Submitted by Biblioteca Central (biblioteca@unicap.br) on 2018-06-19T18:20:17Z No. of bitstreams: 2 rosana_delane_campelo.pdf: 1000416 bytes, checksum: a21c1b4b4cc640362011e13f22791414 (MD5) license_rdf: 0 bytes, checksum: d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2018-06-19T18:20:17Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 2 rosana_delane_campelo.pdf: 1000416 bytes, checksum: a21c1b4b4cc640362011e13f22791414 (MD5) license_rdf: 0 bytes, checksum: d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e (MD5) Previous issue date: 2018-05-09 / Kierkegaard’s thinking is placed in the context of the philosophical critique of religion, which started with Hegel. Kierkegaard is opposed to the perspective of Hegel’s Philosophy of Religion, reducing Christianity to a system dominated by logic, as well as the union between religion and philosophy, where philosophical speculation justifies and explains faith in a rational manner. The problem of the relationship between reason and faith is the starting point for the defence of faith as passion. In the book Fear and Trembling, Kierkegaard analyses the essence of the Christian faith in the biblical passage of the sacrifice of Isaac, asked by God to Abraham, in Genesis 22. Faith is understood as a dimension of subjectivity and, for Kierkegaard, “subjectivity is truth”. Such truth is attained in interiority and must make sense in the individual's life. It is from this emphasis on interiority that the philosopher establishes the discussion of authenticity and its criticism of Christianity. The objective of this paper is to outline the essence of the Christian faith in Kierkegaard, the passion of faith, to deepen the reflection on the meaning of Christianity and being a Christian today – in face of the confusion and crisis of values in contemporary society, the religious mercantilism of the Christian faith, the inconsistencies of fundamentalism and religious intolerance – giving directions to the discussion of otherness and Christian faith nowadays. / O pensamento de Kierkegaard está inserido no contexto da crítica filosófica da religião iniciada com Hegel. Kierkegaard opõe-se à perspectiva da Filosofia da Religião de Hegel de redução do cristianismo a um sistema dominado pela lógica. Ele discorda igualmente da junção entre religião e filosofia, em que a especulação filosófica justifica e explica racionalmente a fé. O problema da relação entre a razão e a fé é o ponto de partida da defesa da fé como paixão. No livro Temor e Tremor, Kierkegaard analisa a essência da fé cristã na passagem bíblica da história do sacrifício de Isaac, solicitado por Deus a Abraão, em Gênesis 22. A fé é compreendida como dimensão da subjetividade, e para Kierkegaard a “subjetividade é a verdade”. Essa verdade é apropriada na interioridade e precisa fazer sentido na vida do indivíduo. É a partir dessa ênfase na interioridade que o filósofo estabelece a discussão sobre a autenticidade e fundamenta a sua crítica à cristandade. A perspectiva do presente trabalho é esboçar a essência da fé cristã em Kierkegaard, a paixão da fé, para o aprofundamento da reflexão sobre o significado do cristianismo e do ser cristão hoje – diante da confusão e crise de valores da sociedade contemporânea, do mercantilismo religioso da fé cristã, das incoerências do fundamentalismo e da intolerância religiosa –, apontando direções para a discussão sobre alteridade e fé cristã na contemporaneidade.

What do religions do and how do they do it? In The Elementary Forms of Religious Life, Émile Durkheim claims that religions are “grounded in and express the real” and center upon a set of ritualized practices that enact and embody in a distinctively intense and potentially transformative form the truth regarding the constitutive relations in which we stand to one another. With the help of Heidegger’s account in “The Origin of the Work of Art” of the way in which works of art work, along with Kierkegaard’s relational account of the health and sickness of the self in The Sickness Unto Death, I attempt in this dissertation to develop an improved version of the basic Durkheimian picture. The central claim is that religious practices are in the game of cultivating and actively integrating the fundamental relationships upon which our being as persons in a most radical and literal sense depends. Where successful, the heightened modes of relationality enacted in such practices transform us into more active, vital, and unalienated agents capable of tackling the concrete normative situations in which we lead our lives. For these reasons, I argue that religious practices aren’t going and shouldn’t go anywhere. If anything, we have grounds for leaning into them more if we hope to develop the existential resources to tackle the various forms of relational breakdown that constitute the true ground of the problem of “disenchantment” and with which our alienated, lonely, and unjust world is saturated.

This thesis provides an historical and intellectual summary of the role of the concepts of 'substance,' and 'participation,' in the making of the doctrine of the Trinity. In the concluding chapter, a study is made of the assumptions of deconstruction, which are somewhat hostile to a substance paradigm. We argue for an appreciation of the importance of both substance and participation for the Trinity, and philosophy generally. Chapters are dedicated to individuals who have in some way contributed to perceptions of these two terms, as they pertain to the Christian notion of the Trinity. Additionally, we seek to define some philosophical problems that accompany a Trinitarian metaphysics of 'substance,' and 'participation.' The problems include those of deconstruction: issues such as 'Logocentrism,' and 'Presence.' Finally, we investigate how Trinitarian ontology can provide answers to many of the questions Derrida raises conceming the problematic future of metaphysical thinking. / Philosophy and Systematic Theology / M.Th. (Systematic Theology)

There exists in the modern worlda form of non-Christianised religious thought which develops the basic ideas of indigenous African religion beyond their beginnings, and is represented in authorssuch as Kamalu, Osabutey-Aguedze, etc. The spheres of interest in such authors fiJay be analysed in terms of the following areas: Intervening ideological conditions bearing on African life (particularr; theological and cosmological ideas): The historical background of African life; The roots of African life, as manifested in its traditions, and tts ethical and cultural heritage; Means for the innovative development of African life, found in African concepts of knowledge, mysticism and magic; The perceived destiny of African life. The thesis concludes with an indication of areas of agreement and debate in post-traditional African thought, of problems faced by such thought; and of other possible priorities for future study. / Religious Studies & Arabic / D.Th. (Religious Studies)

Avec la sécularisation, la laïcité et la diversité croissantes de la société québécoise, la place de la religion en général et du catholicisme en particulier se sont vues remises en question. Cette situation a d’ailleurs mené à la mise en place de deux commissions : l’une sur la place de la religion à l’école (1999) et l’autre sur les pratiques d’accommodements reliées aux différences culturelles (2008). Ces deux commissions auront fourni énormément d’informations sur les rapports qu’entretiennent encore les Québécois avec le catholicisme. Cette recherche a donc pour but de faire le point sur certains aspects du catholicisme au Québec à partir d’une perspective reposant principalement sur des instruments heuristiques issus des écrits signés « Jacques Derrida ». Pour ce faire, nous nous appuierons sur les travaux du Groupe de travail sur la religion à l’école, de la consultation générale sur la place de la religion à l’école et de la commission de consultation sur les pratiques d’accommodement reliées aux différences culturelles. Nous posons comme hypothèse que de manière générale, les Québécois entretiennent avec le catholicisme, des rapports « archivaux », c’est-à-dire conditionnés par des perceptions de ce dernier informées par son passé, plutôt que par son présent. De plus, ces perceptions du catholicisme, probablement développées dans le sillage de la Révolution tranquille et peut-être même un peu avant, nourriraient l’existence de « spectres » qui viendraient hanter les rapports des Québécois à tout ce qui touche le religieux et la diversité culturelle. En ce sens, il s’agit d’une dimension essentielle de ce que nous appellerions la « postmodernité » religieuse québécoise. Pour illustrer ce propos, nous mènerons une analyse de contenu documentaire. Premièrement, nous procéderons à l’analyse thématique de centaines de documents (rapports de recherche, rapports officiels, mémoires) déposés lors de ces débats. Le logiciel QDA Miner permettra d’effectuer une analyse documentaire en identifiant les passages thématiques reliés à la recherche. Nous procéderons ensuite à une analyse plus fine de ces extraits sélectionnés à partir de perspectives philosophiques provenant principalement du philosophe Jacques Derrida. / Due to the secularisation, laicité and the growing religious diversity of Quebec society, the place of religion and Catholicism has been questioned. This situation has led to the creation of two commissions: one on the place of religion in school (1999) and the other on Accommodation practices related to cultural differences (2008). These commissions gave a lot of information about the relationship between Quebecers and Catholicism. This research aims to understand certain aspects of Catholicism in Quebec with a perspective using texts signed "Jacques Derrida". To do so, we will use the works of Groupe de travail sur la religion à l’école, of General Consultation on the Place of Religion in School, and of Consultation Commission on Accommodation Practices Related to Cultural Differences. Our research hypothesis is that generally Quebecers have an ‘archival’ relationship towards Catholicism. Meaning, past perceptions of Catholicism as opposed to present ones condition this relationship. Moreover, these perceptions of Catholicism, that probably developed either just prior to or during the Quiet Revolution in the sixties, would feed the existence of "specters," or "ghosts," that haunt the relationship between Quebecers and everything related to religious and cultural diversity. This would be a fundamental dimension of what we would call the Quebec religious "postmodernity". To illustrate this statement, we will first analyse hundreds of documents deposed to these commissions. The software QDA Miner will help to perform a documentary analysis by identifying key passages related to this research. Then, we will analyse more accurately, the selected passages using philosophical perspectives mainly from Jacques Derrida.

The purpose of this dissertation was to explore how uninstitutionalised female preachers, or dā'iyāt, in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia construct authority in a context in which male ulama dominate the production of religious knowledge and represent the apex of the religious and social hierarchy. The study was broad, descriptive, and explanatory and drew primarily on the framework known as ‘accountable ethnography’. Data collection occurred between June and December 2009 and consisted of observations, interviews, and collection of literary artefacts, which were reviewed alongside literature published internationally. A flexible mode of inquiry was employed, partly in response to constraints on public religious discourse imposed in Saudi Arabia after September 11, 2001. The study concludes that the dā'iyāt construct authority predominantly by relying on male ulama as marji'iyya diniyya (religious frame of reference) when issuing fatwas, as pedagogical models, as sources of charismatic inspiration, and as providers of personal recommendations. The dissertation also addresses a set of 'alternate' strategies of authority construction employed by Dr Fāṭima Nasiīf. Almost uniquely, this dā'iyā is found to construct authority that goes beyond reproduction of institutionalised views by developing scholarly arguments to support interpretations of Islamic texts that are responsive to women’s perspectives and needs. In doing so, she expands the parameters of religiously permissible practice while remaining, for her part, within the confines of orthodox practice. Thus, although her society and most researchers perceive knowledge as a masculine attribute in the Saudi religious sphere, in matters relating to women, as well as through active leadership in ritual practice, Dr Fāṭima demonstrates that the dā'iyā can become the authority. Nevertheless, for her and for the other dā'iyāt, the study finds that legitimatising female religious authority depends upon maintaining the established social order, including the hierarchy that places women in a subordinate position to men.

Horrendous evils pose distinctive challenges for belief in an ethically perfect God. To home in on these challenges, I construct an ethical framework for theodicy by sketching four cases of human action where horrors are either caused, permitted, or risked, either for pure benefit (i.e., a benefit that does not avert a still greater harm) or for harm avoidance. I then bring the framework and the moral valuations confirmed by this casuistry to bear on the project of theodicy. I construct four analogous structures – one for each case – and identify examples of each structure in theodicies in contemporary philosophy of religion. I summarize each theodicy and evaluate whether it is structurally promising with respect to horrendous evils. That is, if the proposed interconnected set of facts and reasons were true, would God be ethically in the clear? My initial conclusions impugn the dominant structural approach of depicting God as causing or permitting horrors in individual lives for the sake of some merely pure benefit. This approach is insensitive to relevant asymmetries in the justificatory demands made by horrendous and non-horrendous evil and in the justificatory work done by averting harm and bestowing pure benefit. I next argue that the structurally promising theodicies I have identified are implausible due to their overestimation of the extent to which finite human agents can bear primary responsibility for horrendous evils and their underestimation of the importance for theodicy of being consonant with a broadly Darwinian approach to evolutionary theory. The project of theodicy is in trouble. The second half of my thesis develops an approach to theodicy that falls outside my proffered taxonomy. Following a suggestion of Leibniz, Robert Adams has argued that theodicy can be aided by the insight that almost all of the evil of the actual world is metaphysically necessary for the community of actual world inhabitants to be comprised of the specific individuals who comprise it. Beginning with this insight, I develop (what I term) Non-Identity Theodicy. It suggests that God allows the evil he does in order to create and love the specific individuals comprising the community of inhabitants of the actual world. This approach to theodicy is unique because the justifying good recommended is neither harm-aversion nor pure benefit. It is not a good that betters the lives of individual human persons (for they wouldn’t exist otherwise), but it is the individual human persons themselves. In order to aim successfully at the creation of particular individuals, however, God would need a control of history so complete that it might be argued to be inconsistent with beliefs about human free will that are important to some theologies. I construct a second version of Non-Identity Theodicy designed to avoid this problem by considering whether God’s justifying motivation for allowing the evil of this world could be his aiming for beings of our type, even if it could not be his aiming for particular individuals. I suggest that God would be interested in loving those he creates under various descriptions (e.g., biological, psychological, and narrative descriptions), and argue that a horror-prone environment is necessary for us to be the type of being we are under each of the descriptions. I assess the structural promise and plausibility of Non-Identity Theodicy. In order to do so, I engage with Derek Parfit’s non-identity problem and with some influential assumptions in the ethics of procreation literature. I end by recapping what I take to be the key areas of overemphasis and under-emphasis in contemporary theodicy.

Ce mémoire se propose d’étudier la manière nouvelle dont se présente la croyance religieuse à l’âge séculier dans la philosophie de la religion du philosophe Charles Taylor. Plus précisément, nous cherchons à démontrer que la croyance et l’incroyance possèdent les mêmes fondements phénoménologiques, qui sont à trouver du côté des questions identitaires. Afin d’y arriver, nous commençons par analyser sa redéfinition de la sécularité afin de comprendre pourquoi l’âge séculier n’est pas en soi un âge irréligieux. Nous montrerons en quoi, selon Taylor, les Occidentaux partagent un même « arrière-plan » moral et spirituel – le « cadre immanent », que nous appréhendons comme le contexte au sein duquel émergent les positions croyantes et athées. Nous présentons ensuite une brève analyse des éléments historiques et phénoménologiques du cadre immanent ainsi que de sa fonction « transcendantale », ce qui nous permet d’expliquer la raison pour laquelle Taylor soutient que la croyance et l’incroyance relèvent avant tout de l’identité morale et des considérations éthiques qui soutiennent notre vision du monde. Ici nous suivons Taylor en affirmant que ce sont toutes deux des expériences vécues qui a priori s’équivalent sur le plan rationnel. Enfin, au cœur de notre réflexion se trouve la mise en valeur d’un concept très important que Taylor développe à partir des travaux de William James, à savoir l’« espace ouvert jamesien ». Cette ouverture, rendue possible par la sécularité elle-même, vise à rendre compte d’un état de lucidité par lequel nous pouvons ressentir la force des deux options. / This paper aims to describe how Charles Taylor articulates his philosophy of religion in his major work, A Secular Age. We argue that belief and unbelief share the same phenomenological fundamentals, which can be found in the constituents of identity. In order to do that, we shall first analyse his redefinition of secularity in order to see how the secular age is not irreligious in itself. What will emerge of this preliminary investigation is the Taylorian idea that all Westerners share the same spiritual and moral “background”, the “immanent frame”, which must be understood as the context in which we form our beliefs. Then we develop an analysis of the historical elements of the immanent frame and of its “transcendental” function, which makes it possible to explain why Taylor conceives belief and unbelief as questions of moral identity. We follow Taylor in arguing that they are both lived experiences of equal rational value. At the heart of our paper, there is an important concept that Taylor has developed from William James’s work, which is the “Jamesian open space”. This openness illustrates a state of lucidity that is characterised by the ability to feel the force of both options, belief and unbelief.

La thèse questionne les conditions d’écoute des témoignages des personnes ayant vécu une expérience sectaire, ainsi que les enjeux éthiques et méthodologiques qui découlent de la manière dont la littérature propose de comprendre le dire de ces personnes. Une revue de littérature permet de montrer que les principaux cadres théoriques utilisés pour expliquer le sectaire (aliénation, manipulation mentale, addiction) déterminent la manière dont est entendu le dire des personnes. De cette façon, le sens du sectaire n’oriente pas seulement la compréhension que nous avons des personnes. Il trace aussi les conditions de l’écoute. Le postulat de base de la thèse est que l’introduction de la « dit-mention » du croire comme carrefour interprétatif permet de développer une écoute qui concerne à la fois le sujet parlant et la dimension de l’être. À partir d’une théorisation du croire comme mouvement du vivant distinct de la religion, de la spiritualité, de la croyance et de la mystique, la thèse déplace la problématique de l’expérience sectaire de sa structure polémique pour donner pleine valeur au dire des personnes. Ainsi, en situant l’écoute sous le versant symbolique, soit dans un rapport qui prend en compte le rapport du sujet à l’Autre, le sens produit par un acte d’écoute du croire ne prend plus appui sur un sens extérieur pour expliquer et rendre compte d’une expérience sectaire. Il est produit par la liaison des signifiants entre eux, ce qui ouvre un espace de recherche pour que du sujet puisse advenir. L’hypothèse d’un sujet à croire sur parole se présente alors comme fondement d’un acte d’écoute différentiel, dans la mesure où il permet l’élaboration d’un savoir efficace, soit un savoir qui déplace, qui surprend, et qui relance le sujet. / The thesis questions the conditions of listening concerning the testimonies of people who lived a sectarian experience, as well as the ethical and methodological issues arising from the way literature proposes to understand the telling of these people. A literature review shows that the main theoretical frameworks used to explain the sectarian (alienation, mental manipulation, addiction) determine the way the telling of these people is listened. Thereby, the meaning of the sectarian directs not only our understanding of people, but it also outlines the conditions of the listening. The premise of the dissertation is that the introduction of the « dit-mention » (the mension of the telling) of the believe as an interpretative intersection leads to develop a listening concerning both the speaking subject and the dimension of the being. From a theorization of believe as a movement of the living distinct from religion, spirituality, belief and mysticism, the dissertation moves the problematic of a sectarian experience from its polemic structure to give full value to the telling of people. Thus, by setting the listening on its symbolic side, that is in a way that takes into account the subject's relation to the Other, the meaning produced by an act of listening to a believe does not rely anymore on an external meaning to explain and report a sectarian experience. It is produced by the binding of the signifiers together, which opens a research space where something of the subject can happen. The hypothesis of a subject « à croire sur parole » (which words must be believed) then offers a basis for a differential act of listening, since it allows the working out of an effective knowledge, a knowledge that moves, surprises, revives the subject.

Ce mémoire se propose d’étudier la manière nouvelle dont se présente la croyance religieuse à l’âge séculier dans la philosophie de la religion du philosophe Charles Taylor. Plus précisément, nous cherchons à démontrer que la croyance et l’incroyance possèdent les mêmes fondements phénoménologiques, qui sont à trouver du côté des questions identitaires. Afin d’y arriver, nous commençons par analyser sa redéfinition de la sécularité afin de comprendre pourquoi l’âge séculier n’est pas en soi un âge irréligieux. Nous montrerons en quoi, selon Taylor, les Occidentaux partagent un même « arrière-plan » moral et spirituel – le « cadre immanent », que nous appréhendons comme le contexte au sein duquel émergent les positions croyantes et athées. Nous présentons ensuite une brève analyse des éléments historiques et phénoménologiques du cadre immanent ainsi que de sa fonction « transcendantale », ce qui nous permet d’expliquer la raison pour laquelle Taylor soutient que la croyance et l’incroyance relèvent avant tout de l’identité morale et des considérations éthiques qui soutiennent notre vision du monde. Ici nous suivons Taylor en affirmant que ce sont toutes deux des expériences vécues qui a priori s’équivalent sur le plan rationnel. Enfin, au cœur de notre réflexion se trouve la mise en valeur d’un concept très important que Taylor développe à partir des travaux de William James, à savoir l’« espace ouvert jamesien ». Cette ouverture, rendue possible par la sécularité elle-même, vise à rendre compte d’un état de lucidité par lequel nous pouvons ressentir la force des deux options. / This paper aims to describe how Charles Taylor articulates his philosophy of religion in his major work, A Secular Age. We argue that belief and unbelief share the same phenomenological fundamentals, which can be found in the constituents of identity. In order to do that, we shall first analyse his redefinition of secularity in order to see how the secular age is not irreligious in itself. What will emerge of this preliminary investigation is the Taylorian idea that all Westerners share the same spiritual and moral “background”, the “immanent frame”, which must be understood as the context in which we form our beliefs. Then we develop an analysis of the historical elements of the immanent frame and of its “transcendental” function, which makes it possible to explain why Taylor conceives belief and unbelief as questions of moral identity. We follow Taylor in arguing that they are both lived experiences of equal rational value. At the heart of our paper, there is an important concept that Taylor has developed from William James’s work, which is the “Jamesian open space”. This openness illustrates a state of lucidity that is characterised by the ability to feel the force of both options, belief and unbelief.