Submitted by Andrea Hayashi (deachan@gmail.com) on 2016-06-24T12:25:51Z No. of bitstreams: 1 dissertacao-andre-queiroz-de-lucena.pdf: 1390360 bytes, checksum: e69e9e9d57efb54a40c1c85c8c5a1e61 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Andrea Hayashi (deachan@gmail.com) on 2016-06-24T12:26:41Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 dissertacao-andre-queiroz-de-lucena.pdf: 1390360 bytes, checksum: e69e9e9d57efb54a40c1c85c8c5a1e61 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2016-06-24T12:26:41Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 dissertacao-andre-queiroz-de-lucena.pdf: 1390360 bytes, checksum: e69e9e9d57efb54a40c1c85c8c5a1e61 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2013-12 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES) / Este trabalho examina a formação da sociedade política na crítica de Rousseau ao jusnaturalista Samuel von Pufendorf. Enquanto o autor do Le Droit de la Nature et des Gens postula uma sociedade fundada nos mandatos da recta ratio, sociabilidade e cumprimento dos Deveres, Rousseau critica aqueles mandatos no que o faz reexaminar a natureza humana e as exigência da sociedade política. Daí, a oposição entre uma legitimidade baseada na alienação ao representante ou assembleia, e outra, formada pela vontade geral e liberdade do cidadão. Os temas implicam, portanto, em um e (ou) outro autor, na apresentação da teoria dos Seres Morais e dos princípios do direito político, do estado de natureza e das fórmulas contratuais. / This work examines the formation of the political society in criticism of Rousseau to the jusnaturalist Samuel Von Pufendorf. While the author of Le Droit La Nature et desgens posits a society founded in the mandates of the recta ratio,sociability and the fulfilment of duties, Rosseau criticizes those terms that makes him review the human nature and the requirement of the political society. Hence, the opposition between a legitimacy based on the alienation to the representative or House. And another one, formed by the citizen general will and freedom. The topics imply, therefore, in either of the author, on presentation of moral beings theory, the political right principles, the nature state as well as the contractual formulas.

Joseph Butler's moral thought and the ethical rationalism of Samuel Clarke, and his followers, John Balguy and Richard Price, are frequently distinguished, as a result of: (a) Butler’s empirical method (e.g., Kydd, Sturgeon); (b) Butler's emphasis upon self-love in the 'cool hour passage' (e.g., Prichard, McPherson); (c) Butlerian conscience, where, on a neo-Kantian reading, Butler surpassed the Clarkeans by conveying a sense of Kantian 'reflective endorsement' (e.g., Korsgaard, Darwall). The neo-Kantian criticisms of the Clarkeans in (c) are consistent with (d) Francis Hutcheson's and David Hume's criticisms of the Clarkeans; (e) modern criticisms of rational intuitionism that follow Hutcheson and Hume (e.g., Mackie, Warnock); and (f) the contention that the Clarkeans occupied an uneasy position within 'post-restoration natural law theory' (e.g., Beiser, Finnis). (d)-(e) thus underpin the distinction between Butler and the Clarkeans in (a)-(c), where the Clarkeans, unlike Butler, are criticised for representing moral truth as the passive, and self-evident, perception of potentially uninteresting facts. This study responds to (a)-(f), by arguing that Butlerian and Clarkean conscience possessed more than one referent; so that conscience meant an individual's experience of his own judgement and God’s judgement and the rational moral order. As a result of their shared theory of conscience, Butler and the Clarkeans held the same theory of moral development: moral agents mature as they move from obeying conscience according to only one of conscience's referents, to obeying conscience because to do so is to satisfy each of conscience's referents. In response to (a)-(b), this study demonstrates that the Clarkeans agreed with Butler’s method and 'cool hour': natural considerations of individual judgement and self-interest were necessary aspects of the progress towards moral maturity in both Butler and the Clarkeans. With respect to (c), it is argued that Butler and the Clarkeans shared the same understanding of practical moral reasoning as part of their shared understanding of conscience and moral development. This study places limits upon proto-Kantian readings of Butler, and neo-Kantian criticisms of the Clarkeans, while making it inconsistent to divide Butler and the Clarkeans on the basis of Butlerian conscience. In answer to (c)-(f), Clarkean conscience shows that the Clarkeans were neither complacent nor ‘externalists’. Clarkean conscience highlights how the Clarkeans positioned themselves within the tradition of Ciceronian right reason and Thomistic natural law. Consequently, in both Butler and the Clarkeans, the intuition of moral truth was not the passive perception of an 'independent realm' of normative fact, but the active encounter, in conscience, with reason qua the law of God’s nature, human nature, and the created universe.