We construct a measure of CEO concern for non-equity stakeholders based on corporate social responsibility (CSR) scores, and we investigate how such incentives affect firm leverage and cash holding. In general, we find that non-equity stakeholder incentives decrease leverage and increase cash holding, after controlling for CEO managerial incentives and other firm characteristics. Our findings suggest that corporate social responsibility benefit non-equity stakeholders, which may come at the expense of shareholders.

Corporate governance and executive remuneration are not new phenomena, but have erupted to the forefront of corporate, academic and public attention as a result of a series of well publicized corporate collapses and scandals over the last decade, which have raised both a curiosity of executive remuneration levels, and an awareness of the potential impact of conflicts of interest between owners and executives in modern corporations. Although literature on corporate governance and executive remuneration in general is plentiful, there is a lack of comment on the relationships between certain specific components of these two broad constructs. These specific components, such as disclosure, executive remuneration and governance needed to be analysed individually before they could be combined into a whole that explains both their interrelationships with each other and the larger corporate governance sub-system, and ultimately in the corporation, as an organisational system. In view of greater globalisation of the world economy, and the market for executive talent, the consequent reforms in the fields of corporate governance and executive remuneration, as well as the changing competitive dynamics of modern corporations, it was necessary to examine whether traditional theory and regulatory frameworks have kept pace with corporate development. A review of both classic and current literature show vastly different approaches to both executive remuneration and corporate governance mechanisms practiced around the world. There is however a noticeable trend towards convergence of these different sub-systems.The most prominent differences in respect of these sub-systems relate to the extent to which disclosures are made. Some of these issues relate to full or limited disclosure, internal or external corporate governance measures to regulate executive remuneration, and differences in respect of a narrow shareholder focus or broad stakeholder focus of different interests in an organisation. / Business Leadership / Ph.D. (Business Leadership)

Submitted by Amelie Pedersen (ameliepedersen22@hotmail.com) on 2016-05-09T20:36:21Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Amelie Pedersen - The Impact of Corruption on the Performance of State-owned Companies - Case of Petrobras Brasil 14-04-2016 VF.pdf: 1430141 bytes, checksum: 82b174df20d7a214894eb1544bfc9f55 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Ana Luiza Holme (ana.holme@fgv.br) on 2016-05-10T12:25:50Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Amelie Pedersen - The Impact of Corruption on the Performance of State-owned Companies - Case of Petrobras Brasil 14-04-2016 VF.pdf: 1430141 bytes, checksum: 82b174df20d7a214894eb1544bfc9f55 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2016-05-10T12:29:19Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Amelie Pedersen - The Impact of Corruption on the Performance of State-owned Companies - Case of Petrobras Brasil 14-04-2016 VF.pdf: 1430141 bytes, checksum: 82b174df20d7a214894eb1544bfc9f55 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2016-04-14 / State-owned companies are often considered as crucial components of a country’s economy. They are responsible for the creation of numerous jobs and are often providing essential services that require heavy capital investment. However, in countries with weak institutions where the accountability of politicians is poor and the management of SOEs’ financial resources undergo little control, officials are often inclined towards corruption. Huge amounts of public funds are easily diverted, and money which should have been invested in capital expenditure, in paying back company debt or in increasing shareholder return, are used to increase private patrimony or illegally fund political parties. Company performance suffers from such divestments as parts of the company’s profits are not reinvested in the company and as managers’ incentives are unaligned with shareholder interests. Petrobras, Latin America’s biggest company in terms of assets and annual revenues, suffered in 2014 and 2015 from an immense corruption scandal the economic impact of which is considerable, as investor confidence in Brazil weakened following the event. The scandal exposed an extensive corruption scheme through which contractors were colluding to increase prices of construction contracts, with the approval of Petrobras’ management who required in return either personal gains or funds for the Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT). The exposure of the scandal in the Brazilian press has had a great impact on Petrobras’ credibility as a firm: the company’s accounts were hiding immense irregularities as it had been paying too much for construction contracts which weren’t priced at market value. Throughout this paper, we will use the example of Petrobras to illustrate how corruption within State-Owned companies undermines company’s performance and how it impacts the company’s various stakeholders. / As empresas estatais são freqüentemente consideradas como componentes cruciais da economia de um país. Eles são responsáveis pela criação de vários postos de trabalho e proveem serviços essenciais que exigem um grande investimento de capital. Porém, em países com instituições fracas, onde a responsabilidade dos políticos é limitada e a gestão dos recursos financeiros das empresas estatais sofre pouco controle, os funcionários são muitas vezes tentados pela corrupção. Enormes quantidades de fundos públicos são facilmente desviados, e dinheiro que deveria ter sido investido nas despesas de capital, no pagamento de dívida da empresa ou no aumento do retorno para os acionistas, é usado para aumentar a riqueza privada de indivíduos ou para financiar ilegalmente partidos políticos. O desempenho da empresa sofre com essas alienações visto que parte dos lucros da empresa não são reinvestidos na empresa e dado que incentivos dos gestores estão desalinhados com os interesses dos acionistas. Petrobras, a maior empresa da América Latina em termos de ativos e receitas anuais, sofreu em 2014 e 2015 um escândalo de corrupção imenso, cujo impacto económico foi considerável, levando ao enfraquecimento da confiança de muitos investidores no Brasil após o evento. O escândalo expôs um extenso esquema de corrupção através do qual os contratantes foram conspirando para aumentar os preços de contratos de construção, com a aprovação da administração da Petrobras que pediu em troca ganhos pessoais ou fundos para o Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT). A exposição do escândalo na imprensa brasileira teve um grande impacto sobre a credibilidade da Petrobras: as contas da empresa estavam escondendo imensas irregularidades dado que a empresa tinha pago demais para os contratos de construção que não foram precificados no valor do mercado. Ao longo deste estudo, usamos o exemplo da Petrobras para ilustrar como a corrupção dentro empresas estatais prejudica o desempenho da empresa e como ela afeta as várias partes interessadas da empresa.

Corporate governance and executive remuneration are not new phenomena, but have erupted to the forefront of corporate, academic and public attention as a result of a series of well publicized corporate collapses and scandals over the last decade, which have raised both a curiosity of executive remuneration levels, and an awareness of the potential impact of conflicts of interest between owners and executives in modern corporations. Although literature on corporate governance and executive remuneration in general is plentiful, there is a lack of comment on the relationships between certain specific components of these two broad constructs. These specific components, such as disclosure, executive remuneration and governance needed to be analysed individually before they could be combined into a whole that explains both their interrelationships with each other and the larger corporate governance sub-system, and ultimately in the corporation, as an organisational system. In view of greater globalisation of the world economy, and the market for executive talent, the consequent reforms in the fields of corporate governance and executive remuneration, as well as the changing competitive dynamics of modern corporations, it was necessary to examine whether traditional theory and regulatory frameworks have kept pace with corporate development. A review of both classic and current literature show vastly different approaches to both executive remuneration and corporate governance mechanisms practiced around the world. There is however a noticeable trend towards convergence of these different sub-systems.The most prominent differences in respect of these sub-systems relate to the extent to which disclosures are made. Some of these issues relate to full or limited disclosure, internal or external corporate governance measures to regulate executive remuneration, and differences in respect of a narrow shareholder focus or broad stakeholder focus of different interests in an organisation. / Business Leadership / Ph.D. (Business Leadership)