The limit between the proper and the foreign – how this limit is established, but also crossed and dissolved – has remained a crucial issue in phenomenology. Setting these questions in the context of the phenomenology of religion, this thesis develops an analysis of the relation between transcendence and body understood in terms of a certain limit. The introductory part is rooted in Edmund Husserl’s discussions of the concept of transcendence, which is shown to have an essential connection to the analysis of inner time-consciousness. Here we encounter a decisive limit to objectifying knowledge, which also comes across in his investigations of the body and its spatiality. The second part discusses Max Scheler’s critique of Husserl’s excessively objectifying view of knowledge, with a particular focus on Scheler’s understanding of love as a condition of possibility for any knowledge. Scheler is shown to have developed a new concept of transcendence that avoids the pitfalls of objectivism, although in his philosophy of religion he tends to downplay the importance of the body. The third part undertakes a reading of Edith Stein, who develops ideas similar to Scheler’s, though in a phenomenologically more nuanced fashion. Although her philosophy of religion also bypasses the body, Stein provides a more genuine access to the writings of the mystics, the analysis of which forms the core of the fourth and concluding part. Drawing on the work of the 13th century Beguine Mechthild of Magdeburg, this concluding chapter develops a phenomenological understanding of religion with an emphasis on transcendence and limit, while also retaining the centrality of our experience of the body. This means: a phenomenology of the limit is investigated, rather than a limit of phenomenology. / Hur gränsen mellan det egna och det främmande ska dras är en central fråga inom den fenomenologiska traditionen, en fråga som här undersöks i ett religionsfilosofiskt sammanhang. På vilket sätt kan vi överskrida oss själva mot det främmande och ogripbara, och på vilket sätt är denna möjlighet förbunden med vår egen kroppslighet? Dessa teman utvecklas i en serie diskussioner av filosofer som Edmund Husserl, Max Scheler och Edith Stein. Redan i Husserls analyser av transcendensen, tidsmedvetandet och kroppsligheten framträder en bestämd gräns för den objektiverande kunskapen, även om han i sista hand alltid uppfattade den som ett ideal. I Schelers och Steins religionsfilosofier utvecklas därefter en kritik av denna kunskapssyn, bland annat i form av en analys av kärleken (Scheler) och mystiken (Stein), men hos ingen av dem får kroppsligheten en central ställning. I den avslutande delen, som analyserar den mystika erfarenhetens uttryck hos den medetida beginen Mechthild von Magdeburg, utvecklas en fenomenologi som förbinder transcendens med kroppslighet och sinnlighet. Därmed undersöks en gränsens fenomenologi snarare än fenomenologins gräns. Jonna Bornemark är forskare och lärare på Södertörns högskola. Boken är hennes doktorsavhandling.

本文嘗試分析馬克斯·舍勒在現象學視野之下對於天主教神學和社會思想的詮釋來探索天主教會在資本主義和世界大戰等現代性文化的壓力之下真正有效的自我更新方式。舍勒運用現象學的思維方法，通過強調經驗的自身性特徵，論述發生式的意義生成和反應-對抗式的意義生成之間的差別，恢復了天主教在批判精神和確證精神之間的平衡，這與新經院體系、圖賓根天主教學派、新托馬斯主義等流派在純然適應或純然對抗的極端思維中理解天主教會與現代社會關係的做法非常不同，也幫助天主教會克服了"保守-激進"的二元論思維的束縛。具體而言，本文將從以下四個方面論述舍勒的天主教思想：1）從知識社會學的角度分析舍勒對宗教更新的本質、宗教知識的文化學特徵以及宗教世界觀的情感結構的論述，總結出公教精神以自身性的原初性思維對抗實證性思維的過程，以及天主教的整體性文化特徵和貴族主義的情感基調；2）從政治現象學的角度分析舍勒的基督教民主、基督教社會主義、基督教自由等理念，尤其是他以態度民主代替情緒民主、以先知性論述社會主義的原始精神、以意志自由和能力自由的區分來論述宗教自由絶對意義的做法，從而用天主教的宗教視角審視了現代政治文化的弊端；3）從社會學的角度分析舍勒以共感而不是以同情為基礎的宗教集體主義，並將之作為天主教在一戰之後乃至於整個現代社會中帶有尖銳批判性的社會學貢獻，並依此建構天主教會戰後理想的和平理念和社會建設的任務；4）從倫理學的角度分析舍勒如何從時常被鄙棄的情感性、身體性等直觀生命經驗中找出先驗的價值奠基力量，並以之作為與在禁慾和縱慾的極端力量牽引之下的現代資本主義倫理殊為不同的自然倫理學的基礎。最後，本文還將比較舍勒與二十世紀中期的天主教新神學運動和梵二神學的論述，指出舍勒的現象學方法中所體現出來的現實主義和人類學轉向，是與天主教神學從梵一會議到梵二會議的歷史演變邏輯一致的，因而會為天主教會未來的發展帶來更多潛在的借鑒意義。 / This thesis mainly focuses on how German philosopher Max Scheler applied his special phenomenological perspective to penetrate into the self-renewal of the Catholic Church and its social teachings under modern society context, including capitalism and World War etc. Scheler, who emphasized the self-given and realistic characters of experience, distinguished the original-given mode from the counter-react mode in the process of constructing meanings, and rehabilitated the balance of introspective self-criticism and extrovertly instructive confirming of catholic spirit. This phenomenological perspective of Scheler is regarded as a sharp distinction from other Catholic schools like the Catholic Tübingen School, the Scholasticism in the 19th century and later, the Neo-Thomism, as their understandings of the self-renewal of the Catholic Church were somehow guided under the extremism-oriented romantic idealism or authoritarian ideology. To some sense, Scheler’s method actually gave an end to the ongoing historical debate of the "conservatism-liberalism" or "nominalism-realism" dualism, and widened the horizon to approach the understating of real "one": ecumenism. For details, this thesis will analyze Scheler’s phenomenological method in understanding the self-renewal of the Catholic Church with four sections: 1 ) from the dimension of sociology of knowledge, an analysis of Scheler’s interpretation of the essence of the evolution of religious knowledge, its social cultural characters and "its inherent emotional structure as well; an comparing study of religious self-givenness with positivism, and also an comparing study of Ganzheit knowledge and Sammlung knowledge, with which the Christian aristocratism will be drawn and discussed; 2) from the dimension of political phenomenology, an analysis of Scheler’s conceptions of Christian democracy, Christian socialism and Christian freedom, from which the difference with electoral democracy, Marxist socialism, and left-wing liberalism and the special religious narratives of the Catholic Church in political fields will be given; 3) from the dimension of sociology, an analysis of Scheler’s religious collectivism on the basis of empathy rather than sympathy, this kind of collectivism was saturated with phenomenological intentional theory and was carried forward in the proposing the after-WWI re-construction tasks for the Catholic Church by Scheler; 4) from the dimension of ethics, an analysis of Scheler’s percipient contentions on the a-priori ethical value of some long-disdained conception, like body and emotion, by giving a laudatory reconsideration to which, Scheler criticized asceticism or the erotic-individualism-oriented capitalistic ethics. In total, Scheler concentrated the unique value of the Catholic Church in breeding the personal and social ethos with its special religious spirit which is quite similar to the orient wisdom from China. Lastly, this thesis will also draw a comparison between Scheler and the theologians in the Nouvelle Théologie Movement in the middle of the 20th century in order to conclude that the realistic and anthropological turn in Scheler’s phenomenological method was actually identical with the theological development from the Vatican I council to the Vatican II council, so Scheler’s phenomenological understanding of self-renewal of the Catholic Church and its social teaching would potentially shed more light on its future development. / Detailed summary in vernacular field only. / 李晶. / Parallel title from added title page. / Thesis (Ph.D.) Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2016. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 195-210). / Abstracts also in English. / Li Jing.

Submitted by Rosana Moreira (rosanapsm@outlook.com) on 2018-08-20T18:46:31Z No. of bitstreams: 2 license_rdf: 0 bytes, checksum: d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e (MD5) Dissertacao_FormalismoDireitoEtica.pdf: 1371206 bytes, checksum: 7835acfcddee847958d0ad05c865cd3f (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Edisangela Bastos (edisangela@ufpa.br) on 2018-08-27T17:27:51Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 2 license_rdf: 0 bytes, checksum: d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e (MD5) Dissertacao_FormalismoDireitoEtica.pdf: 1371206 bytes, checksum: 7835acfcddee847958d0ad05c865cd3f (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-27T17:27:51Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 2 license_rdf: 0 bytes, checksum: d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e (MD5) Dissertacao_FormalismoDireitoEtica.pdf: 1371206 bytes, checksum: 7835acfcddee847958d0ad05c865cd3f (MD5) Previous issue date: 2018-05-04 / A filosofia dos valores (Wertphilosophie), surgida no contexto das investigações neokantianas da Escola de Baden no final do século XIX, é uma abordagem teórica focada no estudo do fenômeno chamado valor. No primeiro capítulo deste trabalho, utilizando metodologia de história das ideias, são tratadas a ética formalista de Immanuel Kant, origem da filosofia dos valores nas teorias de Franz Brentano e dos neokantianos Hermann Lotze, Wilhelm Windelband, Heinrich Rickert e Emil Lask, bem como a divisão da teoria dos valores em uma vertente objetivista e uma vertente subjetivista, procurando demonstrar que prevaleceu esta última por influência das concepções sobre valores de Friedrich Nietzsche. No segundo capítulo, abordam-se, representando a visão subjetivista, a ideia de Max Weber de neutralidade axiológica (Wertfreiheit) das ciências e o formalismo jurídico de Hans Kelsen, sustentado por uma teoria dos valores subjetivista e cética. Apresenta-se também o argumento de Carlos Santiago Nino contra a ideia, defendida por Kelsen, de que apenas uma concepção relativista de valores poderia promover os ideais democráticos de tolerância. O terceiro capítulo dedica-se, após uma breve consideração sobre fenomenologia de Edmund Husserl, aos argumentos de Max Scheler contra o formalismo ético kantiano para sustentar uma axiologia objetivista a partir da noção de que os valores são conteúdos materiais cognoscíveis a priori e, portanto, aptos a fundamentar uma ética não-formal. Conclui-se que, embora a fundamentação de Scheler seja problemática ao considerar o conhecimento dos valores como uma função das emoções e não da razão, por outro lado sua formulação do a priori e de um âmbito de axiologia pura com regras semelhantes às da lógica viabilizam objeções aos pressupostos da axiologia subjetivista. / The philosophy of values (Wertphilosophie), appearing in the context of the neo-Kantian investigations of the School of Baden in the late 19th Century, is a theoretical approach focused on the study of the phenomenon called value. The first chapter of this work, with the methodology of a history of ideas, discusses the formalist ethics of Immanuel Kant, the origin of the philosophy of values in the theories of Franz Brentano and neo-Kantians Hermann Lotze, Wilhelm Windelband, Heinrich Rickert and Emil Lask, and the division of the theory of values into an objectivist strand and a subjectivist one, trying to demonstrate that the latter has prevailed due to the influence of Friedrich Nietzsche's conceptions of values. The second chapter deals with Max Weber's idea of axiological neutrality (Wertfreiheit) of the sciences and Hans Kelsen's legal formalism, which is supported by a subjectivist and skeptical theory of values, both representing the subjectivist view. It is also presented Carlos Santiago Nino’s argument against the idea, defended by Kelsen, that only a relativistic conception of values could promote the democratic ideals of tolerance. The third chapter is dedicated, after a brief comment on Edmund Husserl's phenomenology, to Max Scheler's arguments against Kantian ethical formalism to support an objectivist axiology based on the notion that values are material contents that can be known a priori and are, therefore, capable of substantiating a nonformal ethic. It is concluded that, though Scheler’s statement of grounds is problematic in considering the knowledge of values as a function of emotions, not of reason, on the other hand his formulation of the a priori and of a scope of pure axiology with rules similar to those of logic facilitate objections to the presuppositions of the subjectivist axiology.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-27T17:27:33Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Emerson Ginetti.pdf: 664930 bytes, checksum: 7584d2eecbcbbd465127b00f2dcb8f59 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2010-05-10 / Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico / This work aims to make an analysis of the crisis of ethical values while considering it to be a crisis of historical values, according to Ferdinand Max Scheler. There exists an explanation to the crisis, as well as a possible solution: the rescue of material ethics of objective values, which are shaped in configurations prevalent within modern man, lacking references capable of sustaining an ethic that will lead to perfect morality and its own achievement. Note that the crisis is marked by secularism, relativism and subjectivism in the axiological field. The current crisis gives a reversal in the hierarchy of values. This trend is the subordination of the highest to the lowest. This reversal in the hierarchy of values, according to Scheler, is motivated by the morale of those who are affected by "resentment" and "humanitarianism". Note that the need for sustained moral values is more stable and durable. Non-impregnated interests or subjective elaborations where the moral act is sustained by the paradigms presented by modernity. The highest values are subject to those associated with sensitivity to the matter. Thus, Scheler proposes his objectivist ethics as a possible replacement for subjectivism predominant in modern society, aspiring to something that sustains human life and work / O presente trabalho tem como objetivo tecer uma análise da crise dos valores éticos, considerando-a como uma crise de valores históricos, segundo o pensamento de Ferdinand Max Scheler. Há uma explicação da crise que também poderá ser ainda uma possível solução: o resgate de uma ética material dos valores objetivos, que não se molda nas configurações predominantes no seio do homem moderno, carente de referenciais capazes de sustentar uma ética que o conduza à perfeição moral e à sua própria realização. Nota-se que a crise é marcada pelo secularismo, relativismo e subjetivismo, no campo axiológico. Na crise atual dá-se uma inversão na hierarquia dos valores. Tal tendência é a subordinação dos valores mais altos aos mais baixos, passando, estes, a serem considerados superiores. Esta inversão na hierarquia dos valores, segundo Scheler, é motivada pela moral daqueles que se encontram acometidos pelo ressentimento e pelo humanitarismo . Nota-se a necessidade de uma moral sustentada por valores que sejam mais estáveis, duradouros, não impregnados de interesses ou elaborações subjetivas onde o ato moral, que deve orientar a conduta humana, é sustentado nos paradigmas apresentados pela modernidade. Os valores mais altos estão submetidos aos que estão ligados à sensibilidade, à matéria. Desse modo, Scheler propõe sua ética objetivista como possível substituto para o subjetivismo predominante na ética da sociedade moderna, aspirando-se a algo que sustente o ser e o agir humanos e dê razão aos mesmos

Los “valores” son percibidos emocionalmente en virtud de un acto de amor. Íntimamente relacionado con el concepto de “valor” está el de “persona”, como “valor de los valores”. Ésta es inobjetivable; no se le entiende sino que se le “comprende”; no se la conoce en virtud de un acto intelectual sino que se le ama y, en virtud del amor, se intuye moralmente su esencia, su ordo amoris. A lo largo de esta tesis se repasan los elementos de la ética de los valores de Scheler y la influencia que sobre la misma ejerció San Agustín de Hipona. Eso me lleva a calificar el periodo central del filósofo alemán como “periodo agustiniano”, y a abrir una nueva línea de investigación que corrija los problemas a que dio lugar la pretendida fundamentación axiológica de la ética, con base en el concepto de amor, para construir una “ética del amor”. / The “values” are perceived emotionally by an act of love. Related to the concept of “value” is the concept of “person” as “value of values”. The person is inobjetivable; we can not understand them but can be sympathetic. They are not known under an intellectual act but a loving act. Because of love, it is given a moral intuition of their essence: the “ordo amoris”. Throughout this work we review the elements of Scheler´s ethics and the influence exerted on it by Saint Augustine of Hippo. Thus, I qualify the central period of the German philosopher as “Augustinian period”, and open a new line of researching to correct the problems from the doubtful axiological foundations of the ethics of the values. This can be intended, based on the concept of love, to build a “Love Ethic” which does not lose sight of the real material object of ethics: the Good.

La thèse repose sur un travail de terrain fait en Colombie avec des jeunes. Elle propose un nouveau regard sur la compréhension de la transmission des valeurs et les processus d'identification, en mettant en relief l'importance des "configurations", des interactions, du corporel et du vécu. L'auteur emprunte à Norbert Elias ce terme de "configuration" parce qu'il dépasse l'idée d'une société indépendante des individus et d'un individu-atome, indépendant des autres individus. Dans ce contexte on comprend que ce sont les individus ensemble qui forment des "configurations concrètes", que l'on ne peut analyser sans tenir compte chez les actants de l'intentionnalité de leurs actions. Dans une première partie l'auteur fait le point sur ce que signifie "crise des valeurs". Il analyse ensuite ce qu'est la transmission dans ses processus complexes et variés. Il souligne les principaux aspects distinguant l'adolescence et la jeunesse qui peuvent nous aider à comprendre les modes de transmission dans ces tranches d'âge. La deuxième partie étudie ces modes et leurs caractéristiques, leurs succès et leurs échecs en comparant trois configurations différentes : celles d'un collège urbain, d'un quartier populaire et d'une communauté indienne. Un chapitre est consacré à la transmission familiale. La troisième partie consiste dans l'analyse de l'ensemble des données recueillies. Elle relève les caractéristiques requises du transmetteur, les modes et les moyens de la transmission, et comment le récepteur s'incorpore, fait siennes, les valeurs transmises. Une attention particulière est accordée ici à la place du corporel et à la perception psychoaffective des valeurs.

El movimiento fenomenológico fundado por Husserl a inicios del siglo XX, cuya exigencia frente al positivismo de la época se expresaba en un “ir a las cosas mismas” y “salvar al hombre de ser simple hombre de hechos”, encuentra desarrollos distintos en Scheler y Ricoeur, cuyas concepciones de fenomenología pueden ser entendidas como dos herejías husserlianas. Si bien para ninguno la fenomenología era toda la filosofía, la adoptaron en sus concepciones filosóficas entendiéndola o como una actitud o como un método de fundamentación que apela a la experiencia de la evidencia, la cual requiere de una labor de explicitación. En el marco de sus concepciones de fenomenología, ambos desarrollaron propuestas éticas cuyo fundamento es la persona, la cual es comprendida como una estructura: ya sea, como en el caso de Scheler, una estructura de actos, un ordo amoris, que instancia e individualiza una jerarquía a priori y objetiva del valor, o, como en el caso de Ricoeur, una estructura lingüística ternaria (soi-mêmecomme un autre), que da cuenta de la mediación que instaura, en la subjetividad, la hermenéutica de la sospecha. El lugar protagónico de la persona en sus propuestas y la necesidad de la explicitación de la evidencia nos permiten pensar en un posible diálogo entre ambos. Dicho diálogo nos da tanto la posibilidad de tratar las inversiones axiológicas de relevancia ética, que decantan en una subordinación del valor de la persona frente a otros valores, como la posibilidad de pensar, desde nuestros autores, la importancia actual de una antropología filosófica de orientación fenomenológica.

As I hope to show, a philosophical study of love is highly relevant today, since the sciences have not adequately answered the perennial question: What is love?; Since the time of Socrates, the idea of love and the conception of the human heart have been devalued by thinkers who, by definition, are known as "lovers of wisdom." Considered pejoratively as "the passions," the subject of emotion was deemed inferior to thought centered upon the human faculty of reason. Many studies in the sciences, from biology to psychology, claim to have pointed us to the source of the human experience of love--but do they help us to understand love properly? In order to provide a full consideration of love in my philosophical research, I will focus my analysis on love under the philosophical lens of phenomenology. Known as the study of firsthand human experience, phenomenology became the influential school of thought for many German philosophers in the early twentieth century. My research will closely examine the writings of Max Scheler, Dietrich von Hildebrand, and Jean-Luc Marion within the context of this tradition. Moving from a justification of love in philosophy to the topic of self-love, I hope to define effectively what it means to love another. I shall also attempt to disambiguate the common assumptions regarding the nature of love. Is there a fundamental difference between the phenomenon of "falling in love" and of love itself? I question whether love, in its essence, is defined by the element of choice--of a willful emotional giving of oneself to another--and whether it can be distinguished from a passive feeling and an active loving will. I aim to bring the human affective sphere into the full light of philosophical inquiry, considering whether love is a moral act of the will that involves a total participation of the self--in mind, body, and spirit. Love is arguably the most powerful of the human emotions, one that elevates the human sphere of emotions and the ethical existence beyond simple desire.

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The diploma thesis on the basis of ethical theories sv. Augustinus, M. Scheler, V. E. Frankl and R. Spaemann examines the concept of ordo amoris as theoretical basis of ethics in social work. It deals with the historical development of the concept, its changes and influence on social work in term of three fundamental aspects of social work: a person suffering, relationship to this man and life situations change. It examines the usefulness and value of ethical concept ordo amoris and love as the principle in the relation framework of the aid process.