The debate between scientific realism and constructive empiricism is often cast in terms of a debate over what it is "rational" to accept about successful scientific theories. I cast this debate differently: I place these conflicting philosophies of science within our current political context, asking the question "which of these philosophies gives us the conceptual tools we need to allow science to adequately inform our public policy decisions?" I argue that most cases of long-term planning based on current science. such as curbing carbon emissions based on global warming theory. are decisions that can only be made if we approach scientific theories realistically. This vindicates the project of developing a realist epistemology, for only by inquiring into the truth with respect to unobservables can we make adequately informed public policy decisions.

In the Blue Book, Wittgenstein explicitly opposes his own method of philosophical investigation to that of Socrates, who will not accept a list of examples even as a preliminary answer to his 'what-is-x' question. Relying on Meno and the Seventh Letter however, I will provide an interpretation of Plato's epistemic priority principle that does away with the assumption that what Socrates seeks is the uniquely correct definition of x. Following the work of Fransisco J. Gonzalez, I will argue that the philosopher seeks knowledge of x itself and that this knowledge is non-propositional. An interesting result is that Plato and Wittgenstein turn out to have extremely similar conceptions of philosophy. In particular, I argue that the distinction between doxa and episteme in Plato should be understood along the lines of Wittgenstein's distinction between saying and showing.

Ectogenesis has been billed a revolutionary new advancement in technology that could have a profound impact in the area of human reproduction. My aim is to investigate the supposed benefits and objections to the development of human ectogenesis with a particular focus on potential consequences on the abortion debate and reproductive equality between men and women. I will conclude that arguments for human ectogenesis are not well supported and there fails to be a strong motivation to develop it further, other than as advancement to the area of providing better neonatal care for premature babies.

Weber's contribution to the study of social action has been a major influence upon the development of modern sociology but aspects of his approach have been obscured by the process of translation, commentary and evaluation - and in this respect the work of Parsons and to a lesser extent Schutz has been significant. Hence this study aims (a) to clarify the nature of Webens Theory of Action and (b) to determine its contemporary value in comparison with the extension of his ideas by Parsons and Schutz. We examine the interpretation, advanced particularly by Parsons, that Weber's approach to the study of action changed as he became increasingly concerned with the nature of sociological inquiry, and, thereby, moved beyond the problems of historical method. On the basis of a detailed examination of Weber's theoretical and methodological arguments we reject the idea of a break in his thinking about historical and sociological research and this has important implications for some accepted views-on Weber's conception of objectivity, ideal type concepts and understanding. Parsons set out to extend Weber from the perspective of a natural science of society, but his claim to identify a convergence between Durkheim, Pareto and Weber into the Voluntaristic Theory of Action is rejected and the criticisms, which his development of some aspects of Weberts approach have experienced, are sufficient to cast doubts upon the-validity of his General Theory. Schutz formulated a phenomenological critique of Weber's categories of interpretive sociology and sought to establish a philosophically more secure basis for the study of action but, we suggest, his assumptions about the everyday world, allied to his evaluation of Weber's approach, led him to propose an impracticable methodology. Finally, we argue that the contemporary relevance of Weber's Theory of Action can be seen from the way many of the problems involved in the study of action, some of which were identified by the development of the phenomenological perspective, can be solved by recourse to his approach.

Thesis (Ph.D.) - Carleton University, 2003. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 534-560). Also available in electronic format on the Internet.

No description available.

En psychologie cognitive, les concepts sont les ensembles de connaissances qui sont stockés en mémoire à long terme et qui sont utilisés par défaut dans nos processus cognitifs supérieurs (catégorisation, raisonnement inductif et déductif...). La plupart des chercheurs en sciences cognitives supposent qu'ils ont en commun de nombreuses propriétés. La psychologie des concepts est supposée décrire ces propriétés. Les psychologues admettent ainsi que les concepts forment une espèce naturelle. En examinant un grand nombre de données expérimentales, ce travail de thèse montre que cette hypothèse est erronée. Au contraire, les concepts se divisent en types qui ont peu en commun. En conséquence, la notion de concept est une manière inadéquate de classifier les représentations mentales humaines, si l'on cherche à formuler des généralisations empiriques à propos de l'esprit humain.

Thesis (MA (Political Science))--Stellenbosch University, 2008. / Nationalism is quite easy to understand, but somewhat difficult to explain. In terms of understanding nationalism, we do not need to know anything more about society and sentiment than what is taken for granted in everyday life. An individual who ‘drops’ into a foreign culture may know absolutely nothing about its people’s songs, rituals, amusements and traditions: why some customs evoke tears, and others, bravado. This person would feel no sense of collective awe or inspiration when touring historic battlefields and monuments of an unfamiliar country. Nevertheless, he or she would likely understand and appreciate that all of these things are steeped in meaning and identity. These instances of meaning and identity may not be felt, shared or even fully known, but their role as expressions of nationalism can be readily appreciated. The global spread of nations entails an array of mutually unfamiliar national identities, but the actual phenomenon nationalism is rarely foreign to anyone. From an outsider’s perspective we do not know how certain expressions are significant to a particular group, but we do understand that they are expressions of national belonging. Explaining nationalism is more difficult for the simple reason that experiencing and recognizing a phenomenon is not sufficient to account for its existence. Customs and rituals are two suggested properties of nationalism, but what is the causal relationship between such properties and the end phenomenon (how does custom actually lead to nationalism, if at all)? The answers to these questions are still a matter of debate. The situation is only made worse by the fact that most theories explaining nationalism seem to rest on a tower of abstractions. For instance, it may seem uncontroversial for some to argue that nationalism is an outgrowth of ethnic identity. However, this just begs the question. What is ethnicity? The potential for regress to abstraction is a major impediment to theory. This thesis will examine the problem of explanation: the reasons why theories of nationalism have struggled with explaining nationalism, and a discussion on how to overcome these difficulties. Specifically, this thesis will show that: 1) The problem of explaining nationalism is due in part to the ‘classical’ problem found in the literature: whether nationalism is an ‘ancient’ social phenomenon, or a ‘modern’ phenomenon which can be dated (roughly) to the late eighteenth century. 2) Debates regarding the classical problem are closely affected by philosophical issues in the social sciences. 3) The incorporation of a consilient methodology (i.e. a research program that unifies theories of social science with theories of natural science) can provide a new strategy for future theories of nationalism and work to solve the classical problem.

La présente étude s'intéresse aux popula-tions installées en Irlande avant l'arrivée du christianisme (aux environs du Ve siècle de notre ère), et plus précisément aux bâtisseurs des tombes à couloirs du Néolithique ainsi qu'aux Celtes. L'omniprésence d'une com-posante féminine symbolique dans les pay-sages pré-chrétiens (qu'ils soient naturels, mégalithiques ou littéraires) est au centre de cette analyse, qui prend en considération le caractère matrifocal des sociétés archaïques et en évalue l'impact sociétal et rituel chez les Celtes. La thèse examine la spécificité de la perception des reliefs et l'expression sym-bolique de la représentation. Cette dernière se traduit chez les populations du Néolithique par une féminisation du paysage au travers des modifications délibérées de lieux naturels ou la création de sites clefs (tels que Brú na Bóinne ou Loughcrew). Nous montrons aussi que cette perception de l'espace comme fé-minin fut relayée chez les Celtes par la créa-tion de mythes mettant en scène des figures féminines divines ou évhémérisées transfonc-tionnelles. Le rapprochement proposé entre les créa-tions de ces deux groupes humains distants de plusieurs millénaires (de - 3500 à 700) vise à montrer qu'il existe dans les deux cas conception similaire de la terre d'Irlande comme féminine. Pour ce faire, la thèse met en relation plusieurs disciplines. La confron-tation des documents archéo-mythologiques révèle une continuité chronologique dans les représentations qui est liée à l'assimilation de l'héritage culturel indigène par les Celtes venus du continent. Nous avançons l'idée que l'osmose entre ces deux cultures a donné naissance à une identité celte insulaire unique, fortement ancrée dans la terre d'Irlande.

Cette recherche se consacre à l'examen de la formation de la notion de foi, formulée comme "possibilité de l'impossible" dans la philosophie de Derrida. Cette notion, décrite sous plusieurs exemples concrets tels que "pardon", "don", "promesse" ou "témoignage" dans sa dernière philosophie, a néanmoins sa source dès le commencement de sa philosophie. La notion de foi n'est pas identifiable à celle de religion - bien qu'elle en soit l'une des sources -, et signifie plutôt un dépassement de la limite du savoir. Afin d'esquisser la formation de ce concept, notre recherche se concentre sur son développement dans la lecture derridienne de Husserl, Heidegger et Levinas. Derrida met en question leurs distinctions philosophiques, à savoir, la distinction husserlienne entre la réalité et l'idéalité, la distinction heideggerienne entre l'étant et l'être et la distinction lévinassienne entre l'être et l'au-delà de l'être. Au moment même où il tente de suivre ces distinctions d'une manière stricte, Derrida découvre des points dans lesquels il devient impossible d'accomplir ces distinctions. Dans cette impossibilité, les trois auteurs prennent, selon Derrida, leurs décisions au sein de l'indécidabilité. La foi en question n'est rien d'autre que cette croyance en les distinctions. En observant ainsi rétrospectivement cette problématique, notre recherche tente de montrer que la notion de foi est une conséquence inhérente de la déconstruction, pratiquée comme l'expérience de l'impossible.