This study examines factors that influence managers’ choice to recognize goodwill impairment under Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 142 (SFAS 142). The debate surrounding SFAS 142’s effectiveness centered on whether the managerial discretion allowed by the standard could lead to biased decisions in managers’ determination of goodwill impairment. I use a conditional logistic regression to compare 130 firms that did recognize the existing impairment losses (write-off firms) to a control sample of 130 matching firms that did not recognize the existing impairment losses (no write-off firms). I find that the likelihood of recognizing the existing impairment losses significantly decreases when the managers have sizable holdings of in-the-money stock options. On the other hand, the likelihood of recognizing the existing impairment losses significantly increases when firms have stronger corporate governance, as measured by percentage of outside directors, percentage of outside directors’ ownership, number of busy directors, and separation of CEO and Chair titles. Additionally, I find that during the period leading up to the SFAS 142 write-off, there have been more favorable changes in corporate governance structures of the writeoff firms, compared to that of no write-off firms. These favorable changes in governance structures occurred to a greater extent in firms that have delayed the recognition of existing impairment losses to the sample period compared to the firms that have been recognizing the write-offs on a timely basis. These results are consistent with the notion that favorable changes in corporate governance induce firms to take SFAS 142 impairment losses, which managers have avoided taking in the prior period. Overall, the results imply that managerial incentives do affect the implementation of standards that expand managerial discretion and highlight the importance of corporate boards in the monitoring of discretion allowed by such standards.

<p>Syftet med denna uppsats är att undersöka om svenska koncerners resultat och nyckeltal påverkats av den standardändring som infördes i USA från och med årsskiftet 2001/2002, SFAS 142. Detta för att kunna generalisera resultatet till den svenska marknaden i och med att IFRS 3 implementeras under 2005. Vår undersökning, som genomförts med en jämförande ekonomisk utvärderingsmetod, visar att samtliga undersökta koncerner redovisar ett synbart högre resultat och en urskiljbar högre vinst per aktie. Vi kan konstatera att vid såväl ett positivt som ett negativt resultat är standardändringen gynnsam för koncernerna. Ju större goodwillposten är desto större förbättring av vinst per aktie på grund av den uteblivna avskrivningen.</p>

Syftet med denna uppsats är att undersöka om svenska koncerners resultat och nyckeltal påverkats av den standardändring som infördes i USA från och med årsskiftet 2001/2002, SFAS 142. Detta för att kunna generalisera resultatet till den svenska marknaden i och med att IFRS 3 implementeras under 2005. Vår undersökning, som genomförts med en jämförande ekonomisk utvärderingsmetod, visar att samtliga undersökta koncerner redovisar ett synbart högre resultat och en urskiljbar högre vinst per aktie. Vi kan konstatera att vid såväl ett positivt som ett negativt resultat är standardändringen gynnsam för koncernerna. Ju större goodwillposten är desto större förbättring av vinst per aktie på grund av den uteblivna avskrivningen.

La contabilizzazione delle operazioni di M&A è radicalmente mutata nel corso degli ultimi dieci anni, nel contesto statunitense come in quello europeo. A seguito di tali cambiamenti l’ammontare di goodwill (avviamento) iscritto nei bilanci di molte società si è incrementato. Questo studio si propone in primo luogo di far luce sulla reliability di tali valori analizzando le cause della svalutazione del goodwill, a partire dall’ipotesi essa sia causata in molti casi dal pagamento di un prezzo eccessivo da parte dell’impresa acquirente, piuttosto che essere la conseguenza di eventi successivi all’operazione. L’analisi, in secondo luogo, ha lo scopo valutare se l’impairment test del goodwill, reso obbligatorio dallo SFAS 142 raggiunga l’obiettivo di individuare in modo tempestivo le perdite durevoli di valore del goodwill acquisito e, dunque, di evitare che rimangano iscritti in bilancio come assets valori che di fatto non lo sono. Lo studio ha considerato un campione di 929 acquisizioni concluse nel periodo 1999-2007 che hanno coinvolto società statunitensi quotate ed è stato condotto sviluppando un modello predittivo basato su alcune misure indicanti potenziale overpayment da parte dell’acquirente alla data di acquisizione. I risultati mostrano in primo luogo come alcuni indicatori di overpayment, come la percentuale del prezzo pagata in azioni dell’impresa acquirente e un ammontare elevato di goodwill rispetto al prezzo di acquisto, diano un contributo significativo nella stima di future svalutazioni del goodwill. Un risultato piuttosto preoccupante, poiché segnala una almeno parziale incapacità da parte degli attuali Principi Contabili (SFAS 141) di garantire che alla data di acquisizione il valore attribuito a tale asset sia effettivamente fondato sulle sinergie e sul valore di “going-concern” del target (“core goodwill”), escludendo elementi ad esso estranei, come l’ overpayment da parte dell’acquirente. Per quanto attiene al secondo obiettivo, i risultati mostrano che il lasso temporale tra la data di acquisizione e il momento della svalutazione è in media di due - tre anni, a differenza di quanto accadeva precedentemente all’entrata in vigore dello SFAS 142, quando tale distanza temporale è stata stimata essere tra i quattro e i cinque anni. Tale risultato pertanto suggerisce che l’impairment test (almeno) annuale ha ottenuto l’effetto di migliorare la tempestività dell’individuazione di eventuali perdite durevoli di valore, contribuendo a bilanciare l’effetto sopra descritto che potenzialmente si ingenera alla data di acquisizione. / The purpose of this study is to shed light on the reliability of accounting goodwill numbers by examining whether the root cause of many goodwill impairment losses is the overpayment for the target at the time of the original acquisition, rather than the deterioration of goodwill values caused by events occurred after acquisition. A second related objective is to assess whether the annual impairment test of the acquired goodwill introduced by SFAS 142 improved the ability of accounting standards to timely capture situations in which the amount of goodwill is overstated and should thus be written down. I tested these hypotheses over a sample of 929 acquisitions completed by US listed companies over the nine-year period from 1999 to 2007. To assess whether the occurrence of a goodwill impairment loss can be predicted based on overpayment indicators, I developed a prediction model of goodwill impairment losses using some indicators measured at the acquisition date that signal potential overpayment by the acquiring firm. First, I found that certain measures, such as the percentage of stock in the consideration and the amount of purchase price assigned to goodwill, in fact represent powerful indicators of the occurrence of a subsequent goodwill impairment. This result is troubling as it suggests that SFAS 141 provisions are at least partially unable to avoid that components other than “core goodwill” being included in the amount recognized as goodwill, casting some doubt on the credibility of prominent goodwill amounts included in the financial statements of many corporations. I also found that the recognition of goodwill impairments lags behind the acquisition time by an average of two to three years. Compared with findings of earlier studies this result indicates that SFAS 142 requirements for annual impairment tests in fact improved the timeliness of recognizing goodwill write-offs, eventually helping to mitigate the failure of SFAS 141.

This study examines the impact of Statements of Financial Accounting Standards No. 141 and No. 142 (hereafter SFAS 141, 142) on the characteristics of financial analysts' earnings forecasts after mergers. Specifically, I predict lower forecast errors for firms that experienced mergers after the enactment of SFAS 141, 142 than for firms that went through business combinations before those accounting changes. Study results present strong evidence that earnings forecast errors for companies involved in merging and acquisition activity decreased after the adoption of SFAS 141, 142. Test results also suggest that lower earnings forecast errors are attributable to factors specific to merging companies such as SFAS 141, 142 but not common to merging and non-merging companies. In addition, evidence implies that information in corporate annual reports of merging companies plays the critical role in this decrease of earnings forecast error. Summarily, I report that SFAS 141, 142 were effective in achieving greater transparency of financial reporting after mergers. In my complementary analysis, I also document the structure of corporate analysts' coverage in "leaders/followers" terms and conduct tests for differences in this structure: (1) across post-SFAS 141,142/pre-SFAS 141, 142 environments, and (2) between merging and non-merging firms. Although I do not identify any significant differences in coverage structure across environments, my findings suggest that lead analysts are not as accurate as followers when predicting earnings for firms actively involved in mergers. I also detect a significant interaction between the SFAS-environment code and leader/follower classification, which indicates greater improvement of lead analyst forecast accuracy in the post-SFAS 141, 142 environment relative to their followers. This interesting discovery demands future investigation and confirms the importance of financial reporting transparency for the accounting treatment of business combinations.