Submitted by PPG Filosofia (filosofia-pg@pucrs.br) on 2018-02-14T20:14:58Z No. of bitstreams: 1 DISSERTA??O - GUIDO REY ALT.pdf: 1115224 bytes, checksum: 07a397ded61d1e5aca3f863e7c564076 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Caroline Xavier (caroline.xavier@pucrs.br) on 2018-02-16T12:13:58Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 DISSERTA??O - GUIDO REY ALT.pdf: 1115224 bytes, checksum: 07a397ded61d1e5aca3f863e7c564076 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2018-02-16T12:15:30Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 DISSERTA??O - GUIDO REY ALT.pdf: 1115224 bytes, checksum: 07a397ded61d1e5aca3f863e7c564076 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2018-01-16 / Conselho Nacional de Pesquisa e Desenvolvimento Cient?fico e Tecnol?gico - CNPq / The thesis?s objective is to examine the interconnected problems of the ontological status and the distinction of the principle of individuation, the principle that seeks to explain the numerical identity of individual substances, in the metaphysics of the scholastic philosopher and theologian John Duns Scotus (1255/56-1308). The following exposition seeks to argue for the soundness of Scotus?s analysis of the concepts of identity and distinction in the framework of his doctrine of the ?formal distinction?, which grounds his overall approach to this metaphysical principle. Our interpretative purpose is also oriented on the secondary objective of examining the consistency of an important objection posed by Ockham?s Problem. / O objetivo central da presente disserta??o ? examinar os problemas interrelacionados do estatuto ontol?gico e da distin??o do princ?pio de individua??o, a saber, o princ?pio que visa explicar a identidade num?rica de subst?ncias individuais, na metaf?sica do fil?sofo e te?logo escol?stico J. Duns Scotus (c. 1265/6-1308). A exposi??o subsequente visa argumentar pela cog?ncia da an?lise de Scotus dos conceitos de identidade e distin??o no quadro da sua doutrina da ?distin??o formal?, a qual fundamenta a sua abordagem a este princ?pio metaf?sico. Nosso prop?sito interpretativo ? orientado, ademais, pelo exame da consist?ncia de uma obje??o importante a esta an?lise colocada pelo Problema de Ockham.

This thesis deals with the interpretation of art, set against the background of the medieval Christian Neoplatonism of John Scotus Eriugena. For him, art and philosophy are regarded as the handmaidens of meaning. Therefore, although this thesis begins with a consideration of Eriugena's Periphyseon, it develops into a discussion on aesthetic theory, and ultimately into one on poetic theory. The object of this discussion is to account for meaning in Chaucer's Troilus and Criseyde according to Eriugenian poetics. / The essence of art will thus be pursued within the parameters of the Neoplatonic scala natura. In this way, the whole poetic interpretation of Chaucer's poem is grasped as a mirror of the ontological exitus-reditus pattern. In understanding the poem this way, this thesis comes to immediate terms with the medieval concept of the imago Dei, and understands the likeness of mankind to God to be primarily one made by virtue of language.

While Richard Baxter (1615-91) is well known and rightly held in high esteem for his practical divinity and his evangelistic zeal, he has hitherto been conspicuously neglected as a theologian. In particular there have been no major studies of him with respect to the renewed paradigm of Protestant Scholasticism and none at all of his Methodus Theologiae (1681), which represents the fruit of a lifetime of theological reflection and study and which is arguably, in both scope and vision, one of the last great Summas of English scholastic divinity. This thesis focuses on the Methodus and on Baxter‟s theological method, which he took, though imperfect, to be the closest to the true Scripture method of theology that anyone had yet come. Baxter believed that every level of (active) created reality reflected the impress of God‟s Triune being in metaphysical composition, structure and activity. This he described, following the Italian metaphysicist Tommaso Campanella, in terms of the divine primalities or principles of Power, Wisdom and Love. In the Methodus these insights are systematised into a kind of Trinitarian logic. Baxter held that human reason should be sanctified in order to conform to the Trinitarian structure of created reality, and therefore espoused a method of trichotomising organised according to these same divine principles, derivative of both Ramist and Lullist method. This thesis argues that the whole of Baxter‟s mature thought is structured in a Trinitarian fashion according to his own „hallowed logic‟ and that two themes, often interlinked, are the key to interpreting his thought: the metaphysics of the divine principles and the Christian‟s baptismal covenant with the Triune God. Furthermore it examines Baxter‟s analogical ascent from the general vestigia Trinitatis present in the whole created order through the special vestigium of man‟s soul fashioned in the image of God and finally to the Trinity itself. This detailed exposition provides the basis, in the concluding chapter, for an examination of the whole of the Methodus and a demonstration that this represents a methodological unfolding of the covenant between the believer and God the Father, Son and Holy Spirit in the threefold Kingdom of Nature, Grace and Glory. In this way the Methodus may be seen as having taken its inspiration from the Theo-Politica (1659) of Baxter‟s friend George Lawson. Finally this thesis concludes that Baxter‟s thought has pronounced Scotist and Nominalist accents. His Scotism in particular runs deep and has strong ties with his Trinitarian thought, which is especially significant in light of the recent increasingly vocal discussions of the Scotist character of Protestant Scholasticism. Overall therefore it is suggested that Baxter is a neglected figure who deserves to be rediscovered and whose mature theology represents a fascinating reconstrual of biblical ideas according to a Trinitarian and scholastic paradigm.

Diss. Pontificia Univ. Gregoriana, 2007. / Includes bibliographical references.

Habilitationsschrift--Universität Osnabrück, 1995. / Bibliogr. p. 203-206.

Texte remanié de: Promotionsschrift--Katholisch-Theologische Fakultät--München--Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität, 1995. / Bibliogr. p. 973-1025. Index.

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Thesis advisor: Eileen C. Sweeney / Francis Mayronis was a Franciscan friar and one of John Duns Scotus’s primary students; he became a master of theology in 1323. His Commentary on the Sentences is preserved in more than 100 medieval manuscripts. In recent literature, Mayronis’s work has received considerable attention, especially in his cognitive theory and metaphysics. However, his ethical work has generally received very little attention. Mayronis occupies an important place in the early fourteenth century’s Franciscan intellectual tradition, particularly in the onset of the Scotist tradition. Mayronis not only creatively explicated and developed Scotus’s thoughts in his writings but also actively engaged in conversation with Peter Auriol and William Ockham as the “first” Scotist.My dissertation is organized to present Mayronis’s relational teleology in his notion of beatitude as the enjoyment of God. While generally maintaining a volitional agent-centered perspective that an agent or efficient cause is not determined to seek the good, Mayronis argues for the certitude of the ultimate end of the blessed and sees God, i.e., the final cause, as the total cause of the end. Mayronis harmonizes these seemingly contradictory causal powers of the final and efficient causes with the notion of habitus. First, Mayronis affirms the traditional view of habitus as an active power. In the present life, the free will gradually acquires a habitus toward the good through its own actions, and in heaven, grace or charity, i.e., supernatural habitus, is infused in the will of the blessed so that the will is eventually necessitated by the good. However, he could not maintain this position, i.e., the will’s habitus determines the will’s character, without abandoning Scotus’s emphasis on the will’s free aspect over its natural aspect since habitus is natural, though it is second nature. Hence, he develops a novel story of relation that completely replaces the role of habitus: God freely accepts someone due to a relational change to the person, rather than because the person has a supernatural habitus that is ‘acceptable’ to God. I begin by presenting Mayronis’s metaphysics of final causality in its historical context. For Plato and Aristotle, the end is formal. Plato considers the end as the form externally given by the divine craftsman, and Aristotle depicts nature’s motion toward the end as matter’s internal desire for its form. Then, Avicenna, while defining the final cause as the cause of causes, develops two ways the efficient cause can be central: the intellect can see something other than the good as its end, and the will can seek something not as determined by its goodness. I treat Averroes, Aquinas, Scotus, Ockham, and Mayronis in developing Avicenna’s notion of the final cause and the relationship between the final and efficient causes. In medieval teleology, we see fully developed agent-centered perspectives. In his unique rendering of Avicennian final causality, Mayronis shows that, although the final cause is the primary and necessary cause, it potentially causes our relations with God; then, we, as the efficient cause, contingently actualize the relations. Then, to situate Mayronis’s ethical teleology as a continuation of Scotus’s voluntarism, I argue for Duns Scotus’s ethical teleology against Thomas Williams’s view that sees Scotus’s ethics as proto-Kantian. I then present Mayronis’s notion of our intellect’s vision of God and our will’s enjoyment of God according to his metaphysics of final causality. First, I examine Mayronis’s cognitive theory that holds the vision of God, i.e., intuitive cognition, as a relation. I then argue for his relational teleology based on the premise that Mayronis views our enjoyment of God as a relation. For Mayronis, our ultimate end is our beatific enjoyment of God; it is neither our beatific act nor the object of the act, i.e., God, but the relation between the act and the object. Happiness is the relation to the Supreme Good, and misery is the lack of the relation. The purpose or goal of our life is neither merely internal nor external but relational. Finally, I present how Mayronis translates the role of habitus that grants the certitude of the enjoyment of the blessed into divine acceptance. For Mayronis, our moral life is not a long journey of accumulating habitus or virtues until we finally reach our destination; it is an everyday journey of love where we actualize the final cause, which potentially orders us to the Supreme Good. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2022. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Philosophy.

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