The Bergman & Beving sphere is a group of Swedish companies that have been successfulduring the last decades as serial acquirers. This study examines how the Bergman & Bevingsphere operates and how management makes capital allocation decisions; this has beenexamined through interviews with key individuals and large owners within these companiesand has by that taken a qualitative approach to the research questions outlined.The business model of the Bergman & Beving sphere revolves around continuously acquiringniched companies, with a long track record of profitable growth and with a culture that alignswith that of their own. What distinguishes them from many serial acquirers is that they do nottry to integrate the acquired company into a bigger one and/or find synergies between them,but instead, they operate with a highly decentralized model where the companies actindependently. The group has for a long time used internal financial metrics, with theirtrademark metric being Profit/Working capital (P/WC), to guide their subsidiaries and aidmanagement in capital allocation decisions.

L’activité de fusions et acquisitions (désormais F&A) a atteint un niveau record en 2017 et s’est élevée à plus de 2 993 milliards d’euros (Thomson Reuters, 2018). Cette dynamique sur le marché des F&A est toutefois dominée par une minorité d’acquéreurs qui entreprennent un très grand nombre de F&A (Kengelbach, Klemmer, Schwetzler et Sperling, 2012). Les importants changements environnementaux tels que la globalisation, l'intégration des économies émergentes et les progrès technologiques ont, en outre, suscité de nouvelles opportunités de croissance pour les firmes et ontfait émerger de véritables « serial acquéreurs » ; ces entreprises qui s’engagent dans des séries ou flux de F&A (Fuller, Netter et Stegemoller, 2002) afin de créer de la valeur et améliorer leur performance économique et financière (Laamanen et Keil, 2008). La mise en œuvre et la réussite de cette stratégie extrêmement complexe et risquée (Boubakri, Chan et Kooli, 2012) s’avèrent toutefois difficiles en pratique (Haleblian, Devers, McNamara, Carpenter et Davison, 2009). Plusieurs études montrent, ainsi, des résultats décevants ou une diminution de la performance des acquéreurs en série au fil de leurs opérations (Billett et Qian, 2008 ; Ismail, 2008 ; Fuller et al., 2002). Ce travail de recherche a dès lors été guidé par l’objectif d’identifier des nouveaux déterminants de la performance en s’intéressant aux fondements stratégiques de ceux-ci, qui permettent de piloter efficacement un programme de F&A, de gérer sa complexité et les risques qui y sont associés, et ainsi favoriser ultimement la performance des firmes.Les résultats de cette recherche ; menée à travers 3 essais ; soulignent l’importance des caractéristiques des programmes de F&A (le rythme, la place et le degré de diversification des F&A) et des motivations sous-jacentes aux opérations de désinvestissement (quand elles sont réalisées dans une optique de gestion de portefeuille dynamique) dans la performance financière des acquéreurs en série. De plus, la performance stratégique en matière de croissance, d’internationalisation et de diversification est permise par des séries de F&A qui s’accompagnent du développement de capacités d’acquisition et de la mise en place de mécanismes d’apprentissage organisationnel tels que la temporisation pour codifier et capitaliser les connaissances acquises, l’ajustement de la vitesse d’intégration à la nature de l’intégration poursuivie et la routinisation des processus d’acquisition par la mise en place d’un système d’information commun à l’ensemble du groupe. Ces acquéreurs en série constitueraient ainsi des acquéreurs « habituels », développant de véritables routines d’acquisition. Ces résultats suggèrent, en outre, qu’au-delà des acquéreurs en série, il existe desacquéreurs habituels en parallèle, véritables « maîtres de portefeuille » (Kengelbach, Keienburg, Schmid, Sievers et Mehring, 2016) qui acquièrent parfois en « grappes » ou qui, simultanément, acquièrent et désinvestissent pour gérer au mieux leur portefeuille d’actifs stratégiques. / Global mergers and acquisitions (M&A) activity has hit a record level in 2017 having reached more than 2,993 billion euros (Thomson Reuters, 2018). This dynamic was, however, due to a minority of acquirers who undertook a substantial number of M&A (Kengelbach, Klemmer, Schwetzler and Sperling, 2012). In addition, important environmental changes such as globalization, emerging economies integration and technological progress have created new opportunities for business growth and led to the emergence of "serial acquirers"; these companies engage in M&A series or M&A flows (Fuller, Netter and Stegemoller, 2002) to create value and improve their economic and financial performance (Laamanen and Keil, 2008). The implementation and success achievement of this extremely complex and risky strategy (Boubakri, Chan and Kooli, 2012) is, however, difficult to apply in practice (Haleblian, Devers, McNamara, Carpenter and Davison, 2009). For instance, numerous studies show disappointing results, e. g. a decrease in the performance of serial acquirers during their M&A operations (Billett and Qian, 2008; Ismail, 2008; Fuller, Netter and Stegemoller, 2002). This research work was aimed to identify new determinants of M&A performance by focusing on their strategic foundations permitting to effectively manage an M&A program, its complexity and associated risks, and, thus, ultimately stimulate the firms’ performance.The results of this research (realized by conducting 3 essays) underline the importance of the M&A programs’ characteristics (rhythm, geography and degree of diversification of M&A transactions) and the motivations underlying the divestment operations (undertaken with a view to the dynamic portfolio management) in the understanding of financial performance of serial acquirers. In addition, the strategic performance of the M&A series (e. g. growth, internationalization and diversification amplitude) is accompanied by the development of acquisition capacities and the implementation of organizational learning mechanisms such as codification of acquired knowledge, speed integration adjustment, etc.). These serial acquirers, thus, become “common” acquirers developing real acquisition routines. The results also suggest that, beyond the serial acquirers, there are common acquirers in parallel, true "portfolio masters" (Kengelbach, Keienburg, Schmid, Sievers and Mehring, 2016) who sometimes acquire in clusters or who, simultaneously, acquire and divest tobest manage their portfolio of strategic assets.

In this study, we try to understand how the strategic rationale and financial reports are created and developed by an acquirer with no previous experience, during acquisitions. We also investigate how the acquisitional capability of an organization is built up and competence established in a company without a dedicated M&A function and internal expertise. To accomplish this, we have conducted a case study, which analyses the processes of two completed acquisitions at an unlisted Swedish company with no previous acquisition experience. The study shows that for smaller, unlisted companies, internal acquisition experience and competence are not crucial to acquisition success. The corporate group in our study compensates for the lack of experience, a dedicated M&A function and internal expertise, by employing external experts. For smaller, owner-led companies, the ability to create rapport – a feeling of mutual understanding and affinity – appears to be more important in the acquisition process than acquisition expertise. You need to have a business mindset – you don't have to be an expert in financial analysis or law – but you must have the ability to surround yourself with the right people, connect with others, create rapport and dare to take risks.