過往清史研究關於清代官制多探討其制度成因、演變，鮮少觸及到俸祿、功名與官制彼此間的關聯性或影響程度，而從勞動經濟學的角度來看，官員的功名、官秩應反應出其人力資本投資與職場經驗的累積程度。有鑑於此，本研究利用清代各期間編纂地方方志中的樣本資料來探討及評估清代臺灣地方官吏人力資本投資、職場經驗及其他特徵變數對於薪資(俸祿)報酬的影響為何。 本論文第一個主題探討人力資本對康熙、雍正、乾隆時期薪俸的影響，實證結果顯示，進行人力資本投資(考取功名)可提升俸祿4.5%；官秩升遷可提升俸祿29.9%。若以職官屬性分類，本研究發現文官在人力資本投資與工作經驗的報酬率均優於武官，我們認為主要原因可能因文、武職官升遷模式有所差異。文官晉陞過程與其工作經驗有關，而武官晉陞過程可能與是否有戰功的關係較高，因此受到人力資本與工作經驗的影響較小。 本研究第二部份以傳統迴歸及Heckman兩階段估計法估計Mincerian所得函數，探討清治時期212年間臺灣鳳山縣職官文職與武職構成與其功名、官秩對工資(俸祿)影響。研究結果顯示：(1)以傳統迴歸分析實證結果估計會存有樣本選擇偏誤的問題；(2)俸祿考慮養廉下官員任期是否秩滿、是否因丁憂退出勞動市場、是否具八旗背景對文官薪資有顯著影響；官秩大小對武官薪俸則有正向影響。(3)俸祿不考慮養廉下，官秩對文、武職官薪俸帶有提升效果。 最後，本文探討養廉銀政策的施行對文職職官薪俸的影響。以DID估計發現：政策的實施使職官薪俸提升了0.5倍至數十倍不等；且職官個人功名與官秩顯著影響可獲取的薪俸額度。 / Previous researches in the history of Qing dynasty mainly study the cause of bureaucracy or the evolution in the bureaucratic system, however, there are fewer studies which explain the relationship of wage, official rank and the fame of scholarly honor. In the side of labor economic, the scholarly honor, official rank reply the accumulation of human capital and the experience in the job market. According it, this dissertation tries to evaluate the return of human capital investment, job experience and other characteristic variables on the wage on samples during the periods of Qing dynasty. The first topic tries to analyze the impacts of human capital on wage during the period Kangxi, Yongzeng and Qianlong era. The empirical results indicate that the human capital investment (scholarly honor) rises 4.5% in the wage rate; the return rate of official rank arise 29.9% wage rate. We also find that the civilian officials have better return rate in both factors than military ones. The main reason may due to the promotion process between civilian and military officials are not the same. The promotion in the civilian official base on the experience, the promotion process in military officials may relate to the performance in the war. Therefore the human capital and experience have smaller influence in the military officials’ wage. Using the traditional regression and Heckman two step methodology, the second part of this study estimates the Mincerian earnings function which try to explain the structure of the civilian officer and military bureaucracy sectors, and the return of official rank, the fame of scholarly honor on wage in Fenshan during the occupation period in Qing era. The empirical results indicate: (1) there has a sample selection bias if we estimate with traditional regression. (2) the term of official finished, in mourning for parent's death or the background in Eight banners system has significant effect when we consider the silver honesty system in wage. (3) official rank increases the wage rate of return in civilian and military official if the component of wage does not consider the silver honesty system. Finally, the dissertation investigates the influence of silver honesty system (SHS) in the wage of civilian officer. The empirical estimation finds that the implantation of policy increases the wage between 0.5 to dozens of times through difference and differences methodology (DID). The estimation also indicates that the FAME and RANK affect the available amount of salaries significantly.