Mémoire numérisé par la Direction des bibliothèques de l'Université de Montréal.

No description available.

Orientador : Bento Prado de Almeida Ferraz Junior / Dissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciencias Humanas / Made available in DSpace on 2018-07-18T21:26:50Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Pulino_LuciaHelenaCavasinZabotto_M.pdf: 34736778 bytes, checksum: ccc70db6c2c14252c3b1d57588e6b188 (MD5) Previous issue date: 1994 / Resumo: Neste trabalho apresentamos as idéias de Richard Rorty, a partir de nossa leitura de Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature , 1979, em que ele critica o fundacionismo filosófico, Consequences of Pragmatism, 1982, em que ele explicita essa crítica, até Contingency, irony and solidarity, 1989, em que ele propõe uma nova filosofia. Mostramos como Rorty descontrói a Filosofia centrada na epistemologia, redescrevendo-a, em termos pragmáticos, como uma filosofia que não é mais o alicerce da cultura, mas se presta à busca de autonomia pessoal e auto-criação, deixando para a literatura o papel de possibilitar a criação e a manutenção do sentimento de solidariedade na comunidade. Salientamos o fato de Rorty propor a filosofia como busca de auto-realização inserida numa proposta mais ampla, a da sociedade liberal irônica, uma utopia criada pelo autor para superar os problemas não só filosóficos, mas sociais, políticos e éticos do homem contemporâneo / Abstract: In this work we present Richard Rorty's ideas, from our reading of Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, 1979, in which he criticises the philosophical foundationalism, Consequences of Pragmatism, 1982, in which he elucidates this critique, and Contingency, irony and solidarity, 1989, in which he proposes a new philosophy. We show how Rorty deconstructs the epistemology-centered philosophy, redescribing it, in pragmatical terms, as a philosophy that is not the foundation of culture any more, but serves for searching personal autonomy and auto-creation, letting to the literature the role of making possible for persons to create and maintaining the sense of solidarity in the comunity. We enphasize the fact that Rorty proposes the philosophy as searching for auto-realization inserted in a broader proposal, that of the liberal ironic society, a utopia created by the author to overcome not only philosophical problems, but social, politic and ethical problems of the contemporary man / Mestrado / Mestre em Filosofia

No description available.

Zugl.: Leipzig, Univ., Diss., 2007

Originally presented as the author's Thesis (doctoral)--Århus universitet, 2003. / Includes bibliographical references.

This dissertation examines Richard Rorty's liberalism, especially as articulated in Contingency, irony, and solidarity, from a perspective which is sympathetic to the broad features of his pragmatism. I argue that Rorty's liberalism is, in the first instance a moral, rather than a political project and I begin this dissertation by examining in Chapter One, the basis of this moral project in his rejection of any notion of human nature in favour of a focus on the individual as a contingent, self-creating vocabulary. The moral core of Rorty's work is found in the vision of the liberal self who abhors cruelty. His politics extends outward from one variant of this type, the liberal ironist, who tries to balance her liberal commitments with a disposition to radical doubt. In his attempt to secure society for, and from, the liberal ironist, Rorty constructs a vision of society based in a strong division between public and private. In Chapter Two I argue that we should reject this move, and I argue instead for a vision of society based in conversation. In Chapter Three, I argue that this conversational understanding offers us an increased chance to attain the sort of cosmopolitan community to which Rorty aspires. In particular, I argue that we should see conversation, rather than imagination and reading, as the best means to develop and extend our sense of solidarity. One of the biggest obstacles to our increasing solidarity through conversation is the way in which power operates to sustain existing social and political arrangements by setting the conversational agenda. Rorty, unfortunately, says little about the workings of power and so, in Chapter Four, I propose the use of Iris Marion Young's thought on oppression and domination as a means to illuminate the issue of power at work, and to help us in finding ways to deal with it. In the final chapter I look to the particular role of the intellectual in the conversation. I examine Rorty's rejection of philosophy-as-epistemology in favour of what he calls pragmatism, and how this move combines with a variety of other strategies to apparently silence intellectuals. I argue that in spite of these moves, Rorty's philosophy and his own example actually extend the space from which and through which intellectuals can participate in the conversation and its transformation. / Thesis (Ph.D.)-University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban, 2010.

Thesis (Ph.D.) -- McMaster University, 1998. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 305-313). Also available via World Wide Web.

Thesis (M.C.S.)--Regent College, Vancouver, BC, 1993. / Abstract and vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 146-150).

Thesis (Ph.D.)--York University, 2007. Graduate Programme in Education. / Typescript. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 222-233). Also available on the Internet. MODE OF ACCESS via web browser by entering the following URL: http://gateway.proquest.com/openurl?url_ver=Z39.88-2004&res_dat=xri:pqdiss&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:dissertation&rft_dat=xri:pqdiss:NR29322