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Immediate perception as held by Reid and Hamilton considered as a refutation of the skepticism of HumeLatimer, James F. January 1880 (has links)
Thesis (doctoral)--University of Leipzig. / Cover title. Includes bibliographical references (p. 48-49).
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A concepção de linguagem de Thomas ReidFaller, Jacson Jonas January 2013 (has links)
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Previous issue date: 2013 / The bulk of this thesis is devoted to proposing a crosscut reading of two great works of Thomas Reid (1710-1796), Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man and An Inquiry into the Human Mind on the Principles of Common Sense, aiming at positing Reid’s notion of language that underlies his theory of operations of the mind. For this, the work is divided into four main points: firstly, Reid’s understanding of language is posted, as Reid conceives and organizes it; secondly, the reidian theory of operations of mind is examined as well as its division into social and solitary operation; thirdly, the subject of the testimony is explained so as to, lastly, end it by attempting to answer the question that underlies this research, namely, in what ways Reid’s concept of language depicts the relations among world, mind, and language from Reid’s own conceptions. / A presente dissertação possui como proposta de trabalho uma leitura transversal de duas grandes obras de Thomas Reid (1710-1796), Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man e An Inquiry into the Human Mind on the Principles of Common Sense, com o objetivo geral de tornar aparente a noção reidiana de linguagem que subjaz à sua teoria das operações da mente. Para cumprir com tal objetivo, divide-se este trabalho em quatro momentos principais: em primeiro lugar é exposta a compreensão reidiana de linguagem – como Reid a concebe e a organiza; em seguida, disserta-se sobre a teoria reidiana das operações da mente, bem como sua divisão entre operações sociais e operações solitárias; logo após, aos moldes de Reid, o tema do testemunho é explanado para, enfim, encerrar a exposição com uma possibilidade de resposta à questão que orienta esta pesquisa, a saber, o que esta concepção de linguagem pode representar no que diz respeito à relação entre mundo, mente e linguagem a partir do pensamento de Thomas Reid.
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Wahrnehmen und Wissen die Rolle der Natur im Denken von Thomas ReidHage, Rosine January 2007 (has links)
Zugl.: Diss.
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COMMONSENSE FACULTY PSYCHOLOGY: REIDIAN FOUNDATIONS FOR COMPUTATIONAL COGNITIVE SCIENCE (FUNCTIONALISM, INTENTIONALITY, MODULARITY, MIND, REPRESENTATION).SMITH, JOHN-CHRISTIAN. January 1985 (has links)
This work locates the historical and conceptual foundations of cognitive science in the "commonsense" psychology of the philosopher Thomas Reid. I begin with Reid's attack on his rationalist and empiricist competitors of the 17th and 18th centuries. I then present his positive theory as a sophisticated faculty psychology appealing to innateness of mental structure. Reidian psychological faculties are equally trustworthy, causally independent mental powers, and I argue that they share nine distinct properties. This distinguishes Reidian 'intentionalism' from idealist 'representationalism,' which derive cognitive content either from the inherited structure of faculties of from the occurrent structure of sensory activity. Next, I turn to consciousness and reflection for a contemporary Reidian response to traditional phenomenology. Unlike reflection, faculties of reason and remembrance are not causally mediated by consciousness. My interpretation of Reid is that 'Humean causation' of individual faculty structure accounts only for 'natural intentionality,' while 'efficient causation' of faculty interrelations accounts for cognitive 'personal intentionality.' I then proceed by adopting a form of computational description for reconstructing this view as a computational theory of mind. I contrast functional analyses in explanations of some capacities with computational and componential analyses in explanations of other, intentional capacities, in which some processes must be taken to semantically encode and govern the roles of others. This step reconstructs the Reidian notion of intentional operations as requiring an explanation of component faculties and their representation-governed interactions. I argue that properties of faculties delimiting these interactions under Reid's theory parallel those in Fodor's (1983) essay on the "modularity of mind," although the reasons given for individual criteria are often very different. Fodor also proposes a trichotomous mental structure, but I find that a third level of "central systems" is a myth engendered by causal information theory. Such an analysis cannot capture generalizations over the internal representation of semantic roles that determines the character of faculty relations. This requirement for any computational account of cognition is precisely the motivation for the reconstructed Reidian theory. Thus, it comports more favorably with the explanatory program constitutive of a computational cognitive science.
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Thomas Reid's theory of visionWeldon, Susan, 1950- January 1978 (has links)
No description available.
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The concept of basic beliefs in the philosophy of Thomas Reid and Alvin PlantingaLawrence, Larry D. January 1991 (has links)
Thesis (M.A.)--Trinity Evangelical Divinity School, 1991. / Abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 127-136).
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"Reiding Rawls": A critical assessment of Thomas Reid's Common Sense Philosophy as a response to John Rawls's doctrine of public reasonBaise, Bryan Edward 23 December 2016 (has links)
This dissertation examines John Rawls’s doctrine of public reason in light of Thomas Reid’s Common Sense philosophy. Chapter 1 introduces the topics of public reason and common sense in order to suggest that Thomas Reid’s philosophy can provide a beneficial contribution to public policy debates. Chapter 2 examines key features of Rawls’s doctrine of public reason. Chapter 3 suggests that there are critical problems with Rawls’s doctrine of public reason. Chapter 4 examines key features of Thomas Reid’s common sense philosophy. Chapter 5 shows Reid’s common sense application in early American history as well as contemporary scholarship. It argues that common sense can provide insight into two test-cases, abortion and same-sex marriage. Chapter 6 concludes the dissertation, summarizing the arguments and providing suggestions for further research.
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Thomas Reid: o problema da induçãoPimentel, Pablo Fernando Campos January 2015 (has links)
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Previous issue date: 2015 / The purpose of this paper is to present a possible reidian theory for a justification to the problem of induction from its two major writings, namely,"An Inquiry into the Human Mind on the Principles of Common Sense" 1764 and "Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Men" of 1785. Thus, appear quite subtle conception of Thomas Reid about "Problem of Induction", which is primarily discussed in the Inquiry, however, they appear quite important approaches and crucial also in Essays. It should not be forgotten that while the reidiana theory of induction is emerging, a debate and an analysis will be made by Reid in his great contemporary Hume. The importance of Hume's inclusion is indisputable because it has been Reid's time, and also by the contours of his thought about inductive reasoning and how Reid understands and, in a way, goes further. Therefore, some chapters will work with the problem of induction in the two respective works of Reid, HMI and EIP. It will also be an analysis of what was written about the induction and other peripheral issues in Reid, the other researchers. What conclusions Reid comes in and another work, and realize what critics synthesized his thinking in this respect, namely with regard to induction. / O objetivo do presente trabalho é apresentar uma possível teoria reidiana para uma justificação ao problema da indução a partir de seus dois grandes escritos, a saber, o “An Inquiry into the Human Mind on the Principles of Common Sense” de 1764 e o “Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Men” de 1785. Desse modo, surgirá de forma bastante sutil a concepção de Thomas Reid acerca do “Problema da Indução”, o qual é discutido primeiramente no Inquiry, no entanto, aparecem abordagens bastante importantes e cruciais também no Essays. Não deve ser esquecido que ao passo que a teoria reidiana da indução vai emergindo, um debate e uma análise vão sendo feitos por Reid em seu grande contemporâneo Hume. A importância da inserção de Hume é indiscutível pelo fato de este ter sido do tempo de Reid, e, também, pelos contornos de seu pensamento acerca do raciocínio indutivo e como Reid o interpreta e, de certo modo, vai além. Deste modo, alguns capítulos trabalharão com o problema da indução nas duas respectivas obras de Reid, IHM e EIP. Também será feita uma análise do que foi escrito acerca da indução e outros assuntos periféricos em Reid, da parte de outros pesquisadores. A que conclusões Reid chega numa e noutra obra, e perceber o que os críticos sintetizaram de seu pensamento nesse aspecto, a saber, no que tange à indução.
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Thomas Reid's theory of visionWeldon, Susan, 1950- January 1978 (has links)
No description available.
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Scottish common sense in Germany, 1768-1800 : a contribution to the history of critical philosophyKuehn, Manfred. January 1980 (has links)
No description available.
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