This thesis is a study of religion and the environment in the Dallas-Fort Worth metroplex and how participants define and interpret their religious duty toward nature. The literature is focused on the field of Christianity and Ecology from its historical development, culminating with a discussion of contemporary religious environmental activism. Utilizing a participatory action research framework, a sustainable education program was developed, focusing on the environmental ethics of Christianity. With my participants we address the topics of sustainability and climate change, religion and the environment, consumption, and advocacy. While the final product of the study was a program on Christianity and Ecology, interfaith ideas can be found throughout the work.

Contemporary conflicts over such issues as abortion, same-sex marriage, circumcision, and veiling highlight the need for renewed reflection on the justification of religious norms and authority. While abstract investigation of these questions is necessary, inquiry into them is not foreign to religious traditions. Philosophical engagement with these traditions of inquiry is both intellectually and practically advantageous. This does not demand, however, that these discussions be conducted within a discourse wholly internal to a particular religious tradition; dialogue between a religious tradition and philosophical reflection can be created that is mutually beneficial. To that end, this dissertation explores a central issue in philosophy of halakha (Jewish law): the relation between the justification of halakhic norms and halakhic-legal practice. A central component of philosophy of halakha is the project of ta'amei ha-mitzvot (the reasons for the commandments). Through such inquiry, Jewish thinkers attempt to demonstrate the rationality of Jewish religious practice by offering reasons for halakhic norms. At its best, it not only seeks to justify halakhic norms but also elicits sustained reflection on issues in moral philosophy, including justification and normativity. Still, there is a tendency among its practitioners to attempt to separate this project from halakhic-legal practice. Legal practice is thus isolated from philosophical reflection, and the reasons for the norms do not guide their application. Ta'amei ha-mitzvot therefore also provokes queries in legal philosophy concerning the relation between normative and legal justification. This study explores the relation between the justification of halakhic norms and halakhic-legal practice in modern Jewish thought by placing it into dialogue with both moral and legal philosophy. This occurs in two stages: First, the philosophies of halakha of three influential twentieth-century Jewish thinkers, Yeshayahu Leibowitz (1903-1994), Joseph Soloveitchik (1903-1993), and Eliezer Berkovits (1908-1992) are examined and critically assessed. It is shown that despite the denials of Leibowitz and Soloveitchik, all their accounts of the reasons for the commandments influence their approaches to halakhic-legal practice; they each combine a foundationalist approach to justification with skepticism about the practical normativity of reason; and none of them adequately grounds halakhic-legal authority. However, their skepticism is based on unduly constricted conceptions of reason and untenable alternative sources of normativity, such as will, metaphysics, or revelation. Second, through engagements with the work of Jürgen Habermas and Joseph Raz an alternative to their accounts of the justification of halakhic norms and authority is developed. This alternative is described as critical philosophy of halakha, for it does not attempt to justify halakhic norms or authority but articulates the rational constraints on, and practical consequences of, their justification. In terms of justification, this account is contextualist, that is, pragmatic and intersubjective, rather than foundationalist, and it is responsive to failures of justification. Correspondingly, it entails pluralism yet avoids moral and epistemic relativism. In terms of authority, this account is instrumentalist and thus mediates between normative and legal justification without reducing the latter to the former. Consequently, authority is circumscribed as opposed to total. Critical philosophy of halakha therefore represents a method whereby the modern religious believer may hold herself accountable to both her faith and other individuals.

This dissertation grows out of the collapse of traditional Christian justifications for evil in the wake of Enlightenment critiques of religion and the atrocities of the twentieth century. Skeptical of teleological narratives that sought to domesticate suffering as part of a necessary plan - whether God's plan, or some more secularized ideal of progress - a generation of Critical Theorists adopted the concept of contingency as their central tool for political critique. Defined as the realm of chance, change, and the unnecessary, contingency serves for most contemporary thinkers to remind us that even seemingly natural categories, such as sex, race, and religion could have been otherwise. Yet in using contingency to make sweeping statements about the nature of history, scholars often overlook how contingency is understood on the ground by those who feel their bodies and identities abruptly made unstable. This project seeks to reground contingency in the specificity of human experience by returning to a neglected Christian tradition that understood contingency as a state of finitude, defined in contrast to the necessary, impassive God. For such thinkers, contingency was experienced most acutely in the sense of touch as it renders the body vulnerable to the external world and the passions as they ambush the soul. Accordingly, this work picks up at one of the last junctures before questions of history swept away the tactile, affective understanding of contingency: the end of the eighteenth century with the influence of Pietism on the Early German Romantics. This work draws this particular moment into conversation with the history of science, literature, and the anthropology of the senses, asking questions about the influence of shifting medical theories on the cultural understanding of touch; the historical ties between this version of contingency and theories of psychological pathology; and the relationship between literature and theology within this intellectual tradition. To focus those conversations, each chapter centers on a different situation in which a given thinker experiences contingency through touch or the passions. The opening chapter looks at Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling's 1813 philosophical fable, Ages of the World, which locates contingency in the uncaused, unconditioned - and ultimately pathological - desire for companionship of an omnipotent will at the beginning of time. The chapter argues that Schelling's depiction of the contingency of desire offers a phenomenology of loneliness that grows out of a broader engagement with the problem of evil. The second chapter turns to the argument of the poet Novalis (1772-1801) that we experience contingency as a form of wonder that connects us to a divine whole we can only asymptotically approach. This wonder, he thinks, is experienced most clearly through our physical contact with books that impress on us our inability to ever do more than touch upon fragments of knowledge, given the proliferation of texts in the wake of the printing press. The third chapter reads together Eugène Minkowski's phenomenology of lived space for the mentally ill with Jean Améry's essay on torture during the Third Reich. This chapter pushes against the optimism and revelatory nature of contingency in Novalis by following cases where contingency is experienced as violation through unwanted touch. The final chapter asks whether contingency is solely disruptive, or if it can be incorporated into lasting social structures, by exploring the work of Michel Serres (1930-present). It argues a model of contingency as "common tangency" underlies his environmentalism, leading him to urge the creation of a "natural contract" where humans combat global warming from recognition that they are in co-implicated contact with nature, much like lovers during sex.

The role of divine Revelation in the process of construction of normative judgments has long occupied scholars of religion in general, and Islam in particular. In the area of Islamic studies, numerous works were dedicated to the elucidation of various trends of thought on the question of the methods of formulation of norms and values. Many of those studies suppose a distinction between textualist and rationalist theories, and use this framework to explain the most influential Muslim views on this issue. In contemporary philosophical theology and the philosophy of religion, theorists of religious meta-ethics draw upon the medieval and early modern Christian debates almost exclusively. Reconstructing the philosophical foundations of classical Islamic models of norm-construction, which arise within both theological and jurisprudential works, has not received sufficient attention in either discipline. In this study, I explore eleventh century debates on the place of divine Revelation in the formulation of normative judgments in Islamic theology and jurisprudence, and bring this analysis in dialogue with current questions in philosophical theology. By reconstructing the epistemological, metaphysical and semantic foundations of those debates, I show that two general trends emerge on the question of the depth with which Revelation interferes in human moral reasoning, which generally correspond to recent debates between natural reason and divine command theorists in contemporary philosophical theology. I argue that those tensions were the result of a number of philosophical disagreements, not mere reflections of a commitment to “rationalism” or “textualism.” This study is based on an analysis of texts attributed to prominent eleventh century jurist-theologians, including Abū Bakr al-Bāqillānī (d.1013), Imām al-Ḥaramayn al-Juwaynī (d. 1085), al-Qāḍī ʿAbd al-Jabbār (d. 1024) and Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Bāṣrī (d. 1044). I maintain that abstract normative considerations animating those theories are of trans-historical philosophical value, and can be “appropriated” to provide new insights when introduced into current debates in religious ethics. Whereas, following post-colonial studies that held the inadequacy of treating non-Western thought through the lens of modern Western theories, many recent works emphasized the historicity of Islamic thought, I consider the abstract claims in both Islamic and modern thought in order to generate a philosophical dialogue across traditions. In conclusion, I argue that disagreements between prominent eleventh century Muslim jurist-theologians on the place of Revelation in the formulation of normative judgments is best understood as part of broader debates on theology, metaphysics and epistemology. To do that, we must treat theology and jurisprudence as an integrated meta-ethical project that inserts itself between the text of Revelation and the process of norm-production. Reconstructing those theories of divine speech and command shows us that the Muʿtazilīs combined a naturalist view of ethics with a dualistic metaphysic to hold that Revelation is a sufficient but not necessary condition for moral knowledge. Ashʿarīs, by contrast, insisted on the indispensability of Revelation on the basis of a combination of epistemological skepticism with a metaphysic that prioritized skeptical theism.

<p>It is fair to identify the motive of this dissertation with the paradoxical formulation of Gerhard von Rad, to the effect that the essence of biblical Wisdom is disclosed where the sages articulate this wisdom as inherently limited. This coincidence of opposites has been widely embraced by commentators and read as evidence for the sages' encounter with an infinite divine transcendence, to which they responded in humility, and by which their epistemological certitudes were rebuked. Proceeding from these assumptions, the interpretation of Proverbs has widely concerned itself with two nodal points: (1) the fear-of YHWH as the central concept in Proverbs' articulation wisdom as a finite human operation, conducted in the presence of an infinite divine; and (2) the figuration of this sublime experience in the iconic form of Woman-Wisdom. </p><p>The hypothesis of von Rad lends itself to another trajectory that prioritizes immanence over transcendence. On this reading, the limit of Wisdom lies not between its mere appearance for us (i.e. finite human subjects) and its essential being in itself (corresponding to a noumenal, divine beyond) but rather runs through the field of appearance, which cannot be rendered coherent by the sages' discursive intervention. This non-symbolizable yet immanent check on the sages' wisdom is analyzed in terms of Lacan's Real, a kernel of being (in psychoanalytic terms, jouissance) entirely beyond the signified that nevertheless arises out of the operations of signification. If discourse is thus intrinsically self-defeating, the status of transcendence should re-evaulated with respect to "limit." Transcendence is not the site that disturbs the Symbolic field, but rather the aporetic conditions of linguistic meaning rely on an externalizing process--what I have called a "poetics of making transcendent"-- for a given discourse to maintain its own coherence, i.e. as that which would be coherent if not for the contingent, impossible object. The fear-of YHWH and Woman-Wisdom, whose importance no one disputes, are re-read from this perspective: the former according to Lacan's concept of the Master-Signifier, the latter according to object (a), the object cause of desire.</p> / Dissertation

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L‟objectif de mon mémoire se concentre sur la notion d‟altérité émanant des philosophies d‟Emmanuel Lévinas et de Paul Ricoeur ; je m‟intéresse plus précisément au concept clé d‟éthique et de savoir en quoi enrichit-elle le dialogue judéo-chrétien. Le point initial de ma réflexion est l‟herméneutique biblique, qu‟Emmanuel Lévinas et Paul Ricoeur articulent, d‟après moi, différemment selon leurs héritages religieux respectifs à savoir juif et chrétien. Néanmoins, la signification éthique des Textes Sacrés perdure pour chacun d‟eux comme lieu commun même si la signification leur est différente et propre à leurs traditions religieuses. Ainsi, dans ce mémoire l‟altérité développée par Lévinas, talmudiste reconnu, sera comparée avec la pensée de Ricoeur dont la conception est davantage chrétienne, en référence à son travail exégétique. Quand bien même Lévinas et Ricoeur ont tenu à distinguer leurs philosophies de leurs théologies, l‟hypothèse de départ prend une liberté herméneutique qui oscille souvent entre philosophie et théologie et qui tend à retracer au mieux l‟altérité et son lien intrinsèque avec l‟éthique. Cette lecture comparatiste m‟amènera donc à penser et à intégrer l‟altérité comme une prémisse éthique au dialogue judéo-chrétien. Mon travail en sciences des religions qui prend racine depuis l‟herméneutique même, s‟oriente vers une perspective éthique et dialogique et c‟est cette visée de médiation interreligieuse qui lui confère une appartenance à cette discipline. / The Otherness is the focus of my thesis, a notion that emanates from Emmanuel Levinas’ and Paul Ricoeur’s philosophies; I’m interested more precisely about the concept of ethics and to discover how it improves the reflection upon Jewish and Christian dialogue. The initial point of my reflexion is the biblical hermeneutics that Emmanuel Lévinas and Paul Ricoeur structure, to my point of view, variously depending their religious background: Jewish for Lévinas and Christian for Ricoeur. Nevertheless, the ethical signification of the Bible perpetuates for both of them as a commonplace, even if the signification is different and inherent to their own religious traditions. In my thesis, the Otherness, as elaborated by Lévinas, will be compared with Ricoeur’s thoughts, whom conception is more Christian as his biblical works let us guess. Even if Lévinas and Ricoeur have tried to distinguish their philosophical work from their theological one, claiming a neutrality about theology, my initial hypothesis take an hermeneutical freedom which often oscillates between theology and philosophy and which try to recount the alterity and its intrinsic link to ethics. A comparatist reading will lead me to think that the ethics of the Otherness is the basis of Jewish and Christian dialogue because of Levinas’ and Ricoeur’s works. My work in religious studies is based upon hermeneutics and turns toward an ethical and dialogical perspective; it is this interreligious mediation aim which confers to my thesis a belonging in this discipline.

On numerous occasions Ricoeur has characterized the goal of his philosophical analyses as the "exchange of the ego, master of itself, for the self, disciple of the text." Our investigation follows the development of this theme through careful examination of Ricoeur's phenomenological-hermeneutical philosophy. By way of contrast with Husserl's phenomenology we see how Ricoeur initiates a program of self-recovery that decenters consciousness from the immediacy of self-grounding radicality. Looking instead to the polysemic world of the text, Ricoeur chooses a path of indirect imaginative mediation as the route towards self-interpretation. / The imagination, correlative with the works of culture (signs, symbols and texts), forms the central core of Ricoeur's understanding of selfhood. Already operative in his early publications as the mediating structure of selfhood, the work of imagination is transformed from a transcendental third term into a linguistic process that constructs sonorous worlds in front of consciousness for the self to inhabit. / Ricoeur's analysis of metaphor and narrative shows selfhood to be a task accomplished by means of linguistic interpretation. However, such an interpretation of the self, with the textual world as its other, is a linguistic construction that is caught up in semantic self-identification. Ricoeur's program for the exchange of the self-enclosed ego, for a self discipled by the text, becomes entangled in the semantics of identity to such an extent that selfhood is equated with the objectifications of the reflective process and is never dealt with on the intimate level of the reflexive structure of the self in relation to otherness. This has significant consequences which need to be critically examined by philosophy of religion.

With this paper, I aim to demonstrate that, in Late Antiquity, the definition of magic was inherent to the definition of its opposite, religion. Assuming that the separation of magic and religion is the symptom of cultural clashes. I argue that Iamblichus' (240-325 AD) De Mysteriis was participating in a politico-religious reorganization of the Roman Empire. / The first part of the study analyses the religions beliefs of Porphyry (232--305 AD). With this analysis, I demonstrate that Iamblichus rectified Porphyry's philosophical approach to religion, which minimizied the distinctions between magic and religion. / In the second part of the study, I demonstrate how Iamblichus' response to Porphyry rearranged religious evidence into a new holistic system called "theurgy." By drawing from Neoplatonic political theory, I also explain how the De Mysteriis inseparably bounded politics with theology.

One issue that has been generating considerable debate within the philosophy of religion is whether or not certain religious experiences could provide at least some evidence towards justifying beliefs in the existence of a divine being. Within the literature, positive accounts are typically referred to as arguments from religious experience. I aim to contribute to this debate in two ways. First, many versions of the argument from religious experience rely on a simple perceptual model in order to understand and assess the evidential value of religious perceptual experiences. However, I shall be developing a specified perceptual model that allows for the relational dimensions of religious perceptual experiences to be taken into account. I refer to this model as the care relational model. Second. many versions of the argument from religious experience only include a superficial assessment of the role testimony plays in relation to justifying religious belief's grounded in religious experiences. I shall attempt to remedy this by assessing the evidential value of religious perceptual experiences in light of recent developments in the philosophy of testimony.