This study examines the Uralian iron and steel industry distribution, its changes through time and the reasons for these changes. At present, this is one of the important iron and steel producing regions in the world. At one time it was the most important. In order to obtain the information on which to base this study, it was necessary to resort mainly to published materials, largely Soviet. The American Iron and Steel Institute also supplied some non-published material. In order to collect the published materials it was necessary to make use of the libraries of the University of British Columbia the University of Washington and the Geographical Branch of the Department of Mines and Technical Surveys in Ottawa. Other Ottawa libraries, the personal collections of Dr. Hooson and Dr. Jackson, various bookstores, notably Kamkin's bookstore in Washington, D. C, the bookstore at the United Nations in New York and Davis bookstore in Montreal, were also very useful. The primary problem when conducting a study of this nature is the collecting of sufficient relevant materials for a balanced appraisal of the phenomena being examined. A knowledge of Russian is mandatory and an acquaintance with French is also useful. The information gathered was organized into tables and plotted on maps. These bodies of data were then described and analyzed. Analysis of the Uralian iron and steel industry indicated that this industry was initially essentially located on the iron ore supply. But none of the major plants are at present located on iron ore resources that are large enough to amortize the plant. Also the major plants are on the whole, based on low quality ores. The major economic advantage of the Uralian iron and steel industry production is its association with the Eastern coal supplies. But this advantage is common to all Eastern plants. Expansion at Magnitogorsk will result in more expensive production than the construction of new plants would, even though Magnitogorsk is the most efficient Uralian plant. The Urals is well located for the introduction of natural gas into its metallurgy. This is proceeding. Nevertheless, the use of natural gas is only a partial solution to the fuel problem because it can not completely replace coke. Therefore, the Urals will have to continue bringing in coking coal over great distances. The de-emphasis of iron and steel announced in 1962 will help the Urals to perpetuate its present status as a producer (it supplies about one-third of the Soviet production). On the other hand, no significant increase in its relative importance can be expected. The bulk of the Uralian iron and steel production is located in the Eastern Urals, more particularly in the South Eastern Urals. In 1956, the three largest plants: Magnitogorsk and Chelyabinsk in the South Eastern Urals, and Nizhne Tagil'sk in the Central Urals produced 77 per cent of the Uralian pig iron and 67 per cent of the steel smelted. This has not significantly changed subsequently. Considerable expansion, based on Kachkanar ores, is planned for Nizhne Tagil'sk. But, all things considered, most of the expansion will be located at the major South Uralian plants. / Arts, Faculty of / Geography, Department of / Graduate

No description available.

Transnational organized crime has been prevalent during the last century, but it recently has been recognized as a threat to the world order. Governments throughout the world, along with the intergovernmental organizations identified this phenomenon as a new threat to domestic and international security. This paper attempts to explain the impacts of transnational organized crime on the functioning of democratic societies by adopting the Russian Organized Crime as case study. The descriptive research with regard to definition, scope and organization of transnational organized crime, along with the objectives, limitations and methodology of this research will be included in the first chapter. Recent trends observed in organized crime`s character and the impact of organized crime on the political economies of democratic regimes will be contained in the following chapters. Pre-conditions for a broader response to transnational organized crime and conclusive remarks will be the context of the last chapter.

No description available.

No description available.

This thesis addresses the substantive problem: how does variation in energy wealth impact upon the foreign policies of major energy-producing states? To answer this question, the thesis draws upon the ‘resource curse’ literature, as well as existing works of foreign policy analysis, to formulate a new theory. Based on a framework of neoclassical realism, this energy impact theory of foreign policy proposes that energy wealth, conceived as a national capability, has a significant and reliable effect on major energy-producing states’ foreign policies. Specifically, it is hypothesised that increases in energy capabilities amplify the scale and scope of these states’ international activity; promote boldness, ambition, and aggression; and encourage the adoption of unilateralist approaches to foreign policy. Decreases in energy capabilities are anticipated to have the opposite effects. Having delineated the core features of this middle-range theory, the model is tested using an initial, most-likely case study of the Soviet Union and Russian Federation, 1970 to 2010. The results of this empirical study are enormously encouraging since, following meticulous qualitative analysis of events data, the theory is concluded to have significant explanatory value in this context, as well as substantial promise as a more general model. In this way, the thesis endeavours to make a distinctive contribution, not only to research into the factors shaping Moscow’s international conduct, but also to the broader theoretical literatures on the ‘resource curse’ and foreign policy analysis. It is anticipated that this thesis marks only the beginning of a much more extensive programme of research.

This thesis considers the evolution of the Russian media and assesses the decrease in media freedom and its effect on Russian democracy. The Russian media has lost most of its freedom and ability to report critically over the last five years. Although there are Russian laws that are supposed to protect the freedom of the media, those have not been enforced. In addition, over the last five years a number of reforms have occurred that have removed some of those freedoms. These include laws that restrict coverage of elections, terror events and the Chechen region. The lack of freedom has resulted in the inability for the media to serve their purpose in civil society. This has contributed to civil society's lack of ability to ensure that Russia's government remains democratic. If present trends continue the future does not look good for Russian democracy or the freedom of Russia's media.

Originally presented as the author's thesis--Universität Hamburg, 2006. / Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (M.S.)--Naval Postgraduate School, 2002. / Thesis advisor(s): Richard Doyle, Raymond E. Franck, Jr. Includes bibliographical references (p. 47-50). Also available online.

Thesis (M.A. in National Security Affairs)--Naval Postgraduate School, September 2001. / Thesis advisor(s): Mikhail Tsypkin, Frank Teti. Includes bibliographical references (p. 41-44). Also available online.