Legal consciousness is one of the most important concepts in criminology, which defines individual or public perception of justice, expectations of legal behaviour and demand for sanctions for the deviation from the rules. The theorized criminological perception of legal consciousness, also modern introductions on this field are passed in review in theoretical part of this study. The positive, the subjective and the modern conceptions of legal consciousness are presented.

The focus of this thesis is the normative base of moral liability to defensive harm. Many argue that liability is what makes it morally permissible to seriously injure or kill in self-defense or in the defense of others. Authors such as Jonathan Quong and Jeff McMahan argue that liability not only has important implications for the individual morality of self-defense, but that it plays a major role in the principles of just war conduct. How you determine when someone is liable will have a significant impact on when someone can be harmed. In this paper, I focus on the question of what a person must do to be morally liable to defensive harm. More specifically, I take a close look at Jeff McMahan’s moral responsibility account of liability and argue that it is unsatisfying as an explanation of when and why a person is liable. I then argue that an evidence-based account of liability better captures our moral intuitions surrounding liability. I end by considering an argument put forward by Quong on why we should not support an evidence-based account of liability. / Thesis (Master, Philosophy) -- Queen's University, 2012-09-30 12:44:32.85

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This thesis explores the ethical and legal implications of targeted killing operations employingCombat Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (CUAVs), focusing on the practices of the United Statesand Israel. Grounded in Just War Theory and international law, the research critically examineshow both nations justify these operations under the principles of self-defence and nationalsecurity. Through a comparative analysis of specific case studies, such as the assassinations ofQasem Soleimani and Baha Abu Al Ata, the study highlights the complexities of balancingsecurity imperatives with adherence to international humanitarian and human rights laws. Thefindings reveal significant ethical tensions, particularly concerning the principles ofproportionality, distinction, and the risk of extrajudicial killings. The lack of transparency andaccountability in drone operations further complicates their legitimacy. Additionally, itadvocates for comprehensive policy and legal reforms to enhance oversight and regulation,ensuring compliance with international standards and ethical norms. This research aims tocontribute to the ongoing discourse on modern military practices, urging a more just andaccountable framework for the use of lethal force in contemporary conflicts.

Combatants in war inflict untold devastation. They lay waste the environment, destroy cultural heritage, wound, maim, and kill. Most importantly, they kill. These deeds would be, in any other context, paradigmatically unjust. This thesis asks whether they can be justi-fied. There are two possible approaches: first, deny that killing in war is in fact unjust; sec-ond, argue that the injustice is overridden by weightier moral reasons. In Part I, I reject the view that principles of self-defence can render killing in war just. I argue that the most plausible theories of self-defence are hardest to apply in the cha-otic context of war, while the most practicable theories are least philosophically defensible. Moreover, none of them encompasses the inevitable noncombatant deaths that all wars bring. If killing in war is almost always unjust, perhaps we should advocate pacifism. In Part II, I propose an alternative, arguing that these injustices might be all things con-sidered justified. Combatants have morally important relationships: they have deep personal relationships with friends and family, and comrades-in-arms; if they are citizens of just communities, then that relationship is valuable too. I argue that they have associative duties to protect these relationships against the threat posed by war, and that these duties may override the injustices they must commit to avert that threat. After defending a conception of associative duties, I support this conclusion with the following argument. As well as our general duties not to harm, we have general duties to protect. Our general duties to protect sometimes override our general duties not to harm, in particular, in cases of justified humanitarian intervention. Our associative duties to protect, however, are stronger than our general duties to protect. If our associative duties to protect are stronger than our general duties to protect, and our general duties to protect can override our general duties not to harm, then our associative duties to protect should also be able to override our general duties not to harm.

Thesis (M.A.) - Carleton University, 2005. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 187-204). Also available in electronic format on the Internet.

Any person studying the history of the Cape Colony in the mid- Victorian years must soon grow aware of the contrast between what the imperial authorities said they intended to do and what they actually did. This is particularly obvious in the treatment of the frontier tribes, who lost their lands (and sometimes their lives) in the name of a policy described by one governor as based on 'morality and religion'. But it is also evident in many other spheres of government, and insistently raises the question of that British intentions really were and how far Ministers managed to achieve them. The evidence available is too vast and amorphous for a gene- ral survey to be attempted. In order to investigate the problem it is necessary to limit its scope. The period from 1846 to 1854 has been chosen because it embraced two frontier wars and a series of major administrative changes, involving prolonged consultation between Government House and Downing Street, and raising matters which affected the vital interests of the colonial population itself. It is also ground covered by other historians, but they have frequently differed as to the aims of the imperial government and the colonial reaction to them. One reason for their differences is plain: they have failed to take a comprehensive view of the sub- ject, such as the imperial government itself might have taken. Frontier policy is described as if it bore no relation to constitutional changes in Cape Town; local politics are discussed as if the British connection had little relevance. Britain's treatment of the Afrikaners led one of their leaders to style the nineteenth century a 'Century of Wrong.‘ But those sympa- thetic to the British approach have seen in it an attempt to infuse the spirit of British tolerance and justice into Cane society. They explain its contradictions by depicting an imperial power those 'high natives and worthy ends were frustrated by the inadequate resources which could be spared for the resolution of Cape problems. The material on which this conclusion rests is predominantly that found in official archives in Cape Town and London. A glance at the bibliographies of works by de Kiewiet, Galbraith, Morrell and Macmillan reveals no systematic attempt to study newspapers or other sources to check the accuracy or discover the undertones of official reporting from the Colony. Furthermore, large collections of private correspondence belonging to prominent politicians have recently been made public in Britain. Although often edited of financial or other sensitive items they still raise similar doubts about the comprehend- siveness of Colonial Office despatches. A new assessment of these sources is therefore required. In 1867 Bagehot differentiated between the 'distinguished' and the 'efficient' parts of the British constitution. The former he described as designed to 'excite and preserve the reverence of the population'; the latter as 'those by which it, in fact, works and rules'. This thesis attempts to show that Colonial Office pronouncements on the Cape likewise fall into two categories. Some were intended (again borrowing Bagehot's words) to 'win the loyalty and confidence of mankind'; others to 'employ that homage in the work of governmental. From this it follows that the statements in despatches are not invariably to be trusted, and that some are of greater significance in the interaction of Cape and British politics than others. The private correspondence helps us to differentiate. It also shows the Colonial Office less as a place where policy was made and more as one where decisions taken by Mini- sters were translated into a form understandable to governors and acceptable to the British public. Continued in thesis ...