The modern electronic financial market is composed of a large amount of actors. With the surge in algorithmic trading some of these actors collectively behave in increasingly complex ways. Historically, academic research related to financial markets has been focused on areas such as asset pricing, portfolio management and financial econometrics. However, the fragmentation of the financial market has given rise to a different set of problems, namely the order allocation problem, as well as smart order routers as a tool to comply with these. In this thesis we consider price discrepancies between order books, trading the same instruments, as a proxy for order routing opportunities. A survival analysis framework for these price differences is developed. Specifically, we consider the two widely used Kaplan-Meier and Cox Proportional Hazards models, as well as the somewhat less known Random Survival Forest model, in order to investigate whether such a framework is effective for predicting the survival times of price differences. The results show that the survival models outperform random models and fixed routing decisions significantly. Thus suggesting that such models could beneficially be incorporated into existing SOR environments. Furthermore, the implementation of order book parameters as covariates in the CPH and RSF models add additional performance. / Den moderna elektroniska marknaden består av ett stort antal aktörer som, till följd av ökningen av algoritmisk handel, beter sig alltmer komplext. Historiskt sett har akademisk forskning inom finans i huvudsak fokuserat på områden som prissättning av tillgångar, portföljförvaltning och finansiell ekonometri. Fragmentering av finansiella marknader har däremot gett upphov till nya sorters problem, däribland orderplaceringsproblemet. Följdaktligen har smart order routers utvecklats som ett verktyg för att tillmötesgå detta problem. I detta examensarbete studerar vi prisskillnader mellan orderböcker som tillhandhåller handel av samma instrument. Dessa prisskillnader representerar möjligheter för order routing. Vi utvecklar ett ramverk inom överlevnadsanalys för dessa prisskillnader. Specifikt används de välkända Kaplan-Meier- och Cox Proportional Hazards-modellerna samt den något mindre kända Random Survival Forest, för att utvärdera om ett sådant ramverk kan användas för att förutspå prisskillnadernas livstider. Våra resultat visar att dessa modeller överträffar slumpmässiga modeller samt deterministiska routingstrategier med stor marginal och antyder därmed att ett sådant ramverk kan integreras i SOR-system. Resultaten visar dessutom att användning av orderboksparametrar som variabler i CPH- och RSF-modellerna ökar prestandan.

This thesis covers three topics in Market Microstructure. Chapter 1 demonstrates that market access frictions may play a significant role in the competition between trading platforms. Analyzing a recent dataset of the trading activity in French and German stocks, we provide evidence that the incumbent markets dominate because the sole market entrant exposes liquidity providers to an excessive adverse selection risk due to a lack of noise traders. Chapter 2 presents a theoretical model of price formation in a dynamic limit order market with slow human traders and fast algorithmic traders. We show that in most cases, algorithmic trading has a detrimental effect on human traders’ welfare. Finally, Chapter 3 empirically analyzes the role of pre-trade transparency in call auctions. Comparing the trading mechanisms in place on the French and German stock exchanges, we find that transparency is associated with higher trading volume, greater liquidity, and better price discovery. / Esta tesis estudia tres temas diferentes de la microestructura de los mercados financieros. El capítulo 1 demuestra que fricciones en el acceso al mercado pueden desempeñar un papel significativo en la competencia entre plataformas de negociación de activos. El análisis de un conjunto de datos recientes de la actividad en acciones francesas y alemanas demuestra que los mercados primarios dominan debido a que el único mercado satélite expone los proveedores de liquidez a un riesgo excesivo de selección adversa, causado por una falta de noise traders. El capítulo 2 presenta un modelo teórico de formación de precios en un mercado dinámico con limit order book poblado por agentes humanos lentos y agentes algorítmicos rápidos. Se demuestra que, en la mayoría de los casos, la negociación algorítmica tiene un efecto negativo sobre el bienestar de agentes humanos. Por último, el capítulo 3 analiza empíricamente el papel de la transparencia pre-negociación en las subastas de apertura y de cierre. Comparando los mecanismos en las bolsas francesas y alemanas, encontramos que la transparencia está asociada con un volumen mayor, una liquidez mayor y un mejor price discovery.