A partir do referencial paradigmático e exemplar da figura e disciplina (eu zen) de Sócrates na obra de Xenofonte, desenvolvem-se a análise, a reflexão sobre o princípio reintegrador perante a inexorabilidade, o desconhecimento e a incerteza do real, com vistas à reconciliação proporcional, ao desenvolvimento satisfatório da integridade razoável, para que o homem possa adquirir não somente a compreensão filosófica, mas também condições de resistência, de flexibilidade estratégica - enfim, a capacidade suficiente de transformação e relacionamento com os problemas fundamentais da existência. / From the paradigmatic reference and example of socratic discipline (eu zen) in the Xenophons works, the reflections about the re-integrating principle facing the inexhaustible, uncertain and unknown reality can be developed, searching the proportional reconciliation, the satisfactory and reasonable integrity for the human being to acquire not only the philosophical understanding, but also the conditions of resistence, of strategic flexibility the sufficient capacity to deal with and transform the fundamental problems of existence.

Οι Επτά επί Θήβας του Αισχύλου, σύμφωνα με όσα γνωρίζουμε, παρουσιάστηκαν για πρώτη φορά στην αρχαία Αθήνα το 467 π.Χ. και βραβεύτηκαν ως μέρος της τετραλογίας Λάϊος, Οιδίπους, Επτά επί Θήβας και του σατυρικού δράματος Σφιγξ, σε μια εποχή όπου η δημοκρατία έχει εγκαθιδρυθεί στην Αθήνα, αλλά έχουν αφήσει έντονα ίχνη σε αυτήν και την πολιτική της οι Περσικοί πόλεμοι. Στην εργασία αυτή θα επιχειρήσουμε να διερευνήσουμε και να αναδείξουμε τις σχέσεις της τραγωδίας των Επτά επί Θήβας με αποσπάσματα της προσωκρατικής σκέψης, ξεκινώντας από τα έπη του Ησιόδου, που οι μελετητές θεωρούν σημαντικά ως υπόστρωμα αυτού του έργου, και φτάνοντας μέχρι τον Πρωταγόρα, που η δράση του αρχίζει την εποχή που πρωτοπαρουσιάστηκε το έργο. Παρόλο που οι μελετητές δεν έχουν ασχοληθεί συχνά με αυτό το ζήτημα, φαίνεται να έχει ιδιαίτερη σημασία για την ερμηνεία αυτής της τραγωδίας, γι’ αυτό το λόγο θα επιμείνουμε σε αυτήν την έρευνα και θα προσπαθήσουμε να δείξουμε πώς ο Αισχύλος χρησιμοποιεί όχι μόνο τους διάφορους μύθους αλλά και φιλοσοφικούς στοχασμούς της εποχής του, για να τους μετουσιώσει σε θέατρο. / --

This Thesis consists of two parts theoretical and practical. The theoretical part forms an integrated theoretical conception that seeks inspiration from Greek myths and offers creative starting points for the practical part which is the creative project of realization of an artist book. There are also described the origins and development of the mythical tradition in Greece. The main source of inspiration is found in the myths of origin by the epic poet Hésiodos. The mythical perspective on the origin in chaos is enhanced by the views of Pre-Socratic philosophers who influenced by the mythical tradition sought the rational origin, the primaeval existence. The artist book inspired by the myth of origin is produced in a shape of a folder of ten sheets in A2 format.

A partir do referencial paradigmático e exemplar da figura e disciplina (eu zen) de Sócrates na obra de Xenofonte, desenvolvem-se a análise, a reflexão sobre o princípio reintegrador perante a inexorabilidade, o desconhecimento e a incerteza do real, com vistas à reconciliação proporcional, ao desenvolvimento satisfatório da integridade razoável, para que o homem possa adquirir não somente a compreensão filosófica, mas também condições de resistência, de flexibilidade estratégica - enfim, a capacidade suficiente de transformação e relacionamento com os problemas fundamentais da existência. / From the paradigmatic reference and example of socratic discipline (eu zen) in the Xenophons works, the reflections about the re-integrating principle facing the inexhaustible, uncertain and unknown reality can be developed, searching the proportional reconciliation, the satisfactory and reasonable integrity for the human being to acquire not only the philosophical understanding, but also the conditions of resistence, of strategic flexibility the sufficient capacity to deal with and transform the fundamental problems of existence.

Cette étude propose un commentaire thématique des Mémorables de Xénophon prenant comme fil conducteur la conciliation ergon-logos. En relevant les manifestations nombreuses et variées de ce thème, en les regroupant thématiquement et en les analysant, on peut apprécier dans quelle mesure la conciliation ergon-logos est centrale dans la philosophie socratique de Xénophon. Le premier chapitre considère la place de la conciliation ergon-logos dans l’intention globale des Mémorables – qui est fixée sur le motif apologétique de l’utilité de Socrate –, tout en soulevant un enjeu philosophique de taille concernant les limites du logos, enjeu qui permet de renforcer d’autant plus l’intérêt et l’importance philosophique de la conciliation ergon-logos. Le second chapitre examine à quel point la conciliation ergon-logos est impliquée dans la morale socratique de Xénophon, non seulement parce que Socrate lui-même incarne de façon exemplaire les principales vertus en acte et en parole, mais aussi parce que la conception morale de Xénophon est à la fois intellectualiste et ascétique, impliquant, d’un côté, l’apprentissage et la connaissance, et de l’autre, la maîtrise de soi, l’exercice, la fréquentation d’un maître et la vertu de l’exemple. Le troisième chapitre explore le rôle de la conciliation ergon-logos à titre de condition de l’amitié, d’une part en tant qu’exigence éthique, d’autre part en tant que moyen pour se faire des amis. Enfin, le dernier chapitre montre au moyen de la notion d’imposture que les principes de la morale socratique de Xénophon s’étendent aussi au domaine technique. / This thesis offers a thematic commentary of Xenophon’s Memorabilia following the ergon-logos conciliation. Surveying, regrouping and analyzing the many and varied occurrences of this theme reveals the extent to which it is deeply rooted in Xenophon’s Socratic philosophy. The first chapter considers the role Xenophon ascribes to this theme in the general intention that governs the Memorabilia – which focuses on Socrates’ usefulness as an apologetic device –, and reveals a greater philosophical question about the limits of logos, which in reality reinforces the philosophical interest and importance of the ergon-logos conciliation. The second chapter examines just how significant the ergon-logos conciliation is in Xenophon’s Socratic morality, not only because Socrates himself is, in word and deed, the ideal incarnation of virtue, but also because Xenophon’s moral conception is both intellectualistic and ascetic, which advocates learning and knowledge, as well as self-control, exercise, mentorship, and the virtue of example. The third chapter investigates the role the ergon-logos conciliation plays as a condition to friendship, in turn as its ethical foundation and as a means to acquire friends. Finally, the fourth and last chapter uses the notion of imposture to illustrate that Xenophon’s Socratic morality also stretches to the technical field.

O que é e como é a σωφροσύνη (ό τι ἐστι καὶ ὁποȋόν τι ἡ σωφροσύνη)? Esta é a questão que Sócrates propõe a seus interlocutores, Carmides e Critias, examinarem juntos no diálogo de juventude de Platão, o Carmides, diálogo tentativo ou de exame (πϵιραστικός). Σωφροσύνη é fazer todas as coisas ordenada e calmamente (τò κοσμίως πάυτα πράττϵιν καὶ ἡσυxῇ)? É um sentimento como pudor ou reserva (άἰδως)? É cuidar de suas próprias coisas (τὸ τὰ αὑτοῡ πράττϵιν)? Σωφροσύνη seria fazer coisas boas (τῶν ἀγαθῶν πρᾱξιν)? Ou, ainda, conhecer-se a si mesmo (τὸ γιγνώσκϵιν ἑαυτόν)? Seria ciência das outras ciências e ciência de si mesma (ἐπιστημῶυ ἐπιστήμη ἐστὶ καὶ αὐτὴ ἑαυτῆς)? Ou seria, finalmente, o conhecimento do bem e do mal (τὸ ἀγαθόν καὶ τὸ κακόν)? Como em outros propriamente chamados diálogos socráticos de Platão (no Laques é a coragem, no Eutífron é a piedade) nos quais se examina se uma virtude particular é conhecimento, no Carmides trata-se de examinar se a σωφροσύνη é conhecimento. Se é, é conhecimento de quê? E qual é, para nós, o benefício desta virtude, concebida como conhecimento? Estas são algumas das questões examinadas por Sócrates neste diálogo. Este trabalho pretende acompanhar passo a passo esta que é a primeira investigação (ἐξέτασις) socrática acerca da σωφροσύνη nos diálogos de Platão. Ou, dito de outro modo, este trabalho pretende acompanhar o passo a passo do filosofar socrático no diálogo Carmides. / What is it and how is σωφροσύνη (ό τι ἐστι καὶ ὁποȋόν τι ἡ σωφροσύνη)? This is the question that Socrates proposes to his interlocutors, Critias and Charmides, examine together in the dialogue of youth of Plato, the Charmides, tentative dialogue or examination (πϵιραστικός). Σωφροσύνη is make all things orderly and quietly (τò κοσμίως πάυτα πράττϵιν καὶ ἡσυxῇ)? Its a feeling like modesty or reserve (άἰδως)? You take care of your own things (τὸ τὰ αὑτοῡ πράττϵιν)? Σωφροσύνη would do good things (τῶν ἀγαθῶν πρᾱξιν)? Or even know himself (τὸ γιγνώσκϵιν ἑαυτόν)? Would be science of other sciences and science of herself (ἐπιστημῶυ ἐπιστήμη ἐστὶ καὶ αὐτὴ ἑαυτῆς)? Or would it be finally the knowledge of good and evil (τὸ ἀγαθόν καὶ τὸ κακόν)? Like in others properly called Socratic dialogues of Plato (in the Laches is the courage, in the Euthyphro is the piety) in which examines whether a particular virtue is knowledge, in the Charmides it is examining whether σωφροσύνη is knowledge. If it is, is knowledge of what? And what is, for us, the benefit of this virtue, conceived as knowledge? These are some of the issues examined by Socrates in this dialogue. This work intends to follow step by step this is that the first Socratic investigation (ἐξέτασις) about σωφροσύνη in the dialogues of Plato. Or, put another way, this work intends to follow step by step the Socratic philosophy in dialogue Charmides.

O que é e como é a σωφροσύνη (ό τι ἐστι καὶ ὁποȋόν τι ἡ σωφροσύνη)? Esta é a questão que Sócrates propõe a seus interlocutores, Carmides e Critias, examinarem juntos no diálogo de juventude de Platão, o Carmides, diálogo tentativo ou de exame (πϵιραστικός). Σωφροσύνη é fazer todas as coisas ordenada e calmamente (τò κοσμίως πάυτα πράττϵιν καὶ ἡσυxῇ)? É um sentimento como pudor ou reserva (άἰδως)? É cuidar de suas próprias coisas (τὸ τὰ αὑτοῡ πράττϵιν)? Σωφροσύνη seria fazer coisas boas (τῶν ἀγαθῶν πρᾱξιν)? Ou, ainda, conhecer-se a si mesmo (τὸ γιγνώσκϵιν ἑαυτόν)? Seria ciência das outras ciências e ciência de si mesma (ἐπιστημῶυ ἐπιστήμη ἐστὶ καὶ αὐτὴ ἑαυτῆς)? Ou seria, finalmente, o conhecimento do bem e do mal (τὸ ἀγαθόν καὶ τὸ κακόν)? Como em outros propriamente chamados diálogos socráticos de Platão (no Laques é a coragem, no Eutífron é a piedade) nos quais se examina se uma virtude particular é conhecimento, no Carmides trata-se de examinar se a σωφροσύνη é conhecimento. Se é, é conhecimento de quê? E qual é, para nós, o benefício desta virtude, concebida como conhecimento? Estas são algumas das questões examinadas por Sócrates neste diálogo. Este trabalho pretende acompanhar passo a passo esta que é a primeira investigação (ἐξέτασις) socrática acerca da σωφροσύνη nos diálogos de Platão. Ou, dito de outro modo, este trabalho pretende acompanhar o passo a passo do filosofar socrático no diálogo Carmides. / What is it and how is σωφροσύνη (ό τι ἐστι καὶ ὁποȋόν τι ἡ σωφροσύνη)? This is the question that Socrates proposes to his interlocutors, Critias and Charmides, examine together in the dialogue of youth of Plato, the Charmides, tentative dialogue or examination (πϵιραστικός). Σωφροσύνη is make all things orderly and quietly (τò κοσμίως πάυτα πράττϵιν καὶ ἡσυxῇ)? Its a feeling like modesty or reserve (άἰδως)? You take care of your own things (τὸ τὰ αὑτοῡ πράττϵιν)? Σωφροσύνη would do good things (τῶν ἀγαθῶν πρᾱξιν)? Or even know himself (τὸ γιγνώσκϵιν ἑαυτόν)? Would be science of other sciences and science of herself (ἐπιστημῶυ ἐπιστήμη ἐστὶ καὶ αὐτὴ ἑαυτῆς)? Or would it be finally the knowledge of good and evil (τὸ ἀγαθόν καὶ τὸ κακόν)? Like in others properly called Socratic dialogues of Plato (in the Laches is the courage, in the Euthyphro is the piety) in which examines whether a particular virtue is knowledge, in the Charmides it is examining whether σωφροσύνη is knowledge. If it is, is knowledge of what? And what is, for us, the benefit of this virtue, conceived as knowledge? These are some of the issues examined by Socrates in this dialogue. This work intends to follow step by step this is that the first Socratic investigation (ἐξέτασις) about σωφροσύνη in the dialogues of Plato. Or, put another way, this work intends to follow step by step the Socratic philosophy in dialogue Charmides.