Problem: An analysis of the compatibility of global airline alliances with EC- competition policy including merger policy and EC-competition law. Is the Commission’s current approach to prohibit certain restrictive global alliances the optimal solution to the problem of certain alliances’ anti-competitive effects? Can other conclusions be drawn by taking an approach based on efficiency arguments that recommend a trade-off between the efficiency gains and the inevitable anti-competitive effects of the alliances? Will the results of the latter approach be in the public interest and does it conform to EC- competitionpolicy including merger policy and EC-competition law? Purpose: There are three aims of this paper; two intermediate aims, which are to introduce the complex nature of global airline alliances to legal practitioners, in particular the alliances’ impact on competition in the EU aviation market, and to illustrate the Commission’s assessment of the relevant market and its proposed measures to deal with the restriction of competition. Then my intention is to develop an alternative approach – “the efficiency policy” – and investigate its conformity to EC-competition policy including merger policy and legislation. Limitation: The question on what effects global airline alliances have on competition is naturally a global question, which is dealt with by competition authorities in many countries. In this paper no attempt is made to compare the opinions of and the measures taken by authorities throughout the world; instead the intention is to analyse the current EC-competition policy and merger policy on the subject. Method: In the descriptive part I will take a strictly positive approach and conduct an ordinary empirical research, i.e., to collect and present relevant legal and economic material that explain the legal as well as the economic aspects of global airline alliances. In the analytical part my intention is to analyze the Commission’s current approach towards Global airline alliances and to show how this has effected its decisions. I will then discuss the pros and cons of this approach with respect to the different interests that are to be protected by EC-competition law. Finally, I will develop an alternative approach"the efficiency policy"and discuss whether it conforms to EC- competition policy including merger policy and EC-competition law. Results: Global airline alliances bring efficiency gains, which can be distributed to consumers, communities and other parts of society. Nevertheless, the formation of global airline alliances will distort competition in some of the relevantmarkets. The Commission, which appears to have assessed the relevant market correctly, will not allow competition to be distorted. However, the remedies of the Commission seem to be inadequate. The reason appears to be a conflict between the goal of upholding"workable competition"and facilitating the efficiency gains that global airline alliances bring to society. This problem may be solved by applying another competition policy based on efficiency, which would allow airlines to defend decreased competition in terms of efficiency. However, due to the structure of Article 81 of the EC- Treaty, an"efficiency defence"cannot be allowed under that Article. Nevertheless, there is a possibility that it can be allowed under the Merger Regulation.

Competition law is an area which is going through changes over time, especially EC competition law in regard to the ongoing process of market integration. The definition of the relevant geographic market within EC competition law is of importance to define, both in case law and for undertakings and their businesses, as the law should be predictable. Before Article 82 of the EC Treaty, which prohibits abusive behaviour by undertakings, is applicable the relevant geographic market has to be defined. As is the case with the Merger Regulation, the relevant geographic market has to be defined to make an assessment of the undertakings’ activities. The definition of the geographic market is then used as a tool in the analysis of the assessment of competition and the effects of measures carried out by undertakings which restrain competition. Thus, the definition of the relevant geographic market is crucial for the purposes of Community competition law. The definition of the relevant geographic market can be said to be an area where “the objective conditions of competition applying to the product in question must be the same for all traders” as established in United Brands. In Deutsche Bahn it was clarified that “... the definition of the geographical market does not require the objective conditions of competition between traders to be perfectly homogenous”. It is enough if they are similar, therefore areas in which the objective conditions of competition are different, are not considered to be a uniform market. In the Commission Notice on the definition of relevant market for the purposes of Community competition law the Commission’s work to define the relevant geographic market is described as well as the evidence the Commission contemplates in its assessment. The substitutability test is relied on by the Commission. In case law from the European Court of Justice, the Court of First Instance, and the Commission, different factors are scrutinized to establish the relevant geographic market. Such factors are e.g., the undertakings’ activities, barriers to trade, and barriers to entry. The significance of the evidence and the factors used in the definition of the relevant geographic market are debatable. The factors considered vary on a case to case basis and they need to differ to make a correct assessment of the relevant geographic market in every case within EC competition law.

<p>This thesis intends to analyze and clarify the relevant market within air passenger transport. Further the thesis intends to investigate if there is any difference in air passenger transport in accordance to more general business. The definition of the relevant market is an essential step in order to establish a breach under European competition law. The relevant market includes the relevant product market and the relevant geographic market. The fundamental issue in the relevant product market is whether products are considered to be substitutable and can constitute the same market. The Commission has set a notice which includes methods and criterias and serves as guidelines to courts and companies to define the relevant market. The notice is however not binding for courts. The CJ have developed implementation of the criterias which it tends to refer to even if it is a different branch, however a case-by-case based definition is needed. The definition of the relevant market is based on three main criterias: demand substitutability, supply substitutability and potential competition. Even though the supply substitutability seems not be implemented in a further extension in more general branches, it seems to be of greater importance when defining the relevant market within air passenger transport. The air passenger transport has also established a test called base of origin and base of destination which includes an analysis of price, travel frequencies, comfort of the journey, transfer time to terminals and differences in the qualities and quantities in airports.  However according to air passenger transport, travel sequences seems to be the criteria that courts focus most on.</p>

<p>Problem: An analysis of the compatibility of global airline alliances with EC- competition policy including merger policy and EC-competition law. Is the Commission’s current approach to prohibit certain restrictive global alliances the optimal solution to the problem of certain alliances’ anti-competitive effects? Can other conclusions be drawn by taking an approach based on efficiency arguments that recommend a trade-off between the efficiency gains and the inevitable anti-competitive effects of the alliances? Will the results of the latter approach be in the public interest and does it conform to EC- competitionpolicy including merger policy and EC-competition law? </p><p>Purpose: There are three aims of this paper; two intermediate aims, which are to introduce the complex nature of global airline alliances to legal practitioners, in particular the alliances’ impact on competition in the EU aviation market, and to illustrate the Commission’s assessment of the relevant market and its proposed measures to deal with the restriction of competition. Then my intention is to develop an alternative approach – “the efficiency policy” – and investigate its conformity to EC-competition policy including merger policy and legislation. </p><p>Limitation: The question on what effects global airline alliances have on competition is naturally a global question, which is dealt with by competition authorities in many countries. In this paper no attempt is made to compare the opinions of and the measures taken by authorities throughout the world; instead the intention is to analyse the current EC-competition policy and merger policy on the subject. </p><p>Method: In the descriptive part I will take a strictly positive approach and conduct an ordinary empirical research, i.e., to collect and present relevant legal and economic material that explain the legal as well as the economic aspects of global airline alliances. In the analytical part my intention is to analyze the Commission’s current approach towards Global airline alliances and to show how this has effected its decisions. I will then discuss the pros and cons of this approach with respect to the different interests that are to be protected by EC-competition law. Finally, I will develop an alternative approach"the efficiency policy"and discuss whether it conforms to EC- competition policy including merger policy and EC-competition law. </p><p>Results: Global airline alliances bring efficiency gains, which can be distributed to consumers, communities and other parts of society. Nevertheless, the formation of global airline alliances will distort competition in some of the relevantmarkets. The Commission, which appears to have assessed the relevant market correctly, will not allow competition to be distorted. However, the remedies of the Commission seem to be inadequate. The reason appears to be a conflict between the goal of upholding"workable competition"and facilitating the efficiency gains that global airline alliances bring to society. This problem may be solved by applying another competition policy based on efficiency, which would allow airlines to defend decreased competition in terms of efficiency. However, due to the structure of Article 81 of the EC- Treaty, an"efficiency defence"cannot be allowed under that Article. Nevertheless, there is a possibility that it can be allowed under the Merger Regulation.</p>

The decision of the European Commission to block the merger between Volvo and Scania in the late 90’s became the starting point to the debate of the possible discriminating effects of the European merger regulation. Especially since the Commission a few years earlier had approved of the merger between Mercedes-Benz and Kässbohrer on the German bus market, where the conditions for competition had been similar to those at hand in the Swedish case. The issue that was and still is in focus is whether the European merger regulation is more difficult to pass for large companies situated on a smaller domestic market than is the case for their competitors of corresponding size but situated on a larger domestic market. This thesis aims at examining what the judgement of the geographical relevant market means for the application of the Merger act. This is being done from two perspectives. Firstly how the geographical criterion affects large merging companies situated on a relatively small domestic market and secondly how it affects a member state like Sweden, which is so dependent on its large companies. The purpose of this thesis also opens for a discussion of how rigid the merger control can be in an open market economy. The company perspective of the purpose is being pursued in two studies of the merger cases Volvo-Scania and Mercedes-Benz/Kässbohrer, being four national champs with differing size of domestic markets. The member state angle considers the smaller state dependence on its large companies and if that dependence itself creates a disadvantage in a merger case. The end of the purpose opens for a common discussion of the legitimacy of merger control in an open market economy. After analysing these aspects the thesis concludes that the geographical criterion makes it impossible for large companies with a relatively small domestic market to merge when a market bears the stamp of brand loyalty. Considering the small member state the conclusion is that the European merger control offers both pros and cons for consumers and that smaller states would be better off with a more producer-oriented merger law. The ending conclusion questions the Merger act as an intervening tool because of its arbitrary aspect depending on which composition the Commission has when a merger is announced.

This thesis intends to analyze and clarify the relevant market within air passenger transport. Further the thesis intends to investigate if there is any difference in air passenger transport in accordance to more general business. The definition of the relevant market is an essential step in order to establish a breach under European competition law. The relevant market includes the relevant product market and the relevant geographic market. The fundamental issue in the relevant product market is whether products are considered to be substitutable and can constitute the same market. The Commission has set a notice which includes methods and criterias and serves as guidelines to courts and companies to define the relevant market. The notice is however not binding for courts. The CJ have developed implementation of the criterias which it tends to refer to even if it is a different branch, however a case-by-case based definition is needed. The definition of the relevant market is based on three main criterias: demand substitutability, supply substitutability and potential competition. Even though the supply substitutability seems not be implemented in a further extension in more general branches, it seems to be of greater importance when defining the relevant market within air passenger transport. The air passenger transport has also established a test called base of origin and base of destination which includes an analysis of price, travel frequencies, comfort of the journey, transfer time to terminals and differences in the qualities and quantities in airports.  However according to air passenger transport, travel sequences seems to be the criteria that courts focus most on.

Šiuolaikinėse valstybėse konkurencija yra laikoma pagrindiniu ekonominės tvarkos principu, užtikrinančiu ūkio plėtotę, ekonomikos vystymasį, bendra visuomenės gerovę. Būtent dėl šių priežasčių ji turi būti saugoma. Valstybė turi pareiga saugoti sąžiningą konkurencijos laisvę, palaikyti veiksmingą konkurenciją, neleisti rinkoje veikiantiems ūkio subjektams pažeisti konkurencijos taisyklių. Tačiau konkurencijos taisyklių pažeidimai dažniausiai nėra akivaizdus. Siekiant išsiaiškinti, ar konkrečioje situacijoje yra konkurencijos pažeidimu, visu pirma, prireikia nustatyti nagrinėjamų ūkio subjektų konkurentus, atlikti detalią rinkos analizę. / Market definition is the first step that must be taken in order to determine competitors, calculate the market shares of the operators in the market and to answer the question if the competition is restricting. The process of market definition is complex, consisting of two stages: the definition of relevant product market and the definition of relevant geographical market. The definition of the market is essentially a matter of interchangeability. Potential competition stipulates more precise definition of the relevant market and can be called an extra source of competitive constraint. The temporal market can be an important factor while defining the relevant market; however, we don’t separate it in own stage, because it is not necessary to determine temporal market in all situations. It is sensible to bear in mind that market investigation would be efficient and properly done if it depended on the situation individuality.

Em 1999, o mercado de medicamentos genéricos foi criado no Brasil. Com isso, iniciou-se uma nova fase do mercado farmacêutico brasileiro. Através de dados cedidos pela ANVISA sobre o mercado varejista brasileiro, objetivou-se testar em até que ponto a política de medicamentos genéricos tem logrado êxito. Foram utilizados dados em painel para analisar o impacto da entrada dos medicamentos genéricos sobre a estrutura do mercado, assim como o impacto nos preços e na quantidade vendida entre 2003 e 2007. Os resultados foram favoráveis à diminuição da concentração dos mercados relevantes da amostragem e também ao aumento da quantidade comercializada. Em relação aos preços, o modelo se mostrou pouco significativo, provavelmente pela política de medicamentos genéricos ser um instrumento indireto de controle de preços. De qualquer forma, os resultados encontrados parecem sugerir o bom andamento da política de medicamentos genéricos, o que é um alívio em se tratando de um mercado tão essencial para o bem-estar da população. / In 1999, the generic medicines market was created in Brazil. Thus, a new phase of the Brazilian pharmaceutical market began. Through data provided by ANVISA on the Brazilian retail market, aimed to test in how far the generic drug policy has been successful, we used panel data to analyze the impact of the entry of generic drugs on the market structure, as well as the impact on prices and quantities sold between 2003 and 2007. The results were favorable to the policy as they show decrease of the concentration level in the relevant markets of the sample and also increase of the quantity sold. Regarding prices, the model was negligible, probably due to generic drug policy being an instrument of indirect price control. Anyway, the results seem to suggest the progress of the generic drug policy, which is a relief when it comes to a market as essential for the welfare of the population.

Reference 1 1 Abstract - Abuse of a dominant position and the concept of relevant market The main aim of this thesis was firstly to describe the definition of abuse of dominant position constitute as one of the pillars of competition law (except for agreements distorting competition and illegal merger) and secondly to define the concept of the relevant market in accordance with the interpretation of rules on competition and the case law of the European Commission, the Court of First Instance, European Court Justice and the Office for Protection of the Competition. The introductory chapters I have tried to acquaint potential readers especially with the interpretation of key concepts, facilitating global orientation through the issue of competition and its distortion or restriction. Mainly to work with concepts such as competition, competition law, cartel law, undertaking, company, etc. Without explanation and interpretation of these key concepts could seldom be properly grasp the issue of abuse of dominant position. In the next section, I focus on issues describe the subject of my thesis and a dominant market position and its forms of abuse. A comprehensive interpretation of the issue greatly assists the Community case-law for this purpose I chose the most significant cases clarifying fundamental questions...

This paper analyzes regulation of abuse of dominant position under the law of the European Union and under the Czech law. Both the European and Czech competition laws are not only very similar, as the Czech Act on Protection of Competition is inspired by the European competition law, but after the so called modernization of the European competition law, including the decentralization of its enforcement, the Czech authorities are entitled (and obliged at the same time) to apply the European competition law. Given the special relation between the two legal orders, this paper does not attempt to compare the two, but rather to analyze them it their mutual relation, which is the basic view for the submitted analysis. Firstly, a basic introduction to the problems of competition economics is presented, including characteristics of the basic functions and principles thereof. An explanation of the economic background and different models of competition follows, particularly of those important for understanding the specifics of dominant undertakings' behaviour and motivation. Models of monopoly, oligopoly and monopolistic competition are briefly described in opposition to the model of perfect competition and also some other important approaches to this issue are addressed, including the basic views of the...