In recent years, frequent global disasters such as Typhoon Morakot Republic of China 98 years with the 2011 earthquake in northeastern Japan, these disasters have caused the destruction of large-scale and large-scale, often the government or private relief organizations generally can not load capacity , to compensate for inadequate relief efficiency can be deployed quickly, efficiently support the government's disaster relief units and discipline, national army, police, the main consumer unit, and police units to maintain social order based, such as the main use for disaster relief, more not suitable, so the domestic disaster relief units, non-military, none other than the consumer unit, while the main army to fight, and its legitimacy in the context of this study, in the case of national disaster and emergency rescue shows that the military action in emergency relief and response play a very important role. Both discipline and efficiency not only for the organization, and disaster prevention and emergency response is to rescue the most important time, my country is satisfied that the military after the disaster since Typhoon Morakot one of the central task, while the military situation of disaster relief to the value created out of nothing. However, the national security and domestic disaster prevention organizations have not effectively integrated in the mechanism are also required to solve the problem, when disaster strikes, often severely affected by different levels of the efficiency of disaster relief. Therefore, this research study focused on the motive. The collate and analyze the U.S., Japan and the Chinese military system and the prevention of military, fire and victims of views, some suggestions are as follows: First, refer to the Japanese military relief and rescue regulations of the military situation for me complete relief laws; II to this new security and Taipei and Taichung million concentric drill, for example, development of military active duty, reserve and local governments have to develop mutual support of the relief plan with the annual military exercise, the norm of the exercise; Third, investment needs and national defense disaster training, raises the cost effectiveness of investment in national defense and disaster relief of the legitimacy of the military; Fourth, prevention must be added back to the mobilization and training facilities to meet the current social change. Need to continue to promote the future "sense of urgency of national defense establishment," "a complete disaster laws and regulations", "Construction of National Defense of the security system," the consensus. Basis should be established in future, committed to sophisticated, the forward-looking, overall, the reference approach the major advanced countries, to measure state conditions, a set of conditions for me really disaster prevention system in order to achieve "peace maintaining an army less military forces during the war and more "of the goal to meet the future needs of national defense, military disaster relief mission to reach.

Abstract: When former President Calderón declared war on the cartels in 2006, Mexico was plunged into insecurity, and the government has been trying to reassert control of the security situation ever since. While the situation has improved, the fight will not be over until the police are in control of the streets. Historical and structural problems have plagued the police, forcing the military to play a central role in internal security operations. While a number of positive reforms have been implemented in recent years, there is still much work to do. This paper will examine some of these past reforms and their effects. Current tactics as well as potential reforms and strategies for the future will also be discussed, with a focus on the police reassuming the central role in internal security.

Made available in DSpace on 2015-09-25T12:22:47Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 PDF - Aline Chianca Dantas.pdf: 2235681 bytes, checksum: f6908e90cba608d7851dafbc1d10f674 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2014-04-04 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / This paper aims to discuss the impact of the discourse of human security on the performance of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces and, consequently, on Japanese national security. In order to do this, the work is divided into four parts: exposure of the links between Japanese national security and SDF, presentation of the SDF s action, interaction of the SDF with the discourse of human security and the implications of human security discourse on Japanese national security, in terms of expanding the military character. The methodology adopted in this study is guided by a bibliographic research on the featured topics, emphasizing qualitative and quantitative aspects, whereas the theoretical approach is consistent with the time of each survey. The ideas used were the ones of Wendt s (1999), reflecting over the relationship between agent and structure, the constructive thoughts of Onuf (2002) and Zehfuss (2002), demonstrating the relevance of discourse and ultimately realistic assumptions connected with issues of power and interest. So, in the light of the exposed, it is argued that Japan is in a smooth process of militarization and normalization, within what is meant by pacific activism, having as one of its tools for this an instrument of soft power, that is the human security discourse. / Este trabalho objetiva debater o impacto do discurso de segurança humana sobre a atuação das Forças de Autodefesa Japonesas e, consequentemente, sobre a segurança nacional japonesa. Para isso, divide-se o trabalho em quatro partes: exposição dos laços entre a segurança nacional japonesa e as FAD, apresentação da atuação das FAD, interação das FAD com o discurso de segurança humana e as implicações do discurso de segurança humana sobre a segurança nacional japonesa, em termos de ampliação do caráter militar. A metodologia adotada nesse estudo pauta-se em pesquisas bibliográficas sobre os temas destacados, ressaltando-se aspectos qualitativos e quantitativos; já a abordagem teórica coaduna-se com cada momento da pesquisa, sendo utilizadas as ideias de Wendt (1999) da relação entre agente e estrutura, pensamentos construtivistas de Onuf (2002) e Zehfuss (2002), denotando-se a relevância do discurso e, finalmente, premissas realistas conectadas com questões de poder e interesse. Portanto, à luz do exposto, argumenta-se que o Japão encontra-se em processo de militarização e normalização suave, dentro do que se entende por ativismo pacífico, tendo como uma de suas ferramentas para isso um instrumento de soft power, que é o discurso de segurança humana.

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There is little solid research that explores counterinsurgency practices against the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), not only from the standpoint of what is being done, but, rather, what should be done based on past COIN successes. Notable works on counterinsurgency in Colombia include the research of Tom Marks, who focused on operational strategy and tactics; Kevin Self, who professes the importance of controlling territory in defeating the FARC, by addressing the social and institutional ills within Colombia itself; and Dennis Rempe, who notes US involvement in shaping Colombia's COIN strategy. Using a comparative case study model, this thesis provides an analysis of Colombia?s counterinsurgency (COIN) strategies and tactics through the lens of successful and unsuccessful COIN operations in Iraq, Algeria, Malaya, South Vietnam, Thailand, Algeria and El Salvador over the course of the 20th and early 21st centuries. After all, no matter how successful a COIN force is militarily, their accomplishments will ultimately be fruitless if the conditions which fuel insurgency remains present. This paper begins by providing the historical context for the conditions which shaped the Colombian social order, which led to the revolutionary movement. It then follows the growth of the FARC, examining that organization?s strengths and weaknesses. The FARC is contrasted by outlining recent COIN transformation efforts within the Colombian government, to include little acknowledged failures and successes, strengths and weaknesses. An important focus is placed on Colombian President Alvaro Uribe Velez? Democratic Security Policy as the model for Colombia?s current COIN efforts. After next examining various ongoing factors contributing to the Colombian insurgency?to include institutional failures, illicit funding and the problem of paramilitary groups?this thesis examines past COIN efforts by other governments. Finally, after applying lessons learned from thee past COIN efforts?cross-referencing historically successful and unsuccessful tactics with tactics used and not used by Bogota in its fight against the FARC?I provide recommendations to the government of Colombia (GOC) on how to improve its COIN efforts. Although it is important to look at this problem set from an external standpoint, we must still factor in internal factors that have limited Colombia?s ability to emerge victorious, such as allowing porous borders, airspace and coastlines; placing a priority on killing or capturing the enemy and not on engaging the population; and the primacy of military direction of counterinsurgency; disregard of basic human rights; an insufficient judiciary structure; failure to halt financial support mechanisms; and the lack of an outlet for political inclusion . From this vantage point, we will be able to see that these elements?when properly implemented?have proven successful over time and may enhance GOC success and ultimately result in victory over the insurgency that has plagued their country for 40+ years