Contemporary probation practice has come to be subject to the logic of risk. The rise in the logic of risk has led to significant changes in penal practices. Therefore, it is sociologically important to explore the recent research on the evolution and transformation of probation in Canada with regard to the logic of risk. The purpose of my research was to explore how the logic of risk has impacted and transformed probation objectives, and how it impacted the role of probation officers. Specifically, I wanted to explore how publications present the transformation of probation due to the logic of risk, the formation of new objectives for the system, the deployment of new practices and tools, and how these transformations and new objectives have changed the role of probation officers. To do this, it was determined that a critical literature review of published articles (both academic and government sources) would be the most appropriate data collection method. To analyze the data, an eleven-stage process to a hybrid thematic analysis was utilized. Through this analysis, four main themes were uncovered and explored using a governmentality framework. Objectives of probation as forms effective penal governance were presented, efficient governance through risk was demonstrated through resource allocation, and effective and efficient decision making is explored. It is hypothesized that risk logic leads to the use of heuristic strategies in probation officer decision making. In this thesis, I argue that we are in a phase of ‘new rehabilitationism’ that draws on notions of rehabilitation and reframes them under neo-liberal strategies for control through normalization. In addition to this, knowledge production of probation through the logic of risk is explored and the effects of knowledge/power and its implications for probationers outlined.

The moral justification of punishment is the fundamental concern of this thesis. It is argued that a moral response to crime has to be a civilised response; therefore, the notion of "civility" is defined and discussed. Punishment is then defended in such a way that it accords with being a civilised response to crime. It is argued that in order to be such a response, and thereby qualify as a moral response, punishment must have a certain structure, i.e. it must fulfil seven necessary conditions, which, it is argued, together constitute the sufficient condition for morally justified punishment. In arguing for each of the necessary conditions, different onedimensional theories of punishment are dealt with (retributivism, utilitarianism, deterrence theory, rehabilitationism, a paternalistic theory of punishment, and restitutionalism}, indicating that each fulfils some of the criteria for morally justified punishment. None of the onedimensional theories fulfils all the necessary conditions, however, and hence none on its own fulfils the sufficient condition for morally justified punishment. This is not to argue that a straightforward theory could never on its own fulfil the conditions for morally justified punishment, but I have not been able to conceive how this could be done. The theory I here present is therefore a hybrid approach, incorporating elements of all the above-mentioned theories into a unitary theory. In doing so, it fulfils all the necessary conditions for being a civilised response to crime, thereby fulfilling the sufficient condition too, and hence providing a morally defensible account of punishment. Finally, the question of how this theory can be put into practice is addressed. Because the objective of punishment ought to be a civilised response, thereby benefiting both society as a whole and those being punished and rehabilitated, the thesis may be seen as a progressive synthesis of the various approaches examined. / Philosophy, Practical & Systematic Theology / D. Litt. et Phil. (Philosophy)

The moral justification of punishment is the fundamental concern of this thesis. It is argued that a moral response to crime has to be a civilised response; therefore, the notion of "civility" is defined and discussed. Punishment is then defended in such a way that it accords with being a civilised response to crime. It is argued that in order to be such a response, and thereby qualify as a moral response, punishment must have a certain structure, i.e. it must fulfil seven necessary conditions, which, it is argued, together constitute the sufficient condition for morally justified punishment. In arguing for each of the necessary conditions, different onedimensional theories of punishment are dealt with (retributivism, utilitarianism, deterrence theory, rehabilitationism, a paternalistic theory of punishment, and restitutionalism}, indicating that each fulfils some of the criteria for morally justified punishment. None of the onedimensional theories fulfils all the necessary conditions, however, and hence none on its own fulfils the sufficient condition for morally justified punishment. This is not to argue that a straightforward theory could never on its own fulfil the conditions for morally justified punishment, but I have not been able to conceive how this could be done. The theory I here present is therefore a hybrid approach, incorporating elements of all the above-mentioned theories into a unitary theory. In doing so, it fulfils all the necessary conditions for being a civilised response to crime, thereby fulfilling the sufficient condition too, and hence providing a morally defensible account of punishment. Finally, the question of how this theory can be put into practice is addressed. Because the objective of punishment ought to be a civilised response, thereby benefiting both society as a whole and those being punished and rehabilitated, the thesis may be seen as a progressive synthesis of the various approaches examined. / Philosophy, Practical and Systematic Theology / D. Litt. et Phil. (Philosophy)