Univ., Diss--Toronto. / Includes bibliographical references and index. If liberalism is a faith, what becomes of the separation of church and state? -- Pragmatism, liberalism, and the quarrel between science and religion -- Rorty's repudiation of epistemology -- Rortian irony and the "de-divinization" of liberalism -- Religion and Rawls's freestanding liberalism -- Stanley Fish and the demise of the separation of church and state -- Fish, Locke, and religious neutrality -- Reason, indifference, and the aim of religious freedom -- Appendix : a reply to Stanley Fish.

O presente trabalho examina os principais traços que caracterizam a idéia rortiana de compreender a educação como redescrição do mundo. O neopragmatismo de Rorty tem sido considerado uma das posições filosóficas que têm procurado enfrentar os impasses gerados pela filosofia moderna enquanto “metafísica da subjetividade”. Tal enfrentamento tem se realizado por meio de uma crítica contundente às principais características da filosofia em sua versão fundacional-representacionista, estruturada no modelo epistemológico da relação sujeito-objeto que tem por centralidade a busca da explicação/fundamentação do conhecimento. Partindo de uma crítica rortiana à idéia de verdade e objetividade que tem constituído o cenário “cientificista” da Modernidade, passando por uma crítica ao modelo de filosofia epistemologicamente centrado e sua conseqüente “profissionalização”, o estudo apresenta uma análise atualizada do pensador norte-americano que encontrou na “metáfora”, na “conversação” e na “edificação” um modo de pensar a filosofia “sem espelhos” e sua decorrente “desprofissionalização”. Usando a “redescrição” como conceito-chave, o trabalho procura analisar, numa perspectiva rortiana, as sugestivas “redescrições em educação” a partir das possíveis (des)conexões entre filosofia e educação, público e privado, individuação e socialização, democracia e solidariedade, ética e educação, estética e mundo. As conclusões indicam que é possível ver a “redescrição” como fomentadora de “utopias educacionais” e geradora de “estratégias redescritivas” onde a filosofia, enquanto amor a sabedoria, é concebida como “conversação” e promotora de “mundos novos”. / This work examines the main aspects that characterize Rorty’s idea of understanding education as a redescription of the world. Rorty's neopragmatism has been considered one of the philosophical perceptions which attempted to face the impasses generated by the modern philosophy while “metaphysics of subjectivity”. Such confront has been carried out by means of a strong criticism to the main characteristics of philosophy in its fundational- representationist version, structured according to the epistemologic model of the subject-object relationship, which has, as its central point, the search for knowledge explanation / foundation. Starting from a Rorty’s criticism to the idea of truth and objectivity that has constituted the “scientificist” scenario of Modernity, passing through a criticism to the philosophy model that is epistemologicaly centered and its consequent “professionalization”, the study introduces an up-to-date analysis of the North American thinker who has found, through the “metaphor”, the “conversation” and the “edification”, a way of thinking about philosophy “without mirrors” and its following “deprofessionalization”. Using the “redescription” as a key concept, this work tries to analyze, according to Rorty’s perspective, the suggestive “redescriptions in education” from the possible (de)connections between philosophy and education, public and private, individualization and socialization, democracy and solidarity, ethics and education, aesthetics and the world. The conclusions indicate that it is possible to comprehend the “redescription” as a producer of educational utopias and “redescriptive strategies”, where philosophy, as love for wisdom, is conceived as “conversation” and promoter of “new worlds”.

O presente trabalho examina os principais traços que caracterizam a idéia rortiana de compreender a educação como redescrição do mundo. O neopragmatismo de Rorty tem sido considerado uma das posições filosóficas que têm procurado enfrentar os impasses gerados pela filosofia moderna enquanto “metafísica da subjetividade”. Tal enfrentamento tem se realizado por meio de uma crítica contundente às principais características da filosofia em sua versão fundacional-representacionista, estruturada no modelo epistemológico da relação sujeito-objeto que tem por centralidade a busca da explicação/fundamentação do conhecimento. Partindo de uma crítica rortiana à idéia de verdade e objetividade que tem constituído o cenário “cientificista” da Modernidade, passando por uma crítica ao modelo de filosofia epistemologicamente centrado e sua conseqüente “profissionalização”, o estudo apresenta uma análise atualizada do pensador norte-americano que encontrou na “metáfora”, na “conversação” e na “edificação” um modo de pensar a filosofia “sem espelhos” e sua decorrente “desprofissionalização”. Usando a “redescrição” como conceito-chave, o trabalho procura analisar, numa perspectiva rortiana, as sugestivas “redescrições em educação” a partir das possíveis (des)conexões entre filosofia e educação, público e privado, individuação e socialização, democracia e solidariedade, ética e educação, estética e mundo. As conclusões indicam que é possível ver a “redescrição” como fomentadora de “utopias educacionais” e geradora de “estratégias redescritivas” onde a filosofia, enquanto amor a sabedoria, é concebida como “conversação” e promotora de “mundos novos”. / This work examines the main aspects that characterize Rorty’s idea of understanding education as a redescription of the world. Rorty's neopragmatism has been considered one of the philosophical perceptions which attempted to face the impasses generated by the modern philosophy while “metaphysics of subjectivity”. Such confront has been carried out by means of a strong criticism to the main characteristics of philosophy in its fundational- representationist version, structured according to the epistemologic model of the subject-object relationship, which has, as its central point, the search for knowledge explanation / foundation. Starting from a Rorty’s criticism to the idea of truth and objectivity that has constituted the “scientificist” scenario of Modernity, passing through a criticism to the philosophy model that is epistemologicaly centered and its consequent “professionalization”, the study introduces an up-to-date analysis of the North American thinker who has found, through the “metaphor”, the “conversation” and the “edification”, a way of thinking about philosophy “without mirrors” and its following “deprofessionalization”. Using the “redescription” as a key concept, this work tries to analyze, according to Rorty’s perspective, the suggestive “redescriptions in education” from the possible (de)connections between philosophy and education, public and private, individualization and socialization, democracy and solidarity, ethics and education, aesthetics and the world. The conclusions indicate that it is possible to comprehend the “redescription” as a producer of educational utopias and “redescriptive strategies”, where philosophy, as love for wisdom, is conceived as “conversation” and promoter of “new worlds”.

O presente trabalho examina os principais traços que caracterizam a idéia rortiana de compreender a educação como redescrição do mundo. O neopragmatismo de Rorty tem sido considerado uma das posições filosóficas que têm procurado enfrentar os impasses gerados pela filosofia moderna enquanto “metafísica da subjetividade”. Tal enfrentamento tem se realizado por meio de uma crítica contundente às principais características da filosofia em sua versão fundacional-representacionista, estruturada no modelo epistemológico da relação sujeito-objeto que tem por centralidade a busca da explicação/fundamentação do conhecimento. Partindo de uma crítica rortiana à idéia de verdade e objetividade que tem constituído o cenário “cientificista” da Modernidade, passando por uma crítica ao modelo de filosofia epistemologicamente centrado e sua conseqüente “profissionalização”, o estudo apresenta uma análise atualizada do pensador norte-americano que encontrou na “metáfora”, na “conversação” e na “edificação” um modo de pensar a filosofia “sem espelhos” e sua decorrente “desprofissionalização”. Usando a “redescrição” como conceito-chave, o trabalho procura analisar, numa perspectiva rortiana, as sugestivas “redescrições em educação” a partir das possíveis (des)conexões entre filosofia e educação, público e privado, individuação e socialização, democracia e solidariedade, ética e educação, estética e mundo. As conclusões indicam que é possível ver a “redescrição” como fomentadora de “utopias educacionais” e geradora de “estratégias redescritivas” onde a filosofia, enquanto amor a sabedoria, é concebida como “conversação” e promotora de “mundos novos”. / This work examines the main aspects that characterize Rorty’s idea of understanding education as a redescription of the world. Rorty's neopragmatism has been considered one of the philosophical perceptions which attempted to face the impasses generated by the modern philosophy while “metaphysics of subjectivity”. Such confront has been carried out by means of a strong criticism to the main characteristics of philosophy in its fundational- representationist version, structured according to the epistemologic model of the subject-object relationship, which has, as its central point, the search for knowledge explanation / foundation. Starting from a Rorty’s criticism to the idea of truth and objectivity that has constituted the “scientificist” scenario of Modernity, passing through a criticism to the philosophy model that is epistemologicaly centered and its consequent “professionalization”, the study introduces an up-to-date analysis of the North American thinker who has found, through the “metaphor”, the “conversation” and the “edification”, a way of thinking about philosophy “without mirrors” and its following “deprofessionalization”. Using the “redescription” as a key concept, this work tries to analyze, according to Rorty’s perspective, the suggestive “redescriptions in education” from the possible (de)connections between philosophy and education, public and private, individualization and socialization, democracy and solidarity, ethics and education, aesthetics and the world. The conclusions indicate that it is possible to comprehend the “redescription” as a producer of educational utopias and “redescriptive strategies”, where philosophy, as love for wisdom, is conceived as “conversation” and promoter of “new worlds”.

No description available.

La presente tesis aborda el papel del humor y de la ironía en la filosofía, no solo como armas retóricas que los más importantes autores de nuestra tradición han empleado, sino también como elemento esencial de una tradición llamada “ironista” defendida por el filósofo norteamericano Richard Rorty en su obra Contingencia, ironía y solidaridad. A partir de la consideración de la propia contingencia a nivel epistemológico y moral que la filosofía, según Rorty, debe asumir en tiempos postmetafísicos, planteamos nosotros dos cuestiones principales en nuestra tesis. Por un lado, sostenemos que existe un humor filosófico, representado por la ironía, que no solo permite evaluar críticamente la historia de la metafísica para señalar en ella sus incongruencias (carácter esencial de lo cómico), sino también, permite liberarnos del dogmatismo que nos impide observar la contingencia de nuestros propios “saberes” (o lo que Rorty llama “léxicos últimos”). En este sentido el humor irónico nos enseña a replantear el papel de la filosofía. Por otro lado, Rorty le otorga a la novela y a otras artes y aproximaciones a la realidad, un papel fundamental como insumo cultural que permite la reflexión y la educación moral. Nosotros sostenemos que también la comedia, en tanto expresión artística que usa el humor, nos permite dar cuenta de las incongruencias de la realidad para abordarlas de manera crítica y que a su vez permite tener nuevas perspectivas de la problemática abordada humorísticamente para actuar en consecuencia. El humor de la comedia puede ser, entonces, un insumo para comprender la realidad y para actuar en ella críticamente, es decir, el humor cumple un papel cognoscitivo y se asume como herramienta política que imagina un individuo y una sociedad nuevos

Thesis (PhD) -- University of Stellenbosch, 2002. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: Philosophy has traditionally been concerned with the question of reason and rationality, as its central focus. From the perspective of the modern metaphysical tradition, this focus has developed around the theme of subjectivity in general, and the assumption of an ahistorical transcendental subject in particular. The idea of reason was thus foundational for the articulation and validation of the notions of truth and freedom. From the perspective of modernity, reason has thus been the condition of the possibility of enlightenment, freedom and moral progress. The debate between Habermas and the representatives of postmodern thinking represents the latest chapter regarding the question of reason, its limits, and its possibilities. What makes this debate particularly challenging is that Habermas, while he defends the idea of reason against its critique by the postmodernists, is actually in agreement with them in their dismissal of the tradition of metaphysical thinking. In view of his defense of the idea of reason, however, Habermas has invariably been accused of defending an outmoded and discredited form of philosophical thinking, while his opponents have generally been hailed as progressive thinkers who have succeeded in effecting a radical break with the conceptual legacy of the metaphysical tradition. In my dissertation I argue that the exact opposite position is the case, namely, that it is Habermas, and not his postmodern opponents, who has effected a radical break with metaphysical thinking. It is his ability to transform the idea of reason, from a transcendental into a postmetaphysical concept, in terms of which the question of reason and rationality, and the related ideas of truth and knowledge, are recast in fallibilistic terms, that, in my view, represents the overcoming of metaphysics. The postmodern turn, on the other hand, in view of its reluctance to consider the question of reason from an alternative model of rationality, finds itself still trapped within a form of transcendental thinking in which it seeks to enquire into the (im)possibility of reason, in the absence of a transcendental subject. In the final analysis, I argue that it is postmetaphysical rather than postmodern thinking, that offers us a practical alternative to the problematic conception of reason, bequeathed by the tradition of metaphysical thinking. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Die fenomeen van die rede en die betekenis van rasionaliteit vorm tradisioneel 'n sentrale fokus van die filosofie. Vanuit die perspektief van die moderne metafisiese tradisie het hierdie fokus ontwikkel rondom die tema van subjektiwiteit in die algemeen, en die aanname van 'n a-historiese transendentele subjek in die besonder. Die rede was dus fundamenteel vir die artikulasie en legitimering van die konsepte van waarheid en vryheid. Vanuit die perspektief van moderniteit was die rede dus die voorwaarde vir die moontlikheid van verligting, vryheid, en morele vooruitgang. Die debat tussen Habermas en die verteenwoordigers van postmoderne denke verteenwoordig die mees onlangse hoofstuk van die verhaal van die vraag na rede en rasionaliteit - die beperkings daarvan, asook die moontlikhede daarvan. Hierdie debat bied besondere uitdagings omdat Habermas, terwyl hy die idee van rede verdedig teen die kritiek van die postmoderniste, eintlik met hulle saamstem vir sover hulle die tradisie van metafisiese denke verwerp. In die lig van sy verdediging van die idee van rede, is Habermas egter voortdurend daarvan beskuldig dat hy 'n uitgediende en gediskrediteerde vorm van filosofiese denke bly voorstaan, terwyl sy opponente in die algemeen voorgehou is as progressiewe denkers wat suksesvol 'n radikale breuk gemaak het met die konseptuele erfenis van die metafisiese tradisie. In my dissertasie beweer ek dat die teenoorgestelde inderwaarheid die geval is, naamlik dat dit Habermas, en nie sy postmoderne opponente nie, is wat hierdie radikale breuk met metafisiese denke suksesvol uitgevoer het. Dit is sy verrnoe om die idee van die rede te transformeer vanaf 'n transendentale na 'n post- metafisiese konsep, in terme waarvan die vraag na rede en rasionaliteit, en die verwante idees van waarheid en kennis, omskep is in fallibilistiese beg rippe, wat, soos ek aantoon, 'n (die!) suksesvolle transendering van die metafisika bewerkstellig. Die postmoderne wending, aan die ander kant, in die lig van die traagheid daarvan om 'n alternatiewe en verruimde konsepsie van rasionaliteit te ontwikkel, bly vasgevang in 'n vorm van transendentele denke waarin dit probeer om ondersoek in te stel na die (on)moontlikheid van die rede ten aansien van die afwesigheid van 'n transendentele subjek. Uiteindelik beweer ek dat dit die post-metafisiese eerder as die postmoderne denke is wat aan ons 'n praktiese alternatief bied vir die problematiese konsep van die rede, soos ons dit qeerf het by die tradisie van metafisiese denke.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-25T19:20:54Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 ROBERTO PASCHOALI.pdf: 654301 bytes, checksum: 3ee8d65e13884352a28be15bd00ca1f4 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2008-06-05 / The herewith study has an analitical-philosofical outline and puts the dichotomy between solidarity and objectivity under moderation, more specifically, the focus of tension between the pragmatic conception of social companionship of Richard Rorty and the representacionist one of Jürgen Habermas. The first one edifies the commitment with solidarity above any manner of rationality, sticking with being loyal to the idea that there is nothing independent of the world of the man, of his conventions and practices. The second one, according to Habermas, point of view, submits any manner of human companionship to intersubjective rational principles, which go far beyond the cognitive-instrumental aspects of the human accomplishments that are essential for the social cohesion and the settlement of a fair and equalitarian society. The study concludes that: (a) it is possible, even not giving up on rationality, to be a solidarity member in a wider and socially fair society; (b) every human society is full with latent potential wealth which is plausible of physical, symbolic and spiritual assumption; (c) the societies in which the members have a standard of living that is below the line of poverty, potential wealth only becomes plausible of assumption as long as solidarity puts aside its supporting role in relation to the objective reason / O presente estudo tem um caráter analítico-filosófico e coloca sob reflexão a dicotomia entre solidariedade e objetividade, mais especificamente o foco de tensão entre a concepção pragmática de convivência social de Richard Rorty e a representacionista de Jürgen Habermas. A primeira alça o compromisso com a solidariedade acima de qualquer forma de racionalidade, mantendo-se fiel à idéia de que não há nada que independa do mundo dos homens, de suas convenções e práticas. A segunda, de acordo com o ponto de vista de Habermas, submete qualquer forma de convívio humano a princípios racionais intersubjetivos que vão muito além dos aspectos cognitivo-instrumentais das realizações humanas essenciais para a coesão social e o estabelecimento de uma sociedade justa e igualitária. O estudo conclui que: (a) é possível, mesmo não abrindo mão da racionalidade, ser um membro solidário numa sociedade mais ampla e socialmente justa; (b) toda sociedade humana é plena de riqueza potencial latente passível de apropriação física, simbólica e espiritual; (c) nas sociedades em que pessoas vivem abaixo da linha de pobreza, a riqueza potencial só se torna passível de apropriação desde que a solidariedade deixe de lado seu papel coadjuvante em relação à razão objetivante

In the contemporary U.S., the state, through the Legislative Assembly, the State Board of Education, and the Department of Education, sets policies for K-12 education. These include goals and standards that affect the kinds of influences local officials, parents, and students can have on various education programs, required and elective coursework, graduation requirements, and curriculum content. The state ought to be able to justify their education policies to citizens. I argue here for a pragmatist informed "minimalist approach" to justifying education policies. This approach has state officials (and subsequently local officials) use local, situated reasons for justifying their education standards, goals, and curriculum. I argue that if state officials utilize a minimalist approach to justify education policies, it will be easier for citizens to contest (or support) the state's policies because the language employed will better represent citizen's local, situated common experiences, and be contestable on those grounds. One consequence of this minimalist approach is that state officials could exclude justifications that are made by appealing to isolated, abstract conceptions. Isolated, abstract conceptions are, as pragmatists such as Rorty have argued, transcendental in nature and doomed to failure; fortunately, as the pragmatist defense of a minimalist approach shows, they are also unnecessary. Some implications of adopting a pragmatist-informed approach is that the state should give up terms and phrases that attempt to (i) construct a unifying theory for justification or for truth; (ii) construct and somehow universally justify a single best particular method for interpreting texts and analyzing scientific processes; and/or (iii) construct comprehensive and complete standards. Rather, state officials ought to identify local, situated reasons for particular policies. From these local appeals, state officials could construct a minimal set of education policies that leave room for local officials and teachers to have particular freedoms in constructing programs, projects, and curricula. I approach this argument through a critique of select education policies in Oregon, Texas, Arizona, and Tennessee. I argue that these policies, like many education policies and standards, lack adequate justifications. Those justifications that are provided are too vague and susceptible to interpretations that are not relevant to the particular purposes of the policies. For instance, certain policies have illegitimately led to the denial of funding for "Ethnic Studies" programs in Arizona, or allowed for irrelevant teacher and student criticisms of theories within the sciences to be explored and entertained as legitimate in Tennessee classrooms. My recommendations, if followed, would give state officials grounds for excluding the concerns of citizens that are not relevant to particular policies and provide a legitimate, justifiable basis for constructing state education policies. / Graduation date: 2013

SOARES, José Rômulo. O (neo)pragmatismo como eixo (des)estruturante da educação contemporânea. 2007. 189f. . Tese (Doutorado em Educação) – Universidade Federal do Ceará, Faculdade de Educação, Programa de Pós-Graduação em Educação Brasileira, Fortaleza-CE, 2007. / Submitted by Maria Josineide Góis (josineide@ufc.br) on 2012-07-10T12:37:07Z No. of bitstreams: 1 2007_Tese_JRSoares.pdf: 1102713 bytes, checksum: 5b65ba48a2d88a330c8d1b404c56a6e3 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Maria Josineide Góis(josineide@ufc.br) on 2012-07-17T13:44:16Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 2007_Tese_JRSoares.pdf: 1102713 bytes, checksum: 5b65ba48a2d88a330c8d1b404c56a6e3 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2012-07-17T13:44:16Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 2007_Tese_JRSoares.pdf: 1102713 bytes, checksum: 5b65ba48a2d88a330c8d1b404c56a6e3 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2007 / The present thesis looks into pragmatic philosophy and its historical ability for subsistence in the field of education. After some years of decline, pragmatism has reemerged in the form of neopragmatism, adjusted to a new context and imposing its principles upon contemporary education. The World Bank has been of crucial importance in the establishment of a new educational model, destined especially for the poor or “developing” countries. We analyzed the notion of society which underlies the political philosophy of John Dewey (1859-1952), an American Democrat and intellectual and perhaps the most influential pragmatic philosopher in education. We provide a critical analysis of his commitment to liberal democracy as well as his role as an influential intellectual in his country and elsewhere. Likewise, we examine the notion of society held by Richard Rorty (1931), the main advocate and driving force of the reemergence of pragmatism. In his redefinition of the phenomenon, Rorty attributes post-modern characteristics to pragmatism and questions the philosophical debate from Plato to Hegel, along with Marxism and analytical philosophy, which he considers to be philosophical systems dominated by metaphysics. In his antitheoretical and antiphilosophical outlook, Rorty proposes to hold creative conversations in which intersubjective relationships generate new words capable of solving everyday problems through enhanced use of language games suitable for each situation. Rorty believes that the improvement of society, for which he takes North American democracy as a model, requires the use of language games as a way of justifying beliefs, but not the purpose of reaching truth. Thus, to this neopragmatic thinker, social change should no longer rely on the great narratives, such as Marxism, which he thinks has lost its historical relevance. In contrast to the (neo)pragmatic approach and under the guidance of Marx and his followers, we see the presence of (neo)pragmatism as part of today’s capital crisis and urgent need to deal with humanity’s huge problems―problems generated by capital itself. Since (neo)pragmatism emerged in concert with the establishment of the United States, it has always been an essential support of the American, conservative way of life. Thus, we offer a critique of (neo)pragmatism through the ontology of the social being and considering work as a central ontological category of human life and essential element of human emancipation. / Este trabalho aborda a filosofia pragmática e sua capacidade histórica de recomposição no meio educacional. Após alguns anos de refluxo, o pragmatismo ressurge na forma de um neopragmatismo e se adequa ao contexto, ao mesmo tempo em que impõe seus princípios à educação contemporânea. Nessa direção, O Banco Mundial aparece como instituição fundamental na consecução de um novo modelo educativo, especialmente para os países pobres ou “em desenvolvimento”. No intento de atingir nossos propósitos investigativos, analisamos a concepção de sociedade subjacente à filosofia política de John Dewey (1859-1952), intelectual democrata dos Estados Unidos e o mais notável filósofo pragmático na educação. Nesse sentido, analisamos criticamente seu compromisso com a democracia liberal, como também seu papel de intelectual influente em seu país e no mundo. Da mesma forma, examinamos a concepção de sociedade veiculada por Richard Rorty (1931-2007), principal responsável pelo ressurgimento do pragmatismo, como também o seu maior difusor. Ao reeditar o pragmatismo, Rorty lhe atribui características pós-modernas e questiona o debate filosófico de Platão a Hegel, como também o marxismo e a filosofia analítica, para ele, sistemas filosóficos dominados pela metafísica. Em sua proposta antiteórica e antifilosófica, Rorty propõe a constituição de conversações criativas, nas quais as relações intersubjetivas criem novos vocabulários e esses passem a resolver seus problemas cotidianos utilizando cada vez mais e melhor, os jogos de linguagem propícios a cada situação particular. Para Rorty, o aperfeiçoamento da sociedade, da qual toma como modelo a democracia norte-americana, passa pelo uso dos jogos de linguagem, como forma de justificar crenças e jamais como meio de encontrar a verdade. Assim, para o autor neopragmático, a mudança social não se relaciona mais às grandes narrativas, como por exemplo, ao marxismo, que para o referido autor, perdeu seu sentido histórico. Na contracorrente da abordagem neo(pragmática) e sob a orientação de Marx e de seus adeptos, compreendemos a presença do (neo) pragmatismo como parte da atual crise do capital e de sua necessidade em responder aos graves problemas hoje vivenciados pela humanidade, problemas esses criados pelo próprio capital. Como filosofia nascida junto com a construção do império norte-americano, o (neo)pragmatismo se firma atualmente como aporte do estilo de vida americano, revelando-se, portanto, muito conservador. Assim, realizamos a crítica ao neo(pragmatismo) pela via crítica da ontologia do ser social e tomando o trabalho como categoria ontológica central na constituição da vida humana e também como elemento essencial da emancipação da humanidade.