Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-01T23:30:13Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 tese_10958_Dissertação Marianna.pdf: 58609148 bytes, checksum: 537a8ab8d4f35eb2e7a3339d24bb8200 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2017-05-02 / Este trabalho discute a ideia da casualidade, desenvolvida pela artista Moyra Davey em textos e trabalhos fotográficos, associando-a à lógica do índice da semiótica de Charles Sanders Peirce como ela é desenvolvida pela crítica de arte Rosalind Krauss em seus textos Notas sobre o índice: Parte 1, Notas sobre o índice: Parte 2 e Marcel Duchamp ou o Campo Imaginário. Palavras-chave: Moyra Davey, fotografia, lógica do índice, Rosalind Krauss

Thesis (M.A.)--Georgia State University, 2007. / Title from title page. Andrew I. Cohen, committee chair; Andrew Altman, Andrew J. Cohen, committee members. Electronic text (52 p.) : digital, PDF file. Description based on contents viewed October 11, 2007. Includes bibliographical references.

This thesis analyzes the relationship between Joan Jonas’s 1976 videotape Good Night Good Morning and the existing historiographical discourse on video art from the 1970s. I begin with a careful analysis and historical contextualization of Rosalind Krauss’s seminal 1976 essay on video art, “Video: The Aesthetics of Narcissism.” I then compare her essay with a number of present-day interpretations of video art that are in part motivated by a departure from Krauss and identify a range of presuppositions that have persisted through the art historical discourse on video art from the mid-1970s forward. Finally, I demonstrate that the terms of this essentially medium-specific discourse are too limited to offer a satisfying analysis of Good Night Good Morning and argue that understanding Jonas’s work requires an intermedial analysis. / text

This thesis aims to reexamine the index as a sign that generates meaning in the sculptural oeuvre of contemporary British artist Antony Gormley. The artist has consistently proclaimed his work to be indexical but has never offered clarification of the term. Rather, he adheres to the definition developed in the late nineteenth century by the term's originator, Charles Sanders Peirce. This is problematic because it gives false meaning to the indexical sign in a contemporary context. By comparing Gormley's use of the term in his sculptural practice to Peirce's theories and those of art historian Rosalind Krauss, who was the first to significantly and convincingly relate the index to art, this study will attempt to provide a contemporized definition of the index. This thesis aims to offer a clarification in the meaning of Antony Gormley's sculpture and demonstrate the index's ability to offer resolution to what is contemporary about contemporary art.

Using the narrative imagery of Instagram and the cultural narrative of the Olympics, I explore the role of agency and autonomy in modern sport with a focus on the commercial and institutional arms of surfing. This project is an attempt to evaluate visual and cultural narrative from the perspective of a literary scholar and to root theory and philosophy in issues that go beyond scholarship and academics. In chapter one, I use sports sociologists Jennifer Hargreaves and Krista Comer as well as Jean Kilbourne and Rosalind Gill to illuminate and explore two surf-centric Instagram accounts, both of which imagine a story of surfing through a mostly visual medium. In chapter two, I turn to Elizabeth Grosz and Michel Foucault to help explore the institutionalized arm of surfing through its recent inclusion in the Olympic Games. / Includes bibliography. / Thesis (M.A.)--Florida Atlantic University, 2017. / FAU Electronic Theses and Dissertations Collection

[pt] A tese investiga a trajetória intelectual da crítica de arte, historiadora e professora da Columbia University, Rosalind Krauss. Dividida em cinco capítulos, a pesquisa contempla as fases históricas de seu exercício analítico, da década de 1960 aos dias atuais. Para isso, elege como ponto de partida a hipótese de seu percurso intelectual ser abordado enquanto sobreposições de correntes formalistas distintas, com especial destaque para o formalismo greenbergiano, o formalismo russo e o estruturalismo francês. Pretende-se comprovar que Krauss, mesmo em um contexto notadamente pluralista das práticas artísticas contemporâneas, jamais descarta refletir a respeito das estruturas formais que engendram as obras, isto é, de seus mediums. A obra da ensaísta é aqui considerada enquanto um prisma através do qual é possível identificar distintas vozes que circunscrevem o seu campo discursivo: a apologia histórica da arte abstrata de Clement Greenberg e Michael Fried; a geração de pensadores em torno dos periódicos estadunidenses Artforum e October; a fenomenologia de Merleau-Ponty, a filosofia analítica do segundo Wittgenstein, o estruturalismo de Roland Barthes e Jacques Lacan; e, ainda, o pós-estruturalismo de Jacques Derrida. Deseja-se, com isso, oferecer ao leitor brasileiro uma leitura crítica da obra completa de uma das principais vozes da crítica de arte contemporânea estadunidense. / [en] This thesis looks at the work of the art critic, art historian and professor of Columbia University, Rosalind Krauss. Organized in five chapters, it contemplates the historical phases of her intellectual trajectory, from the 1960s to the present day. The hypothesis that guides this work runs as follows: Krauss essays should be organized as overlapping layers of distinct formalist currents, with special emphasis on Greenbergian Formalism, Russian Formalism and French Structuralism. This research intends to demonstrate that Krauss, even in a remarkably pluralistic context of contemporary artistic practices, has never discarded reflecting on the formal structures that engender the art works, that is, their mediums. The essayist s contribution is here considered as a prism through which it is possible to identify distinct voices that circumscribe her discursive field: the historical apology of abstract art by Clement Greenberg and Michael Fried; The generation of thinkers around the American periodicals Artforum and October; Merleau-Ponty s phenomenology; later Wittgenstein s philosophy; Roland Barthes and Jacques Lacan s structuralism; And Jacques Derrida s poststructuralism as well. In short, this project offers to Brazilian readers a critical reading of the work done by one of the dominant voices of contemporary art criticism.

<p>I denna uppsats presenterar och diskuterar författaren tre invändningar som riktats mot dygdetikern Rosalind Hursthouses förslag om vad som är en moraliskt riktig handling. Hursthouse menar att en handling är moraliskt riktig om den är vad en dygdig agent karaktärsenligt skulle göra i omständigheterna. Den form av invändningar som författaren presenterar och diskuterar i uppsatsen försöker visa på att Hursthouses förslag exkluderar handlingar som vanligen anses är rätt.</p><p>Författaren argumenterar för att en dygdetik lik den Neo-Aristoteliska dygdetik Hursthouse försvarar kan formuleras så att den undgår invändningar som presenteras i uppsatsen. Författaren föreslår att vi istället för att förstå Hursthouses förslag som om det gällde de faktiska handlingar som en dygdig agent gör, istället bör uppmärksamma att en dygdig agent följer handlingsmaximer vilka hon prövat under sin moraliska utveckling till att bli dygdig. Författaren föreslår vidare att det är huruvida en handling utgår från en maxim som karaktärsenligt kan ingå i ett dygdigt liv som är avgörande om den är moraliskt riktig eller inte.</p> / <p>In this paper the author presents and discusses three charges that have been raised against Rosalind Hursthouses virtue ethical account on what it takes for an action to be morally right. Hursthouse proposes that an action is right, if and only if, it is what a virtuous agent characteristically would to in the circumstances. All of the charges discussed and presented in the paper try to show that Hursthouses account excludes actions which we would like to say are morally right.</p><p>The author argues that a Neo-Aristotelian form of virtue ethics, like the one Hursthouse defends, can be formulated so that the charges can be avoided. The author proposes that, instead of understanding Hursthouses account as if it is only the very actions that virtuous agents perform that are morally right, we should observe that the virtuous agents are acting from maxims that they have tested during their development towards becoming virtuous agents. The author then proposes that an action is right if it can be traced from a maxim that can be a characteristic part of a virtuous life.</p>

I denna uppsats presenterar och diskuterar författaren tre invändningar som riktats mot dygdetikern Rosalind Hursthouses förslag om vad som är en moraliskt riktig handling. Hursthouse menar att en handling är moraliskt riktig om den är vad en dygdig agent karaktärsenligt skulle göra i omständigheterna. Den form av invändningar som författaren presenterar och diskuterar i uppsatsen försöker visa på att Hursthouses förslag exkluderar handlingar som vanligen anses är rätt. Författaren argumenterar för att en dygdetik lik den Neo-Aristoteliska dygdetik Hursthouse försvarar kan formuleras så att den undgår invändningar som presenteras i uppsatsen. Författaren föreslår att vi istället för att förstå Hursthouses förslag som om det gällde de faktiska handlingar som en dygdig agent gör, istället bör uppmärksamma att en dygdig agent följer handlingsmaximer vilka hon prövat under sin moraliska utveckling till att bli dygdig. Författaren föreslår vidare att det är huruvida en handling utgår från en maxim som karaktärsenligt kan ingå i ett dygdigt liv som är avgörande om den är moraliskt riktig eller inte. / In this paper the author presents and discusses three charges that have been raised against Rosalind Hursthouses virtue ethical account on what it takes for an action to be morally right. Hursthouse proposes that an action is right, if and only if, it is what a virtuous agent characteristically would to in the circumstances. All of the charges discussed and presented in the paper try to show that Hursthouses account excludes actions which we would like to say are morally right. The author argues that a Neo-Aristotelian form of virtue ethics, like the one Hursthouse defends, can be formulated so that the charges can be avoided. The author proposes that, instead of understanding Hursthouses account as if it is only the very actions that virtuous agents perform that are morally right, we should observe that the virtuous agents are acting from maxims that they have tested during their development towards becoming virtuous agents. The author then proposes that an action is right if it can be traced from a maxim that can be a characteristic part of a virtuous life.

In this thesis I distinguish between two conceptions of naturalism that have been offered as possible starting points for a virtue based ethics. The first version of naturalism is characterized by Philippa Foot’s project in Natural Goodness. The second version of naturalism can be found, in various forms, among the works of John McDowell, Martha Nussbaum, and Rosalind Hursthouse. I argue that neither naturalistic approach is entirely successful on its own, but that we can fruitfully carve a path between both approaches that points the way to a positive ethical account. I then conclude with a brief sketch of what such a positive account of a virtue ethics may look like.

No abstract available. / Thesis (M.A.)-University of KwaZulu-Natal, Pietermaritzburg, 2012.