirically estimated on a large-N framework. The estimated results strongly confirm my theoretical predictions that rebel cooperation encourages rebel biased interventions and, that increased cooperation and competition is dependent upon third party’s commitment. Overall, my findings highlight a distinctive process of multiparty civil conflicts in terms of third party interventions and rebel group dynamics. My first findings regarding rebel biased interventions, expand the existing intervention literature by focusing on rebel group dynamics in multiparty civil conflicts. The empirical evidence showing boosted competition and cooperation caused by intervention, can be linked to studies that discuss the correlation between interventions and conflict terminations. For the policy community, this project suggests that the success of intervention lies in the third party’s measure of intervention.

How does the organizational legacy of a rebel group affect its ability to survive within a conflict? I theorize that adopting the institutional structure from a parent organization can strengthen the rebel group’s ability to resist the government. By drawing upon literature that identifies how such a pre-established structure is complementary to, or serves as a substitute for an informal system of social control, I posit that rebel groups emerging from a pre-existing organization are less likely to get militarily defeated by the government than rebel groups without a parent organization. I test this hypothesis empirically by using the FORGE dataset that identifies not only whether rebel groups emerge from pre-existing organizations, but also from which type of parent organization. I find that only rebel groups with a pre-existing parent organization that has an institutional base pre-designed to resist repression from the government in order to avoid their militarily defeat have positive implications on rebel groups’ durability. In contrast, rebel groups that emerged from the military and non-military faction of the government are found to be more prone to a militarily defeat by its parent.

Many of the most destructive natural disasters have taken place in situations characterized by armed conflict and insecurity: the Indian Ocean tsunami in Sri Lanka and Indonesia in 2004, the floods in Pakistan in 2011, the drought in Somalia in 2011 and typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines in 2013. Surprisingly little research has systematically explored how armed conflict affects natural disaster management, and how shocks from natural disaster influence conflict dynamics. This dissertation addresses these gaps by providing a qualitative and disaggregated analysis of the micro-dynamics underpinning the relationship between armed conflict, natural disasters and cooperation. It asks: what is the relationship between natural disasters and processes of conflict and cooperation in countries affected by civil conflict? To explore this question, the dissertation offers four essays that explore different facets of this relationship, focusing on the rebel group. Examining collaboration between rebel group and humanitarian actors during disaster relief efforts in the Philippines, essay I finds that rebel group behavior after a natural disaster is shaped by the level of hostility between combatant parties and the nature of the ties with the local population. Exploring the effect of natural disasters on conflict dynamics in the case of the Philippines, essay II suggests that natural disasters hinder rebel group recruitment tactics, by increasing hardship for rebel combatants and supporters, by weakening the rebel group’s organizational structure and supply lines, and by leading to a loss of territorial control. Based on a comparative case study between Colombia and the Philippines, essay III revisits ripeness theory and argues that the level of rebel group cohesion will help to predict whether or not rebel groups stay at the negotiation table until an agreement is reached. While a typhoon affected the Philippines during the negotiations, it did not “ripen” the peace talks. Finally, article IV explores pre-disaster evacuation across conflict-affected regions in the Philippines and India, and argues that both experience of previous disaster and the level of trust in government officials influence the likelihood of people evacuating. The dissertation has important implications for both disaster management and conflict resolution, and it calls for more dialogue between both disciplines.

<p>Rebel attacks on civilians constitute one of the gravest threats to human security in contemporary armed conflicts. But why do rebel groups kill civilians? The dissertation approaches this question from a strategic perspective, trying to understand when and why rebel groups are likely to target civilians as a conflict strategy. It combines quantitative studies using global data on rebel group violence with a case study of the civil war in Mozambique. The overall argument is that rebel groups target civilians as a way of improving their bargaining position in the war relative to the government. The dissertation consists of an introduction, which situates the study in a wider context, and four papers that all deal with different aspects of the overall research question. Paper I introduces new data on one-sided violence against civilians, presenting trends over time and comparing types of actors and conflicts. Paper II argues that democratic governments are particularly vulnerable to rebel attacks on civilians, since they are dependent on the population. Corroborating this claim, statistical evidence shows that rebels indeed kill more civilians when fighting a democratic government. Paper III argues that rebels target civilians more when losing on the battlefield, as a method of raising the costs for the government to continue fighting. A statistical analysis employing monthly data on battle outcomes and rebel violence, supports this argument. Paper IV takes a closer look at the case of Mozambique, arguing that the rebel group Renamo used large-scale violence in areas dominated by government constituents as a means for hurting the government. Taken together, these findings suggest that violence against civilians should be understood as a strategy, rather than a consequence, of war.</p>

No description available.

Rebel attacks on civilians constitute one of the gravest threats to human security in contemporary armed conflicts. But why do rebel groups kill civilians? The dissertation approaches this question from a strategic perspective, trying to understand when and why rebel groups are likely to target civilians as a conflict strategy. It combines quantitative studies using global data on rebel group violence with a case study of the civil war in Mozambique. The overall argument is that rebel groups target civilians as a way of improving their bargaining position in the war relative to the government. The dissertation consists of an introduction, which situates the study in a wider context, and four papers that all deal with different aspects of the overall research question. Paper I introduces new data on one-sided violence against civilians, presenting trends over time and comparing types of actors and conflicts. Paper II argues that democratic governments are particularly vulnerable to rebel attacks on civilians, since they are dependent on the population. Corroborating this claim, statistical evidence shows that rebels indeed kill more civilians when fighting a democratic government. Paper III argues that rebels target civilians more when losing on the battlefield, as a method of raising the costs for the government to continue fighting. A statistical analysis employing monthly data on battle outcomes and rebel violence, supports this argument. Paper IV takes a closer look at the case of Mozambique, arguing that the rebel group Renamo used large-scale violence in areas dominated by government constituents as a means for hurting the government. Taken together, these findings suggest that violence against civilians should be understood as a strategy, rather than a consequence, of war.

Why do some rebel groups perpetrate conflict-related sexual violence (CRSV) while others do not? A growing body of research has suggested various explanations, but offers no consensus regarding this puzzling question. At the same time, recent studies have recognized how foreign fighters impact rebel groups’ violence against civilians. Yet, to what extent the presence of foreign fighters could also explain rebel-inflicted CRSV remains unexplored. In this study, I argue that rebel groups with foreign fighters are more likely to perpetrate CRSV than rebel groups without foreign fighters, based on two causal mechanisms. Firstly, foreign fighters pose a risk to the internal cohesion of rebel groups, which is why CRSV is initiated as a socialization tool. Secondly, foreign fighters alleviate the rebel groups dependency on the local civilian community, thereby enabling such violence. The results from logistic regressions, based on a sample of 45 rebel groups between 1989 and 2014, indicate that there is indeed covariation between the presence of foreign fighters and CRSV occurrence. The findings contribute to the ongoing scholarly debate trying to explain variations in CRSV, as well as to the emerging field of foreign fighters' effect on violence against civilians. The results also have relevant policy implications for the international efforts in preventing CRSV.

The answer to if peacekeeping is successful or not is still debated. The focus has mostly been on internal characteristics of peacekeeping missions. While external factors, have been largely overlooked. This thesis aims to explore the effects external involvement in intrastate conflicts may have on the success of peacekeeping deployment. It poses the following research question: how does foreign state sponsorship to rebel groups affect the success of peacekeeping operations? The main argument made is that the causal mechanisms presented for why peacekeeping operations are effective, do not have an effect on the sponsors and their incentive to stop fighting. Hence, it is hypothesized that peacekeeping operations are less effective in decreasing the duration of intrastate armed conflict when rebel groups are sponsored by foreign states. The argument is tested using a discrete-time survival analysis and Cox proportional hazard models on all intrastate conflicts between 1970-2017, and foreign state sponsorship is treated as an interaction effect. The findings did not support the hypothesis but rather suggest that the presence of peacekeepers has a dominant positive conflict-intensity reducing effect. These results scratch the surface of what the effects external involvement may have on peacekeeping success and indicate that peacekeeping is successfully undermining sponsorship.

The literature on rebel cohesion/fragmentation currently presents valid macro-level explanations for rebel group cohesion/fragmentation, yet no model currently exists exploring non-utility-based motivations regulating pro-group behaviour. This thesis tests the assumptions of a novel social psychological framework – Identity Fusion Theory – on rebel cohesion. Using a primarily quantitative approach applying a logistic regression model to primary data gathered on the Syrian Civil War, and a smaller qualitative element comparing groups with “fused” and “non-fused” memberships during the war, the thesis tests the hypothesis that “groups with highly fused memberships will be less likely to fragment during the course of a civil war than groups with non-fused memberships”. The results of the analysis show a strong, positive relationship between fused memberships and rebel cohesion. The results of the thesis are to some extent limited by potential omitted variable bias (suggested by high R2 values) and the use of Syria as the only population from which to sample. Nevertheless, the relatively large number of observations in the dataset (63) as well as heterogenous nature of groups involved suggest the findings are generalisable. In conclusion, we did find a positive relationship between fusion and rebel group cohesion. The main implications of this thesis being that future academic research may benefit from focusing on social psychological factors when examining rebel dynamics while policymakers potentially shape better responses to insurgencies and rebellions.