Thesis (Ph.D.)--Bowling Green State University, 2007. / Document formatted into pages; contains xii, 174 p. : ill. Includes bibliographical references.

Written in the form of a narrative, this thesis explores the phenomenon of voice in writing, and what the development of an awareness of the multiplicity voices while writing and reading can mean for language learners. This thesis is also a personal reflection of depression, and a recollection of individual, family and life events. One chapter takes the form of a unified narrative, while another presents anecdotal recollections. It is, in this sense, an exploration of voices through an analysis of available academic and public writing, and a personal inquiry into how the concept of voices in writing has affected my development as an individual and as a writer. The first section reviews some of the academic and public literature on writing and voice, and reveals that early writing on the issue of voice reflected a monolistic theory of voice. That is, that there is one voice that as writers we must find within ourselves, or there is a voice of the author that we must seek out. However, views of the multiplicity of voices in writing are increasingly common. While philosophical tradition since Plato has mistrusted writing and viewed it as secondary to speech, philosophy has nevertheless employed writing to further its own inquiries. Re/viewing the issue of voice in writing may be one way to deal with this long-standing schism between speech and writing. There is a need to further problematize the field of writing, not searching for ways to simplify the process but seeking ways to celebrate the inherent complexity, ambiguity, and paradoxical nature of writing. The thesis concludes with a reflection on the need to seriously consider the significance of voices in writing in first and second language instruction. / Education, Faculty of / Language and Literacy Education (LLED), Department of / Graduate

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The principal claim defended in this thesis is that for Aristotle arousing the emotions of others can amount to giving them proper grounds for conviction, and hence a skill in doing so is properly part of an expertise in rhetoric. We set out Aristotle’s view of rhetoric as exercised solely in the provision of proper grounds for conviction (pisteis) and show how he defends this controversial view by appeal to a more widely shared and plausible view of rhetoric’s role in the proper functioning of the state. We then explore in more detail what normative standards must be met for something to qualify as “proper grounds for conviction”, applying this to all three of Aristotle’s kinds of “technical proofs” (entechnoi pisteis). In the case of emotion, meeting these standards is a matter of arousing emotions that constitute the reasonable acceptance of premises in arguments that count in favour of the speaker’s conclusion. We then seek to show that Aristotle’s view of the emotions is compatible with this role. This involves opposing the view that in Rhetoric I.1 Aristotle rejects any role for emotion-arousal in rhetoric (a view that famously generates a contradiction with the rest of the treatise). It also requires rejecting the view of Rhetoric II.2-11 on which, for Aristotle, the distinctive outlook involved in emotions is merely how things “appear” to the subject.

Thesis (M.S.)--State University of New York at Binghamton, Department of Psychology, 2009. / Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Michigan State University. Dept. of Rhetoric and Writing, 2008. / Title page also has title printed in Cherokee syllabics. Title from PDF t.p. (viewed on July 10, 2009) Includes bibliographical references (p. 281-290). Also issued in print.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Illinois State University, 2003. / Title from title page screen, viewed Jan. 6, 2005. Dissertation Committee: Janice W. Neuleib (chair), Kenneth J. Lindblom, Julie M. Jung. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 278-289) and abstract. Also available in print.

Thesis (Ph.D.) - University of St Andrews, May 2010.

In this thesis, I examine the nature and role of persuasion in Roman politics in the period immediately following the assassination of Caesar on the Ides of March 44 B.C. until the capture of the city of Rome by his heir Octavianus in August 43 B.C. The purpose of my thesis is to assess the extent to which persuasion played a critical role in political interactions and in the decision-making processes of those involved during this crucial period in Roman history. I do this by means of a careful discussion and analysis of a variety of different types of political interactions, both public and private. As regards the means of persuasion, I concentrate on the role and use of oratory in these political interactions. Consequently, my thesis owes much in terms of approach to the work of Millar (1998) and, more recently, Morstein-Marx (2004) on placing oratory at the centre of our understanding of how politics functioned in practice in the late Roman republic. Their studies, however, focus on the potential extent and significance of mass participation in the late Roman republican political system, and on the contio as the key locus of political interaction. In my thesis, I contribute to improving our new way of understanding late Roman republican politics by taking a broader approach that incorporates other types of political interactions in which oratory played a significant role. I also examine oratory as but one of a variety of means of persuasion in Roman political interactions. Finally, in analyzing politics and persuasion in the period immediately after Caesar’s assassination, I am examining not only a crucial period in Roman history, but one which is perhaps the best documented from the ancient world. The relative richness of contemporary evidence for this period calls out for the sort of close reading of sources and detailed analysis that I provide in my thesis that enables a better understanding of how politics actually played out in the late Roman republic.