Depuis les années 1960, les états européens font face à l’arrivé d’un grand nombre de musulmans dans leurs territoires. l’application de la shari‘a en europe devient, donc, une question centrale.dans les systèmes juridiques européens, le règles islamiques sont appliquées pour des reaisons définies externes et internes. elles coexistent dans les espaces accrédités à la justice alternative connue par l’acronyme adr- alternative dispute resolution.Le recours a la justice privée, au royaume-uni, sous les auspices des normes islamiques, et ses effets en termes géopolitiques, font l’objet de cette recherche.un processus d’institutionalisation des procedures adr conformément aux normes islamiques a lieu au royaume-uni. institutions islamiques adr se présentent, agissent et sont perçues en tant que tribunaux de justice islamique. du coup, dans le débat elles sont appelées sharia courts. en revanche, ce travail de thèse n’utilise pas l’expression pour indiquer l’offre entière de justice islamique au royaume-uni. elle se réfère a des institutions islamiques qui ont des caractéristiques précises.quand ces organismes dépassent les limitis imposées par le droit interne, on assiste à un conflit de juridiction, au sens geopolitique, où l’offre de justice des tribunaux nationaux est représentée en termes antagonistes à celle des sharia courts. depuis 2008, le conflit continue de croître à travers una série de moments significatifs, de plus en plus d’acteurs et de représentations.ce qui ressort de l’analyse menée est une application du droit islamique par les sharia courts qui cause un changement entre les systèmes de valeurs concernées en direction d’un éloignement entre eux-ci. / SINCE THE 1960s, EUROPEAN STATES ARE CONFRONTED WITH THE ARRIVAL OF A GROWING NUMBER OF MUSLIMS. ACCORDINGLY, THE APPLICATION OF SHARI‘A LAW IN EUROPE WAS MEANT TO BE A CENTRAL ISSUE.IN EUROPEAN LEGAL SYSTEMS ISLAMIC RULES APPLY FOR BOTH EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL REASONS. THEY COEXIST ALONGSIDE EACH OTHER AS THE STATE MAKES ROOM FOR THE OPTIONAL CIVIL LAW. THIS IS THE CASE WITH THE ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RELOSUTION, BEST KNOWN BY THE ACRONYM ADR.ADR ENABLES PARTIES TO CHOOSE THE APPLICABLE LAW, PROVIDED THAT THE REQUIREMENTS LAID DOWN IN LAW ARE MET. THE ROLE OF ISLAMIC ADR IN BRITAIN AND ITS GEOPOLITICAL EFFECTS IS THE TOPIC OF THIS RESEARCH.A PROCESS OF INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF ISLAMIC ADR HAS BEEN TAKING PLACE IN BRITAIN SINCE THE 1980s. ISLAMIC ADR INSTITUTIONS ACT AS COURTS OF JUSTICE. FURTHERMORE, THEY ARE PERCEIVED AS SUCH BY BOTH MUSLIM COMMUNITIES AND NON-MUSLIM COMMUNITIES. INDEED, THEY ARE OFTEN REFERRED TO AS SHARIA COURTS. IN CONTRAST, THIS WORK USES THE EXPRESSION ‘SHARIA COURTS’ TO ONLY INDICATE ISLAMIC INSTITUTIONS HAVING SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS. WHEN THESE ADR INSTITUTIONS BREAK THE LIMITS SET BY THE LAW, A CONFLICT OF JURISDICTION OCCURS. IT IS TO BE UNDERSTOOD IN GEOPOLITICAL SENSE, BECAUSE JUSTICE GUARANTEED FROM DOMESTIC COURTS IS DEPICTED AS ANTAGONIST TO THE JUSTICE GIVEN BY SHARIA COURTS.THE CONFLIT STARTED IN 2008 AND HAS CONTINUED TO GROW OVER THE YEARS, BY BRINGING WITH IT THE EMERGENCE OF SEVERAL OPPOSING ACTORS AND REPRESENTATIONS.THE RESEARCH UNDERTAKEN SHOWS THAT THE APPLICATION IF ISLAMIC FAMILY RULES BY SHARIA COURTS CAUSES A CHANGE IN THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE VALUE SYSTEMS AT STAKE, IN THE DIRECTION OF A MUTUAL DEPARTURE.

In un Paese come l’Inghilterra che, a differenza dell’Italia, non conosce, strumenti di gestione del pluralismo religioso come le intese e/o i concordati, l’istituto giuridico prescelto da legislatore per raggiungere questo risultato anche in campo giurisdizionale, è stato l’arbitrato: alle comunità religiose presenti nel Regno Unito, è stato concessa la facoltà di poter istituire propri organi giudiziari in conformità all’Arbitration Act del 1996 le cui decisioni potranno, ad alcune condizion, spiegare efficacia esecutiva nell’ordinamento statale. All’approfondimento dell’originalità di questa scelta è dedicato il presente elaborato che, partendo da un’analisi storica di alcune esperienze passate di gestione del pluralismo religioso (Capitolo I), che dimostrano che il tema non è affatto nuovo, passa a delineare i principi cardine degli arbitrati religiosi legati indissolubilmente al carattere multiculturale della società inglese in quanto finalizzati a garantire il principio di uguaglianza in una società di “diversi” (Capitolo II).Oltre che all’analisi dell’Arbitration Act del 1996, che rappresenta la cornice normativa di riferimento dei faith-based approaches to dispute resolution, il terzo capitolo è dedicato alla descrizione della struttura e del funzionamento dei tribunali religiosi islamici ed ebraici. Nella parte finale della ricerca saranno prese in considerazione le criticità dell’istituto dell’arbitrato religioso e alcune proposte in senso migliorativo. / In a country like England which, unlike Italy, does not know, instruments of management of religious pluralism such as agreements and Concordats, the legal institution chosen by the legislator to achieve this result also in the jurisdictional field, has been arbitration: the religious communities present in the United Kingdom have been granted the right to establish their own judicial bodies in accordance with the Arbitration Act of 1996, whose decisions may, to some conditions, explain their enforceability in state law. To the deepening of the originality of this choice the present paper is dedicated which, starting from a historical analysis of some past experiences of managing religious pluralism (Chapter I), which show that the subject is not new at all, goes on to outline the cardinal principles of religious arbitrations inextricably linked to the multicultural character of English society as they are aimed at guaranteeing the principle of equality in a society of "different" (Chapter II). In addition to the Arbitration Act of 1996, which represents the framework reference legislation of the faith-based approaches to dispute resolution, the third chapter is dedicated to the description of the structure and functioning of Islamic and Jewish religious courts. In the final part of the research the critical aspects of the institution of religious arbitration and some proposals in an improvement sense will be taken into consideration.

Malgré un format institutionnel classique, l’État libanais ne présente pas certaines propriétés par lesquelles la sociologie politique caractérise le pouvoir étatique. Il figure ainsi régulièrement dans la liste des États faibles. Ce travail de recherche remet en question la pertinence de cette qualification en s'inscrivant dans une démarche de sociologie politique du droit et de la justice, appliquée à la justice civile des mineurs ainsi qu’à la justice de la charia. Il documente l’activation à partir de 2002 des juges des enfants sur un terrain libanais où le droit de la famille est pluriel, et où plusieurs droits religieux sont mis en œuvre par plusieurs systèmes juridictionnels religieux, en l’absence d’un droit civil commun. Cette thèse mobilise la notion d’“épreuve d’État” pour étudier un conflit public, de 2007 à 2010, entre ces juges des enfants et les tribunaux sunnites de la charia autour de la protection de l’enfant en danger. Ce conflit, quoique clôturé en 2010 par un recul des ambitions des juges civils, produit des effets au-delà des arènes juridictionnelles, sur des mobilisations de femmes qui tentent avec un certain succès de modifier en leur faveur le droit religieux sunnite de la famille. Ces effets d’État ne passent pas par les éléments traditionnels recherchés par la sociologie de l’État et de l’action publique : des budgets, une bureaucratie, des règles centrales obligatoires. Il s’agit ici de formes originales d’étatisation par concurrence entre tribunaux autour de l’enfant et de la famille libanaise. L’enquête ouvre ainsi la boite noire de l’État réputé faible à travers l’épreuve du conflit interjuridictionnel, pour s’attarder sur les formes et les effets de la présence de l’État là où il est supposé être absent. Au lieu de chercher le changement dans les droits rigides de la famille uniquement à travers une politique publique sécularisante du centre civil, cette démarche permet de suivre et de mieux comprendre les bouleversements à l’intérieur même des normativités religieuses et de leurs droits supposés immobiles. Le rapport entre l’État et la communauté religieuse n’est plus un jeu à somme nulle, les droits religieux de la famille montrent une certaine réactivité face aux mobilisations des droits par le bas, et l’État libanais acquiert une effectivité que ne lui reconnaissent pas les récits récurrents de sa faiblesse. / The Lebanese state is often depicted as failing to possess some of the properties through which political sociology usually defines state power. Therefore, it is often described as a weak state. I question the relevance of this description through a political sociology of law, an approach I apply to civil juvenile courts and to sharia courts. I study the activation in 2002 of juvenile judges in Lebanon, where several religious family laws are implemented by parallel religious courts, in the absence of a common civil law for the family. I use the notion of "State test" to study a public conflict (2007 - 2010) between these juvenile judges and Sunni sharia courts around the protection of endangered children. This conflict produces effects beyond judicial arenas on women mobilizations that are trying, with some success, to change religious Sunni family law. These "state effects" are not channeled through the traditional elements sought by the sociology of the state and policy studies : budgets, bureaucracy or mandatory central rules. These original forms of stateness are the result of a competition between courts for the child and the Lebanese family. Instead of seeking change in rigid family laws only through a secularizing public policy from the civil center, investigating these "state tests" and their effects can allow us to track and better understand the changes within religious groups and their supposedly immobile legal systems. The relationship between the state and the religious groups is no longer a zero-sum game, religious family laws appear more responsive to legal mobilizations from below, and the state acquires an effectiveness that often goes unrecognized by the recurrent narratives of its weakness.