This project involves a sustained investigation into the sense of the enemy. Chapter one begins by focusing on a common understanding of the enemy found within our homeworld: the political enemy. As will become clear, this mode of encountering the enemy has become the dominant framework for understanding the enemy in our liberal-democratic home. Our task at this point is to identify the political elements from which our mode of understanding the enemy emerges. Once this dominant understanding has been developed, I will treat it as a clue for a fuller investigation into the sense of the enemy. In chapter two, we see that even positions critical of liberal-democratic thought tend to occupy a similar political understanding of the enemy. Working with the writings of Carl Schmitt, we observe how even his critical posture towards the liberal-democratic understanding of the enemy is itself operating within a similar articulation of the enemy. I argue that Schmitt's articulation is similar to the liberal-democratic articulation in that they are both modern in nature. The task of the third chapter is to understand the problematic aspects of the modern understanding of our world so as to clear the way for a fuller understanding of the enemy. This is followed by the fourth chapter that is devoted to finding a way to think outside of the modern liberal-democratic model of politics that regulates our homeworld understanding of the enemy. In so doing, chapters three and four help us find an opening into a more essential structure organizing the sense of the enemy. Once this goal is accomplished, the final chapter investigates the way we encounter the enemy within generative and intersubjective lived experience.

In this dissertation I examine our relationship with the Earth and our natural environment by clarifying what it means to be human. I do this by looking at the interpenetration of spheres of being or philosophical anthropology to articulate how the human being is the dynamic meeting point of life and spirit. In this interpenetration of life and spirit, the task of the human being as loving flashes forth. On the basis of this task, it is possible to realize a loving relationship with the Earth and our natural environment that is not based on domination or use. To understand further how we are situated in relation to the earth and our natural environment, I discuss shortcomings of both the conservation and deep ecology movements. I also discuss problems with traditional philosophical anthropologies to highlight how some of these presuppositions have been incorporated into our relationship with the earth and our natural environment. To illuminate how life and spirit are enmeshed in one another, I describe Nicolai Hartmann's new ontology and Edmund Husserl's regional ontology as well as Scheler's philosophical anthropology since all of these philosophers ground their reflections in experience. However, since Scheler grounds being human in loving, his approach is unique and not only resolves the supposed dualism between life and spirit but gives us a fresh outlook on the responsibility inherent to being human. This opens the possibility for living a loving relationship with the earth and our natural environment.

Thesis advisor: Richard Kearney / This dissertation investigates the possibility of a renewed phenomenological ethics that would ground ethics in the structure of lived experience, so that daily existence is ethically informative and the good is located in the concrete, heartfelt affairs of dwelling in the world with others. Thus far, phenomenological ethics has been deeply influenced by the two schools of Max Scheler’s value ethics and Emmanuel Levinas’ alterity ethics, both of which I argue share a fundamental point of contact in what I am calling Deep Kantianism. That is, phenomenological ethics has been haunted by Immanuel Kant’s non-phenomenological divide between nature and freedom, being and goodness, ontology and ethics. In response, I will suggest a new point of departure for phenomenological ethics beginning with the originary unity of being and goodness as revealed by the love that moves the self beyond herself toward her ground in the other person. Chapter One seeks to establish and identify the problem of Deep Kantianism, or explain what exactly Deep Kantianism is according to its origins. Kant begins his ethics with Hume’s assumption that being and goodness, is and ought, are separate. The implications of this divide threaten to reduce being to bare being without ethical import and to convert the good into an abstract shadow that is irrelevant to the situations of daily life. Chapter Two examines how Scheler in his value ethics shows against Kant that the ethical is only experienced by a being with a heart. The source of normativity is revealed and known through affectivity. However, this insight is troubled by Scheler’s distinction between values and bearers of value that repeats the Kantian distinction between nature and freedom, respectively. Chapter Three focuses on Scheler’s prioritization of love as the fundamental affect of the heart and person in its moving the person outside of herself, a movement that constitutes the person as such. However, this love turns out to not be for the sake of the person but for the value-essence that she bears, again placing the ethical with Kant outside of the realm of Being. Chapter Four begins with Levinas’ discovery that ethics is constituted by the relation to the Other, an ethical relation that is the first relation before any ontological relation, indicating that the self is responsible for the Other. Yet Levinas here is haunted by Deep Kantianism in his denigration of affectivity, which for him is an egoist return to the self that excludes the Other. Chapter Five argues that Levinas’ ethics is permeated by an abyssal nothingness that is exhibited in the destitution of the Other in Totality and Infinity and the passivity of the self in Otherwise than Being. The nothingness that permeates the ethical relation hints at the necessity of a return to the ontological, suggesting that ontology is not, as Levinas maintains following Kant, devoid of ethical implications. Chapter Six turns to Martin Heidegger in his retrieval of a pre-Kantian pathos through his readings of Augustine and Aristotle. This pathos suggests that affectivity is always already oriented toward the things and persons of the world in a way that reveals what is conducive and detrimental to one’s Being, implying a notion of what is good and bad for one’s Being, which Heidegger leaves undeveloped. Chapter Seven conducts a phenomenology of the ground of ethics that is informed by the discoveries made by Scheler, Levinas, and Heidegger. The self begins as constituted by a nothing, demanding that it move outside of itself in the exteriorization of love. This exteriorization directs the self to the concrete other person, the thou, who is revealed to be both the Good and Being as the proper end of love, indicating that the self is constituted by Being-for-the-Other. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2021. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Philosophy.

AN ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION OF J. Edward Hackett, for the Doctor of Philosophy degree in Philosophy, presented on December 6, 2012 at Southern Illinois University Carbondale. TITLE: Scheler's Phenomenological Ontology of Value: Implications and Reflections for Ethical Theory MAJOR PROFESSOR: Dr. Kenneth W. Stikkers My dissertation provides the first comprehensive account of what values are in Max Scheler's Formalism in Ethics (Formalism hereafter). As a phenomenologist, Scheler did not attempt to invent a new ontological language to describe value experience clearly as Heidegger invented for his fundamental ontology of Dasein. In so doing, Scheler's phenomenological descriptions often use metaphysically rich language and in so doing, Scheler generates ambiguity surrounding what he most sought to make clear, value. To remedy this confusion, I argue that Scheler's concept of Aktsein can supply an ontological understanding of value given the dearth of a clear ontological explanation of value in his phenomenological period culminating in the Formalism. This inquiry is divided into three chapters. In Chapter 1, I explain the central concepts in his phenomenology of value at root in the Formalism. I both explain and reveal the central ambiguities in the Formalism. For the most part, Chapter 1 is expository and develops an interpretation of the central ambiguities in Scheler's phenomenology of value. In Chapter 2, I problematize these central ambiguities and take note of when and where phenomenology collapses into ontology. This transition can best be made clear in his Idealismus und Realismus essays where Scheler explicates the structure of being-in-an-act at the very moment he "ontologizes" phenomenology. In addition to that moment in this work, I make analogies to Heidegger's phenomenology as a way into ontology. By making specific analogies to being-in-an-act and being-in-the-world, I show how the similar ontological tendencies in Heidegger provide us with a way to regard Scheler's Aktsein. In making this analogy, I do not reduce Scheler's phenomenological ontology to Heidegger, but instead put them into dialogue with each other revealing the solution of Scheler's ontology of value is realized in the act-intentionality of love. When I draw my conclusions both from the analysis of the Idealismus und Realismus essays and Heidegger, I label Scheler's ontological account of value: participatory realism. In Chapter 3, participatory realism is, then, put into contact with philosophers from the emotivist tradition. I define the emotivist tradition to include a noncognitivist interpretation of David Hume, A. J. Ayer and C. L. Stevenson. While I could have been content to seek out a solution to this ambiguity in Scheler's work and conclude the merits of my interpretation, I am a firm believer in Scheler's position as a solution to the problem of value ontology. As such, participatory realism's uniqueness and merit are better served by putting it into contact with another decided alternative. Given that the analytic tradition had supplied emotivism as a view that connects the emotions with value-experience, it seemed only fitting that Scheler could call into question a dominant answer to value ontology and further clarify the resources Scheler brings to bear on the problem itself.

In this paper I set out to find a new tradition beyond the dilemmas of modern and post-modern philosophy, and, once found, to explore the basic assumptions and their correlative view of the world. To do this I analyze and compare St. Augustine and Max Scheler as thinkers who avoided many of our modern-day dilemmas. Starting with Scheler’s abstract thought, I then proceed to show how it comes to life in Augustine’s Confessions. Both thinkers are woven together into an organic whole that seeks to present as many interconnections of internal justification for this worldview as possible. The end result that is hoped for is twofold: 1. to show the extreme connection binding these thinkers together and 2. to present a viable alternative to the action forms that us modern subjects live in.

On part d’une difficulté d’interprétation qui a partagé les commentateurs concernant le statut transcendantal de la philosophie de Martin Heidegger. En effet, alors que beaucoup des concepts fondamentaux d’Être et temps (1927) semblent résister à une interprétation transcendantaliste (le Dasein, le « on », le comprendre, l’ustensilité, la tournure, l’angoisse, l’appel), au sens où il désignent la façon dont nous sommes immédiatement au monde, sans la médiation d’un sujet constituant, Heidegger désigne lui-même l’orientation générale de son traité comme une orientation transcendantale. En effet, la temporalité couronne l’édifice, et fonde même l’existence dans sa dimension la plus concrète. De quel transcendantal Heidegger fait alors usage, s’il refuse le sujet comme substance, et qu’il n’y a donc plus d’instance subjective constitutive de l’expérience ? On défend une interprétation pratique de ce transcendantal : le fondement est bien la quête de Heidegger, mais en tant qu’il est toujours à fonder par un Dasein libre et responsable de lui-même. Cette interprétation que nous appelons « praxiologico-transcendantale » permet d’inscrire Heidegger dans une tradition métaphysique bien déterminée, en montrant comment sa philosophie s’élabore contre les conceptions transcendantalistes des néokantiens, en montrant aussi comment Husserl et Scheler lui donnent les outils phénoménologiques pour associer pratique et transcendantal, et enfin en l’inscrivant dans une tradition dont Kant fut le précurseur dans quelques textes, et dont Fichte fut le vrai fondateur : un kantisme qui décrit un sujet pratique, au moyen de l’union des deux première Critiques. Ainsi, loin de rompre avec la métaphysique en 1927, Heidegger en régénère-t-il une figure fondamentale dont on essaie d’indiquer les concepts cruciaux. / This PhD work starts from a difficulty of interpretation that had divided commentators, concerning the transcendental status of the Martin Heidegger’s philosophy. Indeed, whereas many basic concepts in Sein und Zeit (1927) appear to resist a transcendentalist interpretation (« Dasein », « Man », « Verstehen », ustensility, « Angst », « Ruf »…), because they designate the way we are immediatly in the world without the mediation of a constituting subject, Heidegger indicates the treaty’s general direction as a transcendental direction. Indeed, the temporality crowns the building, and grounds existence in its most concrete dimension. What is the Heidegger’s transcendental, if he refuses the subject as substance, and if there is therefore no more constituting subject for experience ? We defend a practical interpretation of this transcendental : the ground is indeed the quest of Heidegger, but as it is always to be found by a free and responsible for himself Dasein. This interpretation, that we call « praxiologico-transcendental », allows to link Heidegger to a well determined metaphysical tradition, by showing how his philosophy confronts neokantian’s transcendentalist conceptions, by showing also how Edmund Husserl and Max Scheler provide phenomenological tools for joining praxis and transcendental, and finally by locating him within a tradition of which Kant was the precursor in some texts, and of which Fichte was the true founder : a kantism that describes a practical subject, by means of the union of the two first Critique. Thus, far from breaking with metaphysics in 1927, Heidegger regenerates one of its fundamental figure, of which we try to indicate crucial concepts.

Zugleich: Diss. Heidelberg, 2008. / Literaturverz.

Inaug.-Diss. - #. / 'Diese arbeit erscheint zugleich in der 'Sammlu. # # lungen zur # (reibe II, bd. 7).

Proefschrift--Sociale wetenschappen--Utrecht--Rijksuniversiteit, 1985. / Mention parallèle de titre ou de responsabilité : Lösung aus dem Bann der Vernunft : eine Konfrontation zwischen der kultur- und wissenssoziologischen Auffassung von Max Scheler und Max Weber. Résumé en allemand. Bibliogr. p. 376-394. Index.

Thesis--Münster. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 165-168).