Thesis (M.M.A.S.)--School of Advanced Airpower Studies, 1995. / Subject: An examination of the links between science, philosophy, and military theory. Cover page date: June 1995. Vita. Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis--Utrecht. / With a summary in English. "Stellingen" ([2] p.) inserted. Includes name index. Includes bibliographical references (p. 219-228).

Diss.--Erlangen-Nürnberg. / Bibliography: p. [266]-274.

Thesis--Hessischen Ludwigs-Universität zu Giessen. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (p. [3]-[5]).

Theses (M.A.)--University of Canterbury, 2009. / Typescript (photocopy). Includes bibliographical references (leaves 98-103). Also available via the World Wide Web.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--McMaster University, 2001 / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 236-241). Also available via World Wide Web.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Chicago, Divinity School, March 2001. / Includes bibliographical references. Also available on the Internet.

In this thesis, I argue for rationalism, the claim that political legitimacy should be distributed such that justice is promoted best. In chapter 1, I define legitimacy as the permission to rule. I deny that political institutions generally enjoy authority, which is the moral power to directly impose duties on others. I then describe how legitimate political institutions without authority are possible in principle. In the second chapter, I outline a major problem for rationalism. If individuals have strong, moral rights, then it seems that political institutions cannot legitimately operate without their subjects' consent. I describe the key assumptions in this argument, and discuss a series of unconvincing proposals in the literature to escape it. In chapter 3, I argue that we can solve the problem if we look at theories of the moral justification of rights. There are two major such theories, the interest theory and the status theory. I outline the interest theory, and argue that it allows for non-consensual but legitimate political institutions. In chapter 4, I describe a Kantian claim about the nature of rights, according to which our rights are fully realised only if there are political institutions. If we accept this thought, then non-consensual political institutions can be legitimate on the status theory as well. In chapter 5, I outline what it means to promote-rather than respect-justice, and argue that the promotion of justice enjoys primacy over other values. At first sight, rationalism appears to have very radical implications, given that it asks us to base legitimacy on justice. In chapter 6, I argue that this impression is mistaken. We should often pursue justice indirectly, for example, through methods which focus on legal validity or democratic procedure rather than justice.

Should the state undertake the task of promoting the good life? Perfectionism is the idea that the state should promote the good life. Many philosophers have answered in the negative to the above question, so they reject perfectionism. This thesis aims to develop a moderate version of perfectionism, and seeks to defend it against several influential anti-perfectionist arguments, in particular the argument from public reason liberalism. I begin by examining public reason liberalism. John Rawls, Gerald Gaus, Martha Nussbaum, and many other political philosophers endorse public reason liberalism. They believe that state coercion should be publicly justified, and that perfectionism cannot meet the requirements of public reason. I argue that public reason is the object of reasonable rejection, so it cannot be realised in actual politics through state intervention in a publicly justified way. In addition, I argue that respect for persons is not a reliable basis for public reason. Thus we have good reason to reject public reason liberalism. Then I develop a moderate version of perfectionism. I contend that the state should promote the good life through supporting a wide variety of perfectionist goods, and that it should do so by using moderate measures and by appealing to perfectionist judgements of a moderate kind. Some anti-perfectionists consider that perfectionism would be unnecessary when a fair distribution of resources is realised. Yet a fair distribution of resources is not foreseeable. I propose several kinds of moderate perfectionist policies that are of great importance for any neo-liberal society where the distribution of resources is far from fair, and these policies are ultimately important for the good life, not only for remedying unfairness. Contrary to the positions of many liberal philosophers including Ronald Dworkin and Jeremy Waldron, I argue that moderate perfectionism should not be rejected on grounds of paternalism and unfairness to different conceptions of the good.

Orientador: Ricardo Monteagudo / Banca: José Benedito de Almeida Junior / Banca: Ana Maria Portich / Resumo: A figura do Legislador na obra Do Contrato Social de Jean-Jacques Rousseau surge em meio a uma forma de legislação popular, sendo o povo o próprio Soberano e encarregado, por meio da vontade geral, de legislar para o próprio povo. Para tanto, este trabalho tem por objetivo analisar a definição que o autor dá ao Legislador, seus exemplos e a necessidade real para a existência deste Legislador. Posteriormente, analisaremos a utilidade para esta função recorrente na filosofia rousseauniana. / Abstract: The figure of the Legislator in The Social Contract work of Jean-Jacques Rousseau comes amid a popular form of legislation, being the Sovereign own people and charge through the general will, to legislate for the people themselves. Therefore, this paper aims to examine the definition that the author gives to the legislator, his examples and the real need for the existence of this Legislator. Later, we will examine the usefulness for this recurring role in Rousseau's philosophy. / Mestre