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Hur upplevs positiva och negativa somatiska markörer vid stora livsbeslut?Stål, Martina January 2012 (has links)
Personer som saknar förmåga att uppleva emotioner tar sämre livsbeslut trots en hög IQ. Somatiska markörer är förändringar i kroppens inre tillstånd som uppträder då vi ställs inför ett emotionellt laddat stimuli och deras funktion är att stödja beslutsfattandet. Genom erfarenhet lär vi oss tolka de emotioner som ett visst stimuli genererar som någonting positivt eller negativt för oss. Syftet med studien är att undersöka hur medvetna positiva och negativa somatiska markörer upplevs vid stora livsbeslut. Semistrukturerade intervjuer har genomförts med tolv personer. Resultatet visar på en mångfald av somatiska markörer och att tilliten till somatiska markörer vid beslutsfattande varierar. Användningsområdet för studien är främst inom det kliniska området – att lära människor att känna och tolka somatiska markörer på ett adekvat sätt.
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A consciência segundo Damásio: um enfoque neurofilosófico / Consciousness according to Damasio: a neurophilosophical approachRosa, Luiz Augusto [UNESP] 02 February 2018 (has links)
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Previous issue date: 2018-02-02 / Fundação de Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado de São Paulo (FAPESP) / Nessa dissertação buscamos fazer uma análise filosófica das teorias sobre a emoção, sentimento, self e consciência de António Damásio frente ao contexto neurobiológico contemporâneo. No primeiro capítulo, nós fizemos uma revisão de literatura sobre os dois paradigmas da consciência vigentes na neurobiologia, no caso, o paradigma cognitivista, onde revisamos os trabalhos de Crick, Baars, Dehaene, Tononi, Koch e LeDoux, e o paradigma afetivista, onde revisamos as ideias centrais de Panksepp. No segundo capítulo, nós revisamos as ideias centrais de Damásio sobre emoção, sentimento, self e consciência, analisando tanto a atualização conceitual e neurobiológica no decorrer de suas obras principais quanto como cada teoria está embasada nas ideias de James sobre os processos emocionais e nos paradigmas discutidos no primeiro capítulo. No terceiro capítulo, nós revisamos as ideias centrais do modelo construtivista da emoção de Russell e Barrett, as posições de Damásio e outros autores sobre a problemática da possibilidade de consciência em animais não-humanos, avaliamos as teorias centrais de Damásio frente ao contexto neurobiológico atual, e analisamos tanto os problemas conceituais inerentes à teoria da consciência de Damásio quanto as posições de Damásio sobre o problema da causação mental e identidade mente-cérebro. Nós esperamos, com essa dissertação, ter contribuído, mesmo que modestamente, com um debate que vem ganhando grande impacto na literatura especializada, que vai muito além do aqui foi apresentado. / In this dissertation we sought to make a philosophical analysis of Antonio Damásio’s theories on emotion, feeling, self, and consciousness in the face of the contemporary neurobiological context. In the first chapter, we reviewed the literature on the two paradigms of consciousness in neurobiology, in this case, the cognitive paradigm, where we reviewed the works of Crick, Baars, Dehaene, Tononi, Koch and LeDoux, and the affectivist paradigm, where we reviewed Panksepp’s core ideas. In the second chapter we review Damasio’s central ideas on emotion, feeling, self, and consciousness, analyzing both the conceptual and neurobiological actualization in the course of his major works, and how each theory is based on James’ ideas on emotional processes and the paradigms discussed in the first chapter. In the third chapter, we reviewed the core ideas of Russell’s and Barrett’s constructivist model of emotions, the stance of Damasio and other authors on the problematic about the possibility of consciousness in nonhuman animals, we assessed Damasio’s central theories in the face of the current neurobiological context, and we analyzed both the conceptual problems inherent in Damasio’s theory of consciousness and Damasio’s stance on the problem of mental causation and mind-brain identity. We hope, with this dissertation, to have contributed, even modestly, to a debate that has been gaining great impact in the specialized literature, which goes far beyond what was presented here. / 2015/14849-3
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The role of emotions in the creation of core consciousnessBouffard, Jeremy-John 16 April 2018 (has links)
Although emotions are a frequent and common attribute shared by all of humanity little consensus exists among theorists who set out to understand and explain what this phenomena is all about. René Descartes set the tone about 360 years ago with his dichotomous interpretation that separated body from mind and therefore left little room for the influence that emotions actually could have upon the mind. Many contemporary authors speak of emotions in terms of desires and beliefs but do so by dismissing physiology altogether. A new and promising approach seen as a continuation of the physiological understanding as initiated by William James seeks out to understand emotions and related phenomena by carefully using neurobiological evidence in order to develop a new theory for understanding them. This approach used by Antonio Damasio is the main focus of this thesis. Damasio combines neurobiological evidence from patients who have suffered damage to specific parts of the brain along with philosophical insight. l will explain how he uses this method in order to describe emotions in terms of the influence they have upon reason and decision making as well as their role in the creation and development of consciousness and the self. / Bien que les émotions constituent un attribut partagé par l'ensemble des humains, on s'étonnera de constater qu'il existe peu de consensus chez les théoriciens qui tentent de comprendre ce phénomène. René Descartes fut probablement celui qui aura le plus influencé notre compréhension des émotions, il y a environ 360 ans, en élaborant son interprétation dichotomique qui séparait le corps et l’esprit. Toutefois, on peut reprocher à cette approche d ' avoir accordé peu d ' attention à l’influence réelle des émotions sur l’esprit. De même, plusieurs auteurs contemporains abordent les émotions en termes de désirs et croyances mais négligent souvent l’aspect physiologique du sujet. Une approche neurobiologique nouvelle et prometteuse constituant une suite logique de la compréhension physiologique des émotions telle qu'initiée par William James tente de comprendre les émotions et les phénomènes apparentés en utilisant méticuleusement des preuves neurobiologiques dans le but de développer une nouvelle théorie. C'est sur cette approche, due à Antonio Damasio, que se concentre ce mémoire. Damasio fait la combinaison de données scientifiques issues de cas de patients ayant subi des dommages à des régions spécifiques du cerveau et d'intuitions philosophiques. Je montrerai comment il tente ainsi d'expliquer l'influence des émotions sur la raison et sur la prise de décision, ainsi que leur rôle dans la création et le développement de la conscience et du soi.
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A filosofia de Espinosa no pensamento de Damásio e de Atlan / Spinozas philosophy in Damasios and Atlans thoughtMônica Ferreira Corrêa 04 September 2013 (has links)
Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / O presente estudo é resultado do exame das aproximações feitas entre o pensamento do filósofo holandês Baruch de Espinosa e as pesquisas e reflexões atuais do biofísico Henri Atlan e do neurobiólogo António Damásio. O exame consistiu, primeiramente, na identificação dos conceitos de Espinosa utilizados nas obras desses autores, o que envolveu destacar as relações que os próprios cientistas reconhecem ter com o pensamento do filósofo e também encontrar outras relações legítimas, não indicadas pelos autores. O resultado dessa etapa inicial foi a reunião das reflexões em torno de dois temas: 1. a teoria do conatus e 2. a teoria mente-corpo espinosista. O exame consistiu também na discussão sobre o modo como esses conceitos são utilizados por Espinosa e pela detecção de suas novas significações no contexto das pesquisas de Damásio e Atlan. Além disso, foi realizado um exame crítico dessas apropriações pela investigação de perdas e reduções no pensamento do filósofo. As aproximações empreendidas pelos autores à teoria mente-corpo espinosista nem sempre são consistentes, ou por falta de evidências que as justifiquem, como no caso de Atlan, ou pela adoção de uma perspectiva metafísica monista distinta da de Espinosa, como no caso de Damásio. Mas, com relação à noção de conatus, as assimilações são melhor sucedidas. O esforço de perseverar no ser pode ser traduzido adequadamente como o ímpeto que rege os mecanismos homeostáticos que governam a vida ou a força responsável pela auto-organização dos sistemas naturais. / This study is the result of the examination of some approximations made between the thought of the Dutch philosopher Baruch Spinoza and the researches and reflections made in our time by the biophysicist Henri Atlan and the neuroscientist Antonio Damasio. The examination consisted, first, in the identification of Spinozas concepts used in the works of these authors, which involved highlighting the relationships that these scientists recognize with Spinozas thought, and also finding some other legitimate relationships that were not indicated by them. The result of this initial task was the gathering of the reflections around two themes: (1) conatus theory, and (2) Spinozas mind-body theory. The examination also consisted in the discussion of how these concepts are used by Spinoza, and the detection of their new meanings in the context of Damasios and Atlans researches. In addition, a critical assessment of these appropriations was made, in which losses and reductions of the philosophers thought were analyzed. Not always the approximations made by the two authors with Spinozas mind-body theory are consistent, be it in virtue of a lack of evidence to justify them, as in the case of Atlan, or due to the adoption of a monistic metaphysical perspective different from that of Spinoza, as in the case of Damasio. However, concerning the notion of conatus the assimilations proved more successful. The "effort to persevere in being" can be properly translated as the impetus that rules the homeostatic mechanisms that govern life or as the force responsible for the natural systems self-organization.
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A filosofia de Espinosa no pensamento de Damásio e de Atlan / Spinozas philosophy in Damasios and Atlans thoughtMônica Ferreira Corrêa 04 September 2013 (has links)
Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / O presente estudo é resultado do exame das aproximações feitas entre o pensamento do filósofo holandês Baruch de Espinosa e as pesquisas e reflexões atuais do biofísico Henri Atlan e do neurobiólogo António Damásio. O exame consistiu, primeiramente, na identificação dos conceitos de Espinosa utilizados nas obras desses autores, o que envolveu destacar as relações que os próprios cientistas reconhecem ter com o pensamento do filósofo e também encontrar outras relações legítimas, não indicadas pelos autores. O resultado dessa etapa inicial foi a reunião das reflexões em torno de dois temas: 1. a teoria do conatus e 2. a teoria mente-corpo espinosista. O exame consistiu também na discussão sobre o modo como esses conceitos são utilizados por Espinosa e pela detecção de suas novas significações no contexto das pesquisas de Damásio e Atlan. Além disso, foi realizado um exame crítico dessas apropriações pela investigação de perdas e reduções no pensamento do filósofo. As aproximações empreendidas pelos autores à teoria mente-corpo espinosista nem sempre são consistentes, ou por falta de evidências que as justifiquem, como no caso de Atlan, ou pela adoção de uma perspectiva metafísica monista distinta da de Espinosa, como no caso de Damásio. Mas, com relação à noção de conatus, as assimilações são melhor sucedidas. O esforço de perseverar no ser pode ser traduzido adequadamente como o ímpeto que rege os mecanismos homeostáticos que governam a vida ou a força responsável pela auto-organização dos sistemas naturais. / This study is the result of the examination of some approximations made between the thought of the Dutch philosopher Baruch Spinoza and the researches and reflections made in our time by the biophysicist Henri Atlan and the neuroscientist Antonio Damasio. The examination consisted, first, in the identification of Spinozas concepts used in the works of these authors, which involved highlighting the relationships that these scientists recognize with Spinozas thought, and also finding some other legitimate relationships that were not indicated by them. The result of this initial task was the gathering of the reflections around two themes: (1) conatus theory, and (2) Spinozas mind-body theory. The examination also consisted in the discussion of how these concepts are used by Spinoza, and the detection of their new meanings in the context of Damasios and Atlans researches. In addition, a critical assessment of these appropriations was made, in which losses and reductions of the philosophers thought were analyzed. Not always the approximations made by the two authors with Spinozas mind-body theory are consistent, be it in virtue of a lack of evidence to justify them, as in the case of Atlan, or due to the adoption of a monistic metaphysical perspective different from that of Spinoza, as in the case of Damasio. However, concerning the notion of conatus the assimilations proved more successful. The "effort to persevere in being" can be properly translated as the impetus that rules the homeostatic mechanisms that govern life or as the force responsible for the natural systems self-organization.
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La pedagogia: un chiasma tra antichi e nuovi saperi Dalla filosofia alla scienza, alla Fenomenologia alle neuroscienze, da Merleau-Ponty a DamasioPIETROCARLO, LUIGI 05 March 2012 (has links)
La domanda alla base di questa tesi è semplice: quale tipologia di relazione ci potrebbe essere tra scienza e filosofia in pedagogia dopo le recenti scoperte delle neuroscienze? C’è una contrapposizione o una integrazione reciproca? La tradizionale contrapposizione storica è confermata o si può parlare di complementarità reciproca? Con l’obiettivo di mostrare l’interdipendenza reciproca tra questi campi del sapere, attraverso il metodo fenomenologico, la sezione α fa un’analisi teoretica di alcune teorie estratte dalle ricerche di Antonio Damasio. La sezione β esamina gli stessi problemi ma attraverso la fenomenologia di Merleau-Ponty, introducendo alcuni concetti: la “carne” (chair), il “chiasma” e la “reversibilità”, concetti chiave per poter pensare la relazione tra gli le cose, gli enti, le discipline e la pedagogia. I risultati mostrano che non si tratta di sacrificare la pedagogia alla scienza o alla filosofia, né di sacrificare la scienze e la filosofia alla pedagogia, perché questi campi del sapere sono ontologicamente legati tra loro. I risultati aprono a nuove prospettive di ricerca: quali sono le conseguenze di una relazione in chiasma in pedagogia? Possiamo estendere questa particolare relazione alle altre discipline? / The question at the basis of this thesis is simple: which typology of relationship there may be between science and philosophy in education after the most recently neuroscience discoveries? Is there contradiction or an integration? Is the historical and traditional opposition confirmed or we could talk about a possible integration? In order to show the reciprocal interdependence between these fields, using a phenomenological method, the α section does a theoretic analysis of some assertions taken from Antonio Damasio’s researches. The β section looks trough the Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology the same problems and introduces some concepts: the “flesh” (chair), the “chiasma” and “reversibility”, central ideas in order to think the relationship between things, beings, disciplines and education. Results show that it is neither a question of sacrificing education to science and philosophy, nor philosophy and science to education, since these fields are ontologically bound together. In conclusion results open further new questions: what are the consequences of “chiasma” relationship in education? Could we extend this particular relationship to other disciplines?
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LE PROCESSUS DE TRANSMISSION DES VALEURS CHEZ LES JEUNES : Etude comparative de trois configurations colombiennesLondono Orozco, Ernesto 13 November 2006 (has links) (PDF)
La thèse repose sur un travail de terrain fait en Colombie avec des jeunes. Elle propose un nouveau regard sur la compréhension de la transmission des valeurs et les processus d'identification, en mettant en relief l'importance des "configurations", des interactions, du corporel et du vécu. L'auteur emprunte à Norbert Elias ce terme de "configuration" parce qu'il dépasse l'idée d'une société indépendante des individus et d'un individu-atome, indépendant des autres individus. Dans ce contexte on comprend que ce sont les individus ensemble qui forment des "configurations concrètes", que l'on ne peut analyser sans tenir compte chez les actants de l'intentionnalité de leurs actions. Dans une première partie l'auteur fait le point sur ce que signifie "crise des valeurs". Il analyse ensuite ce qu'est la transmission dans ses processus complexes et variés. Il souligne les principaux aspects distinguant l'adolescence et la jeunesse qui peuvent nous aider à comprendre les modes de transmission dans ces tranches d'âge. La deuxième partie étudie ces modes et leurs caractéristiques, leurs succès et leurs échecs en comparant trois configurations différentes : celles d'un collège urbain, d'un quartier populaire et d'une communauté indienne. Un chapitre est consacré à la transmission familiale. La troisième partie consiste dans l'analyse de l'ensemble des données recueillies. Elle relève les caractéristiques requises du transmetteur, les modes et les moyens de la transmission, et comment le récepteur s'incorpore, fait siennes, les valeurs transmises. Une attention particulière est accordée ici à la place du corporel et à la perception psychoaffective des valeurs.
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“The Undiscovered Country”: Theater and the Mind in Early Modern England / Theater and the Mind in Early Modern EnglandMagsam, Joshua 12 1900 (has links)
ix, 203 p. : ill. / As critic Jonathan Gottschall notes, "The literary scholar's subject is ultimately the human mind - the mind that is the creator, subject, and auditor of literary works." The primary aim of this dissertation is to use modern cognitive science to better understand the early modern mind. I apply a framework rooted in cognitive science--the interdisciplinary study of how the human brain generates first-person consciousness and relates to external objects through that conscious framework--to reveal the role of consciousness and memory in subject formation and creative interpretation, as represented in period drama. Cognitive science enables us as scholars and critics to read literature of the period through a lens that reveals subjects in the process of being formed prior to the "self-fashioning" processes of enculturation and social discipline that have been so thoroughly diagnosed in criticism in recent decades. I begin with an overview of the field of cognitive literary theory, demonstrating that cognitive science has already begun to offer scholars of the period a vital framework for understanding literature as the result of unique minds grappling with uniquely historical problems, both biologically and socially. From there, I proceed to detailed explications of neuroscience-based theories of the relationship between the embodied brain, memory, and subject identity, via detailed close reading case studies. In the primary chapters, I focus on what I consider to be three primary elements of embodied subjectivity in drama of the period: basic identity reification through unique first-person memory (the Tudor interlude Jake Juggler ), more complex subject-object relationships leading to alterations in behavioral modes (Hamlet ), and finally, the blending of literary structures and social context in the interpretation of subject behavior (Middleton's A Trick to Catch the Old One ). / Committee in charge: Lisa Freinkel, Chairperson;
George Rowe, Member;
Ben Saunders, Member;
Lara Bovilsky, Member;
Ted Toadvine, Outside Member
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Healing the Cartesian Split: Understanding and Renewing Pathos in Academic WritingWashburn, Travis 02 July 2012 (has links) (PDF)
There have always been rogues who dared to go against the traditional "intellectual" writing style of science and academia, a style that seems bent on transcending the "merely personal." Those who take this risk are embracing the rhetorical tradition of pathos, one that goes as far back as Aristotle. Current academic trends support a genre devoid of pathos and lacking true ethos—a deviation from classic rhetoric, and one that supports the Cartesian split of mind-body dualism. Neurological studies done by Antonio Damasio and others suggest that a holistic view is a more accurate picture of how a human soul functions. Philosophy and psychology support this same perspective, proving that the opposite of logic is not emotion: the opposite of logic is illogic. By the same token, there are two types of emotion: reasonable emotion and unreasonable emotion, one good, the other bad. There are dangers when emotion is left on its own, but there are equal dangers when logic is left on its own; so it is crucial that the two be united. Changing the academic super-genre and inviting pathos back will require writers to pursue, to an extent, divergent thinking.
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Action in Chronic Fatigue Syndrome: an Enactive Psycho-phenomenological and Semiotic Analysis of Thirty New Zealand Women's Experiences of Suffering and RecoveryHart, M J Alexandra January 2010 (has links)
This research into Chronic Fatigue Syndrome (CFS) presents the results of 60 first-person psycho-phenomenological interviews with 30 New Zealand women. The participants were recruited from the Canterbury and Wellington regions, 10 had recovered. Taking a non-dual, non-reductive embodied approach, the phenomenological data was analysed semiotically, using a graph-theoretical cluster analysis to elucidate the large number of resulting categories, and interpreted through the enactive approach to cognitive science.
The initial result of the analysis is a comprehensive exploration of the experience of CFS which develops subject-specific categories of experience and explores the relation of the illness to universal categories of experience, including self, ‘energy’, action, and being-able-to-do.
Transformations of the self surrounding being-able-to-do and not-being-able-to-do were shown to elucidate the illness process.
It is proposed that the concept ‘energy’ in the participants’ discourse is equivalent to the Mahayana Buddhist concept of ‘contact’. This characterises CFS as a breakdown of contact. Narrative content from the recovered interviewees reflects a reestablishment of contact.
The hypothesis that CFS is a disorder of action is investigated in detail.
A general model for the phenomenology and functional architecture of action is proposed. This model is a recursive loop involving felt meaning, contact, action, and perception and appears to be phenomenologically supported.
It is proposed that the CFS illness process is a dynamical decompensation of the subject’s action loop caused by a breakdown in the process of contact.
On this basis, a new interpretation of neurological findings in relation to CFS becomes possible. A neurological phenomenon that correlates with the illness and involves a brain region that has a similar structure to the action model’s recursive loop is identified in previous research results and compared with the action model and the results of this research. This correspondence may identify the brain regions involved in the illness process, which may provide an objective diagnostic test for the condition and approaches to treatment.
The implications of this model for cognitive science and CFS should be investigated through neurophenomenological research since the model stands to shed considerable light on the nature of consciousness, contact and agency.
Phenomenologically based treatments are proposed, along with suggestions for future research on CFS. The research may clarify the diagnostic criteria for CFS and guide management and treatment programmes, particularly multidimensional and interdisciplinary approaches.
Category theory is proposed as a foundation for a mathematisation of phenomenology.
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