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This thesis is an exploration of the ways in which a number of important Russian writers and filmmakers of the 1910s and 1920s appropriated domestic interiors as structural, visual and literary metaphors. My focus is on the artistic articulation of the closed space of the Russian domestic interior, in particular as it surfaced in the narratives of the modernist literature and cinema of the time and became an essential metaphor of its age. In my discussion I take issue with two standard ways of understanding domestic space in existing literature. I argue that representations of home spaces in early twentiethcentury Russian culture mount a challenge to the conventional view of the home as a place of safety and stability. I also argue that, at this point, the traditional approach to the room and the domestic space as a fixed closed structure is assailed by representations that see domestic space as kinetic. The importance of the 'room in motion' means that I address cinematic as well as literary representations of domestic space, and show that even literary representation borrow cinematic techniques. My different chapters constitute case studies of various separate, but complementary, aspects of the representation of home space. The first chapter shows how domestic space in reflected in the poetical language of Anna Akhmatova. The second chapter focuses on the parallel exploration of rooms and a child's consciousness in Kotik Letaev by Andrei Belyi. The third chapter discovers the philosophy of a room built by Sigizmund Krzhizhanovskii in his short stories of the 1920s. The next three chapters focus on interiors of three different cinematic genres. The fourth chapter looks closely at films created by Evgenii Bauer, showing the director's innovative techniques of framing and set-design. The fifth chapter explores the film Tret'ia Meshchanskaia by Abram Room, focusing on the director's employment of the room as a structural device of the film. The last chapter analyses two lyrical comedies by Boris Barnet to show the comic effect produced by the empty room and domestic objects in his films, and also focuses on the image of staircase. In conclusion, I speculate that the representation of interior spaces in the period in question goes beyond genre, medium, and narrative structure and becomes an important and culturally dynamic motif of the time.

No description available.

A comparative content analysis was conducted to determine whether the Russian (ITAR-TASS) and the American (UPI) wire service coverage of President Boris Yeltsin in the April 25, 1993, referendum was balanced and unbiased. Also, the amount of space dedicated to this topic was measured. Study results indicate that ITAR-TASS was more critical of Yeltsin prior to the referendum than UPI, and that there was no statistically important difference between the two wire services in their post referendum coverage. UPI articles were almost 30% longer than the ITAR-TASS articles. Each UPI article was on an average more than 220 words longer than were the ITAR-TASS articles.

In the study of contemporary politics few interstate relationships have proven more instrumental, controversial, and perplexing to global policy makers than that which has persisted between Moscow and Tehran since the collapse of the USSR. Despite the great importance of Russian-Iranian relations to questions of global and regional politics there has, to date, been very little in the way of critical scholarship performed on the subject. While a wide-array of accounts from subject analysts provide a wealth of data on contemporary and historical events which have presumably defined and conditioned bilateral relations, there has been relatively little effort to isolate, examine, test, and evaluate those conditions or variables that are deemed salient to cooperation. In light of these circumstances, this study seeks to initiate a tradition of scholarship on Russian-Iranian relations that appeals broadly to the use of a scientific methodology. The first step of any scientific inquiry requires attention devoted expressly to the development of a dependent variable of bilateral political affinity. While it remains outside the scope of this present investigation to analyze the host of factors/conditions capable of influencing bilateral relations, the formalization of a variable which records changing political affinity is a necessary first step and one that will fill-in a significant gap within the existing literary tradition. Rather than simply dismissing the extant tradition of literature on Russian-Iranian relations, this study seeks to aggregate and transform the subject's many diverse narratives into a user-friendly, quantitative, political metric which can form the basis for future empirical inquiry. Thus this study introduces a new approach to monitoring and measuring changes in Russian-Iranian cooperation known as General Political Affinity (GPA). Represented on the basis of a 21-point scaled indicator of bilateral affinity, GPA succinctly defines cooperation between Moscow and Tehran as the summation of three underlying, persistent issue dimensions: the trade in conventional weapons; cooperation in Iranian nuclear development; and level of agreement on matters of Caspian Sea delimitation. In more generic terms, these three criteria seek to evaluate interstate cooperation, generically, as a product of: defense cooperation; state-sponsored development assistance; and territorial agreement. The unique approach to operationalizing political affinity presented in this study not only functionally improves our ability to explain and predict the course of Russian-Iranian relations, but also provides a new schematic for evaluating bilateral relations among all political dyads.

Orientador: José Gilberto de Souza / Banca: Selma Lúcia de Moura Gonzales / Banca: André Roberto Martin / Resumo: A Rússia a partir do primeiro governo de Vladimir Putin apresentou maior proatividade em suas ações na esfera das relações internacionais. O território russo foi diminuído após o fim da União Soviética, mas com a presença de Putin tornou-se um projeto o reestabelecimento da influência sobre as antigas fronteiras, constituindo parcerias e unindo os países ex-soviéticos em organizações de cooperação militar e comercial. Além de embarcar em um novo paradigma com relação as suas parcerias estratégicas, tendo por foco a China, Irã, Síria, Venezuela e os países dos BRICS (Brasil, Rússia, Índia, China e África do Sul). Em forte oposição aos Estados Unidos e União Europeia utilizando-se de duras medidas coercitivas por meio de seu potencial energético do petróleo e do gás. Soma-se essas ações com a particular característica de Putin em articular e aplicar suas políticas, sendo muitas vezes, qualificadas por centralizadoras e autoritárias. Portando o objetivo do trabalho é analisar a geopolítica russa, com Vladimir Putin no governo. Para tal será avaliado o desenvolvimento econômico por intermédio de dados intrínsecos a sociedade e ao panorama global do comércio mundial. Também será observado as ações políticas internacionais e atitudes militares, utilizando embasamento jornalístico que descreva as principais ações de impacto da Rússia. Em uma escala temporal do ano 2000 até 2015. Esses itens serão sustentados teoricamente pela proposta de Teoria Política de Dugin, o Neo-eurasianismo. / Abstract: Russia has showing more proactivity in the international relations since the first government of Vladimir Putin. The Russian territory was dwindled after the end of the Soviet Union, but with Putin's presence the reestablish of the influence on the old frontiers became a project, creation partnerships by means uniting former Soviet countries in military and commercial cooperation organizations. In addition to showing on a new paradigm in relation to its strategic partnerships, focusing on China, Iran, Syria, Venezuela and the BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa). In strong opposition to the United States and European Union using hard coercive measures through its energy potential of oil and gas. Putin's particular characteristic in articulating and applying his policies. The purpose of the work is to analyze Russian geopolitics, with Vladimir Putin in government. For that will be evaluated economic development through data intrinsic to society and the global panorama of world trade. International political actions and military attitudes will also be observed, using a journalistic background describing the main impact actions of Russia. On a time scale from the year 2000 to 2015. These items will be theoretically supported by Dugin's proposal for Political Theory, Neo-eurasianism. / Mestre

Who supports social policy in the developing world? Most of what we know about micro-level preferences for social policy comes from well-developed, wealthy countries of the OECD, where governments can credibly commit to policy enforcement and implementation. This dissertation explores preferences for social policy in post-communist countries, where weak constraints on the state challenge the welfare state. In doing so, it provides novel insights both into social policy debates in these countries and the coalitions which support (or oppose) social policy. I argue that support for social policy depends on how institutions shape the expectations of actors about the costs they pay into social policy programs versus future benefits. I draw on existing theories of political economy to propose four mechanisms -- misappropriation, contract enforcement, free-riding, and macro-economic risk -- that alter the distribution of winners and losers from social policy. Misappropriation stems from officials' ability to divert funding away from intended uses. While for most this imposes dead-weight costs on social policy, where institutions are poor. the politically well-connected can benefit from diverted funds to decrease social policy costs. The contract enforcement mechanism emerges due to the inability of weakly constrained states to enforce contracts. Predictions are similar to misappropriation, but actors also cannot trust other private actors with control of social policy. Free-riding emerges when bureaucrats are unwilling to expend effort to ensure tax compliance. Again, this imposes dead-weight costs on most, but garners support from tax evaders, who can free-ride. Finally, the macro-economic risk mechanism suggests that macro-economic volatility is heightened in settings with weak institutions, which increases both individual risk and support for social policy. The empirical portion of the dissertation tests the observable implications of each of these mechanisms. Chapter 2 provides a first-cut, cross-national test of part of the argument using micro-level data from a cross-national survey of 28 post-communist countries. I draw on work on informality in the post-communist world to identify individual characteristics associated with tax evasion to test the free-rider mechanism. Consistent with it, I show that those associated with evasion support social policy more where institutions are weaker. Chapter 3 posits that if the mechanisms I propose matter, actors will appeal to the logic of my theory during concrete reform debates. I test this using evidence from the 2001 pension reforms in Russia. I combine analysis of the legislative debates surrounding reform with in-depth content analysis of the Russian media, which draws on an original dataset of all mentions of reform in 352 Russian newspapers, journals, and trade magazines. I show that all four mechanisms were indeed major concerns. Chapter 4 tests the theory at the firm level, using a survey of 666 Russian firms to look at preferences where institutional quality is weak. I test whether firms that I predict support the welfare state in such settings -- those with political connections and a comparative advantage in hiding from the authorities -- actually do so. In addition to providing some support for the misappropriation and free-riding mechanisms, this chapter is a contribution in its own right: it is among the first to use surveys to study firms' preferences for social policy. Finally, chapter 5 uses a survey experiment conducted on 1600 respondents to attempt to understand the ceteris paribus effect of institutions on the average individual. Using a simple framing experiment, I provide three different treatment groups with information about bribery, tax evasion, and the extent to which private pension funds commit fraud to test the misappropriation, free-riding, and contract enforcement mechanisms, respectively. The chapter offers mixed evidence. The dissertation makes contributions to both the study of the welfare state and the political economy of institutions and investment. First, the dissertation explores preferences for social policy in the developing world and introduces institutional quality concerns to this literature. My work particularly focuses attention on the ways certain groups can abuse social policy to pass costs onto others, adding nuance to existing understandings of who benefits from social policy. Second, it advances our understanding of how institutional quality shapes economic decision making and provides evidence as to how different pathologies of poor institutions shape economic decisions.

No description available.

The continued existence of the Russian defence and arms industry, known as the Oboronnyi Promyshennyi Kompleks (OPK), was called into question following the disintegration of the Soviet Empire in 1991. Industry experts cited the lack of a domestic market, endemic corruption, and excess capacity within the industry as factors underpinning its predicted demise. The most telling factor was the sudden removal of considerable government subsidies and high defence industry wages that had traditionally buttressed the industry's economic viability and encouraged the cream of Russia's workers into the sector. It was a crippling blow. However, the industry's export customers in China, India and Iran during those early years became the OPK's saving grace. Their orders introduced hard currency back into the industry and went a long way to preventing the forecasted OPK collapse. Although pessimistic predictions continued to plague the OPK throughout the 1990s, the valuable export dollars provided the OPK the breathing space it needed to claw back its competitive advantage as an arms producer. That revival has been further underpinned by a new political commitment, various research and development initiatives, and the restoration of defence industry as a tool of Russian foreign policy. In order to gauge the future prospects for the OPK, it is necessary to examine the domestic and external drivers that have either underwritten its success to date or are still required to ensure its long term endurance. Domestically, continued success demands a closer collaboration between the OPK and the Russian armed forces. It also requires serious efforts to curb endemic corruption, further consolidation of the defence industry and continued development of the Russian domestic market for arms. Externally, the strength of the state arms exporter, Rosoboronexport, global market diversification and joint military ventures with strategic partner countries are essential ingredients for long term OPK success. Cultivating and maintaining the economic and political momentum vital for the OPK's progress will be a daunting undertaking for Russia. However, Russia's accomplishments in these key areas since 2000 suggest that continued success is a genuine prospect and that the OPK could potentially grow to be the proverbial 'phoenix from the ashes'. China and India constitute approximately eighty percent of the total Russian arms transfer market. Trading and cooperation with these two countries has provided Moscow with the finances to sustain its defence industry through continued orders and valuable finance for research and development programmes for military hardware. However, post 2015, the Chinese market will be nearing total saturation and the Indian market will have contracted somewhat, as the indigenous defence industries of these nations can be expected to usurp the demand for Russian equipment. This scenario, together with a more active foreign policy under Putin has seen Russia launch aggressive marketing campaigns into the Middle East, South East Asia and Latin America. The strategy has already begun to pay dividends with large contracts being signed by Algeria, Indonesia, and Venezuela. The Russians hope that large sales to these countries will trigger further sales within the respective regions. The realised or potential contracts for arms from Libya, Saudi Arabia, Malaysia, Mexico, and Brazil suggest that this strategy is producing the desired result. The short term future of the Russian OPK looks promising. The rising domestic defence order is beginning to challenge the export market as the OPK's most important customer. Meanwhile, exports will be safeguarded by continued foreign demand for niche Russian defence products such as cruise missiles and air defence systems as well as cost effective and user friendly Russian aircraft, ships, submarines and land systems. Flexible financing options offered by Rosoboronexport will stimulate demand in new markets such as Algeria and Indonesia and sustain the economic viability of the OPK for at least the next decade.

published_or_final_version / Education / Master / Master of Education