A satisfactory definition of the imagination has proved elusive in Western philosophy. Two contemporary French thinkers, Gilbert Durand and Paul Ricoeur, are concerned with establishing a fundamental philosophy of imagination. For Durand the imagination is the source of symbolic mediations that are both therapeutic and theophanic. His theory is grounded in a Platonist-esoteric tradition which he supports by a philosophy of the imaginal (coined and articulated by Henry Corbin, a French Islamicist). Ricoeur, in contrast, sees the imagination as a creative cognitive mediator in a dialectic model of knowledge. Within a critical framework the imagination functions at the limits of experience and expression as a catalyst provoking new insights and ways of being. Both theories support a philosophy that rehabilitates the imagination from its former denigrated and suspect categorizations, though Ricoeur's programme is more relevant to contemporary philosophical issues.

Thesis (M.A.)--Abilene Christian University, 1994. / Includes abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 85-92).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Hong Kong, 1993. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 424-435).

Thesis (M. A.)--Trinity Evangelical Divinity School, 2009. / Abstract. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 91-93).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Chicago, Divinity School, December 2000. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 313-318). Also available on the Internet.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Marquette University, 2009. / Access available to Marquette University only. Available for download on Dec. 17, 2011. Pol Vandevelde, Andrew Tallon, Stanley Harrison, Sebastian Luft, Advisors.

The thesis aims to show that, while an interpretive psychology is not compatible with theory as it occurs in the predictive- causal explanation of the natural sciences, it is both possible and necessary to develop a concept of theory valid within an interpretive methodology. These claims are advanced in the course of an examination of Ricoeur 's interpretation of Freudian psychoanalysis. After examining some traditional ways in which phenomenological psychology has responded to the psychoanalytic challenge, the thesis presents an interpretation of Freudian psychoanalysis as a hermeneutic approach which utilized theoretical constructions in a productive way, although distorted by Freud's natural-scientific self- understanding. Freud's causal-explanatory language and natural- scientific meta theory are shown to be significant inasmuch as they provide a vehicle for theory construction in psychoanalysis. However, since the theory is modeled on that of the natural sciences, it proves incompatible with the interpretive aspects of Freud's approach. We then establish a concept of theory and of causal analysis which is different to that of the natural sciences, and is compatible with, and indeed founded in, an interpretive approach to psychology. These concepts are then illustrated in the context of psychoanalysis. In the final chapter the advantages of the use of theory in interpretive psychology are discussed.

No description available.

Comment une personne peut-elle rester identique dans le temps malgré les changements qu’elle traverse au cours de sa vie ? L’identité personnelle, abordée dans ce mémoire comme phénomène temporel, renvoie au fait qu’une personne reste la « même » ou « soi-même » à travers le temps. Cette permanence dans le temps ne prend toutefois pas le sens de l’invariabilité ou de l’immuabilité. Une personne qui semble être la même qu’hier et dont on s’attend à ce qu’elle reste identique demain a connu et connaîtra inévitablement des transformations autant physiques, psychologiques que morales. Confronté à cette variabilité, on ne met pourtant pas en doute l’identité indéniable de tout un chacun. L’identité personnelle se phénoménalise donc comme une forme de permanence dans le changement. Si l’expérience surmonte toujours déjà l’apparente contradiction entre la permanence et les changements d’une personne dans le temps, la question théorique de l’identité personnelle prend l’apparence d’un défi. Dans ce mémoire, nous proposons de répondre à ce défi à partir de l’œuvre du philosophe et herméneute Paul Ricœur. Le premier et le second chapitres de ce mémoire seront consacrées à la restitution de sa recherche conceptuelle, investiguant les concepts de mêmeté et d’ipséité, puis de sa recherche descriptive, consacrée aux phénomènes de caractère, de promesse et d’identité narrative. Afin d’évaluer les apports de Ricœur au défi de l’identité personnelle, sa conception de l’identité fera l’objet au troisième chapitre d’une lecture critique dans laquelle ses limites seront identifiées. Ce geste de déconstruction permettra de repenser, avec le philosophe László Tengelyi, les possibilités offertes par les analyses de Ricœur sur la base desquelles une conception plus adéquate de l’identité personnelle sera édifiée dans le dernier chapitre. / How can a person remain identical in time, despite the many changes that they go through in the course of their life? Personal identity, which will be discussed in this thesis as a temporal phenomenon, refers to the fact that a person remains the “same” or “themselves” through time. This permanence in time does mean invariable or immutable. A person who seems to be the same as they were yesterday and that we expect to be identical again tomorrow has inevitably undergone and will undergo many physical, psychological, and moral transformations. Yet even this variability does not cause us to doubt the undeniable identity of each person. Personal identity thus manifests itself as a form of permanence through change. If our experience already reveals the apparent contradiction between permanence and change when it comes to a person in time, the theoretical question of personal identity takes on the sense of a challenge. In this thesis, I attempt to respond to this challenge by beginning from the work of hermeneutic philosopher Paul Ricœur. The first two chapters offer a reconstruction of his conceptual research, exploring in particular the concepts of sameness and selfhood, as well as of his descriptive research into the phenomena of character, promising, and narrative identity. In order to evaluate Ricœur’s contribution to the challenge of personal identity, in chapter three I provide a critical reading of his theory of identity in which I identify its limitations. Through this deconstructive approach and with a turn to the work of László Tengelyi, the final chapter proposes a rethinking of the possibilities offered by Ricœur’s analyses and what I argue is a more adequate conception of personal identity.

Tableau d’honneur de la Faculté des études supérieures et postdoctorales, 2013-2014. / Le présent mémoire a pour objet la vérité dans les arts poétiques telle que la conçoit Paul Ricœur. Nous concentrant sur ce procédé de langage qu’est la métaphore, nous cherchons à montrer que même les productions langagières qui paraissent déliées des contraintes de la concordance au réel mettent en jeu une référence. Le déni de cette référence relève, selon Ricœur, d’une conception réductrice du langage et de la réalité induite par l’importation de présuppositions scientifiques dans les divers domaines de l’expérience humaine. À la faveur du déploiement d’une référence indirecte, la métaphore donne à voir et à sentir, sur le mode du « comme si », des aspects de la réalité qui ne passent pas dans les usages simplement descriptifs du langage. Il apparaîtra en conclusion que la métaphore vive peut dire l’expérience vive, qui n’est autre que l’être lui-même sous les modalités de l’acte et de la puissance. / The purpose of this dissertation is to investigate Paul Ricœur’s concept of truth in the poetic arts. Taking the linguistic process of metaphor as an object, we try to show that the linguistic utterances that seem to be freed from the constraints of correspondence to reality still involve a reference in the Fregean sense. According to Ricœur, the denial of this reference is the consequence of the importation of scientific presuppositions in various domains of the human experience. Through the unfolding of an indirect reference, metaphor allows us to see and feel, in a fictitious mode, aspects of reality that cannot be expressed in the simply descriptive uses of language. In conclusion, it will appear that lively metaphor can enunciate lively experience, which is none other than Being itself as act and potency.