Submitted by PPG Hist?ria (historia-pg@pucrs.br) on 2019-03-12T14:21:46Z No. of bitstreams: 1 DISSERTA??O PEDRO BARBOSA - VERS?O FINAL BIBLIOTECA.pdf: 3948101 bytes, checksum: 5d6457822c787103e25ca0037faefdc4 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Sheila Dias (sheila.dias@pucrs.br) on 2019-03-21T11:41:56Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 DISSERTA??O PEDRO BARBOSA - VERS?O FINAL BIBLIOTECA.pdf: 3948101 bytes, checksum: 5d6457822c787103e25ca0037faefdc4 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2019-03-21T11:49:22Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 DISSERTA??O PEDRO BARBOSA - VERS?O FINAL BIBLIOTECA.pdf: 3948101 bytes, checksum: 5d6457822c787103e25ca0037faefdc4 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2019-02-27 / Conselho Nacional de Pesquisa e Desenvolvimento Cient?fico e Tecnol?gico - CNPq / After ten years of war against the Portuguese colonial regime, on 25th June 1975 the decolonization of Mozambique took place, and the Liberation Front of Mozambique (FRELIMO) became the country's only party. Samora Machel, a charismatic man who led the movement at the time, became the first Mozambican president. The policies implemented were in line with a national construction project that sought to spread a "New Man" in the country, which, in contrast to ethnic diversity, get rid of all the traditional and colonial past in favor of moderns and socialists values. Among these policies was the creation of the National Film Institute, which nationalized the whole production, exhibition and distribution of films, so that the film industry came into existence according to the objectives outlined by the party. Among his productions was the newsreel Kuxa Kanema. Between 1978 and 1979, in its first phase, this newsreel constructed a narrative that linked the image of Samora Machel to the construction of socialism in the country and a great "internationalist" cooperation. Already in 1981, in the second phase, when Mozambique was in a big economic crisis, with a civil war of increasing proportions, and realized that the support of the socialist countries was insufficient to deal with the situation, the constructed narrative came to emphasize the nationalist values, the fight against the "undesirables" and the great leadership of Samora Machel. / Ap?s dez anos de guerra contra o regime colonial portugu?s, em 25 de junho de 1975 aconteceu a descoloniza??o de Mo?ambique, e a Frente de Liberta??o de Mo?ambique (FRELIMO) tornou-se partido ?nico do pa?s. Samora Machel, uma figura carism?tica que liderava o movimento ? ?poca, tornou-se ent?o o primeiro presidente mo?ambicano. As pol?ticas implantadas estiveram de acordo com um projeto de constru??o nacional que buscava difundir um ?Homem Novo? no pa?s, que, para al?m da diversidade ?tnica, desvinculava-se de todo o passado tradicional e colonial em favor de valores modernos e socialistas. Entre essas pol?ticas, esteve a cria??o do Instituto Nacional de Cinema (INC), que nacionalizou toda a produ??o, exibi??o e distribui??o de filmes, de modo que a ind?stria cinematogr?fica passou a existir conforme os objetivos tra?ados pelo partido. Entre suas produ??es esteve o cinejornal Kuxa Kanema. Entre 1978 e 1979, em sua primeira fase, esse cinejornal construiu uma narrativa que vinculava a imagem de Samora Machel ? constru??o do socialismo no pa?s e a uma grande coopera??o ?internacionalista?. J? em 1981, na segunda fase, quando Mo?ambique se viu em grande crise econ?mica, com uma guerra civil de propor??es cada vez maiores, e percebeu que o apoio dos pa?ses socialistas era insuficiente para lidar com a situa??o, a narrativa constru?da passou a enfatizar os valores nacionalistas, o combate aos ?indesej?veis? e a grande lideran?a de Samora Machel.

The Reagan Administration took office in 1981 and began to implement against the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), what became known as the Reagan Doctrine. The was an effort to break with previous the previous presidential administration’s policies toward the USSR and would involve the rollback of Communism, instead of simply just co-existing with Communism (Détente) or containing the spread of it. Part of the area that was subject to the Reagan Doctrine included the volatile southern African region, which had two Marxist-Leninist Regimes, namely Angola and Mozambique. Using Graham Allison’s bureaucratic political model, this study attempts to answer the question: “Even when all the prerequisites were met, why was there a decision to only implement a modified form of the Reagan Doctrine in Mozambique, instead of a full-blown effort, such as in, for example Angola or Afghanistan?” As will be shown in the research, the Reagan Doctrine was not a written doctrine, but had many different facets, as will be shown. The most significant part of the Reagan Doctrine was the recognition and arming of insurgents who confronted the Soviet backed regimes including RENAMO. There have been claims that the US Government did not recognize RENAMO. This is false as will be shown by the fact that President Reagan urged FRELIMO to negotiate with the RENAMO resistance. The real significance of this is that even if all prerequisites were met, why was there such reluctance to apply the doctrine with the veracity as compared to the effort in Angola and Afghanistan in arming RENAMO. Was the United States Government still trapped in the “Vietnam Syndrome”? Did the Mozambique National Resistance (RENAMO) have the 3 same political and charismatic qualities as the Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA)? Were special interests or lobbyists influencing government bureaucrats to view decisions in a specific way? A significant part of this study is devoted to the question of how much influence did the bureaucracy and the politicians (both appointed and career) had on the important national security decision-making process involving Mozambique. Another question that could be asked is: Was the doctrine indirectly applied through third parties? In 1989 when the Reagan Administration ended, did President Reagan and the Reagan Administration achieve their objectives toward Mozambique. If so, was this due to the Reagan Doctrine or other factors? If not, did any actors or events interfere with the strategy? / Political Sciences / M.A. (International Politics)

The Reagan Administration took office in 1981 and began to implement against the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), what became known as the Reagan Doctrine. The was an effort to break with previous the previous presidential administration’s policies toward the USSR and would involve the rollback of Communism, instead of simply just co-existing with Communism (Détente) or containing the spread of it. Part of the area that was subject to the Reagan Doctrine included the volatile southern African region, which had two Marxist-Leninist Regimes, namely Angola and Mozambique. Using Graham Allison’s bureaucratic political model, this study attempts to answer the question: “Even when all the prerequisites were met, why was there a decision to only implement a modified form of the Reagan Doctrine in Mozambique, instead of a full-blown effort, such as in, for example Angola or Afghanistan?” As will be shown in the research, the Reagan Doctrine was not a written doctrine, but had many different facets, as will be shown. The most significant part of the Reagan Doctrine was the recognition and arming of insurgents who confronted the Soviet backed regimes including RENAMO. There have been claims that the US Government did not recognize RENAMO. This is false as will be shown by the fact that President Reagan urged FRELIMO to negotiate with the RENAMO resistance. The real significance of this is that even if all prerequisites were met, why was there such reluctance to apply the doctrine with the veracity as compared to the effort in Angola and Afghanistan in arming RENAMO. Was the United States Government still trapped in the “Vietnam Syndrome”? Did the Mozambique National Resistance (RENAMO) have the 3 same political and charismatic qualities as the Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA)? Were special interests or lobbyists influencing government bureaucrats to view decisions in a specific way? A significant part of this study is devoted to the question of how much influence did the bureaucracy and the politicians (both appointed and career) had on the important national security decision-making process involving Mozambique. Another question that could be asked is: Was the doctrine indirectly applied through third parties? In 1989 when the Reagan Administration ended, did President Reagan and the Reagan Administration achieve their objectives toward Mozambique. If so, was this due to the Reagan Doctrine or other factors? If not, did any actors or events interfere with the strategy? / Political Sciences / M.A. (International Politics)